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A B S T R A C T 
The survey of trade union leadership attitudes reported in this 
study marks an attempt to empirically investigate two central 
theoretical propositions about unions and union leaders. The 
first of these concerns the question of whether manual and non-
manual unionism are associated with different forms of conscious-
ness. The second objective involves an empirical test of the 
claim that the influence of the 'dominant ideas' penetrates trade 
union leadership thinking and that this basically accounts for their 
economistic and reformist industrial strategies. The study out-
lines the many sources of variation in trade union leadership 
attitudes and highlights their ambiguities and contradictions in 
trade union leadership consciousness. A particular theoretical 
concern of the study is the attempt to identify the 
structural possibilities for class consciousness and class action 
on the part of organised labour. To this end, the objective 
conditions for class consciousness and its institutional 
expressions in the form of trade unions and industrial relations 
are highlighted by means of analysis of fundamental changes with-
in the labour process of the prevailing mode of production. This 
conceptual approach contributes greatly to sociological under-
standing of the subjective implications of the economic recession 
for the consciousness of the leadership of organised labour. 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
Australia began the 1970's with an economy over which the first 
shadows of the international recession were already looming. By 
the mid-seventies, ominous signs of economic turbulence appeared 
in the form of rising levels of inflation and unemployment and 
in a growing incidence of poverty and homelessness. The present 
crisis within the Australian and the world capitalist economies, 
climaxing more than a generation of unprecedented economic growth, 
has restored the question of radical social upheaval to the agenda 
of sociological debate. 
For decades now, it has been a conventional wisdom that funda-
mental social transformation as envisaged by revolutionary 
Marxism, has long ceased to be a serious possibility in advanced 
capitalist societies like Australia. Characteristically, the 
failure of class conflict in these societies to assume 
revolutionary forms has focused theoretical concern in some 
quarters on the ideological mechanisms underlying the incorporation 
of the 'historic' agents of revolution, the working class, into the 
prevailing institutional order. 
Basically, the problem that such approaches set out to address is 
how does the working class and, especially, organisational 
expressions of it like the trade unions, come to systematically 
define their interests largely in material terms and to perceive 
such interests as being attainable within the present social 
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system? In other words, why do subordinate groups tacitly 
acquiesce in their own subordination? The answer suggested by 
formulations such as Gramsci's concept of 'hegemony' is that 
working class attitudes and behaviour reflect to a considerable 
degree the pervasive influence of 'ruling class' definitions of 
reality. 
In essence, what the notion of 'hegemony' suggests, is that 
those who control the dominant institutions of society are able 
to secure their power (to a significant extent) by virtue of 
their ability to impress their definitions of the situation upon 
those subject to their rule. Effectively, therefore, what keeps 
the system from falling apart is not the brute physical repression 
of oppositional tendencies; force, in fact, is mainly an instrument 
of last resort, to be deployed only when the consensus-generating 
mechanisms fail. Rather, the perpetuation of the system rests 
primarily on the moulding of mass consent to the established 
order. 
Accordingly, 'hegemony' is a ruling class's (or coalition of 
ruling 'fractions') control of subordinate classes and social 
strata through the formulation and insinuation of its 'ideology' 
viz. its assumptions and ideas, into the very minds of the latter, 
where it serves to underpin and inform their everyday behaviour. 
Hegemony thus constitutes a particular 'slant' or way of per-
ceiving social reality which is disseminated throughout society 
by the organs of ideological control, most notably, the mass 
media, so that it eventually comes to be sedimented into the bed-
rock of 'commonsense' itself. 
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By pervading virtually every aspect of social life, hegemony 
functions to safeguard the dominant institutions of society from 
the radical consequences of its deep and abiding tensions. 
This is epitomised by the 'institutionalisation of class conflict' 
whereby the class struggle comes to be deflected mainly into 
compromise economic bargaining. 
Fundamental to the 'institutionalisation' of conflict is the 
structural separation of the 'industrial' and 'political' spheres 
of action. This separation serves to ensure that basically 
political concerns like the power to control production and 
appropriation which underpins the whole workplace struggle over 
domination and subordination, are channelled into largely 
'industrial' forms of bargaining which do not call into question 
prevailing property rights. 
Significantly, the economistic behaviour of trade unions acts to 
endorse and reinforce the formal distinction between 'industrial' 
and 'political' action contributing in the process to the stability 
and perpetuation of the system. Since the presumption that social 
order arises out of shared normative understandings is central to 
the idea of hegemony, the relative absence of radical worker and 
trade union protest might suggest that the prevailing system is 
accepted as natural, right and proper by the Australian labour 
movement. 
Yet, it is also clear that while ruling class hegemony extensively 
permeates the thinking of subordinate groups, it does not complete-
ly determine such thinking. For, characteristically, the 
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structural locations, concrete experiences and social networks of 
workers serve to provide the underlying 'meaning systems' through 
which 'ruling class' definitions of social reality are perceived 
and assessed. 
Ultimately, therefore, it would appear that whether the 'ruling 
ideas' are accepted or not by the working class crucially depends 
on the extent to which they correspond with important aspects of 
working class life and/or aspirations. On this basis, the onset 
of a period of profound economic decline after many years of 
growth and prosperity can reasonably be expected to carry profound 
repercussions for working class consciousness. 
THE STUDY 
The study sets out to investigate the class consciousness of the 
leadership of organised labour in Australia. Unlike conventional 
'industrial relations' approaches, this study does not attempt to 
provide a mass of empirical detail on the internal activities of 
unions. Rather, what it principally endeavours to do is to relate 
the theoretical analysis of trade unionism to broader sociological 
guestions of class formation and class alliance. 
The study consists of two parts. The more substantial part, 
comprising the first four chapters, consists of a sustained, 
theoretical analysis of the implications of the economic recession 
and, above all, the changes within the labour process for the long-
term size and strength of the trade union movement. 
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Needless to say, the pivotal importance of the union leadership in 
the continuing crisis of Australian capitalism made it clearly 
desirable to establish how this leadership perceived the changed 
material and ideological context in which it functioned. Thus, 
the remainder of the study consists of a survey of trade union 
leaders which was designed to cast some light on this problem. 
Chapter 1 examines the mounting wave of hostility to the trade 
unions evidenced in the mass media during the seventies. Possibly 
the most unremittingly virulent articulation of anti-union 
rhetoric in the mass media during this period came from political 
journalists like Paul Johnson. Characteristically, sociological 
discussion has generally tended to be dismissive of views like 
Johnson's, believing them to be not worthy of serious intellectual 
consideration. 
Yet, what is often overlooked, is that it is precisely this tendency 
for anti-union ideologies to be elaborated from 'commonsense' 
assumptions which are already 'taken-for-granted' that accounts 
for their popular appeal - as shown, most notably, by the wide-
spread public acceptance and support of formulations about 
'excessive union power' whereby union 'militants' and 'agitators' 
conspire to 'hold the country to ransom'. 
Chapter 2 deals with the economic crisis and the collapse of both 
Keynesian and neo-Marxist presumptions that advanced capitalism 
could almost indefinitely postpone serious economic dislocation. 
Coming after a prolonged period of economic prosperity, the crisis 
raised the possibility of intensified class struggle as Australian 
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trade unions were propelled into more militant confrontations with 
employers and the State. 
Yet, if the 'post-industrial society' theorists of the sixties 
were to be believed, the structural transformation of the labour 
force - exemplified by the growing shift from manual to non-manual 
work, made rising unemployment a less politically-explosive 
phenomenon in the 1970's than in the 1930's! Clearly, however, 
the implication that white-collar employment spells the rejection 
of the collectivist organisational patterns of manual labour has 
been rendered untenable by the steady expansion and rising 
militancy of white-collar unionism. 
Chapter 3 explores the prospect of trade union militancy assuming 
radical political forms by examining the comprehensive and in-
sightful theoretical contributions provided by classical Marxism 
on the role of trade unions as agencies of struggle. In particular, 
it notes the contrasting positions taken by Marx, Lenin, Luxemburg 
and Trotsky on the one hand, and revolutionary syndicalism on the 
other, over the guestion of the ability of trade unions to 
radically transform capitalist society without the guidance and 
support of a 'vanguard' political party. 
Chapter 4 considers the objective possibilities for alliance between 
manual and non-manual trade unions in response to the wage cuts and 
declining living standards imposed by the economic crisis within 
Australian and world capitalism. 
Significantly, the work of contemporary Marxist writers like 
Braverman, Carchedi and Poulantzas offers a useful means of 
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conceptualising the potential for alliance between manual and non-
manual occupational categories. Briefly, their approaches locate 
occupational categories or parts thereof - not on the timeworn 
and oversimplified Marxian basis of property ownership and non-
ownership, but by identification of their function within the 
production relations of advanced capitalism. The merit of such 
approaches is that they serve to highlight the structural bases 
for alliance between manual workers and segments of the non-manual 
labour force. 
Chapter 5 discusses the survey of union leaders which was based 
on a questionnaire distributed to the 100 largest unions in New 
South Wales. 
Chapters 6-9 report on the main findings of the study. These 
deal with the respondents' attitudes to worker and trade union 
solidarity; their feelings about the Arbitration system and about 
strikes; their perceptions of the role of trade unions and of 
union affiliation with political parties; their views on private 
enterprise, on multinational corporate ownership of Australian 
industry and resources and on the prerogatives of management to 
which such ownership gives rise. The final section of the study 
summarises the conclusions and outlines the implications for the 
future of industrial and political struggle in Australia. 
THE SURVEY OF UNION LEADERS 
In the continuing debates over the changing composition of the 
labour force and trade union movement, an important point of dispute 
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has been whether or not non-manual trade unions are very different 
in character from their manual counterparts. Certain writers, of 
course, have claimed that variations in the character of non-manual 
employment are associated with very different forms of union 
character (c.f. Blackburn, 1967; Prandy, 1966; Prandy, Stew-
art ad Blackburn, 1974). Notably, what these writers suggest, is 
that the degree of 'unionateness' (their term) of a non-manual 
labour organisation, is to be judged in terms of the extent to 
which it satisfies the following seven criteria: 
i) recognition of collective bargaining and protection 
of its members' interests as its prime responsibility; 
ii) independence of employers; 
iii) militancy; 
iv) declaration of itself as a trade union; 
v) registration as a trade union; 
vi) affiliation to the T.U.C.; 
vii) affiliation to the Labour Party. 
Undeniably, the concept of unionateness provides a handy tool for 
assessing how closely various worker associations approach being 
full-blooded trade unions. However, while it usefully distin-
guishes different levels of trade union consciousness, it remains 
highly-inadequate as an indicator of more intrinsically-radical 
expressions of working class consciousness. In this context, the 
work of t'lichael Mann (1973) goes some way to remedying such 
limitations. 
Briefly, Mann envisages working class consciousness as involving 
four essential components. They are: 
i) 'class identity', i.e. an awareness by workers 
of themselves as working class; 
ii) 'class opposition', viz. a recognition by them of 
the fundamental opposition of interests which exists 
between workers and employers; 
iii) 'class totality', i.e. an awareness on their part 
that their grievances and deprivations form a 
totality in the sense that these are anchored in 
the basic structure of society; 
iv) 'class alternative', viz. a belief in the possi-
bility of an alternative social order. 
A broadly-similar view of class consciousness is presented by 
Wild in his book Social Stratification in Australia (1978). 
Basically, he identifies three dimensions of class consciousness 
which he labels respectively: 
i) 'Limited awareness' - indicating simply a recognition 
of the existence of class and class differences in society; 
ii) 'Systematic awareness' - suggesting the perception of 
antagonistic interests and the idea of class conflict; 
iii) 'Revolutionary awareness' - embodying the possibility of 
radically restructuring society through collective action 
on the part of the working class. 
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According to the prevailing consensus, the trade union movements 
in Western industrial countries exhibit little sign of revolution-
ary class consciousness - at least in the sense suggested by the 
formulations of Mann and Wild. Even so, the situation may be 
further compounded by differences between manual and non-manual 
trade unionists in their levels of class consciousness. For 
example, logic suggests that the traditional manual working class 
should have a more strongly developed sense of class identity and 
class opposition than their non-manual counterparts. Indeed, 
such beliefs clearly underlie some of the 'new working class' 
speculations. 
Basically, the argument is that the historic market, work and 
status advantages enjoyed by non-manual workers have contrived to 
hinder a consciousness of class identity and class opposition 
among these privileged strata. Admittedly, 'new working class' 
analyses do concede that many of the advantages of non-manual employ-
ment have become largely illusory in the case of contemporary routine 
white-collar workers. For, not only has such employment ceased to 
confer higher earnings relative to manual occupations but many white-
collar 'fringe benefits' e.g. sick leave, long service leave, super-
annuation etc., are now enjoyed by many manual workers. At the 
same time, the nature of much white-collar work has changed 
dramatically as increasing numbers of office workers find their 
jobs subjected to processes of mechanisation, work measurement and 
tight supervisory control more reminiscent of manual employment. 
Accordingly, if some of the 'new working class' theorists are to be 
believed, while non-manual employees may be impelled to form trade 
11. 
unions and to act in industrially-militant ways, such behaviour is 
not necessarily a reflection of class identity or class opposition. 
On the contrary, what prompts such action is an attempt by non-
manual employees to halt the erosion of traditional non-manual 
advantages by manual workers. From this perspective, therefore, 
white-collar unionisation represents not an identification with 
manual workers but an affirmation of the social distance which 
exists (or ought to exist) between the two groups. Similarly, 
since the target of resentment underlying white-collar unionisation 
is primarily manual workers rather than employers, then the emer-
gence of a genuine sense of class opposition among the former is 
also seriously undermined. 
On the other hand, as the 'new working class' thesis suggests, a 
sense of 'class alternative' symbolised by orientations toward 
control over the conditions and nature of work tends to be much 
stronger among non-manual than manual employees. For, where 
much of white-collar work was once relatively free of close super-
vision, increasingly such work has become subject to more restric-
tive forms of control. Under such circumstances, therefore, the 
salience of managerial prerogatives and fundamental questioning of 
the purposes of work organisation assume a more acute expression 
in non-manual industrial agitation than manual unionism has ever 
been able to sustain. 
The purpose of this survey then is to investigate the nature of 
class consciousness among the leadership of manual and non-manual 
trade unions. This is undertaken by means of an examination of 
their attudes to a variety of industrial and political issues. 
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In this way it is hoped to gain a fuller understanding both of the 
ideological currents within trade unions and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, of the extent to which trade union leadership thinking 
reflects the influence of the dominant ideology. 
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1. TRADE UNIONS AND MEDIA ARTICULATIONS QF THE 
DOMINANT IDEAS 
The mass media and the trade unions 
It is a sociological commonplace that the mass media, most notably, 
television, newspapers and radio, play an enormous part in the 
shaping of and, arguably, even in the creation of 'public opinion'. 
Understandably, therefore, sociological analysis of media treatment 
of trade unions and industrial relations has generated widespread 
discussion of the ways in which trade unions and their activities 
are generally understood, explained and responded to, by and within 
the mass media. 
Tellingly, emerging out of this debate is a growing scepticism con-
cerning the extent to which media news reports of industrial relat-
ions and trade union actions represent reliable and true accounts of 
'what actually took place'. Indeed, a key finding of much of the 
contemporary sociological research on the media, is that a pronounced 
and systematic bias permeates the orthodox media discourse on trade 
unions and industrial conflict. Certainly, to the degree that the 
media generally acts to sustain certain understandings of society and 
the way it operates, then bias is inevitably incorporated in the very 
processes of selection, interpretation and presentation of media 
accounts of the world. 
Characteristic of the way that the media attempts to shape public 
understandings of various issues is its predisposition to present 
strikes as 'bad news'; as actions to be censured, irrespective of 
the reasons which precipitate them or the intrinsic merits of the 
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strikers' claims. Even when the media does concede the justice of 
the strikers' cause, the discussion is often framed in terms of 
moral regret. Such reactions are perhaps only to be expected. 
For, in the main, strikes are presented as demonstrably "silly", wasteful and 
economically damaging - ultimately to the 'nation as a whole'. 
Above all, they 'achieve little' and are largely 'pointless exer-
cises' . 
Predictably, therefore, worker and trade union action are rarely 
perceived by the mass media to be the natural consequences of legi-
timate dissatisfaction - let alone as expressions of the inevitable 
conflict of interests inherent in the employment relationship. 
Rather, industrial action and strikes in particular, are far more 
likely to be attributed to such base motives as union 'greed' and 
'bloody-mindedness', or, alternatively, to the devious machinations 
of small groups of union 'agitators'. 
These processes of selective emphasis and exclusion are clearly-
evident in the media's preference for publicising certain types of 
union action rather than others and in its tendency to discuss in-
dustrial disputes in terms of such inflammatory formulations as the 
'inconvenience to the public'. It is therefore not without signi-
ficance that the media generally assigns prominence to the more 
sensational aspects of strikes in their news reports of such pheno-
mena. The vivid imagery evoked by the crowds of stranded commuters, 
the piles of uncollected garbage, the lengthy queues of motorists 
engaged in the desperate search for petrol and the clashes between 
police and union picket lines is, of course, beyond dispute. 
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Needless to say, such selectivity of focus is often rationalised on 
the grounds of 'newsworthiness' - a judgement reflecting prevailing 
media norms concerning what makes for 'good journalism'. However, 
in basing the collection and selection of news material mainly on 
considerations of journalistic impact, the central issues at stake 
in industrial disputes are often obscured in news reports. More 
importantly, the popular image of strikes as an 'expensive waste of 
time, money and effort', so dear to the hearts of employer represent-
atives and conservative politicians, is lent enormous credibility. 
Clearly, in the reporting of trade unions and strikes, the media 
play a critical role in the creation of 'public knowledge' about such 
matters. Yet, what is also plain, is that the process of 'reality 
construction' for most people is more often a reflection of media 
emphases and concerns than an objective consequence of 'what's really 
going on'. For instance, there is no denying that the construction 
of strikes as issues of public discourse has much less to do with 
the objective facts of their frequency and seriousness than with the 
amount of media coverage that they attract. 
Accordingly, the understandings most people have of trade unions and 
strikes are largely derived from the mass media whose role in creating 
stereotyped images about such phenomena should not be underestimated. 
For, once certain stereotypes become incorporated into people's 
'world-view', it is possible for all sorts of conclusions to be 
reached. Thus, to be repeatedly told by the mass media that strikes 
are 'irrational' and 'disruptive' and largely the work of 'militants' 
and 'extremists', makes it only too easy to submerge the justice of 
the workers' claims under the convenient stereotype label which tells 
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US 'all we need to know'. 
In effect, then, the mass media and their news reports, far from 
'telling it as it really is', systematically purvey quite a one-
sided view of the world. However, this is not to suggest that 
such distortion is the product of deliberate attempts to mislead, 
or that it is the outcome of bias on the part of any particular in-
dividuals or sections of the media. Rather, what needs to be 
clearly grasped is that the limited and inadequate character of 
media explanations of social reality derive mainly from the frame-
work of assumptions normally employed by the media in their inter-
pretations of the world. Almost inevitably, therefore, media 
presentations privilege certain social understandings and social 
prescriptions over others. 
In particular, the ideological significance of the media is basic-
ally traceable to its critical role in upholding and propagating 
the dominant ideas - ideas which essentially serve to legitimise 
the existing social arrangements. Not surprisingly, in its 
dissemination of the dominant structure of definitions and images 
the influence of the media over the ideas, beliefs and, in effect, 
the consciousness of individuals makes it a highly potent instru-
ment of social control in society. 
Paul Johnson and the media assault on the trade unions 
Possibly one of the most immediate and striking consequences of the 
economic recession convulsing the developed Western nations since 
the seventies has been the intensified hostility of the media to 
the trade union movement. In this context, the work of Paul 
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Johnson, a political journalist and disillusioned former 'socialist', 
exemplifies the lengths to which sections of the media are prepared 
to go in their bid to persuade people that the trade unions are main-
ly to blame for the present crisis. 
From the mid-seventies, Johnson unleashed a series of remarkably-
ferocious attacks on the labour movement. Johnson's prime target 
is the political Left and his overriding passion is with the menace 
to individual freedoms supposedly posed by the trade unions. 
Predictably, Johnson soon came to be regarded by the conservative 
press as easily the favourite authority on the trade unions and 
Labour Party. Interestingly enough, although it is the British 
trade union movement and Labour Party to which Johnson directs his 
unflattering comments, there is the clear implication that his 
assessments are equally applicable to their Australian counterparts. 
This is evidenced, for example, by the fact that articles which first 
appeared in the British press were reprinted in their entirety in 
some of the Australian press. Even more importantly, Johnson was 
brought to Australia on various speaking visits to spread the message 
of the global dangers to democracy represented by militant unionism. 
Characteristically, those who seek to give credibility to Johnson's 
views have been at pains to emphasise his 'left-wing' background 
and qualifications: an ex-editor of a leading left-wing journal, a 
person who has been on close, first-name terms with leading members 
of the Labour Party and, indeed, someone who had been 'one of 
Britain's leading left-wing intellectuals'. (Nation Review^ 1975: 
820-1) The net effect of all this has been seemingly to convey 
the impression that if someone with his political background and 
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associations proclaims union power to be a threat to democratic 
institutions and economic well-being, then, presumably, there must be 
some substance in his claims. 
By and large, the few, feeble attempts to refute Johnson's arguments 
have left such beliefs largely undisturbed. Further, the generally-
conciliatory tone of much of this criticism - instanced by the 
tendency to preface comment with acknowledgement of Johnson's 
'breadth of knowledge', 'sincerity' and 'fortrightness of expression', 
has failed to produce the intended 'calming effect' on the debate. 
On the contrary, such approaches appear only to have incited Johnson 
to even greater excesses of verbal hostility toward unions and the 
Labour Party. 
Yet, paltry and inadequate as such opposition to Johnson has been, it 
represents a considerable advance on the social science literature 
which has steadfastly ignored Johnson's arguments altogether. 
Needless to say, the extremist and polemical character of Johnson's 
writings can hardly fail to offend academic sensibilities. But to 
regard Johnson's newspaper commentaries as mere 'journalism' and, as 
such, completely undeserving of serious academic attention, is to be 
manifestly blind to the hegemonic implications of his formulations. 
Johnson's descriptions of trade union leaders, in fact, provide some 
of the most-unambiguous demonstrations of the manner in which the mass 
media sets about creating 'folk devils' and orchestrating the result-
ing 'moral panics'. Here, for instance, are samples of the technique, 
developed to perfection by Johnson, in which union leaders are por-
trayed as: 
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the complacent^ the conservative, the unimaginative, 
the lazy-minded; men soaked in old prejudices and 
habits of mind. Bourbons to the core, forgetting 
nothing, learning nothing, negative, obstructive, 
slow, dull, long-winded, unadventurous, immensely 
pleased with themselves and quite willing to resist 
planned change of any kind. 
(Nation Review, 1975: 831) 
But it is the British trade union leaders in particular who are the 
hapless victims of Johnson's fury and scorn; they, he proceeds to 
condemn root-and-branch as: 
Smug and self-assured, oblivious of any criticism, they 
have encouraged British industrial workers in habits 
and attitudes, in rules and procedures, in illusions 
and fantasies which have turned the British working 
class into the coolies of the Western world, and 
Britain into a stinking industrial slum. 
(Nation Review, 1975: 831) 
More revealingly, still, is his invocation of the popular mass media 
stereotype of the 'all-powerful' union leader. As Johnson rhetoric-
ally puts it: 
How are we to describe a band of determined men occupying 
key positions in society and using their power to raise 
their incomes regardless of the needs and interests of 
the rest? Powerful men who conspire together to squeeze 
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the oornmunity are gangsters. Let us identify them 
as such. 
Oration Review, 1975: 830) 
The assertion that trade unions are the power in the land is, of 
course, manifestly absurd when set against the truly awesome and 
repressive powers of the police, judiciary, military and secret 
intelligence agencies of the state. Indeed, beside the vastly-
superior powers of the huge multinational corporations, union power 
is but puny and insignificant. 
Nevertheless, Johnson's preoccupation is with the union bogey and 
his main target is union belligerence. Thus, for example, we read 
of trade unionists "smashing their fists in the community's face". 
(Nation Review, 1975: 820.) However, Johnson's stand as a defender 
of the rights of the individual would carry much more conviction were 
he genuinely endeavouring to pinpoint the real sources of threat to 
individual freedoms. But his strictures are directed solely at 
the trade unions with never a hint of the ways in which personal 
liberties are daily eroded; e.g. by the growth of data banks and 
the new developments in computer and surveillance technology, all 
of which conspire to create the apparatus for an Orwellian police 
state already in most developed societies. 
For, Johnson, of course, problems of industrial unrest and economic 
inefficiency are simply sheeted home to labour intransigence with 
scant regard to management inadequacy, investment policies or the 
global recession. Thus, we learn that: "British Leyland was badly 
run because management had to spend far too much of its energy and 
resources on labour relations and on mitigating the consequences 
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of strike action". (Nation Review, 1975: 831.) Likewise, in 
Johnson's view, the low levels of industrial productivity can be 
ascribed largely to the 'restrictive practices' of the trade unions. 
Accordingly, worker resistance to technological innovation is 
purely: 
a mixture of hatred of management, dislike of change 
of any kind, fear of unem:ployment, unwillingness to 
adapt to technologioal improvement, and an almost child-
like faith that the system will somehow continue to 
provide for them. 
(Nation Review, 1975: 831) 
The oversimplification and distortion implicit in such interpretations 
of industrial and economic affairs is further evident in Johnson's 
attempt to attribute inflation to the so-called 'wage explosion'. 
Significantly, the propagation of such a view of inflation is 
hegemonically important by virtue of its attempt to legitimise both 
its diagnosis of what the problem is and the prescribed remedy for it. 
Certainly, to the extent that the idea of pay increases for workers 
can be successfully portrayed as the basic cause of inflation, then 
public support for 'wage restraint' may well be forthcoming - despite 
the obvious implications of such action for the maintenance of 
existing patterns of income inequality. More ominously, by present-
ing the causes and solutions to inflation in terms of wage movements, 
such an approach serves to invest wage controls and inaction on the 
rising levels of unemployment with the legitimacy of economic 
'realism' and 'rationality'. 
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As noted earlier, Johnson's pre-eminent fixation is with the power 
of the trade unions. Needless to say, as the opinion polls indicate, 
the mythology of union power exercises a powerful hold over the 
popular consciousness. Johnson thus shows himself fully alive to 
the political possibilities of this situation when he sets out to 
play (or prey!) on the normative concerns of large segments of the 
population. Yet, in seeking to portray 'the community' as being at 
the mercy of the trade unions, Johnson is so preoccupied with 
presenting the issue as one of 'the unions versus the community', 
that he never considers for a moment that trade unionists and their 
dependants form a significant proportion of the 'community', on 
behalf of whose rights he so passionately protests. 
The notion that trade unions possess or wield massive power in 
relation to governments or big business has arguably always been a 
fiction. Indeed, possibly the most pointed commentary on trade 
union 'power' within recent years, has been the inability of the 
unions to halt unemployment and the slide in the purchasing power of 
many of their members' pay packets. Above all, trade unions seek 
but generally fail to gain control over working conditions - let 
alone over the right to hire and fire. Nevertheless, such is the 
moral indignation that such action provokes from Johnson that he 
sees it as nothing short of a totalitarian threat to the rights of 
the individual. 
Characteristically, the immensely greater power of those who own 
and control industry or run the public corporations entirely escapes 
Johnson's critical gaze. In fact, vast numbers of people can be 
thrown out of work, entire industries dismantled and whole regions 
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left to decay without Johnson appearing to notice any erosion of 
individual liberty. Rather, all his invective is reserved for 
people struggling to exist and the industrial and political organ-
isations which they form to articulate their struggles. 
In view of this, it would be easy to dismiss Johnson as part of 
the 'lunatic fringe' whose ideas have little support in society. 
But to do so would be to fundamentally misunderstand the ideo-
logical significance of his views or the reasons for their pro-
motion in the mass media. Since the seventies, the key ideological 
problem confronting the dominant groups in the developed Western 
nations has been to secure the consent of the mass of the people 
for the prevailing politico-economic system while simultaneously 
seeking to persuade them to sacrifice many of the material rewards 
which formerly bought their allegiance. Johnson's unique contri-
bution to this task of maintaining hegemony is his ability to 
plausibly represent the reductions in living standards and welfare 
services and the attacks on trade union rights as a sacred quest for 
national economic salvation whose acceptance by those affected con-
stitutes a patriotic duty of the highest order. 
The Media and the Legitimation Crisis 
It is a conventional wisdom that in the main the agencies of hege-
mony like the mass media function to win popular support for the 
established social order. But when fundamental transformations 
such as those which have been taking place throughout the Western 
World since the seventies occur, new ideas must be formulated and 
'sold' to the public in order to minimise resistance. This has 
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been plain to see in Australia. After more than thirty years of 
consensus on full employment and the construction of a hegemonic 
order based on limitless economic growth, the political commit-
ment to the principle of providing 'work for all who wanted it', 
has been allowed to lapse. 
The fundamental move away from the post-war liberal consensus is 
perhaps most-evident in the field of economic theory, where after 
thirty years of hegemony in policy-making circles, the Keynesian 
approach came under sustained attack from the apostles of 
'monetarism'. The hegemonic crisis within academic economics, 
of course, only reflects the hegemonic crisis within the wider 
society. Certainly, it is not without significance that the 
threat posed to the nation by trade union 'militants' emerged into 
popular media discussion in Australia during the seventies. The 
collapse of the mechanisms which underpinned the stability of the 
system for over three decades, viz economic growth, full employment 
and welfare reforms, has clearly made the process of securing the 
legitimacy of the present order infinitely more precarious. 
Precisely because of the threat of social upheaval posed by the 
worsening economic recession, the logic of capitalist survival 
underlines the imperatives of accumulation. Yet, at the same 
time, the necessity to organise mass consent cannot be overlooked 
for any extended period. The problem of how to reconcile the 
demands of economic management with those of political legitimacy 
has become a central feature of the crisis facing Australian 
capitalism, confirming it as, above all, a crisis of hegemony. 
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As previously mentioned, the hegemonic crisis pervades economic theory 
and is visible in the struggle for ideological supremacy between the 
exponents of the Keynesian and monetarist approaches. Needless to 
say, this struggle is not simply an abstract economic dispute which 
need not unduly concern us. On the contrary, it has widespread 
implications for the way the crisis is perceived and acted upon. 
Notable in this regard, has been the standing on its head of the 
conventional Keynesian wisdom about the role of the State; to 
monetarists, far from being the basic remedy for it. State inter-
vention is regarded as a major cause of the present economic crisis. 
The monetarist attack on the size of government 'budget deficits' 
thus needs to be viewed in the context of the hegemonic struggle 
waged within the mass media and elsewhere to win popular support 
for cuts in government spending on essential services like health, 
education and welfare. Likewise, it is no accident that the equation 
of 'inflation' with 'excessive wage claims' came to feature prominent-
ly in the ideological offensive waged by the mass media against the 
trade unions. Certainly, with journalistic attacks on the union 
movement like Johnson's, we can readily observe the mechanisms 
through which trade union wage increases have become constructed ideo-
logically in the mass media as a 'national' problem, thereby 
rendering them subject to specific and intense forms of control and 
repression. 
To begin with, the widening economic recession and the ensuing fears 
of social collapse have combined to create an ideological atmosphere 
where the routine trade union struggle to protect and improve the 
pay and conditions of their members has come increasingly to be 
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interpreted as jeopardising the stability and even the survival of 
the social order. This is epitomised in the very terms in which 
media discussion of such union activities has tended to be framed: 
'the conspiracy against the nation', 'holding the country to 
ransom'; the stereotypes of 'decent' and 'hardworking' workers 
being manipulated by 'militants', 'agitators' and assorted 'sub-
versive elements'. 
The clear implication of such descriptions of the trade unions, is 
that they had come to possess 'too much power' and thus constituted 
a danger to 'society'. Such attacks confirm the tendency of the 
mass media to create 'folk devils' - particularly in periods of 
crisis. Trade unions, of course, have traditionally been favour-
ite targets for media anointment as 'folk devils'. The ensuing 
'moral panic' which this inevitably creates functions to uphold the 
dominant social norms and to legitimise the intensification of 
social control. In other words, if the dominant groups in society 
with the support of the media can successfully stereotype certain 
groups as 'trouble makers', they will more easily secure public 
support for taking action against them. 
The construction of trade union action as a 'problem', then, has 
emerged from a whole series of struggles, advances and reverses 
which have characterised the development of the economic crisis. 
The situation this has created of a system increasingly unable to 
fulfill its economic promises to vast numbers of people, coupled 
with the recognition of the need for social unity in order to 
survive, has made the issue of 'union power' an important signifier 
of the crisis. However, the essence of what Habermas and others 
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have called the 'legitimation crisis' in the developed Western 
nations arises from the fact that the proposed remedies for the 
recession viz. wage control, rising unemployment and reduced govern-
ment spending on essential services are not policies which can simply 
be imposed from above. Consent for them has continually to be won. 
It is within this process of winning consent that the purpose of 
media attacks on the union movement is plainly-evident: to neutralise 
trade union opposition so that policies which fundamentally erode the 
living standards of workers can safely be pursued. 
All of this serves to raise the question of the possibility of unified 
counter-hegemonic struggle under the leadership of the forces of 
organised labour. In this context, it is clear that the class con-
sciousness of organised labour needs to be understood historically as 
well as theoretically. Typically, class consciousness does not 
develop in a linear way but is subject to breaks and discontinuities -
particularly in periods of economic crisis, which produce changes in 
a wide range of class relations. 
Certainly, such consciousness is not the sole prerogative of manual 
workers but encompasses the experienced reality of wage labour in 
general at different levels of the labour process. Basically, of 
course, the substantial transformations of industrial and occupational 
structure prevailing during the seventies are not, in the main, the 
outcome of the recession. Rather, they reflect fundamental changes 
in the labour process which increasingly find expression in the 
growing automation of factory and office. 
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Accordingly, the economic crisis and the computer revolution in 
industry demand sustained theoretical analysis of the processes 
of class formation and class alliance in the face of increased 
threats to workers' living standards. In fact, as sociologists 
like Terry Johnson (1977) has argued, the issue of class conscious-
ness cannot be meaningfully addressed without considering the 
'prior theoretical question of the structural determinants of class 
which constitute the conceptual base from which problems relating 
to the ideological commitment of class groups and factions can be 
posed'. Additionally, it remains to consider the extent to which 
worker institutions like trade unions are capable of posing a 
fundamental and sustained challenge to the established social order. 
These key issues are explored in the following three chapters. 
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THE CRISIS AND THE PROBLEM OF WORKING CLASS POLITICAL 
MOBILISATION 
Capitalist Crisis and class-consciousness 
The spread of economic recession throughout the capitalist world 
has, as Dowd {1916) remarks, largely demolished the concept of a 
permanently 'slump-free' capitalist economy. In the process, it 
has fundamentally called into question many of the sociological 
orthodoxies about the stability and cohesiveness of advanced 
capitalist societies. 
Undeniably, the intensification of the economic crisis threatens 
to accentuate the inherent class^based tensions between capital 
and labour. Yet the fact that capitalism is 'in crisis' does not 
mean that it will simply fall apart under the weight of its own 
'contradictions' {see belowj. On the contrary, any radical trans-
formation of capitalist society still requires political 'grave-
diggers' - as Karl Marx designated his agents of revolution - the 
industrial working-class. 
To Marx, the political mobilisation of the working-class was an 
essential pre-condition for socialist revolution. Basic to this 
In fact, as the historial record shows^ the death^throes of even 
a moribund oapitalism may he very -prolonged. 
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process of mobilisation is the development of working-class 
consciousness whereby the working-class comes to be transformed 
from a 'class-in-itself' into a 'class-for-itself'. 
Paradoxically, although it is central to an understanding of the 
dynamics of revolution, the sociological study of class-conscious-
ness, as Maravall (1976) notes, remains relatively-unexplored 
theoretical terrain. Likewise, as he discloses, with the notable 
exception of the work of Lukacs, Gramsci and Althusser, there has 
been little systematic attempt by Marxism to theoretically analyse 
the nature of class consciousness. 
However, as Maravall stresses, notwithstanding the theoretical 
contributions of Lukacs, Gramsci and Althusser, there exists within 
Marxism as within Sociology, a sharp contrast between the rigour of 
theoretical work on the 'objective conditions' for social revolt and 
the relatively-cursory treatment given to analysis of the subjective 
factors. In essence, claims Maravall, this concentration of theoret-
ical focus on the objective aspects of class conflict by both the 
'sociology of revolutionary conflict' and the Marxist tradition 
presupposes that the level of class-consciousness is simply a mechan-
ical i.e. 'unproblematic' response to underlying social realities. 
But what such deterministic conceptualisations tend to ignore is the 
Weberian question posed by Sartori and echoed by Maravall; 
namely, how do we pass from class conditions to 
class consciousness and actions? 
(1976: 23-24) 
Further, even though Marxist writers like Lukacs, Gramsci and Althusser 
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have attempted to deal with the problem of class consciousness in 
a theoretical fashion, invaluable as their contributions are, they 
too exhibit, as Maravall contends, one of the distinctive conceptual 
weaknesses of the Marxist approach; specifically: 
The social determination of antagonistic interests Is 
assumed to be the relevant question in the study of 
conflict: the social determination of antagonistic 
Ideologies is seen as a secondary and as a dependent 
problem. Thus the analysis of ideologies (and the 
study of their political significance) is based on 
a generally implicit paradigm of the 'adequate' 
ideology corresponding to externally assessed object-
ive interests, 
(1976: 27) 
However, as Maravall notes, what is manifestly lacking in such 
analyses of the development of 'revolutionary ideologies' is any 
critical consideration of the process by which 'objective reality' 
is subjectively understood. (1976: 27) On the contrary, such 
perspectives tacitly assume that the same social forces which 
initially spawn the working class as a 'class-in-itself' would 
ultimately generate its conversion into a 'class-for^itself', 
Thus, to the extent that Marxism is primarily concerned with identify-
ing the structural conditions for revolt, its dominant focus, under-
standably, tends to be on the social contexts in which, as Maravall 
puts it, "antagonistic ideologies emerge and develop" (1976: 29). 
Characteristically, this preoccupation with the underlying structural 
precipitants of social change leads Marxism to convey a rather 
deterministic picture of the individual as victim of impersonal 
social forces which are inherent in the very nature of social 
arrangements in capitalist society. But this by no means implies 
that the problem of the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat 
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is only a peripheral concern in Marxist theory. On the contrary, 
it is of central importance to Marxist analysis insofar as this 
purports to embody a theory of transcendence. Thus, immanent in 
Marxism also, we find a voluntaristic conception of the individual 
as relatively 'free' to initiate and indeed, to shape events. As 
Marx himself put it, "men make their own history" - though as he 
simultaneously warned, "but they do not make it just as they please" 
(cited in Hyman, 1975: 5). 
It is evident therefore, that in the Marxist approach, to quote 
Richard Hyman, people are not merely "impotent playthings of 
impersonal forces" (1975: 5), On the contrary, the individual's 
capacity for autonomous activity is readily acknowledged. Yet, 
while Marx himself was prepared to concede a measure of 
choice in human affairs, at the same time, he strenuously emphasised 
that such choice was itself ultimately subject to certain structural 
constraints - as the foregoing citation of his remarks makes clear. 
Consequently, although Marx grants that the unfolding of the historical 
process is by no means inevitable, that, indeed, history is the product 
of the actions of autonomous beings, what he also was at some pains to 
stress, is that the actual forms human actions assume are in part 
structurally-conditioned. 
Accordingly, Marxist theory classically epitomises the embodiment 
of the dialectical themes of free will on the one hand and determinism 
on the other - though, seemingly, it is the second tendency that is 
analytically dominant. It is this methodological propensity which 
incessantly generates the proliferation of critiques of the Marxist 
perspective. For example, in summing up the limitations of Marxian 
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explanations of class consciousness, one writer is moved to suggest 
that: 
In his theory of class consciousness Marx does not allow 
much room for analysing how people see themselves in 
society. Because it is based on their productive relation-
ships, his theory can only hint at how people actually 
view their social situation ... (and) while the concept of 
'false' consciousness goes some way towards providing 
indications of measurements, it is still too crude a 
category for assessing political behaviour, 
(Davies, 1970; 17) 
In a similar vein, V/right Mills, remarking on Marx's conception of 
class consciousness considers: 
How it will develop he does not make as clear as why 
it will for according to his analysis of their condition, 
as the interests of the two classes are in objective and 
irremediable conflict, their members will eventually 
become aware of their special interests and will pursue 
them, 
(1963: 87) 
Although \'right Mills' interpretation imparts a highlyr-nnechanistic 
and misleading flavour to the Marxian conception of the process in 
which class consciousness evolves, nevertheless, one cannot quarrel 
with his essential point: in the final analysis we need to theoretic-
ally grasp how workers make sense of those elements of their social 
world which impinge upon their activities. In particular, it is 
vital to understand how they subjectively come to terms with the 
contradictions between their daily experiences as workers and the 
image of social reality presented in bourgeois ideology - aspects 
of which they tend to internalise the course of their socialisation 
in capitalist society. 
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in view of this, it is probably correct to suggest that the 'sociology 
of revolutionary conflict' requires, as Maravall maintains, critical 
examination of both the objective conditions for class antagonism 
and the subjective prerequisites for revolt. Most notably, there 
would seem to be an evident need for systematic investigation of the 
"processes whereby ideological radicalism emerges and is transmitted". 
(Maravall, 1976: 32j. Certainly, any adequate analysis of the 
'subjective conditions for revolutionary conflict' intrinsically 
entails consideration of the 'meaning-systems' workers use to 
construct their social worlds. As a result, it can plausibly be 
argued that: 
A theory of 'subjective conditions' should not be limited 
to reflections about the social determination of objective 
interests and about situations of ideological monopoly but 
should shift a greater deal of its attention to the study 
of the political praxis related to the emergence, persistence 
and development of political ideologies ,.. 
(Maravall, 1976; 32) 
Needless to say, this redirection of conceptual focus urged by 
Maravall is a very tall order indeed. 
Ideological struggle and the vanguard party 
Significantly, a basic Leninist dictum is that where the working class 
lacks access to socialist ideas and influences, their values, attitudes 
and beliefs will tend to reflect the assumptions of 'bourgeois 
ideology'. To counter the pervasive influence of 'bourgeois ideology', 
Lenin advocated the formation of a socialist political party to which, 
to use Parkin's words, "workers may look ... for political guidance in 
the attempt to make sense of their social world". (1971: 99) 
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This vision of the workers' political party as a source of counter-
ideology in capitalist society however, as Parkin notes, has to a 
large extent been abandoned where social-democratic and labour 
parties constitute the main institutional expression of working class 
politics. According to Parkin, the policies and actions of such 
parties only serve to highlight that in broad outline they accept the 
legitimacy of capitalist institutional arrangements and are quite 
prepared to work within their constraints. 
Predictably, the political incorporation of the major working class 
party represents"^ a fairly serious obstacle to the development of a 
politically-informed and radical working class. For, as Parkin warns, 
the failure of such parties to present a "radical class-oriented 
meaning-system to their supporters" basically deprives the working 
class of vital "sources of political knowledge and information which 
would enable them to make sense of their situation in radical terms". 
(1971: 98) 
Characteristically, the provision of what Berger and Luckman (1977) 
term 'counter-definitions of society' is perhaps most important when 
capitalism is in a state of crisis. Certainly, access by the working 
class to alternative and especially to radical interpretations of the 
crisis would mark a significant contribution to undermining the hold 
of bourgeois ideology upon their attitudes and actions. Above all, 
the pervasive ideological impact of conservative notions that rising 
wages are the 'cause' of the present crisis underscores the necessity 
of counter-ideology in the political mobilisation of the working class. 
Predictably, conservative attempts to saddle the workers with the blame 
for the crisis highlights an underlying tendency to perceive the crisis 
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in purely technical terms. As such, it is therefore seen as being 
amenable to technical solutions derivable from the 'tool kit' of 
bourgeois economics. 
Unfortunately for such outlooks, however, the prevailing features 
of contemporary economic life in the advanced capitalist nations -
high inflation coupled with rising unemployment - have so far proved 
highly-immune to technocratic remedy. More importantly, what is 
manifestly obvious from the conventional diagnoses and proposed 
solutions to the crisis, is the methodological deficiency of much 
of so-called 'mainstream' economics. Premised on the assumption 
that non-economic factors are largely 'extraneous' variables, these 
are nevertheless assumed by this perspective to be mysteriously 
responsible to purely^technical economic remedies. Conversely, 
however, it is plain that to conceptualise the crisis as a crisis 
of capitalist political economy is basically to focus worker 
discontent upon the priorities of capitalist economic and social 
organisation. 
Clearly, what is important to bear in mind is that these 'counter-
definitions of society' comprise a potential source of threat to the 
existing social order in that they can be employed to mobilise 
political opposition to that order. For as Connell observes: 
The class structure does not exist and probably could 
not exist as a system of naked power. It is based on 
a system of property rights and these are much more 
readily enforcible if they are widely believed to be 
legitimate. Common beliefs surrounding the subject 
of private ownership are thus important to the 
stability of the class structure. If a system of mass 
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belief compatible with private ownership is successfully 
maintained, the bases of ruling class power are effect-
ively unassailable. If important divisions appear in 
mass beliefs concerning these issues the class structure 
is in danger. 
(1977: 180)* 
The significance of ideas in social and political struggles is, 
therefore, manifestly not to be underestimated. 
As yet, however, little indication of a consistent, radical and 
organised expression of the economic grievances of the working 
class has been forthcoming from labour and social-democratic parties. 
(On this score, the actions of social-democratic governments during 
the Great Depression provide little cause for optimism). Certainly, 
to date, there has been no attempt to translate the workers' 
industrial struggle against inflation and unemployment into a full-
blown challenge to the system of capitalism itself. 
Enough has been written to underline that the working class does not 
develop revolutionary consciousness simply because it is oppressed. 
To transcend the existing social order, the working class requires 
more than a sense of deprivation or of economic exploitation. 
* Uhile as Connell vightly argues, the vule of a ruling class is 
not maintained solely (or even, most importantly) by coercion, it 
is however quite misleading to make the assumption of legitimacy 
central to the definition of domination, ^s one writer suggests, 
underlying such a conceptual approach is the "unwarranted rational-
ist assumption tlmt the ruled do not rebel only, or mainly, because 
they consider the mxle of the rulers to be justified", (Therbom, 
1978: 171). Plainly, however, as this observation serves to under-
line, there is a world of difference between conformity and 
legitimacy. 
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Perhaps, nowhere is this point more powerfully made than in Robert 
Tressell's novel "The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists". (1965) 
Set in Edwardian England, this book presents a harrowing picture of 
the poverty, misery and sheer brutalisation of working class life 
at the height of Britain's imperial greatness. Poorly-clad, poorly-
fed, poorly housed, frequently unemployed and in debt, these workers 
are nevertheless staunch defenders of the system which exploits them 
economically and condemns them and their families to lives of 
destitution and early graves. It is this which leads Tressell to 
describe them as 'ragged trousered philanthropists': in effect, 
altruists in rags who stubbornly see no irony in working themselves 
to exhaustion for the enrichment of those who employ them at barely 
subsistence wages. 
Perhaps, most importantly, what Tressell's novel manages to brilliant-
ly convey is the scale of the ideological struggle that has to be 
waged and won before the existing social system can be overthrown. 
Illustrating this through the experiences of Owen, the central 
character in the novel, Tressell writes: 
Usually whenever Owen reflected upon the gross injustices, 
and inhumanity of the existing social disorder^, he became 
convinced that it could not last; it was bound to fall to 
pieces because of its own rottenness. It was not just, it 
was not commonsense, and therefore it could not endure. 
But always after one of these arguments - or, rather disputes 
- with his fellow workmen, he almost relapsed into hopeless-
ness and despondency, for then he realised how vast and how 
strong are the fortifications that surround the present system; 
the great barriers and ramparts of invincible ignorance, apathy 
and self-contempt, which will have to be broken down before the 
system of society of which they are the defences, can be swept 
away, 
(Tressell, 1965: 364) 
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How frequently the insights of the great novelist suffer little 
by comparison with those of the sociologist is indicated by 
juxtaposing Tressell's remarks above to those of Professor Bob 
Connell. For example, commenting on the long-held expectation of 
capitalism's collapse, Connell has this to say: 
Socialists of the nineteenth century, though disagreeing 
in every conceivable way about how it should happen, were 
reasonably agreed that the collapse of capitalism would 
happen and probably in their own lifetimes. A system so 
morally ugly could not last long (yet, VhS.) twentieth 
century socialism has been forced to recognise in a much 
sharper v/ay the resilience of capitalism and the strength 
of its non-economic defences ,,.. 
(1977: 205) 
It is thus with remarkable perceptiveness that Tressell manages 
to portray in his book how the consciousness of the working class 
is moulded in an environment of social institutions controlled by 
the ruling class. Basically, these mechanisms of ruling class 
'cultural hegemony' as Connell terms them, serve to condition the 
working classes to regard the social arrangements within capitalist 
society as though they were simply part of the 'natural', if not 
divinely-r-ordained, scheme of things. In the words of that still-
popular hymn, 'All things bright and beautiful': 
The rich man in his castle, 
The poor man at his gate, 
God gave each his station, 
And ordered his estate. 
Maybe in this modern age in which we now live, not too many people 
believe that the class system in capitalist society has the direct 
sanction of the deity. Yet, it is interesting to reflect that the 
secular ideologies which have replaced religion in explaining the 
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world have been no less concerned to emphasise the legitimacy of 
the existing social order. This is underscored, for example, by 
D'Urso's biting attack on the educational system: 
The 'hidden curriculum' of the school leads the young to 
internalise such norms as the hierarchical disposition of 
power and the acquiescence in one's own powerlessness, 
compliance with authority^ job fragmentation and extrinsic 
job motivation, external direction and evaluation of one's 
work and worth, 
(cited in Connell, 1977: 180) 
While agreeing with D'Urso's general line of argument, Connell disputes 
that the 'norms of compliance' are 'internalised' to quite the extent 
suggested. Rather, what is significant about the schools' 'hidden 
curriculum' is that pupils are implicitly drilled in the "practice 
of compliance, whether they like it or not". (1977: 18U) 
The pervasiveness of bourgeois ideology and the early state at which 
it affects the individual's perception of the social world is sharply 
brought out in Connell's survey of 'class consciousness in childhood'. 
(1977: 135-51) Perhaps the most striking aspect of this study is 
Connell's demonstration of the way what he calls 'middle class 
culture' - mediated through the institutional agencies of socialisation, 
provide working class children with negative images of themselves. 
Not unexpectedly, such children tend to internalise these negative 
self-images. Thus, as Connell shows, these children come to believe 
that they are inferior - as evidenced by their widespread tendency 
to explain their relatively-low occupational aspirations in terms of 
not 'having the brains', (1977: 163) 
Persons with such an outlook, as Connell's conclusions 
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underline, are unlikely to respond positively to attempts to 
politically organise against their unequal share of society's 
resources. On the contrary, as his empirical research confirms, 
they have basically been conditioned to accept that their deprived 
position in society is a reflection solely of personal inadequacy. 
Needless to say, the media of mass communication play a crucial part 
in the daily conditioning and manipulation of individuals into un-
thinking acceptance of the value-system which underpins the existing 
structure of pov/er and privilege in society (.see Connell, 1977: 204). 
(An interesting, if understandably, hardly dispassionate sidelight, 
on the role of the media in the conditioning of the working class in 
capitalist society is to be found in Robert Tressell's novel "The 
Ragged Trousered Philanthropists" (1965). Tressell's opinion of the 
ideological functions of the capitalist press is amusingly but un-
equivocally revealed in his sarcastic designation of such newspapers 
as the 'Obscurer', the 'Ananias' and the 'Chloroform'.) 
If the existing institutional order is to be overturned therefore, 
it can only be realised through the organised action of a working 
class - conscious not only of its own subordination in capitalist 
society - but of the alternatives to such a system of social production 
However, any assumption that fundamental social change is going to be 
easy merely because an economic crisis adversely affects the material 
well-being of the working classes is hardly justified on the facts of 
history. As Tressell's grim tale highlights, revolutionary conscious-
ness and organisation are not the automatic products of material 
deprivation. 
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Put simply, the working class does not automatically become revolt 
utionary because it is exploited and dehumanised. Rather, since 
its consciousness continues to be basically mediated through the 
existing institutions and forms of bourgeois ideology, extreme 
deprivation may breed - not revolutionary politics, but resignation 
and despair - classically epitomised in the 'its not for the likes 
of us' mentality of Robert Tressell's "Ragged Trousered Philanthro-
pists" . 
At the same time, it is necessary to avoid being overpessimistic 
about the prospect of ideological struggle in contemporary capitalist 
society. Indeed, on this score, it is relevant to recall that the 
working class movement emerged in the 19th century under conditions 
of infinitely more hegemonic influence for ruling class ideas (see 
below). Fittingly, as Tressell's novel serves to remind us, the 
hold of religion and nationalism on the working class underlines the 
fact that the problem of ideological domination - far from being a 
novel one, has perhaps existed for as long as the working class itself. 
Ultimately, therefore, the question of ideological struggle will 
resolve itself in the following uncompromising formulation: which 
factor will in the long-run prove more decisive in shaping the worker's 
This lends support to Connell's contention that ideological 
domination while 'pretty thorough' is 'never total'. (1977: 207) 
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outlook towards the existing social system - the bits and pieces 
of bourgeois ideology he absorbs from the 'mindbending' institutions 
of capitalist society ^ church, school, mass communication media -
in fact, the whole cynical paraphernalia of capitalist 'public 
relations', or the stubborn reality he daily confronts as a worker 
(see below;. To pose the question in this way however, is not to 
minimise the importance or the necessity for leadership and organis-
ation. On the contrary, Lenin's unique contribution to revolutionary 
theory was to empirically give force to the postulate that where the 
working class is not organised by a socialist 'vanguard' party, its 
consciousness is likely to remain stunted by the cultural milieu of 
bourgeois society. 
Accordingly, if the present economic crisis in advanced capitalist 
societies provides any possibilities of fundamental social transform-
ation, its realisation will critically depend (as Lenin's model of 
revolution suggests), upon the existence of a political leadership 
which can theoretically grasp the potentialities for change implicit 
in the underlying crisis and impart this consciousness to the protest 
activities of the masses Csee below 2), Indeed, to the degree that 
In effectJ the inherent instability of the situation is to borrow 
Tony Lane's -phraseology, ''precisely what one would expect to find where 
one class is ideologically dominated by another and yet finds itself 
periodically hard up against the exploitation of which the ideological 
dominance is but a veneer", (1974: 71^2) 
2, It cannot be too strongly stressed that "men's consciousness of the 
socially^contingent nature of the conditions under which they live, and 
their familiarity with alternative conditions and the means of attaining 
them - all this clearly varies over time and circumstance, and is 
determined by many factors, one of which at least being the kind of 
political leadership that is present at moments of particular class 
tension", (Coates, 1975: viii) 
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the collective power of the working class is expressed, in the main, 
largely through its own distinctive institutions -- the trade unions 
and the labour party, the attitudes of the leaders of these organis-
ations must, ultimately, crucially affect the situation of the class. 
Above all, to the extent that any thoroughgoing social transformation 
requires the generalisation of economic dissatisfactions into political 
grievances the problems posed for such change by the growing reformism 
of the labour party need careful examination. 
Labourism and Reformism 
It has become a venerable part of the political mythology in certain 
socialist circles, that the failure of socialism to eventuate in the 
advanced capitalist countries can basically be attributed to the endemic 
'class treachery' of the Labour Party and its leaders. While such 
oversimplifications may give solace to those who hold such 
opinions, as an explanation of why socialism has not come about in 
the industrial West, they are clearly inadequate. To begin with, to 
ascribe the absence of socialism in these societies to 'treacherous 
acts' on the part of the Labour Party and its leaders is clearly to 
beg the question of what it is about this party and its characteristic 
mode of operation which leads it to produce leaders who perpetually 
'betray' the working class struggle? 
To pose the problem in this way is naturally to raise a highly-
pertinent question: what underlies the persistent failure of the 
Labour Party to give political expression to any radical impulses 
for change? It follows that, to frame the question in this form is 
to seek answers - not in the psyches of labour leaders, but in terms 
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of the structural context of party politics in capitalist society. 
Hence, to explain "why the Labour Party has so systematically 
disappointed its supporters", one needs to centrally examine, not 
so much the psychological predispositions of individual Labour leaders, 
as the "logic and limits of social-democratic politics". (Coates, 
1975: ix-x) 
Inevitably, to adequately do so involves examination of the role of 
the state in capitalist society. Writing over a century ago, Marx 
and Engels made the famous observation that: 'The executive of the 
modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of 
the whole bourgeoisie'. (Cited in Hyman, 1975: 121) In recent times, 
of course, this opinion has come in for a great deal of criticism. For 
example, a popular conservative view is that the growth of State power 
signifies not the preservation of capitalism but its fundamental 
transformation. 
In this regard, much is made of the fact that in contemporary capitalist 
society business enterprises are subject increasingly to a whole variety 
of forms of State regulation. However, such arguments tend to miss the 
fundamental point. For, whatever curtailment of individual capitalist 
'freedoms' has resulted from various state interventions, such inter-
ventions serve - not to challenge the capitalist mode of accumulation 
but to express it. Indeed, one of the major impulses behind the 
increased role of the State in economic affairs has been the changes 
which have occurred in the capitalist mode of production. As Goran 
Therborn explains it: 
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State intervention has grown to meet the need for large-^scale, 
long-^term investment that is too risky for private capital to 
undertake, and the need for a degree of economic coordination 
that cannot be realised by the market. The dependence of 
monopoly capitalism upon a few giant corporations has further 
encouraged ad hoc state action to rescue ailing companies, 
(1978: 67) 
Likewise, contrary to conservative fears, "state intervention in the 
field of 'social welfare' is not necessarily an obstacle to capital 
accumulation: as Bismarck already understood, it can even strength-
en the capitalist regime against challenge and revolt". (Therborn, 
1978: 72) (see below). 
Put simply, the "enlarged role of the State" in modern capitalist 
societies reflects not merely its position "as controller and part-
owner of the national economy": equally-^important, is that its 
"role in the 'social field outside production proper, complements 
this role within production" since such services - notably education, 
"run by the state have a function both in producing labour-power 
and in controlling and manipulating labour in and out of the production 
process". (Shaw, 1975: 32) To say therefore that the steady growth 
of state power will be used to ensure the viability of the existing 
social system is to do no more than to recognise the "policy constraints 
(on the state - W.S) which stem necessarily from the capitalist context 
This is not to imply tlw.t the rvMng^ class will neaessarily pei^oeive 
a certain state intervention to he in their interest. In fact, the 
case of Roosevelt's 'New Deal' is cited by Therborn to make the point 
that "a certain intervention may well go against prevailing ruling^ 
class opinion, (emphasis added) while objectively furthering or 
maintaining its mode of exploitation and domination". (1978: 148) 
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of political life", (Hyman, 1^75; 121) Prominent among such 
constraints, Hyman considers: 
'Economic stability' is the precondition of all the other 
goals which governments pursue, whatever their political 
complexion; yet (in the absence of mobilisation to overturn 
capitalist economic relations) this inevitably entails the 
stability of a capitalist economy. Hence private profit -
the barometer of economic 'health' and the source of new 
investment - has to be encouraged; and with it, intention-
ally or not, the associated inequalities of power and 
material advantage. More generally, policies must be 
pursued which maintain what is termed 'the confidence of 
industry' (which means, not the majority who work in industry 
but the minority who own and control industry. 
(1975: 125) 
To some degree, these 'limits to radicalism' are inherent in the logic 
of parliamentarism itself. In the first place, as Claus Offe has 
noted, "the voting constituency of the parties does not have a clearly 
delimited sociostructural composition, but in fact displays extensive 
overlappings". (1972: 91) Put simply: 
The constituencies from which parliamentary representatives 
are elected are defined by m.ore or less arbitrary lines on 
the map; they contain no necessary internal homogeneity, no 
patterns of internal relationships which are a source of 
organic unity (as is to some extent the case, say, of the 
workforce of the factory). 
(Hyman, 1975: 123) 
Significantly, moreover, not only is a heterogeneous grouping of 
"employers and workers, housewives and shopkeepers, landlords and 
tenants - notameaningful entity outside the election period itself", 
(Hyman, 1975: 123)5 but more importantly, as Therborn observes, 
"once elected they (parliamentarians - W.S) are not answerable to 
their constituents". (1978: 106) Interestingly, as Richard Hyman 
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reminds us: 
The argument that parliamentary representatives must, 
between elections, be Immune from popular control was 
originally explicitly anti-democratic, It is Ironical 
that this should now be a central proposition of 
'parliamentary democracy', 
(Hyman, 1975: 123) 
Accordingly, what the perennial attempts by contemporary parties to 
capture the political 'middle ground' classically exemplify is at 
least an awareness that, as Offe puts it, "the ability to permanently 
sustain a broad appeal beyond class, strata, or particular interests 
has become a sine qua non for the success of the party as such". 
(1972: 84) Thus, insofar as such parties comprise the effective 
universe of political choice in capitalist society, changing govern-
ments has become essentially a meaningless spectacle r- a choice, as 
Catley and McFarlane (1974) sardonically put it, between 'Tweedledum' 
and 'Tweedledee'. Making due allowances for exaggeration, it is 
difficult to dispute the broad implications of Catley and McFarlane's 
observation. As spelt out by Offe, what parliamentary elections 
basically serve to underline is that "differences between parties lie 
not so much with divergent overall conceptions as with ad hoc, played-
up timely issues of high press value, which of course must never 
compromise any actual or potential coalition truce". (1972: 84) 
Although one might question that considerations of potential coalition 
- either explicitly or implicitly form part of political motivations 
in electioneering, plainly, the political preoccupation with media 
'image' - of the parties and especially their leaders, to which Offe 
draws attention - should, in view of his foregoing comments, come as 
no great surprise. 
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One of the bitterest and most persistent criticisms of socials 
democratic politics concerns the ability of the parliamentary party 
to flout arguably, even the 'binding' decisions of its own party 
conferences. However, what needs to be realised, is that to a large 
extent, this relative independence of the parliamentary party from 
direct control of the party rank-^and^-file is not unique to social-
democratic politics. Rather, it is rooted in the institution of 
parliament itself. 
Put simply, the parliamentary system of political representation 
tends to create and institutionalise a line of division within 
political parties into 'parliamentary wings' and organisational or 
'administrative wings'. It is, therefore, not without significance 
that "party leaders and prime ministers are usually made and unmade 
by parliamentary groups, rather than by the extra-parliamentary 
bodies of their party" (Therborn, 1978: 106). Fundamentally, 
what this serves to signify is not simply the degree to which "the 
centre of power has been firmly located within their parliamentary 
bodies". (Therborn, 1978: 106) Equally important, what underlies 
the pre-eminence of the parliamentary sphere, is, what Richard Hyman 
calls, the "ideology of the independence and autonomy of the State". 
(1975: 129) 
Translated into an elaborate framework of parliamentary rules and 
procedures, this ideology has facilitated the incorporation of 
"Social-Democratic parties into the political order" as successive 
of these administrations and their leaderships have allowed them-
selves to be persuaded that "they are responsible first of all to 
parliament and secondarily to their own party membership". 
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(Therborn, 1978: 106) (see below) This pressure to demonstrate 
that they are not merely the representatives of some 'sectional 
interest' has traditionally been deployed with considerable skill 
and success against Labour and Social-Democratic administrations. 
Therborn, for example, cites the case of the first social-democratic 
government in Sweden. As he tells it, one of the first requests of 
the party by the Swedish monarch was that, as Therborn puts it, "it 
should act quite independently of the influence of 'external bodies'". 
(.1978: 106) 
Needless to say, swearing allegiance to the institutions of capitalist 
society is hardly compatible with commitment to radically transform 
them. It is therefore not surprising that this kind of criticism 
has been often used to considerable effect as a political weapon 
Certainly parliamentavlsm tends to accentuate the division between 
parliamentary hranch of a labour or social-democratic party and its 
working-^class and trade union base. But this is part of a more 
general tendency which has been oompound.ed by the relative political 
powerlessness of the parliamentary back-bencher^ Indeed, what 
mystifications about ^responsibility to parliament ' serve to conceal 
is that, as Offe (1972) notes, the nature of the parliamentary system 
acts increasingly to hinder parliamentary backbenchers from perform-
ing their formal roles within the legislature as independent watch-" 
dogs of government action. In fact, as he argues, "in the institution-
alised permanent electoral struggle, the government and parliamentary 
fraction of the government party are dependent on one another in a 
way which prohibits the participation of the latter in the public 
regulatory functions of the pajcliament", (1972: 90). Offe thus 
concludes that insofar as it makes sense "to speaK of an institution-
alised line of conflict within the political system, it is certainly 
not drawn between the parliament and the government, but between the 
government and the government fraction on the one hand, and the 
parliamentary opposition on the other". (1972: 90). It is therefore 
such factors which largely eccplain the basic political ineffectiveness 
of the so-called 'parliamentary left' of labour and social-democratic 
parties, and why, as David Coates (1975) so brilliantly shows, ideolog-
ical postures an^. radical reputations gained in opposition are such 
poor gv.ides to action when the party comes to office. 
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against labour and socialr-democratic governments. Yet, at the same 
time, to the degree that these parties encounter such forms of 
political opposition it is clear that "Labour governments have not 
been without problems for the ruling class" (Therborn, 1978: 209). 
Conve rsely, however, it is a by now familiar observation that several 
years of social^democratic government in various societies have not 
succeeded in eliminating the capitalist economic basis of these 
societies. True, they have managed to mitigate some of the uglier 
features of the system. But they have not abolished it. For many, 
failure of these parties to do so is seen as confirmation of the 
belief that to seek to change the system through parliament is to 
condemn such efforts and their advocates to political impotence. 
Although such a view is overpessimistic, nevertheless, the cautionary 
tale of the Allende government in Chile serves as a forceful reminder 
that the 'parliamentary road to socialism' is a rocky one and one 
fraught with political dangers for the unwary and the unprepared. 
Yet having said all that, it must also be admitted that the failure 
of social'^democratic governments has resulted ^ not from the fact 
that the 'parliamentary road to socialism' has been tried and found 
wanting. Rather, more likely than not, it has been found wanting and 
not tried. The technocratic enthusiasms of contemporary social-
democratic politicians are thus - not an aberration but a logical 
development of reformist politics. In fact, the deletion from the 
party platform of the Australian Labor Party of its traditional 
objective to 'socialise the means of production, distribution and 
exchange: at the federal conference of the party at Terrigal, N.S.W. 
in February, 1975, only served to formalise the de facto abandonment 
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of socialist aims which had been gradually taking place over many 
years. 
Characteristically, with the advent of economic crisis in the industrial 
West during the mid-1970's, the Australian Labor government - like all 
social-democratic governments, has found that working for reforms 
within the existing social order obeys certain impersonal laws of 
the capitalist market. Basically, the most important lesson the crisis 
teaches is that as a general rule, social and economic reforms pre-
suppose the necessary material prosperity to sustain the required 
concessions. An economic crisis therefore which can only be made 
worse by the making of reforms only serves to highlight the inherent 
limitations of reformist politics. 
Thus, as Labour and social-democratic governments found during the 
Depression of the 1930's and as they are rediscovering again today, 
given their acceptance of the permanency of the capitalist system as 
a framework for political action, when the system is in crisis, they 
are obliged by the logic of their ideological position to institute 
policies which would ensure its survival - even where this means 
sacrificing the interests of the working class whom they purport to 
represent. In effect, therefore, the economic policies pursued by 
governments during the Great Depression were basically the same -
whatever the political complexions of such governments. 
Similarly, the economic policies being pursued by governments of 
capitalist societies during the present economic crisis - although 
differing in minor details and modes of implementation, are broadly 
alike. Regardless of their subjective wishes or desires, the 
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policies of labor governments must in the final analysis obey the same 
relentless logic of the capitalist mode of accumulation. 
To economists like Glyn and Sutcliffe (1972), the crisis typically 
presents itself as a 'profit squeeze' being experienced by capitalist 
industry. Accordingly, they see the inevitable solution as involving 
a fairly massive transfer of resources from wages back to profits. 
Characteristically, Glyn and Sutcliffe's thesis on the cause of the 
economic crisis has been fiercely disputed by their fellow economists. 
Notably, the observation is made that their argument is based over-
whelmingly on the evidence of British economic conditions which are 
not necessarily representative of other capitalist societies. (See 
Holland, 1975: 394-8) (See below) Such claims, notwithstanding, 
it is very significant that the economic interventions of the state 
in the various crisis-ridden capitalist countries have, by and large, 
been remarkably similar. 
To sum up therefore, the failure of social-democratic governments to 
effect drastic social change reflects all too clearly, what David 
Coates calls, the "fundamental incompatability between the goal of 
socialism and the basis of power of the Parliamentary State". 
In reply to such criticisms of Glyn and Sutcliffes argiment^ two 
points should perhaps he made^ Firstly^ the economic crisis is 
a generalised one in the capitalist world. As the U.S. magazine 
'Time' (Decemher 22, 1971: 41) reported, not even such traditional 
bastions of capitalist economic 'success' like Switzerland, have 
managed to remain exempt from the problems of high inflation and 
high unemployment. Secondly, the misleading nature of international 
comparisons of economic conditions is superhLy disclosed by the same 
'Time' story. Briefly, it relates that Switzerland was attempting 
to solve its unemployment problem by seeking to repatriate its 
'guest' workers, IJhat moreover, should be noted is that in certain 
European countries, Switzerland incLuded, 'guest workers' are not 
included in official unempLoyment statistics. 
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(1975; 229), In short, to the extent that such governments have 
traditionally sought to transform capitalism from within, they have 
found repeatedly that such attempts tend to founder because the 
administration of a capitalist system intrinsically entails obeying 
its economic dictates. If, therefore, the present economic crisis 
in the capitalist world serves to make one thing very clear, it is 
this: 
... in situations in which the national capitalism is too 
competitively weak to pay the price of ambitious programmes 
of social reform. Labour Governments that depend on the 
voluntary co-operation of the senior echelons of the 
capitalist command structure will fail to deliver that which 
they promised, and in the process undermine their credibility 
with their own electorate .... 
(Coates, 1975: 222) 
Accordingly, what is important to bear in mind is that under such 
conditions, "the Labor Party will doubtless be brought up against, 
and be obliged to challenge, the industrial power and degree of 
job control of its own working class electorate. And it will come 
to that confrontation not as the passive tool of an unseen capitalist 
elite, but on its own initiative and out of the logic of its own 
dependence on State power". (Coates, 1975: 223) (.emphasis added). 
Characteristically, the resulting frictions between Labor governments 
and the trade unions likely to find their fullest expression in the 
trade union leaders ^ caught up as they are between the conflicting 
pressures from the government to hold down wage demands and from their 
rank-and-file to protect their jobs and living standards. However, if 
the response of trade unions and trade union leaders to the present 
economic crisis is to be adequately understood, it is imperative to 
have some insight into the nature of trade unionism under capitalism 
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and the way this influences the role that the trade union leadership 
plays. 
Trade unions and trade union leadership; The paradoxes of 
organisation and protest 
Like the Labor Party, trade unions and trade union leaders also come 
in for a great deal of criticism. A significant feature of much 
criticism of union leaders however, is that it rarely explores the 
fundamental issue: namely, what social forces actually shape the 
role played by trade union leaders in capitalist society? Rather, 
the emphasis tends to be placed on the various factors which disting-
uish the union leadership from the rank-^-and-^file. Thus, frequent 
resort is made to the union leader's 'middle class' life style, his 
virtual entrenchment in office and the like. But, important as such 
factors doubtlessly are, to adequately comprehend the role of union 
leader in capitalist society, it is necessary to critically examine 
the structural context in which trade unions operate. 
In the first place, it is relevant to note that trade unionism 
originally emerged as a collective working-r-class response to capitalist 
exploitation in the workplace. Yet, while it intrinsically represents 
an institutional expression of working class opposition to capitalism, 
trade unionism is simultaneously as Gramsci observed, "a reflection 
of capitalist society" (cited in Hyman, 1971: 12). By this he meant 
that trade unionism "organises workers, not as producers but as wage-
earners, that is as creations of the capitalist system of private 
property, as sellers of their labour-power" (cited in Hyman, 1971: 12) 
56, 
Since, as their very name implies, the basis of their organisation 
is the trade, it is scarcely surprising that trade unions should 
reflect, as Richard Hyman puts it, "the industrial and occupational 
divisions of capitalism rather than uniting workers as a class". 
a971: 12) 
Fundamentally, therefore, trade unionism is simultaneously an 
expression and a critique of capitalist property relations. 
... on the one hand a protest and defence against the economic 
and human deprivations imposed on workers by their role in 
capitalist industry; on the other a means of accommodation 
to the political economy of capitalist industry. This in 
turn reflects the contradictory pressures inherent in trade 
union organisation and collective bargaining activity: on 
the one hand the expression of the basic conflict of interest 
between employers and employees ,., on the other the develop-
ment of a stable and compatible bargaining relationship. 
Hence the curious phenomenon of 'antagonistic co-operation' 
... the constant interpretation of conflictual and collaborative 
aspects of trade unionism, 
(Hyman, 1974: 257-8) 
Characteristically, the contradictions of trade unionism under 
capitalism tend to find their most acute manifestation in the role 
of union leader. This involves all union leaders - regardless of 
political ideology. Underlying it, as Hobsbawm observed, is the 
elemental fact that: 
even the most revolutionary must fight the battles for 
improvement and reform according to the nature of the 
terrain, which is that of 'realistic' calculation in a 
capitalist econom.y and a capitalist state. That is to 
say they must compromise, make allies, and in general 
act as reformists. If he is to be effective in a stable 
capitalist economy, even the communist union leader must 
do this, whatever his private reservations and calculations. 
(cited in Lane, 1974: 234-5) 
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Put simply, the struggle to win economic concessions from the system 
is as imperative for the radical union leader as it is for his 
conservative colleagues. Indeed, as Tony Lane puts it, "the leader 
who hoped for the dissolution of capitalism nevertheless had to come 
to terms with a capitalist reality in his daily round". U974: 228). 
For all that, the ideological position of the union leader is not 
completely irrelevant. 
While it did not alter the fact that a capitalist reality 
had to be coped with, some scope still remained. The 
reality did not have to be embraced: it v/as entirely 
possible to regard it as provisional, 
(Lane, 1974: 229) 
As Lane proceeds to further explain, even such an ostensibly innoc-
uous activity like where the union chose to invest its funds was of 
'symbolic' importance. 
It did at least signal a refusal to regard capitalism as an 
immutable object ^ and to that rather quiet extent helped 
ensure that ideas resembling socialism stayed alive, 
(Lane, 1974: 230) 
However, while capitalism may not necessarily be thought of as 
'immutable', it does not avoid the constant need for radical union 
leaders to engage in the fight for material concessions from employ-
ers. 
Certainly they were in no position to tell the members to 
put up with the problems of the day because the morrow would 
see the dawning of a socialist society. Such a statement 
would have been met with baffled incredulity -r- and quickly 
followed by the sound of feet tramping off in the opposite 
direction, 
(Lane, 1974: 241) 
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As one might therefore reasonably gather from this, whatever his 
politics, the primary task of the union leader is inevitably to 
get a better deal for his members from their employers. Put bluntly, 
unless he wishes to be dumped as their industrial representative 
and the articulator of their economic grievances, the union leader 
plainly cannot defer the problem of material improvements in his 
members' economic conditions to the coming of the socialist millenium. 
To the extent that this is true, the actions of trade union leaders 
are largely dictated by the logic of unionism in capitalist society. 
This centrally implies that to gain better wages and working conditions 
for their members, trade union leaders must have some institutional 
means of negotiating with employers. The importance of this is self-
evident. 
Negotiations^ by virtue of deciding what went out of the 
till and into members' pockets, simultaneously decided 
the fate of the union as an organisation and the leader's 
place within it, 
(Lane, 1974: 242) 
Yet, the process of negotiation itself poses a dilemma for the trade 
union leader. By its very nature, negotiation involves mutual 
compromise. Rarely does the initial claim by unions and counter-
offer by management bear much relation to the eventual settlement. 
Characteristically, this need to reach agreement frequently gives 
rise to accusations of 'sell-outs' which union leaders frequently 
experience from disgruntled members of their own rank-and-file. 
Exploding this criticism however, Lane suggests that it signifies 
a fundamental inability to grasp that "working within the system 
meant making compromises with it". (1974: 177) In fact, as he 
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goes on to disclose: 
What 'selling out' most typically meant (blatant cases of 
treachery apart) was that opinions differed as to what was 
a 'reasonable' compromise. That labour leaders were ready 
to compromise rarely had anything to do with their political 
morality. Indeed most frequently it was, more than any-
thing else, a reflection of the dilemma that mutually 
embraced both leaders and followers, 
(Lane, 1974; 177) 
To a large extent, this 'dilemma', as Lane calls it, is rooted in 
the logic of the bargaining relationship itself. As Fox reminds us, 
underlying any system of industrial conflict settlement is a measure 
of normative consensus between the contending parties about the rules 
provided, of course, that they are "congruent with the aspirations 
of both sides". (1971: 149) More importantly, to the degree that 
"there is normative agreement about these behaviours, it embodies 
a recognition by both sides that any immediate tactical advantage 
resulting from violation of shared expectations would be outweighed 
by damage to the system within which they had hitherto accomplished 
satisfactory results". (Fox, 1971: 149) 
Characteristically, the trade union leader's acute sensitivity to 
such problems quite frequently gives rise to charges of 'attachment 
to the status-quo' (see Cliff, 1975: 126) from his critics. This 
point is well made in an amusing but probably apocryphal story 
related by Tony Cliff. As he tells it, a union leader was addressing 
a mass protest meeting of his members. 
He asked them: 'Do you want more money?' And to his 
surprise the shout came back loud and clear; 'No', 
'Do you want more holidays?' Again the answer came; 
'No'.' Baffled he asked: 'What do you want?' The reply 
was, 'We want the revolution? He retorted: 'But that's 
not on. Management will never agree to that.' 
(Cliff, 1975; 126-7) 
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It is, of course, fairly easy for their critics to satirise the 
concern of union leaders with maintaining the bargaining relation-
ship by at least keeping the lines of communication with management 
open. The really important question which this type of criticism 
begs however, is what are his options if he totally refuses to 
negotiate with management? To pose the question in this way, is to 
call attention to the relatively limited resources that he can 
mobilise - particularly in the face of determined opposition from 
both employers and the state - rather than to indulge in simplistic 
speculations about the quality of his moral courage which underlies 
the popular 'lack of guts' hypothesis. (See below) 
What is essential to realise is that the basic dilemmas that trade 
union leaders must continually confront reside in the institution 
of wage^labour itself. 
The trade union leader, in other words, experiences a commitment 
to the existing bargaining arrangements and the terms of 
collective agreements. This commitment, moreover, is attrib-
utable less to any personal characteristics of the official 
than to his function: the negotiation and renegotiation of 
order within constraints set by a capitalist economy and a 
capitalist state, 
(Hyman, 1975: 91) 
These points are further rammed home by Tony Lane, 
This is by no means to deny that the union leadev is uniquely -placed 
to influence his members' perceptions of what constitutes a 'reasonable 
compromise'. 
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Union leaders had to pursue the immediate interests of their 
members, and to do that they had^ to establish reasonable 
working relationships with employers, If personal bitterness, 
hostility and acrim.ony continually punctuated their meetings, 
then efficient negotiations would have been almost possible. 
That, presumably, would only have suited trade union leaders 
had they been operating in a near revolutionary situation 
with the working class prepared in outlook and organisation. 
With the working class prepared in neither of these respects, 
even the union leader who would have had it otherwise had no 
choice but to become a professional, a master of what George 
Woodcock called the 'shabby compromise'. 
(1974; 248) 
A recurring criticism of modern trade unions is that their increas-
ingiy bureaucratic character assigns 'too much power' to the union 
leaders and inhibits rank-and-file members from exercising democratic 
control over the actions of their officials. The question of democ-
racy in trade unions is, to be sure, a problem which troubles many 
people -r- including union leaders themselves. Yet, it is important 
to recognise that the bureaucratic tendencies within trade unions 
are unlikely to be simply a result of the 'power-hungry' proclivities 
of union leaders as many of their conservative critics fondly 
imagine. Rather, as Lois MacDonald (1959) insists, the bureaucratic 
nature of the trade unions is largely a reflection of their vastly 
altered functions as a consequence of employer and state acknowledge-
ment of their legitimacy. As MacDonald goes on to explain: 
Collective bargaining processes and duties in administering 
contracts place a premium on skills of negotiation and admin-
istration with the result that the type of 'agitational and 
organisational' leader is in less demand than he was in the 
formative period of union growth. Therefore, the agitator is 
replaced by the administrator, who in dealing with employers 
and in directing the organisational life of the union gains 
valuable experience and entrenched position, 
(1959: 6) 
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But, whatever the underlying causes for its emergence, there is no 
doubt that the bureaucratisation of trade unions raises profound 
questions about the power of union leaders. Much has been made of 
the 'oligarchical' nature of trade unions in which a relative lack 
of direct membership control over internal union administration has 
allowed a strong and largely self-perpetuating leadership to emerge. 
Scepticism about the possibility of striking a balance between the 
demands of administrative efficiency and those of internal democracy, 
of course, finds theoretical underpinning in Michels' 'iron law of 
oligarchy' which articulated the celebrated aphorism: 'Who says 
organisation, says oligarchy'. 
Since Michels' famous theoretical observations on the shrinkage of 
democratic control in trade unions, this problem, as Hyman notes, 
has tended to be conceptualised in terms of such subjective categories 
as membership 'apathy' or alternatively, leadership 'corruption' or 
'careerism'. To the extent that this approach represents even a minor 
tendency in trade union analysis, Hyman's warning is very timely. 
As he rightly says: "To remain at this level of analysis is ... to 
moralise rather than to explain". (1975: 69) 
Taking a hard look at much of the analysis of trade union leadership 
power, we see that fundamental to the notion of an 'iron law of 
oligarchy' is the assumption that there exists a basic line of cleavage 
within trade unions between their leaders and their rank-and-file. Kor 
writers like Tony Cliff (1975), the objective conditions for this gulf 
between leadership and led are to be found in the relatively privileged 
economic position of the leader vis-a-vis his members and the bureau-
cratic nature of his organisational role. These factors are thus seen 
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as contriving to create an elite within trade unions with distinctive 
interests of its own, not the least of which is perpetuation of itself 
in office. 
However, what should be forcefully emphasised is that what distinguishes 
trade union leaders as a social category is not so much that they may 
have interests that are qualitatively different from those of their 
members. Kather, the distinction lies in the exigencies of their role. 
Accordingly, whether or not trade union leaders support the workers' 
struggle is intrinsically a function of the degree to which their actions 
are subject to the control of the workers. 
Arguably, many of the factors which are seen to differentiate union 
leaders from their members are, to some extent, symptoms rather than 
causes of oligarchic tendencies in trade unions. Admittedly, compared 
with their members some union officials are very favourably placed 
financially, but as Hyman cautions: 
The attractions should not he exaggerated: the hours of work 
are often long, the pressures considerable, the pay (for 
junior officials at least) rarely much above the earnings of 
the higher-paid sections of the membership. 
(1975: 78) 
Although Hyman is here referring to the British union movement, his 
comments would seem to be broadly applicable to its Australian counter-
part also. 
Underlying the dialectics of oligarchy and democracy within trade 
unions is the curious phenomenon to which Lois MacDonald calls our 
attention where: 
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On the one hand, members seek to impress the leaders with 
constant reminders that they are the servants of the 
workers and, on the other, they bestov/ on the officials 
ample status and power to act on occasion with considerable 
indifference to the interest of members. 
(1959: 76) 
Even so, it is clear that in the final analysis there are inherent 
contradictions within trade unionism that prevent union leaders from 
totally functioning as 'managers of discontent', as Wright Mills 
U948) wryly dubbed them. Indeed, as Hyman has insightfully suggested; 
If excessive discontent and conflict is disruptive of 
established bargaining relationships - excessive passivity 
is equally unpalatable - depriving the whole institution 
of its basic raison d'etre.. The union official cannot 
suppress 'rebellion' entirely without rendering his organ-
isation and himself redundant: his task is to sustain a 
delicate balance between grievance and satisfaction, between 
activism and acquiescence. Potentially, at least, this must 
be regarded as a highly-precarious enterprise^ 
(1971: 37) 
Or, to put it in the rather more colourful terminology of C. Wright 
Mills, "the labour leader can play the role of brakeman only at the 
risk of losing his seat as engineer". (1948: 288) 
Finally, it remains to be said that inherent in Michel's 'iron las 
of oligarchy' is the presupposition that trade union leaders have 
been rendered incapable of radical class action by the structural 
constraints in which they operate. Put simply, the basic implic-
ation of Michels' excessively gloomy conception of social change, 
is that political visionaries who wish to radically transform society 
should refrain from seeking election to full-time office as this 
inevitably generates bureaucratic pressures which culminate in the 
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abandonment of their revolutionary zeal, (See below) But underlying 
the 'iron law of oligarchy' with its postulate of leadership 
'corruptibility', is an assumption that suspiciously resembles a 
doctrine of organisational 'original sin'. 
However, as Hobsbawn has recently written, "if the left may have to 
think more seriously about the new society, that does not make it 
any less desirable or necessary, or the case against the present one 
any less compelling". (1978: 64) Fittingly, with the crisis in 
advanced capitalist society revealing 'the system's' decreasing 
ability to make concessions of any sort to pressures 'from below' 
(.Hobsbawm, 1978: 66), it is perhaps timely to critically re-examine 
the classical Marxist views of trade unions as instruments of 
socialist transformation. 
In effect, to aooept formulations such, as Uicfiels' 'iron law of 
oligarchy' is to foster defeatism about the prospect of genuine 
social chcmge. For, in essence, 'oligarchy' is seen in this 
approach as an inevitable tendency of any movement for radical 
social change - in sliort, an immanent 'law' of historical devel-
opment. Viewed in these terms therefore, revolutionary change 
is simply an illusion, as in Michels' view, it is predestined 
to culminate in oligarchy, leaving the masses as equally power-
less to influence events after the revolution as before it. 
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3 . M A R X I S M A N D U N I O N I S M 
M A R X 
That the work of Karl Marx has made a valuable contribution 
to the study of trade unionism is a statement which is likely to 
provoke little dissent among sociologists. Certainly, not even the 
fiercest opponents of Marx's ideas would go so far as to deny that 
the sociology of trade unionism is greatly in his intellectual debt. 
Basically, Marx's views on trade unionism are situated, and so have 
to be understood, in the context of his wider analysis of the 
revolutionary potential and historic tasks of the proletariat. 
Significantly, a key element in Marx's conception of revolution, 
outlined in "Capital" and the "Communist Manifesto" is that capital-
ism not only pauperises the working-classes and polarises society -
it also creates its own executioners in the form of the proletariat. 
In analysing Marx's vision of the class war, Joseph Banks points to 
the emphasis he placed on "the part to be played in the class struggle 
by organisations - trade unions, international working men's assoc-
iations, political parties". (1970: 46) 
Nevertheless, as Banks readily admits, despite his voluminous writings 
on the working-class and his long and intimate association with the 
leadership of the European trade union movement in the First Inter-
national, Marx never addressed himself theoretically (at least, not 
in a systematic way), to the question of trade unions or the specific 
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part they were to play in the revolutionary struggle of the working-
class. Accordingly, it has been left to later writers to piece to-
gether Marx's scattered references to the subject. Much of the 
credit for this work belongs to Lozovsky (1935) whose book, despite 
its partisan and adulatory treatment of Marx, remains the most 
comprehensive attempt so far to discuss Marx's views on trade unionism. 
In examining Marx's conception of the role of trade unions in the 
proletarian struggle, Lozovsky affirms that: 
Marx, first and foremost, considered the trade unions 
organising centres for collecting the forces of the 
workers, organisations for giving the v/orkers an 
elementary class training. 
(1935: 15) 
As Lozovsky discloses, Marx and EngeJs in their correspondence cease-
lessly emphasised the view that trade unions not only provide a basis 
for working-class unity but are also 'schools of socialism". [1935: 
15-16). Citing Marx's resolution on the role and functions of trade 
unionism under capitalism at the Geneva Congress of the First Inter-
national in 1866, Lozovsky underlines Marx's perception of the polit-
ical task of trade unions as being primarily to "emancipate the down-
trodden masses". (See Lozovsky, 1935: 16-18) 
Certainly, in his 'Instructions for delegates to the Geneva Congress', 
Marx clearly envisages trade unions as agencies of political social-
isation which serve to alert the working-class to its revolutionary 
responsibilities. For instance, in dealing with the "past, present 
and future" of the trade unions, Marx identifies the basic impulse 
behind the formation of trade unions as the economic exploitation 
68. 
Of the workers by capitalist employers. 
To Marx, therefore, the principal significance of trade unions for 
class struggle lay in the fact that they constitute embryonic 
manifestations of working-class solidarity - even though the unions 
themselves may be subjectively unaware of such implications of their 
existence. Expanding upon this notion, Marx hypothesises that 
"unconsciously to themselves, the trade unions were forming centres 
of organisation of the working class, as the medieval municipalities 
and communes did for the middle class". (Marx, 1974: 91) 
Trade unionism thus contributes to the development of working-class 
consciousness by virtue of the unceasing economic struggle it is 
compelled to wage against the bourgeoisie. In Marx's view, such 
"activity of the trade unions is not only legitimate, it is necessary" 
(1974: 91) Nevertheless, as he emphasises: 
If the trade unions are required for the guerilla 
fights between capital and labour, they are still 
more important as organised agencies for superseding 
the very system of wage labour and capital rule. 
(Marx, 1974: 91) 
In brief, then, Marx's conception of trade unionism envisions that 
trade unions under capitalism initially emerge as defensive organ-
isations at the point of production to protect and secure the econom-
ic interests of the workers. However, in the course of the economic 
struggle, the workers progressively become aware of their distinctive 
class interests vis-a-vis the bourgeoisie. This transformation of 
the working-class from a 'class-in-itself' into a 'class-for-itself' 
simultaneously translates the class struggle from a fragmented 
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industrial battle aimed at wringing economic concessions from the 
existing social order into a full-blown political movement which will 
confront and ultimately overthrow the entire system of economic and 
social ppression. (See Hyman, 1971: 6-8) 
Generally-speaking, however, Western trade unions have manifestly 
failed to fulfill Marx's expectations of them. As Hyman C1971) reminds 
us, even during his own lifetime, the trade unions evidenced little 
inclination to assume the revolutionary role assigned to them by Marx. 
Yet, as Hyman goes on to say, although Marx and Engels were fully 
aware of the lack of revolutionary fervor on the part of the 19th cent-
ury trade union movement, they did not fundamentally alter their theory 
of revolution. (Jn the contrary, suggests Hyman, they were inclined to 
regard the non-revolutionary character of the fledgling trade union 
movement as at worst a temporary deviation from the predicted evolution-
ary process. (See Hyman, 1971: 8) 
Hyman contends that the presupposition by Marx and Engels that the 
absence of a revolutionary or even vaguely socialist outlook, 
(especially on the part of the early British trade unions), was 
simply a transient phenomenon, led them to cast around for explanations 
of the problem based largely upon the unique historical circumstances 
of British capitalism. Thus, as he points out, they tended to 
excuse the lack of revolutionary zeal of the British trade unions on 
the grounds that the existing unions were an 'aristocracy of labour' 
comprising only the most skilled and privileged sector of the working 
class. This condition, "was seen as eventually self-correcting" 
as unionism was extended to the semi-skilled and un-skilled 
70 . 
layers of the proletariat. (1971: 9) 
In effect, then the imperviousness of the 19th century British trade 
union movement to revolutionary socialism was ascribed by Marx and 
Engels to the opportunism and class-collaborationism of some union 
leaders - an accusation not entirely without substance. As David 
Fernbach explains in his introduction to Marx's "The First Inter-
national and after", a number of British trade union leaders "had 
quite literally 'sold-out' to the bourgeoisie and after the passage 
of the 1867 Keform Act they worked secretly and successfully - in 
exchange for Home Office bribes - to mobilise the working-class 
behind the Liberal Party in the 1868 general election". C1974: 25) 
Moreover, Fernbach indicates that despite Marx's efforts, British 
trade union leaders were basically inhospitable to the idea of 
socialist revolution. (See below) In fact, he suggests that for a 
number of these union leaders, affiliation with the First Internation-
al represented a pragmatic evaluation of the practical advantages 
accruing from membership rather than a declaration of political 
belief. As Fernbach notes the First International played an important 
part in checking the practice of international strike-breaking by 
"preventing the import of foreign workers to break strikes" - a not 
Such an Intevpretation is shaved by Collins wnd Ahramsky who in 
their examination of the impact of Marxian ideas on the First 
International Comment: "It seems paradoxical that it was in 
England where the General Council of the International ... 
(was based and) ... where Karl Marx came into contact with 
leading trade unionists that his direct influence was so small". 
(1965: vi) 
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infrequent practice in the Victorian era. (1974: 10). Thus, 
according to Fernbach, such forms of practical assistance to the 
union movement by the First International encouraged "English trade 
unionists ... (to use) the International as a surrogate international 
department of the newly-formed T.U.C.". (1974:25; 
Finally, Hyman discloses that Marx and Engels tended to view the 
reformist outlook of British trade unions as basically a reflection 
of the bourgeoisification of the English working-class stemming from 
"the monopoly position of British capitalism in the world economy". 
(.Hyman, 1971: 9) Central to this interpretation of the revolutionary 
inertia of the British proletariat is Engels' sardonic observation 
that the British working class was: 
becoming more and more bourgeois!fled, so that this 
most bourgeois of all nations in the end apparently 
wants to have a bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois 
proletariat alongside the bourgeoisie. For a nation 
that exploits the whole world this as a matter-of-fact 
is more or less natural. 
(See Lozovsky, 1935: 58) 
However, regardless of whether such behaviour is 'natural' or not, 
it certainly is the case that Marx and Engels envisaged the bourgeois-
ification of the British working class as a passing phase, destined 
to disappear, as Hyman puts it, "as the British economy faced increas-
ing international competition" which would inevitably erode "the 
privileged position of British workers". (1971: 10) By and large, 
therefore, Marx and Engels did not visualise the conditions which 
gave rise to trade union reformism as permanent. Consequently, they 
presumably saw little reason to drastically revise their theory of the 
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transition to socialism. (See below) At the same time, it is 
difficult to quarrel with Hyman's assertion that there is in 
certain Marxian writings at least some recognition of the intrin-
sically reformist tendencies of trade unions. For example, as 
Marx wrote in "Wages, Price and Profit": 
Trade unions work well as centres of resistance against 
the encroachments of capital. They fail partially from 
an injudicious use of their power. They fail generally 
from limiting themselves to a guerilla war against the 
effects of the existing system, instead of simultaneously 
trying to change it, instead of using their organised 
forces as a lever for the final emancipation of the 
working class, that is to say the ultimate abolition of 
the wages system. 
(See Glyn and Sutcliffe, 1972: 208) 
But, notwithstanding such insights, "At the level of general theory, 
their early revolutionary interpretation of trade unionism remained 
unquestioned by Marx and Engels". (Hyman, 1971: 11) 
Yet, as Marouse notes: "The failure of the pvoletavLat to act as 
the vevolutionary class is anticipated in Marxian theory; per se, 
(the above conditions - l^.S) do not constitute events which must 
refute the theory. (Emphasis added) In Marxian theory, they are 
generally explained, by objective and subjective 'imnaturity' and 
considered as a temporary regression, after which the revolution-
ary trend will be resumed loith a subsequent growth in the class 
consciousness of the organised proletariat. But the situation is 
quite different if, with or without a defeated revolut-ion, the 
development of mature capitalism shows a long-range trend towards 
class collaboration rather than class struggle, towards national 
and international division rather than solidarity of the proletariat 
in the advanced industrial countries. In Marxian theory, capital 
and (wage) labour define each other, or, more specifically, the 
growth of the revolutionary proletariat in t'he long-run defines 
the irreversible direction of capitalist development. Consequently, 
if the trend is reversed on the side of the proletariat, the 
capitalist development reaches a new stage to which the traditional 
Marxian categories no longer apply. A new historical period begins, 
characterised by a change in the basic class relations. Then 
Marxism is faced with the task of redefining the conception of the 
transition to socialism and of the strategy in this period." 
(1971: 22) 
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LENIN 
Of all the writings on trade unionism in the Marxist tradition, 
possibly few are better known or more controversial than Lenin's 
book 'What is to be done?' first published in 1902. Here Lenin 
specifically undertook to expose the reformist and inherently 
Utopian assumptions pervading Russian and German Social-Democratic 
thought at the turn of the ZOth century. Basically, these found 
expression in the notion that the trade union struggle could serve 
as a means of significant advance to socialism. Reviewing what 
he termed the 'revisionist' tendencies within the Russian and German 
Social-Democratic parties of his day, Lenin mercilessly attacks 
their ideological commitment to the trsde union struggle as the 
primary means of liberating the working-class. Denouncing such 
approaches as mere 'economism', he embarked upon an attempt to 
explode the reformist credo that trade union demands inherently 
pose a fundamental challenge to the system of class exploitation. 
As Lenin argues, trade unionism, at best, signified a rudimentary 
form of class consciousness. To emphasise this point, he drew a 
sharp analytical distinction between 'trade union consciousness' 
and 'Social-Democratic' i.e. 'revolutionary socialist' conscious-
ness. (.See below J Furthermore, in categorically rejecting the 
^s the translator of Paul Frdlich's biography of Rosa Luxemburg 
informs us, prior to the First l-^orld ¥ar and the disintegration 
of the Second International, "the term social-demooratie meant 
quite simply 'revolutionary socialist'. It was only after the 
founding of the Third (Communist) International that 'social 
democracy' finally became totally identified and equated with 
reformism". (See Frdlich, 1972: 19) 
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claim of the 'Economists' that the working-class would 'spontaneously' 
develop revolutionary socialist consciousness in the course of the 
trade union struggle for material improvements, Lenin emphatically 
asserted that: 
The history of all countries shows that the working-class, 
exclusively by its own effort is able to develop only trade 
union consciousness. 
(1952: 52-3) 
Thus, while he saw revolutionary socialist consciousness as an 
essential precondition for socialist revolution, Lenin simultaneously 
rejected the idea that the working-class, unaided, could develop such 
consciousness. As he forcefully affirmed: "It could only be brought 
to them from without". (.Lenin, 1952: 52). Unlike the Social-Democrats 
therefore, who insisted that the leadership of the working-class should 
come from within its own ranks and who visualised intellectuals as 
playing an advisory and essentially auxiliary role in the proletarian 
struggle, Lenin maintained that the capacity of the trade unions to 
serve revolutionary ends was basically contingent upon the degree to 
which they were subject to the direction and control of a political 
party lead by revolutionary socialist intellectuals. 
In seeking to rationalise his ascription of the proletarian struggle 
to the intelligentsia, Lenin cites the fact that the idea of 
socialism was developed - not by the workers, but by the intellect-
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uals. (See below;. Additionally, he proceeds to justify his seem-
ingly elitist organisational principles by invoking the presumed 
precedent set by Marx and Engels. Thus, as he writes in defence of 
his view of the 'vanguard' party and its leadership: 
The theory of Socialism ... grew out of the 
philosophical, historical and economic theories 
that were elaborated by the educated represent-
atives of the propertied classes, the intellectuals. 
According to their social status, the founders of 
modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, 
themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligent-
sia. 
(Lenin, 1952: 52-3) 
Needless to say, Lenin's distinctive conception of the class struggle, 
(in particular his view that the working-class left to their own 
devices were incapable of evolving socialist consciousness and, more 
importantly, his transfer of the revolutionary initiative from the 
masses to the vanguard party), has been a perennial source of 
discussion and dispute. To be sure, there is something supremely 
Even though Lenin's conception of revolutionavy organisation attributes 
a ovucial vole in the class struggle to intellectuals these intellect-
uals aj>e defined primarily in terms of their ohpective revolutionary 
function and suh;]ective readiness to assume the role Lenin assigns to 
them. In short, Lenin basically perceives the 'socialist intellect-
ual' as someone who is totally dedicated to one overriding aim - that 
of socialist revolution. Fundamentally, therefore, the Leninist 
vision of the revolutionary party embodies two central propositions. 
(1) professional revolutionary intellectuals of bourgeois social 
origins form the nucleus of the vanguard party and through them 
socialist ideals are taken to the working class; but, at the same 
time, (2) the work of this revolutionary party intrinsically abolishes 
the distinction between 'intellectuals' and 'workers' among its members. 
Expressing these ideas, Lenin wrote: "The organisations of revolution-
ists must be composed first and foremost of people whose profession is 
that of revolutionist As this is the common feature of the members 
of such an organisation, all distinctions as between workers and 
intellectuals must be dropped". (See Conquest, 1972: 43) 
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ironical in Lenin's charges of 'revisionism' which he levels at the 
Social-Democrats in 'What is to be done?' For despite his profess-
ions of fidelity to Marxian orthodoxy, Lenin's work represents a 
radical departure from the theoretical approach of Marx. (See Hyman, 
1971: 11-4) 
In fact, symptomatic of Lenin's modification of Marxian tenets is 
his view that trade union reformism is immanent in the economic 
struggle rather than being the product of exceptional historical 
circumstances, as believed by Marx and Engels. (Hyman, 1971: 12) 
Another notable point of difference between Leninist and Marxian 
perspectives on unionism is the distinction Lenin makes between 
the economic and the political in relation to trade union activity. 
In the classical Marxiam approach, as Tony Cliff reminds us: "An 
economic demand, if it is sectional is defined as 'economic' in 
Marx's terms. But if the same demand is made of the state it is 
'political'." (1975: 81) 
Elaborating upon this issue, Cliff makes the point that claims made 
upon individual employers for amelioration of the conditions of 
particular groups of workers - by the very sectional nature of the 
demands, are defined by Marx and Engels as primarily economic acts. 
By contrast, however, trade union agitation to secure an 8-hour day 
law, for example, was essentially interpreted by these writers as a 
political act. Accordingly, as Cliff sums up, "in this way, out of 
the separate economic movements of the workers there grows up 
everywhere a political movement". (.1975: 81) 
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Significantly, therefore, as Hyman shows, where to Marx and Engels 
union agitation to secure a legal limitation of the length of the 
working day "represented a significant heightening of the class 
struggle", Lenin conceived of such initiatives as simply manifest-
ations of 'trade union consciousness'. In his view, "trade union 
politics of the working class is precisely bourgeois politics of 
the working class". (See Hyman, 1971: 12). Thus, central to 
Lenin's approach to the question of class struggle is the idea that 
the socialist revolution can be achieved only as a result of purposive 
political action. Such a position has allowed Lenin's many critics 
to claim, as one of the more influential of these puts it: 
This theory enabled him to substitute for the 
proletarian masses whom Marx had seen as the engine 
of social progress, a small elite of professional 
revolutionaries, possessed of superior theoretical 
insight . . . v/ho for this reason were fitted to 
provide leadership for the workers. Lenin held -
quite reasonably, as one may think — that ordinary 
working men v/ould never make the kind of revolution 
he wanted if they were left to their own resources, 
but had to be cajoled or coerced into doing so. 
(Keep, 1967; 135-6) 
Notably, moreover, for Marx and Engels, the state was simply an 
epiphenomenon of the underlying economic sub-structure. Consequently, 
as Keep reveals, the class struggle was conceptualised by them 
principally as a "socio-economic phenomenon, a v-yar of classes for 
control of the means of production". (1967: 136). By contrast, 
however, as Keep indicates, Lenin envisaged the conflict basically 
as a "political phenomenon, a war of organisations which supposedly 
embodied the will of the classes they represented and its purpose 
was to destroy the bourgeois state and transfer power to those who 
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could speak for the proletariat". (Keep, 1967: 136) 
In essence, therefore, where the classical Marxian approach locates 
the revolutionary impetus firmly within the working class, Lenin's 
perspective counterposes the idea of what may best be described as 
'revolution from above'. Indeed, this is implicit in his conception 
of a highly-centralised, tightly-disciplined political party controlled 
by people for whom, in the words of Joseph Banks, "revolution is a 
vocation" (1972: 27). Clearly, to Lenin, socialism was by no means 
an historical inevitability. On the contrary, its achievement required 
conscious political struggle. Accordingly, for him, the conquest of 
state power could not be left to the 'spontaneous' upsurge of the 
masses. Rather, the working class had to be politically organised 
for struggle through conscious understanding of their social situation. 
To Lenin, the principal agent of the political education and revolution-
ary mobilisation of the working class is the socialist 'vanguard' party. 
Thus, while he perceived the struggle of organised labour as forming 
an important basis for the development of class antagonism, neverthe-
less, the conquest of state power by the working class, in his view, 
required political education and organisation of a qualitatively 
different and infinitely more intense order. Put simply, the Leninist 
approach basically considered that the level of consciousness and 
organisation necessary for revolution required the existence of a 
monolithic and disciplined political party. Such organisational 
principles found expression in the Leninist dictum of 'democratic 
centralism'. By this he meant that although the party may be the 
creation of a body of professional revolutionists, it must be firmly 
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rooted in the proletariat by a multiplicity of personal and 
organisational bonds so that it is accepted by them as their 
political representative. Put another way, the vanguard party, 
in Lenin's view, is not a substitute for the working class as the 
agent of socialism. On the contrary, it is an integral part of 
the political struggle of the working class. 
Generally speaking, perhaps Lenin's greatest single contribution 
to the Marxist theory of revolution has been to rid Marxism of its 
mechanistic and deterministic ramifications by clearly apprehending 
and emphasising the role of consciousness in social change. But, 
at the same time, embodied within this approach is Lenin's unique 
contribution to revisionism - namely, his theory of the vanguard 
party which would spearhead the revolution in the name of the working 
class. 
Not surprisingly, Lenin's conception of the revolutionary party has 
generated a great deal of controversy. Cliff, for example, has noted 
the tendency for some of Lenin's detractors to portray his principles 
of party organisation as serving to elevate the intellectuals above 
the workers in the revolutionary struggle. (1975: 87) Others, 
seizing upon Lenin's decree that revolutionary socialist consciousness 
had to be brought to the working class 'from without' have tended to 
interpret this in the literal sense as 'from outside the working class', 
rather than in the more specific theoretical sense in which Lenin 
employed the phrase to refer to such consciousness as coming from 
"outside the sphere of relations between workers and employers", in 
effect, "outside the economic struggle", as Gareth Stedman Jones has 
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SO lucidly and succinctly expressed it (1975: 48;, 
Predictably, such misunderstandings of Lenin's 'theory of conscious-
ness' as Keep (1967) calls it, have given rise to simplistic counter-
positions of the 'mindless masses' and the 'omniscient party' which 
are then held to crystallise Lenin's views on the nature of the 
relationship between the revolutionary party and the working-class. 
However, contrary to the asymmetrical implication of such mis-
conceptions of the Leninist view of the relationship between the 
workers and the revolutionary intellectuals, a major principle en-
shrined in the Leninist guidelines of party organisation was that 
the party leadership needed not only to teach the masses, but equally-
importantly, to learn from them. 
Indeed, Lenin's own political behaviour prefigured the formal 
articulation of such ideas in 'What is to be done?' For example. 
Cliff (1975) instances the fact that between 1891 and 1896 both Lenin 
and his wife Krupskaya were involved in a Marxist organisation in 
Russia called the St Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation 
of the V/orking Class - known somewhat less cumbersomely (if satirically), 
as the 'Evening Sunday School'. Describing the activities of this 
organisation. Cliff writes: 
The school served as a source of recruitment for 
revolutionary workers and .,. also played a central 
role in gathering information about factory conditions 
for use in the League's leaflets and in organising 
distribution of the leaflets in the factory. 
(1975: 54-5) 
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In this involvement in organisational activity, Lenin was simply 
following the classical pattern established by Marx and Engels and 
reflected, for example, in their active participation in political 
bodies from the Communist Correspondence Committees to the League 
of the Just to the First International. (See Therborn, 1976: 334) 
Accordingly, the Leninist concept of revolutionary organisation, far 
from setting out to entrench an intellectual elite which would stand 
above the working class, on the contrary we are informed "perceived 
the moment of reciprocity in this relationship and very soon came to 
emphasise the central working-class contribution to the revolutionary 
leadership". (Therborn, 1976: 326-7). As a consequence, Lenin is 
seen to have "insisted that the revolutionary cadres should be drawn 
mainly from the ranks of the workers, who possessed the necessary 
'class instinct' and practical experience of the class struggle". 
(Therborn, 1976: 326-7) 
Admittedly, as Therborn concedes, faced with the practical demands for 
effective revolutionary organisation, 'Lenin was soon to qualify in 
word and deed' many of the organisational principles that he enunciated 
in 'What is to be done?' But, despite his many twists and turns on 
organisational policy and strategy, Lenin never precluded workers from 
being part of the revolutionary leadership. For example, as Conquest 
points out, "he was to insist that worker revolutionaries should be 
withdrawn from actual factory work to become full-time party operatives, 
living on party funds". (1972: 43) 
Despite the clarity of his views on this question however, Lenin's 
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concept of the intellectual elite who would direct, guide and control 
the spontaneity of the masses and lead them in the revolutionary over-
throw of capitalist society has been greatly misunderstood by some of 
his opponents. (See below) As Therborn observes, in sharp contrast 
to Kautsky who viewed this leadership basically as a 'bourgeois 
intnlligentsia', Lenin's view of them is broadly similar to the way 
this group were perceived by Marx and Engels in the 'Communist 
Manifesto': that is, as intellectuals of bourgeois origin who 
embrace completely the revolutionary struggle of the working-class. 
Or, to use the elegant terminology of Therborn, as a "declasse and 
radicalised section of the petty bourgeoisie". (1976: 326) 
For Lenin, of course, the difference with Kautsky's definition of 
the party leadership is not simply one of semantics, but signifies 
a radically different conception of the political struggle of the 
working class and the role of the intellectual in it. To Lenin, the 
conquest of state power cannot be achieved merely by education and 
propaganda among the working class by revolutionary intellectuals -
important as such activities unquestionably are. Rather, radical 
There is pvohdbty no cleaver indioation of the fact that Lenin 's 
concept of the intellectual leadership of the revolutionary 
socialist party (to whom he assigns the vital function of 
ideological indoctrination of the masses) does not exclude the 
workers,, than his explicit statement on the question of revolution-
ary socialist consciousness in 'Waat is to he done?' As Lenin 
wrote: "This does not mean, of course, that the workers have no 
part in creating such an ideology. But they take part, not as 
workers, hut as socialist theoreticians ... (emphasis added) ... 
in other words, they take part only when, and to the extent they 
are ahle, more or less to acquire the knowledge of their age ar^ 
advance that knowledge". (1952: 67-8) 
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social change is seen as the product of conscious and deliberate 
struggle by the working class under the active and disciplined 
leadership of a political party dedicated to socialist revolution. 
In essence, therefore the Leninist approach to revolution firmly 
emphasises the unity of theory and practice - an idea that found 
its most complete embodiment and ultimate vindication in the success 
of Bolshevism in Russia in 1917. 
Significantly, although 'What is to be done?' represents perhaps 
Lenin's classic statement on trade unionism, his views on the subject 
are by no means confined to this polemical pamphlet. In point of 
fact, as Richard Hyman affirms, "the inflexible position adopted by 
Lenin in V/hat is to be done? accords ill with certain of his earlier 
and later writings, where the potential of the trade union struggle 
for raising workers' consciousness received considerable emphasis". 
(1971: 41). For example, illustrative of Lenin's far more positive 
evaluation of the significance of the trade union struggle for the 
development of worker political consciousness is the draft programme 
for the Russian Social-Democratic Party which he wrote around 1895. 
(See Hyman, 1971: 41) 
Commenting upon this, Tony Cliff maintains that in this programme, 
Lenin articulated the belief that the trade union struggle served 
a three-fold purpose for the working-class individual. Firstly, it 
unequivocally showed him how he was being economically exploited by 
the existing system; secondly, it bred a sense of class resentment 
in him and thirdly, it politically sensitised him to his overall class 
position in society. (Cliff, 1975: 52). Cliff further makes the point 
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that at this stage in his revolutionary career, Lenin envisaged that 
the futility of the economic struggle would serve to convince the 
workers that their only hope of significantly bettering their position 
lay in political struggle to radically alter the existing social order, 
As Cliff reveals: 
Lenin pursued this line of thought consistently in the 
agitational leaflets and pamphlets which he wrote during 
1894 to 1896. 
(1975: 52) 
By 1902, however, Lenin was to completely disavow such ideas in the 
course of his polemical onslaught against the 'Economists' in 'What 
is to be done?' Basically, he now argued that the trade union 
struggle merely allowed the working class to, as Hammond put it, 
"obtain slightly better terms of sale for their commodity - labor 
power". (Hammond, 1957: 19). In blunt terms, Lenin now gave short 
shift to any idea that revolutionary socialist consciousness can 
'spontaneously' develop out of the economic struggle waged by the 
workers through their trade unions. Rather, he sharply polarised 
worker consciousness into trade union conscious;! iii-ss and revolutionary 
socialist consciousness - asserting for good measure that there can 
be 'no middle ideology'. Thus, for Lenin, the uncompromising choice 
for the working class movement was between 'bourgeois ideology' or 
socialist ideology. (See Hyman, 1971: 40-1) 
Interestingly, however, with the 'spontaneous' eruption of revolution-
ary activity among the Russian masses in 1905 (.and which reportedly 
caught Lenin completely by surprise by its 'suddenness'), Lenin, as 
Hammond among others discloses, totally repudiated the gloomy assess-
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ment of the revolutionary potential of the working-class vyhich he 
had so vigorously upheld only three years earlier in 'What is to 
be done?' (See Hammond, 1957: 19-23). As a matter of fact, as 
Hyman stresses, faced with such dramatic and incontrovertible 
evidence of the revolutionary capacities of the Russian masses, 
Lenin swiftly reversed his earlier opinion and was now prepared 
to concede the ability of the working class to become in his own 
words, "instinctively, spontaneously Social-Democratic" (See Hyman, 
1971: 42); in other words, 'revolutionary socialist'. (See below) 
It is this evident adaptability of Leninist tenets that has obstruct-
ed, or at least complicated, objective analysis of his work and which 
basically accounts for the controversy surrounding theoretical discuss-
ion of his ideas. Yet, what should be kept in mind is,that, as one 
writer notes: 
Whatever Lenin's merits as a philosopher, historian, 
or literary critic, he was pre-eminently a politician, 
and it v/as as a master of political tactics v/ho skilfully 
manipulated men and ideas to v/in power for his party that 
he won the greatest success. 
(Keep, 1967: 135) 
Whether or not we accept Keep's evaluation of Lenin's significance, 
there is no denying that tactical considerations do much to explain 
Broadly speaking, Lenin's change of heart on the revolutionary -potential 
of the working class does not ipso facto entail any fundamental 
alteration of his view concerning the leading role of the party in 
the revolutionary struggle. In fact, the distinction drawn by 
Althusser between 'class instinct' and 'class position' serves to 
emphasise the continuing necessity of the revolutionary party in 
the Leninist approach. 4s Althusser states: ^  "Class instinct is 
subjective and spontaneous. Class position is objective and 
rational. To arrive at proletarian class positions, the class 
instinct of proletarians ... needs to be educated". (1971: 16) 
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the expendability of certain of his doctrines, formulated as they 
were - to employ a Marxism - not simply to interpret the world, but 
to change it. (See below) Consequently, his ideological shifts 
on the question of whether or not socialist consciousness arises 
spontaneously within the working class serve to confirm that his 
writings were conceived - not primarily as dispassionate contrib-
utions to 'value-free' scholarship, but as ideological weapons to 
enhance the political consciousness of the working class and pre-
cipitate socialist revolution. 
To Lenin therefore, the weapons of criticism which he utilised 
were seen as merely a prelude to the criticism with weapons. It 
thus comes as no surprise that Robert Conquest draws attention to 
Lenin's complete dedication to the notion that the success of the 
revolution is the supreme law. For, as Conquest suggests, not 
only did he regard the ends as justifying the means, but as we 
are further informed, "Lenin was prepared to use any means what-
ever to forward the struggle". (Conquest, 1972: 42). Conquest 
is thus moved to summarise the Leninist postulates on revolutionary 
organisation as "a theory of extreme tactical flexibility". 
(1972: 117) 
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Broadly speaking, therefore, in his concept of the vanguard party, 
what Lenin created was - to borrow a phrase from Paul Wilkinson, 
"the decisive instrument for the fulfillment of Marx's theory of 
class struggle and proletarian revolution". (1971: 129) Yet 
what should not be overlooked is that: 
The construction of the Leninist party (or party 
leadership) as the real representative of the 
proletariat could not bridge the gap between the 
new strategy and the old theoretical conception. 
Lenin's strategy of the avant-garde acknov/ledged 
in fact what it denied in theory, namely, that 
a fundamental change had occurred in the object-
ive and subjective conditions for the revolution. 
(Marcuse, 1971: 33) 
Accordingly, it is in this elevation of the revolutionary party 
to a political principle that the Leninist departure from Marxian 
tenets most clearly reveals itself. More importantly, despite 
any suggestion to the contrary, the Leninist doctrine of the central-
ised party sketched out in 'What is to be done?' cannot be regarded 
as simply a product of organisational expediency - an historical 
(but essentially temporary) necessity imposed upon the revolutionary 
struggle by social circumstances in Czarist Russia. For there is in 
Lenin's resolution to the Comintern? in 1921, fairly convincing 
evidence that his theory of party organisation had been translated 
into a universal imperative of socialist revolution. As Lenin's 
resolution declared: 
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The main principle of democratic centralism is that of the 
higher cell being elected by the lower cell, the absolute 
binding force of all directives of a higher cell for a cell 
subordinate to it, and the existence of a commanding party 
centre (whose authority is) indisputable for all leaders 
in party life, from one congress to the next. 
(See Conquest, 1972: 45) 
To sum up, the Leninist conception of the vanguard party was, 
arguably, no mere strategic reaction to a particular historical 
state of affairs; rather, it was advanced as the sine qua of 
revolutionary struggle. (See below) 
But this is not to imply that Lenin's vision of the specific form 
the party was to take was entirely uninfLuenced by external social 
realities. In point of fact, Lenin's conx^eption of the form of 
political organisation required for the conquest of State power in 
Czarist Russia, as Conquest points out, " was based in part on the 
idea that repression made conspiratorial tactics necessary, in part 
on the backwardness of the Russian working-class, but also as a means 
of countering the inefficiency and backwardness of the Russian 
intelligentsia''. (Conquest, 1972: 44). Similarly, his schematic 
view of party organisation and especially his 'arbitrary assumptions ' 
about intellectual leadership, which he sought to institute as a 
basic and internationally-valid principle of revolutionary struggle 
are perhaps more intelligible in the context of the economic and 
political isolation of the Soviet Union following the failure of the 
forces of intemiational capitalism to crush tl^e Bolshevik revolution. 
More importantly, Lenin's remarks on political organisation and world 
revolution need to be seen in the light of the class-collaborationism 
of the leaderships of European Social Democratic parties, which 
expressed itself in chauvinistic support for their respective ruling 
classes in World. Var I and which coupled loith the defeat of the 
subsequent German revolution and the crushing of the Spartakus League 
by the post-War German Social-Democratic Government resulted in the 
disappointment of Lenin's liopes for revolution in the advanced capital-
ist nations. If nothing else, these events served to emphatically 
demonstrate to Lenin the futility of a strategy of socialist revolution 
based upon reliance on 'reformist' Social-Democratic parties and their 
leaderships. To sum up: "The conception which was initially aimed at 
the 'immaturity ' of the Russian proletariat became a principle of inter-
national strategy in the face of the continued reformist attitude of 
the 'mature ' proletariat in the advanced industrial countries. To 
counteract the integration of a large sector of organised labour into 
the capitalist system, the 'subjective factor' of revolvvtionary 
strategy is moyiopolised by the Party, which assumes the character of 
a professional revolutionary organisation directing the proletariat. " 
(Marcuse, 1971: 39) 
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LUXEMBURG 
Like Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg waged vigorous and relentless ideological 
warfare against the inherently revisionist character of European 
Social-Democratic politics - a tendency which to her found its 
classic theoretical exposition in the work of Eduard Bernstein. 
Briefly, in his book 'Evolutionary Socialism', Bernstein not only 
expressed considerable doubt about the continued validity of the 
revolutionary perspectives of Marx and Engels, but, even more 
controversially, sought to argue that in the changed social and 
material circumstances of the advanced industrial societies, a 
gradual (and largely) peaceful transition to socialism was not only 
possible but desirable. 
Central to Bernstein's prescription of a gradual 'evolution' to 
socialism however, as Geras (1975) indicates, lay his conviction that 
the industrial working-class was as yet historically unprepared to 
either assume State power or to exercise it. Consequently, in his 
view, to prosecute the proletarian revolution in the manner envisaged 
by the original architects of Marxism, was simply to engage in 
political adventurism and thus foredoom the working-class struggle 
to defeat and demoralisation. (Geras, 1975: 8). 
Fundamentally, Bernstein's thesis was predicated on the optimistic 
deduction that "capitalism could generate mechanisms of adaptation 
which suppressed or attenuated the contradictions which Marx had 
seen as integral to the system". (Looker, 1972: 16) Accordingly, 
consistent with his assumption that socialism could be achieved by 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary means, Bernstein, as Looker 
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notes, placed considerable importance upon the trade union struggle 
as a major instrument for the peaceful transformation of capitalism 
(1972: 17). 
However, replying to Bernstein in her pamphlet 'Social Reform or 
Revolution', Luxemburg began with the observation that, in essence, 
Bernstein's work constituted an extremely misleading way of formulat-
ing the problem facing the Social-Democratic movement, in that it 
artifically polarised the issue into one of reform or revolution and 
moreover, ruled out the latter alternative as a realistic option. 
To Rosa Luxemburg, such analysis only served to confirm Bernstein's 
inability to comprehend the essential nature of the problem. As 
she pointed out: 
Legislative reform and revolution are not different 
methods of historic development that can be picked 
out at pleasure from the counter of history, just as 
one chooses hot or cold sausages. Legislative reform 
and revolution are different factors in the develop-
ment of class society. They condition and complement 
each other, and are at the same time reciprocally 
exclusive, as are the north and south poles, the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat . . . . It is contrary 
to history to represent work for reforms as a long-drawn 
out revolution and revolution as a condensed series of 
reforms. A social transformation and a legislative 
reform do not d i f f e r according to their duration but 
according to their content. The secret of historic 
change through the utilisation of political power 
resides precisely in the transformation of simple 
quantitative modification into a new quality or to 
speak more concretely, in the passage of an historic 
period from one given form of society to another. 
That is V7hy people who pvonouncethemselves in favour of 
the method of legislative reform in place o f , and in 
contradistinction to the conquest of political power and 
social revolution, do not really choose a more tranquil, 
calmer and slower road to the same goal, but a different 
goal. Instead of taking a stand for the establishment of 
a new society they take a stand for the surface modifications 
of the old society. If we follow the political conceptions 
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of revisionism, vie arrive at the same conclusion that is 
reached when we follow the economic theories of revisionism. 
Our program becomes not the realisation of socialism, but 
the reform of capitalism; not the suppression of the system 
of wage labour, but the diminution of exploitation, that 
is, the suppression of the abuses of capitalism instead of 
the suppression of capitalism itself." 
(Luxemburg, 1969: 59-60) 
Moreover, in her view, Bernstein's apostasy fundamentally reflected 
his intellectual innocence of the complexities of the dialectical 
process. Indeed, as she sarcastically observed: 
It is surprising that Bernstein has so little 
acquaintance with his material. And it is 
astonishing how poorly he utilises the existing 
data in his own behalf. 
(Luxemburg, 1969: 43) 
Bernstein's real heresy however, as Luxemburg made abundantly plain, 
lay not in his suggestion that Marx erred in the detail of his 
prognosis of the dynamics of capitalist development. On the contrary, 
his heretical position emanated from his implied view that the 
Marxian theory of capitalist development was inherently defective and 
that this basically accounted for its predictive deficiencies. Taking 
Bernstein severely to task for such unabashed elaboration of what she 
doubtlessly construed as a pernicious form of Marxless Marxism, 
Luxemburg indignantly declared: 
If Bernstein's revisionism merely consisted in affirming 
that the march of capitalist development is slower than was 
thought before, he would merely be presenting an argument 
for adjourning the conquest of power by the proletariat, 
on which everybody agreed up to now. Its only consequence 
would be a slowing up of the pace of the struggle. 
But that is not the case. What Bernstein questions is 
not the rapidity of the development of capitalist society, 
but the march of the development itself and, consequently, 
the very possibility of a change to socialism. 
(Luxemburg, 1969: 12) 
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It was thus in the light of such perceptions of socialist strategy 
that Luxemburg was to clash heatedly, first with Bernstein, and then 
with the politically 'moderate' leadership of the German Social-
Democratic Party, over their attempts to ascribe primacy to the 
struggle for reforms while simultaneously seeking to relegate the 
struggle for socialism to some indefinite future. (Geras, 1975: 10). 
Among other things, she radically contested the following propositions 
which she saw as implicit in the political presuppositions of the 
party leadership, namely: 
1) "that the trade unionist and parliamentary struggle for 
the minimal demands could be a substitute for a strategy 
of mass struggle leading to the conquest of power; 
2) that secreted within that day-to-day, bread-and-butter 
struggle was some automatic trajectory towards social-
ism; 
3) that the trade union and electoral strength of the 
working-class could 'become', through organic growth 
and a Social-Democratic majority in the Reichstag, 
the dictatorship of the proletariat; 
4) that bourgeois parliamentarism itself might be the 
organ of proletarian dictatorship and democracy." 
(Geras, 1975: 10) 
Against such assumptions Luxemburg advanced the view that the "trade 
union struggle for improved working-class conditions and for social 
reforms, and the parliamentary struggle for democratic reforms took 
on a fundamentally socialist character only if their final aim was 
socialism". (Frolich, 1972: 53) 
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Predictably, this conception of the intrinsically reformist character 
of the trade union struggle leads Frolich to point to the obvious 
parallels between Luxemburg's approach and Lenin's general critique 
of 'economism' and 'spontaneity'. (1972: 53). Yet, although she 
considered that from the viewpoint of the achievement of socialism, 
trade union activity per se is as inherently futile as what she calls, 
the "labour of Sisyphus" ^Luxemburg, 1969: 53), what should not be 
ignored is that "Rosa Luxemburg was - by no means an opponent of 
reforms. She regarded the struggle for reforms - for the improvement 
of living standards, for the protection of labour, and for the extension 
of democratic rights within the framework of the bourgeois state - as 
the very means of preparing the working class for the revolution, of 
educating and organising it, and of making it realise through practical 
experience that the capitalist state had to be overthrown if the 
proletariat were ever to be freed from the bonds of wage-slavery". 
(Frolich, 1972: 53). 
It is noteworthy, however, that despite a certain degree of agreement 
with Lenin on the political potential of trade union agitation, Rosa 
Luxemburg nonetheless clashed violently with Lenin over the dominating 
role he assigned to the socialist party in the revolutionary struggle 
of the proletariat in 'What is to be done?' Basically, at the heart 
of this quarrel lay quite different conceptions of the process of 
ideological development. Specifically, what was at issue was whether 
the working-class in the course of strictly (and entirely) proletarian 
forms of activity such as trade union action, could unilaterally 
develop a revolutionary socialist consciousness. (Hyman, 1971: 40-3; 
Nettl, 1966: 223-30). 
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Lenin's view firmly emphasised that trade union activity could develop 
only 'trade union consciousness' - a phenomenon he viewed as an 
inverted reflection of bourgeois ideology. A distinguishing feature 
of the Leninist conception of revolutionary organisation in 'What is 
to be done?' therefore, is that it not only assumes socialist 
intellectuals to be the catalysts of revolution, but more importantly, 
his schematic perspective fundamentally deprives the trade unions of 
any autonomous significance. In fact, in this approach, trade unions 
are basically envisaged as subordinate agencies or appendages of the 
socialist party. (Nettl, 1966: 223-30) 
Certainly to Luxemburg (as indeed to Lenin), the trade union struggle 
for material improvements was not, and could never be, a substitute 
for the political liberation of the working class. In fact, to 
suggest otherwise, as Bernstein and the 'revisionists' were seemingly 
doing was to deny the necessity for socialism, which she contended 
formed the very foundation of Marxism. (Nettl, 1966: 223-30) 
Simultaneously, however, Luxemburg sharply disagreed with Lenin's 
somewhat mechanistic interpretation of the revolutionary process in 
'What is to be done?' and in particular, soundly condemned his attempt 
to transform his ultra-centralist vision of political organisation 
into a fundamental axiom of revolutionary struggle. As we have been 
told: 
Rosa Luxemburg regarded the existence of an all-powerful 
central coimittee as a danger to the development of the 
struggle itself. Experience in Russia and in other countries 
showed that every new form of struggle had not been invented 
by leaders, but had arisen from the creative initiative of 
the masses. Here too, she wrote, unconscious action preceded 
conscious action; the logic of the objective historical 
process preceded the subjective logic of those bearing it. 
(Frolich, 1972: 85) 
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P r e d i c t a b l y , L u x e m b u r g ' s biting criticism o f his v i e w p o i n t stung Lenin 
into e n d e a v o u r i n g to stigmatise Luxemburg as an advocate of 'spontaneity' 
C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y , this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of L u x e m b u r g ' s p o s i t i o n has 
been u n c r i t i c a l l y accepted by s u c c e s s i v e g e n e r a t i o n s of his a d h e r e n t s . 
Like their i d e o l o g i c a l m a s t e r , the Leninists have r i t u a l i s t i c a l l y 
r e a f f i r m e d the distortion of L u x e m b u r g ' s view, by seeking to depict 
her revolutionary p r e c e p t s as entailing a reliance on the s p o n t a n e o u s 
activity o f the m a s s e s to achieve revolution, while basically ignoring 
the p r o b l e m of the political o r g a n i s a t i o n of these masses. 
Such aspersions however, were explicitly controverted by both Luxemburg's 
own political behaviour and in her numerous writings where she incessant-
ly stressed the need for organisation. In fact, Frolich maintains: 
Rosa Luxemburg was in agreement with Lenin that the 
revolutionary party had to be the vanguard of the 
working-class, that it had to be centralistically 
organised, and that the will of its majority could 
be carried out by means of strict discipline in its 
activities. 
(Frolich, 1972: 84) 
At the same time in fiercely resisting, what Paul Wilkinson calls, 
"Lenin's conception of the exclusive, disciplined, professional, 
revolutionary organisation under strict centralised control" (1^72: 142), 
there is no doubt that Luxemburg was, above all, totally repelled by 
the dictatorial implications of Lenin's exaltation of iron discipline 
and centralised authority over the party by its executive. Moreover, 
in Luxemburg's mind, Lenin's over-schematic view of revolution and 
revolutionary tactics in 'What is to be done?' gave the impression 
of what can best be described as political Canutism - an illusion on 
Lenin's part that he could make the flow of history unfold according 
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to his master plan in much the same fashion that the legendary and 
deluded King Canute believed that he could command the flow of the 
tide. 
Sharply rebutting Lenin's organisational rigidities in her essay 
'Leninism or Marxism' U961), Luxemburg proceeds to shovv that the 
authentic alternative to the Leninist model of party organisation is 
not a less-structured party, but a more flexibly and democratically-
controlled party. (See below) Thus, in opposing the principle of 
the control of the party from below to Lenin's idea of party control 
vested in the leadership, Luxemburg basically envisioned the primary 
duty of the party as being not to hegemonically direct the working-
class struggle, but to guide it in such a way that the revolutionary 
overthrow of the old order fundamentally expressed the democratic 
content and aspirations of socialism. 
For Luxemburg therefore, as Wolfe observes in his introduction to 
her pamphlet 'The Russian Revolution and Leninism or Marxism' (1961), 
socialism and democracy are not incompatible - on the contrary, they 
are inseparable. From this it followed that if the essential aim of 
socialism involved the realisation of a fully self-managing industry 
and self-governing society, the revolution itself must entail not 
merely an assumption of power by a socialist elite, but a complete 
democratisation in the exercise of such power. More importantly, 
since democracy, in her view, had to be constantly exercised to avoid 
This essd'i ixis first -published in 1904 by Liuxembia^g undev the title 
of 'Ovqaiksatiorxil ^j.estions of Russian Social D&nocraay'. 
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the danger of atrophy, then the democratic process could not be 
put in cold storage until after the revolution, but had to be made 
part and parcel of the organisational practice of the vanguard party. 
By contrast, as she pointed out, the political party organised on 
Leninist principles inherently stifled the prospect of democracy by 
its autocratic structure, which, in turn, underlined the subordination 
of the rank-and-file and bred contempt for their views among the 
executive. As she warned: 
Nothing will wors sursly ensl3.vs a young la.bojc movsinsnt. 
to an intellectual elite hungry for power than this 
bureaucratic straitjacket, which will immobilise the 
movement and turn it into an automation manipulated by 
a Central Committee. 
(Luxemburg, 1961: 102) 
To her, therefore, while the intellectual elite was essential to 
the proletarian revolutionary struggle, she basically conceived 
its role as being - not so much to command as to convince. 
Furthermore, as she reminded Lenin, the history of mass protest in 
Russia conclusively highlighted the fact that these uprisings had 
perennially eventuated independently of any Bolshevik influence. 
Indeed, to Luxemburg, such incidents provided eloquent testimony to 
the frequency with which the Russian populace had 'spontaneously' 
revolted, thus, in the words of Wolfe's introductory commentary on 
'The Russian Revolution and Leninism or Marxism', "surprising the 
party and making a mockery of its pedantic formulae and recipes". 
(Luxemburg, 1961: 15). 
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In Luxemburg's view, such developments only confirmed the imperative 
necessity for the party to, above all, be highly-sensitive to potential 
revolutionary opportunities and be in a constant state of readiness 
to transform any such possibility into reality. Thus, for Luxemburg, 
no predetermined strategy of revolutionary advance - regardless of 
its intellectual cleverness or impressiveness, can basically mean very 
much unless it enables the extensive and informed participation of 
the masses in the struggle for their political emancipation. 
Characteristically, underlying this outlook lay her firm conviction 
that the masses had to be allowed to make their own mistakes. To 
her, this was the very essence of democracy and she vigorously opposed 
any attempt on the part of a party leadership to abridge this basic 
right. As she trenchantly declared: 
Historically, the errors committed by a truly revolutionary 
movement are infinitely more fruitful than the infallibility 
of the cleverest Central Committee. 
(Luxemburg, 1961: 108) 
Despite such criticism, Luxemburg was by no means unaware or un-
sympathetic to the immense problems faced by Lenin in seeking to accom-
plish a socialist revolution in a backward absolutist state like 
Czarist Russia. But she suspected that in advancing his ideas on 
party organisation in 'What is to be done?', Lenin, essentially, was 
not seeking to rationalise his dictatorial formulations as merely an 
unfortunate but unavoidable necessity imposed upon the proletarian 
struggle by the nature of the situation in Russia. Rather, she feared 
that he was proposing to enunciate general principles of revolutionary 
action and such beliefs lent special point to her dispute with him. 
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TROTSKY 
Trotsky's analysis of trade unionism is in many respects a curious 
blend of Marxian optimism and Leninist pessimism about the revolution-
ary capacities of organised labour in capitalist society. For example, 
in his exposition of the political significance of trade unionism 
under capitalism - namely, the polemical essays published in 1925 
under the title 'V^here is Britain Going?' (and since republished and 
introduced by George Novack, 1973), Trotsky was to argue, in a manner 
reminiscent of Marx, that the mere fact of their existence confirmed 
trade unions as a basis of opposition to capitalism. As he wrote: 
"The trade unions are an organisation of wage labor against capital. 
On the basis of the trade unions we have the growth of the Labour 
Party". (1973: 77) 
In fact, for Trotsky: 
There is no other country in the world in which the class 
character of socialism has been so objectively, obviously, 
unquestionably revealed by history as in England. For in 
this country, the Labour Party grew out of the parliament-
ary representation of the trade unions, i.e. the purely 
class organisations of wage labour. 
(1973: 70) 
To the extent therefore that he regards trade unions as a latent 
threat to capitalism, this is because, as he explains: "The danger 
from the trade unions consists in the fact that they - hitherto only 
partly, irresolutely, and in a half-and-half manner - are advancing 
the principle of a workers' government". (.Trotsky, 1973: 126) 
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Like Lenin, however, Trotsky recognises that in the main, trade unions 
in capitalist society do not serve as instruments of class warfare 
but as agencies of reform. But whereas Leninist explanation of trade 
union reformism implicitly conceives of it as having occurred by de-
fault - an inevitable result of their structure and function in 
capitalist society, Trotsky viewing the phenomenon from a radically 
different vantage point stresses the pressures to which trade unions 
are subject in the form of what Hyman calls, "an active and deliberate 
strategy by government and industry to emasculate the threat inherent 
in unionism". C1971: 17) 
Accordingly, while he visualised that the "trade unions will become 
schools of education for the proletariat in the sense of socialist 
production", he readily conceded that they were at that moment "in a 
blind alley", from which "only revolution can save the English working 
class, and with it its organisations". (Trotsky, 1973: 128-9). 
Trotsky, however, harboured few illusions that the social transform-
ation he hoped for was going to be easy. In fact, he savj the chief 
obstacles to proletarian revolution as being the leadership of the 
industrial and political wings of the labour movement itself. Thus, 
as he contended: 
In order to seize power, the proletariat must have at 
its head a revolutionary party. In order to make the 
trade unions capable of undertaking their future 
function, they must be freed from conservative office-
holders, from superstitious fools, v/ho ignorantly 
expect 'peaceful' miracles from somewhere. 
(Trotsky, 1973: 129) 
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By and large, such formulations reflected Trotsky's belief that 
"to be capable of offering revolutionary resistance, the masses must 
be prepared for such action, mentally, materially and by organisation", 
(1973: 103). Consequently, to the degree that the British labour 
movement v-^ as non-revolutionary in nature, this only served to under-
line the fundamentally reformist character of its leadership. In 
Trotsky's view, the existence of such leadership not only inhibited 
the development of revolutionary consciousness on the part of the 
British working class, but acted essentially as a brake on radical 
working-class political activity. 
To Trotsky, the conspicuous political retardation of the British 
labour leadership was highlighted by their internalisation of 
bourgeois values. Typically, he saw graphic evidence of this in 
their slavish attachment to 'national' i.e. 'bourgeois' traditions 
and institutions. For Trotsky, of course, nowhere was the political 
witlessness and cringing servility of the labour elite more manifest 
than in their attitude to the institution of royalty. Ridiculing 
their rationalisations that the monarchy is politically innocuous 
and moreover is less-expensive than the presidential system character-
istic of republicanism, Trotsky declared that in times of great social 
upheaval, "the bourgeoisie will make use of the royal power with great 
success as a concentration of all non-parliamentary i.e. real forces 
aimed against the working-class". (1973: 62) Furthermore, adverting 
to the labour leadership's aspirations to socialism while simultaneous-
ly rejecting republicanism, Trotsky makes the incisive and witheringly-
sarcastic observation that: 
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To proclaim a socialist platform and at the same time 
to declare that the royal power does not 'interfere' 
and is actually cheaper, is equivalent, for instance, 
to a recognition of materialistic science combined 
with the use of magic incantations for toothache -
since the latter are cheaper. Such little 'insignificant' 
traits fully characterise a man by shov/ing the complete 
emptiness of his recognition of material science and the 
complete fallaciousness of his system of ideas. The 
socialist cannot consider the question of monarchy from 
the point-of-view of present-day bookkeeping especially 
with doctored books. The matter at stake is a complete 
transformation of society, a purification of all elements 
of serfdom. This task, both politically and psychologic-
ally, excludes any possibility of conciliation with the 
monarchy. 
(1973: 62-3) 
Accordingly, not only does he thus pillory the attitudes of the 
leadership of the British labour party, but even their style of 
dress arouses Trotsky's scorn. For example, he delivers a scorching 
verbal broadside against what he calls the "clownish court dress" 
of Labour Party cabinet ministers which he intuits as being basic-
ally symptomatic of their utter political and ideological bank-
ruptcy. Predictably, to Trotsky, such aping of ruling class manners 
and mores by the labour leadership underlined the fact that far from 
challenging the values, conventions and institutions of the bourgeoisie, 
the so-called 'socialist' leaders were their staunchest upholders. 
For, in essence, even their affectation of bourgeois forms of ceremon-
ial regalia proclaimed their passionate desire for the approval of the 
bourgeoisie. 
Conversely, as he shrewdly observed: 
When the young bourgeoisie was fighting the nobility, 
it renounced side curls and silk doublets. The bourgeois 
revolutionists wore the black raiment of the Puritans. 
As opposed to the Cavaliers, the Puritans enjoyed the 
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nickname of Roundheads. Each new content always seeks 
its new form. Of course, the form of dress is only a 
detail, but the masses simply will not understand -
and they are right - why the representatives of the 
working class should submit to the complicated pomp 
of monarchicmasquerade. And the masses are gradually 
beginning to learn that those who make mistakes in 
little things will also be undependable in big things. 
(1973: 63) 
Unquestionably, the subsequent history of the British labour movement 
has amply confirmed Trotsky's diagnosis, viz. that its 'socialism' 
is largely an imposture. For the same cloying obsequiousness, 
which Trotsky noted, had led certain of its leaders to bedeck them-
selves in the ceremonial finery of the ruling class has increasingly 
found expression in an equally-craven attitude to bourgeois titles 
and honours with which they have since eagerly sought to invest 
themselves. As Trotsky correctly discerned, this monumental inability 
to transcend even the social norms and customs of the ruling class 
makes a hollow pretense of the labour leadership's professions of 
socialism. In fact, just as Trotsky foreshadowed, the British labour 
leadership, arguably, has traditionally been far more concerned to 
imitate the bourgeoisie than to eliminate it. 
Significantly, the preoccupation of the British labour leadership 
with demonstrating their 'responsibility' and 'respectability' to 
the bourgeoisie has, on occasion, as Trotsky observed, taken rather 
bizarre form. Characteristic of this has been the tacit acceptance 
by this leadership of the conservative view, that political contrib-
utions by trade unions to the Labour Party from their members' 
subscriptions, constitute a "crying violation of individual liberty". 
(Trotsky, 1973: 119). 
104. 
Basically, such attitudes had, as Trotsky noted, allowed the 
conservative parties to enact a law in 1913 permitting individual 
trade unionists to opt out of paying the political levy. Exposing 
the hypocrisy of Conservative and Liberal Party commitment to the 
principle of 'individual liberty' upon which they stridently expressed 
their opposition to compulsory political contributions by trade unions, 
Trotsky insightfully remarked: 
The Conservatives defend against the trade unions the 
'right' of the worker to vote for any party he may wish, 
these same Tories who for centuries refused to grant 
the worker any suffrage right at all ... The reform of 
1832 was instituted early when it was no longer possible 
to avoid it, and the extension of the suffrage right was 
introduced as a matter of direct calculation, for the 
purpose of separating the bourgeoisie from the workers. 
There v/as in reality nothing that divided the Conservatives 
from the Liberals, who, having attained the electoral 
reform of 1832, left the workers in the lurch. When the 
Chartists demanded from the Tories and Whigs the granting 
of the right of suffrage to the workers, the opposition of 
the parliamentary monopolists became positively furious. 
And when the v/orkers finally secured the vote, the 
Conservatives came out in defense of their 'individual 
liberty' against the tyranny of the trade unions. 
(Trotsky, 1973: 121-2) 
Trotsky, thereupon, thoroughly castigated Labour Party parliamentar-
ians for failing to see through the conservative cant of 'democracy', 
'equality' and 'individual liberty' - asserting for good measure: 
"Even a blind man can here perceive the purely class character of 
the principle of personal liberty which in the present concrete 
conditions means nothing more or less than an attempt by the possess-
ing classes to expropriate the proletariat politically by reducing 
its party to nothing". (1973: 12-2) But the timeless relevance 
of Trotsky's writings can perhaps best be seen in his comments on 
the significance of the principle of worker solidarity which under-
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lines and nourishes trade unionism. As Trotsky declared: 
The trade unions are - in spite of all the subtleties 
of liberal casuistry - a class organisation of wage 
workers for combating the greed and avarice of 
capitalists. One of the most important weapons of 
the trade unions is the strike. Members' contributions 
go to support strikes. In times of strikes, the 
workers are engaged in a fierce struggle with strike-
breakers, viho are the product of another Liberal 
principle, that of the 'right to work'. In any great 
strike, the union needs political support, it must 
turn to the press, the parties, the parliament. The 
hostile attitude of the Liberal press toward the trade 
union struggle was one of the causes impelling the 
latter to create a Labour Party. 
(1973: 124) 
Needless to say, Trotsky's remarks are especially pertinent to the 
contemporary opposition to 'trade union power'. (See 1 below). 
Noting that in times of strikes such forces are invariably hostile 
to the cause of the workers and would exercise every effort to defeat 
a strike, Trotsky underlined the need for worker unity via compulsory 
unionism by making the elementary but vitally important point that 
"what may appear from the point of view of capitalist democracy to 
be personal liberty appears from the point of view of proletarian 
democracy to be the liberty of political strikebreaking". (.1973: 125) 
Trotsky is thus grandly contemptuous of assertions of commitment to 
abstract principles of 'democracy'. (See 2 below) 
2 
In fact, in its affirmation of principles and with some modifications 
in minor details, Trotsky's statement could have been written in 
response to the current attack by the conservative forces on 
'compulsory unionism'. 
As he points out in relation to Tory outrage at the political 
contributions by trade unions to the Labour Party, "parties can 
be made, (and) they can be made with the aid of money, that funds 
play a decisive part in the mechanism of democracy, mst we point 
out that the financial resources of the bourgeoisie are incomparably 
more plentiful tl^an those of the proletarians? This simple fact 
should be sufficient to disperse the hypocritical vapors of democracy". 
(Trotsky, 1973: 123-4) 
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For him, therefore, to simply accept the "fictions and sophisms of 
bourgeois democracy" (1973: 129) is to conspicuously ignore that 
the "half-truths of the Conservatives have the quality of Machiavell-
ianism; the half-truths of the Labour Party are the child of contempt-
ible cowardice". 
Put simply, Trotsky's thesis is that bourgeois democracy is politically 
valuable to the proletariat only to the extent that it permits the 
advancement of the class struggle. Accordingly, any working-class 
leadership which meekly allows the bourgeois state to acquire ever-
increasing power to control the trade unions only serve to perpetuate 
and reinforce the system it purports to detest. More importantly, 
Trotsky perceived that the working-class movement faces a constant 
and mortal threat from two directions; first, from the bourgeois 
state and second from its own leadership. In particular, Trotsky 
maintained that under monopoly capitalism, trade union leaders have 
increasingly become part of the repressive apparatus of the bourgeois 
state through helping monopoly capitalism to diffuse worker dissent 
and ideologically disarm the working class. (See below) 
For Trotsky^ the leadership of the trade unions and the Labour Party 
by diverting the energies of the working class into eoonomism and 
reformism are largely to blame for its political irmohilisation. 
Consequently3 in order for the working class to assume its historic 
mission, it is necessary to dispose of the reformist leadership of 
the British labour movement. As Trotsky explains "The Labour Party 
and the trade unions - these are not two principles, they are only a 
technical division of labour. Together they are the fundamental 
support of the domination of the English bourgeoisie. The latter 
cannot be overthrown without overthrowing the Labourite bureaucracy". 
(1972: 59) 
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Elaborating his notion of the political integration of the trade 
union hierarchy into the bourgeois state in his pamphlet 'Marxism 
and the trade unions' Trotsky contended: 
There is one common feature in the development, or more 
correctly the degeneration, of modern trade union 
organisations in the entire world: it is their drawing 
closely to and growing together with the state power. 
This process is equally characteristic of the neutral, 
the Social-Democratic, the Communist and the 'anarchist' 
trade unions. This fact alone shows that the tendency 
towards 'growing together' is intrinsic not in this or 
that doctrine as such but derives from social conditions 
common for all unions. 
(1972: 5) 
Basically, Trotsky's explanation of this phenomenon is that because 
of the monopoly character of late capitalism, the trade unions "find 
themselves deprived of the possibility of profiting by the competition 
between the different enterprises. They have to confront a central-
ised capitalist adversary, intimately bound up with state power" 
(Trotsky, 1972: 6). In order to counteract their disadvantageous 
position vis-a-vis the monopoly capitalists therefore, it is essential 
for the trade unions "to adopt themselves to the capitalist state and 
to contend for its cooperation". (Trotsky, 1972: 6) 
Assuredly, such 'adaptation' is made easier by the reformist orienta-
tions of the trade union bureaucracy which accepts the principle of 
private property and tirelessly seeks to demonstrate its loyalty to 
the bourgeois democratic state. But pressures for the political 
incorporation of the trade unions also come from the state - acting 
as an agent of bourgeois interests in times of profound economic 
crisis for capitalism. (See Hyman, 1971: 19). As Trotsky makes 
plain, severe economic dislocation fundamentally rules out reformism 
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"because the objective conditions leave no room for any serious and 
lasting reforms". (1972: 9) Under such conditions, in fact, the 
continuation of capitalism demands either the fascist solution of the 
destruction of independent trade unionism or the political castration 
of the unions through the transformation of the union leadership into 
agents of labour discipline. (See Hyman, 1971: 19). 
By and large therefore: 
Monopoly capitalism Is less and less willing to reconcile 
itself to the independence of trade unions. It demands of 
the reformist bureaucracy and the labour aristocracy who 
pick the crumbs from its banquet table, that they become 
transformed into its political police before the eyes of the 
working class. If that is not achieved, the labour bureaur-
cracy is driven away and replaced by the fascists. 
(Trotsky, 1972: 11) 
Revealingly, Trotsky's argument represents an implicit contradiction 
of Leninist orthodoxy. For, in essence, his approach acknowledges 
the possibility that the normal, reformist activities of trade unions 
can, under certain circumstances, pose a serious threat to the 
existence of capitalism. (See Hyman, 1971: 19). Hence, the attempt 
by the monopoly capitalists to politically and ideologically decapitate 
them by seeking to turn their leaderships into the accomplices of 
bourgeois rule. 
Simultaneously, however, Irotsky's analysis embodies many fundamental 
Leninist presuppositions. For example, as Hyman (.1971) notes, under-
lying the attractiveness of union incorporation to the bourgeoisie 
is the fact that reformism had achieved a measure of plausibility 
in the past by its success in raising the material living standards 
of the working class. As a consequence, the reformist union leader-
ship and indeed, the ideology of reformism itself, had managed to 
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command a fair degree of support and thus, legitimacy. (See Hyman, 
1971: 19-20;. As a consequence, the gradual transformation of 
trade unions into what Trotsky calls "organs of a labour aristocracy" 
(1972: 9), facilitated their outright conversion into 'stockholders' 
of the imperialist designs of the bourgeoisie (1972: 12). As Trotsky 
concluded: 
the whole task of the bourgeoisie consists in 
liquidating the trade unions as organs of the 
class struggle and substituting in their place 
the trade union bureaucracy as the organ of the 
leadership over the workers by the bourgeois 
state. In these conditions, the task of the 
revolutionary vanguard is to conduct a struggle 
for the complete independence of the trade 
unions and for the introduction of actual workers' 
control over the present union bureaucracy. 
(1972: 15-6) 
The social development of the advanced capitalist societies in the 
three or four decades since Trotsky wrote as Hyman (1971) observes, 
abundantly confirms his view that intensified efforts will be made 
by the bourgeoisie to politically absorb the trade unions, in order 
to hobble any latent revolutionary potential they may possess. 
Characteristically, there has been a marked redoubling of such 
initiatives in periods of major crisis for capitalism. Significantly, 
however, Trotsky's analysis tends to overexaggerate the likelihood 
that such moves will be successful. (See Hyman, 1971: 32-5) 
Admittedly, Trotsky's perspective has been partially confirmed by 
the growing involvement of the union hierarchy in government economic 
policy through their participation on various 'planning' committees, 
and in some cases, by their acceptance of responsibility - grudging 
or otherwise for administering government 'income policies'. 
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(Hyman, 1971: 32). However, what Trotsky's approach basically 
assumes is that trade union leaders possess such a degree of "immunity 
from rank-and-file control that they could with equanimity embrace 
the role of agents of an assault on their members' conditions". 
(Hyman, 1971: 34j. 
That this is patently not the case, is powerfully indicated, as 
Hyman (.1971) shows, by the numerous attempts on the part of the 
State to legally control, and thus, presumably eliminate, the 
'disruptive' manifestations of union rank-and-file activity such as 
'wildcat' strikes. (See below) Ironically, however, as Hyman notes, 
such action by the state only accentuates the contradictions of a 
reformist union leadership by forcing it either to defend its 
membership against such attack or risk forfeiting its authority 
over them (1971: 35). Accordingly, in the light of such consider-
ations and more particularly, in view of the abundant empirical 
evidence to the contrary, Trotsky's pessimistic hypothesis that, 
as Hyman put it, "the trade unions - in the absence of the 'alternat-
ive leadership' of a revolutionary party - would automatically 
succumb to the incorporating embrace" (1971: 35), basically remains 
Hyman eontends that while many of these judicial and legislative 
attempts to 'gullivevise' the trade union movement hy tying it 
down with legal vestriotions ave, avgv.dbly^ impelled partly hy 
an under-lying "ideological liostility to trade unionism as such", 
these efforts represent, more importantly, "a more forceful variant 
of the incorporation strategy: an attempt to compel union leader-
ships, on pain of severe financial penalties, to assume and apply 
powers to discipline and control their workshop representatives". 
(1971: 24) 
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the elaboration of a tendency rather than a description of fact. 
SYNDICALISM 
Syndicalism, or more precisely, revolutionary syndicalism, represents 
arguably one of the most visibly militant expressions of working class 
radicalism. (See below) Essentially a movement of action rather than 
of ideas, it shares with classical Marxism the traditional socialist 
objective of the abolition of capitalism and the inauguration of the 
'dictatorship of the proletariat'. Significantly, however, like 
Leninism, it totally rejects the seemingly deterministic implications 
of Marx's conception of social change. To the syndicalist - as indeed 
to the Leninist, the transcendence of the capitalist order is not a 
mere end-product of some impersonal and automatic process of historical 
evolution. Rather, socialism had to be won by conscious struggle: in 
effect, by those v/ho experience most acutely the endemic exploitation 
and class oppression of capitalist society - the working classes. 
The syndicalist approach to revolution therefore, in its grasp of 
the importance of the subjective element in social change partly 
rests on a similar concept of revolution as its Leninist counterpart. 
Certainly, it assents equally-vigorously that ideological preparation 
is a crucial prerequisite for orienting the masses toward revolution-
ary means of solving their problems. 
^s Ridley (1970) explains, the term 'syndicalism' stems from 
the French term 'syndicat' which literally translated means 
'trade union'. 
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(See below). Yet, despite its superficial affinities with Leninism, 
what sharply distinguishes the syndicalist conception of social 
change from the Leninist perspective is, pre-eminently, its method-
ology of revolution. 
Characteristically, the Leninist model of revolution envisages the 
process of socialist transformation primarily in terms of the capture 
of State power by a well organized and highly disciplined political 
party - officered mainly by professional revolutionary intellectuals. 
Underlying this approach, of course, is the assumption spelled out 
unambiguously by Lenin in 'What is to be done?' that the only conscious-
ness developed by the working class solely from its own ideological 
resources is 'trade union consciousness' i.e. consciousness of its 
narrow, sectional, economic interests. 
Accordingly, in the Leninist view, to acquire a socialist revolution-
ary consciousness, it is essential for the working class to be guided 
by those who can best give radical purpose and direction to its 
struggle. From this perspective therefore, the political party is 
visualised as the most appropriate and effective institutional means 
for supervising the political education of the working class and for 
spearheading its liberation from capitalist domination. Fundamentally, 
lleither Leninist ov syndicalist oveeds doubt for a moment the indispens-
ability of the consciousness of the pvoletajciat to a socialist 
revolutionary transformation. However, they both are unconvinced by 
any suggestion that such consciousness is an historical inevitability. 
Thus, whatever their disagreements, they both subscribe to a view 
of class consciousness as the driving force of history. 
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this concept of revolution suggests a tendency favourable to - rather 
than antagonistic to centralisation. As such, it implicitly embraces 
the broad political orthodoxy regarding the centrality of the State -
as indeed is evident from the Leninist preoccupation with the capture 
of the machinery of the State as the prime means of redressing class 
injustices. 
Syndicalism, conversely, totally rejects the Bolshevik concept of the 
vanguard party as the embodiment of revolutionary initiative. It thus 
intrinsically denies the necessity for socialist consciousness within 
the working class to be mediated by disaffected bourgeois intellectuals, 
On the contrary, it envisions the central revolutionary reality to be 
the daily struggle of the proletariat against the fact of its economic 
exploitation and consequent social subordination. This is underscored 
in the syndicalist contention that it is basically out of the elemental 
economic struggle that the consciousness of the proletariat emerges. 
There is thus in syndicalist doctrine no question of a revolutionary 
party that is the source and arbiter of class consciousness. Rather, 
class consciousness itself is perceived as the product of the omni-
present struggle between capital and labour. Essentially, therefore, 
where Bolshevism conceives the achievement of socialism principally in 
terms of the disciplined political activity of a revolutionary elite, 
syndicalism places its confidence in the spontaneous revolutionary 
impulses of the working masses. 
Generally, the syndicalist credo acknowledges that capitalist society 
cannot be radically transformed except by the most determined struggle 
waged by the working class acting as a conscious and organised force. 
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However, it contends that authentic proletarian revolution is 
dependent upon the efforts of the working class itself. It therefore 
had little time for Leninist notions of 'socialism from outside' and 
even less for any idea of the subordination of the trade unions to the 
dictates of a political party. In particular, animated by a profound 
distaste for party politics and parliamentarism, syndicalism predicated 
its revolutionary activity on the complete prohibition of political 
involvement across class lines. 
Characteristically, the syndicalist edict of proletarian exclusiveness 
reflected its pessimism that fundamental social change could be 
achieved through parliamentary means. Indeed, in conceptualising 
itself as an exclusively proletarian movement, syndicalism served 
to underline the class-divided nature of capitalist society. 
Carrying the doctrine of class war to its extreme ... 
syndicalists drew a line between the proletariat and 
the rest of society ... not only did syndicalism deny 
'outsiders' the right to intervene in its affairs, it 
also refused (theoretically) to be associated with 
members of another class or institutions not its own. 
(Ridley, 1970: 95) 
Syndicalism, in effect, strenuously affirmed the right and duty of the 
working class to speak and act for itself - to be the subject - not 
the object of the process of revolutionary transformation. Predict-
ably, underlying its postulates of direct action, mistrust of State 
authority etc., lies a profound commitment to the principle that workers 
actively exercise the right to determine for themselves the objectives 
of their struggle. Thus, it is to the trade unions that the syndicalist 
looks for the means by which the working class would organise itself 
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into a fighting force in order to launch the mortal struggle against 
capitalism. 
Characterised by a deep-seated suspicion of intellectuals and by 
implacable opposition to party politics, syndicalism is thus the 
diametrical opposite of Lenin's notion of trade unionism. Notably, 
it asserts the paramountcy of the economic struggle and conceptual-
ises the trade union as the basic instrument of proletarian revolution. 
Implicit in this approach, is the assumption that the "socialist 
society could be achieved by the seizure of the means of production 
without recourse in the first instance to seizure of the political 
machinery of the State". (Lane, 1974: 177). To be sure, syndicalist 
militancy is impelled by a commitment to class war. For the syndicalist, 
however, such war is waged by industrial rather than political means. 
Among the industrial methods it advocates are the boycott, strike and 
industrial sabotage. In the syndicalist view, these are regarded as 
weapons of revolt, and of these, perhaps the most important is the strike. 
Basically, the syndicalist tends to regard all strikes as dress rehears-
als for revolution. From this perspective, industrial strikes are not 
simply designed to extract economic concessions from employers. Rather, 
their essential purpose is visualised as being to ideologically condition 
the working class to fulfill its revolutionary mission (see below). 
Contvary to the conventional view which sees tvade unions simply^ as 
organisations for defending workers' jobs and industrial conditions, 
syndicalism emphatically maintained that in trade unions, workers 
were provided with the basic organisational means for effecting the 
transition to socialism. 
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Viewed in these terms, the strike is not an end in itself but a pre-
lude to proletarian self-emancipation which it is believed will 
ultimately be achieved through a General Strike. (Ridley, 1970: 35-8) 
(see below). Following the collapse of capitalism, syndicalist formu-
lations posit that industry would be run on democratic lines with owner-
ship of the means of production collectively vested in the workers 
through their trade unions. (MacDonald, 1912: 3-4) The trade union, 
in syndicalist terms, is thus conceived "both as an organ of struggle 
(.with the general strike its most potent tactic), and also as a found-
ation on which the future free society might be constructed". (VJood-
cock, 1971: 18-19) 
Contrary to Leninist tenets therefore, the syndicalist approach 
robustly affirms that the revolutionary struggle of the working class 
does not require any orchestration from above by professional revol-
utionary intellectuals. In fact, not only does it envision the 
prospect of the working class contriving to create a truly emancipated 
and democratic socialist society, but it also radically disputes the 
Leninist suggestion that the working classes are incapable of liberat-
ing themselveswithout the dedicated assistance of their own band of 
dissident bourgeois advisers. 
However, the differences between Leninism and syndicalism are far more 
profound than a simple disagreement over revolutionary strategies. 
To the ardent syndicalist, evevy industrial dispute cvjirulatively 
served to bring closer the day of reckoning for capitalist society. 
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In fact, their revolutionary tactics really epitomise totally 
divergent conceptions of the State, and, perhaps, even of the 
fundamental nature of socialism itself. Unlike party-oriented models 
of socialist politics, syndicalist insurgency aims to destroy the 
capitalist State - not to take it over and adapt it to its own 
purposes (see below 1). To the syndicalist, socialism means and 
requires the abolition of all systems of discrete political authority 
no matter how revolutionary. More specifically, it conceives of 
socialism as denoting above all the condition of common ownership 
and control of the means of production (see below 2). 
From the syndicalist standpoint, since all alienation ultimately 
emanates from economic exploitation, this condition can only be 
effectively remedied by the abolition of wage slavery and the 
In all fairness, however, Leninism sought not so much to 'adapt' 
the existing State as to demolish it and create an entirely new 
political structure i.e. one more appropriate to the needs and 
aspirations of a socialist society. Significantly, though, 
syndicalist struggle contemplates the liquidation of the State -
not merely its capture. 
2 
Its revolutionary aspirations thus largely found expression in 
the idea of universal workers' control. To the syndicalist, 
workers' control basically provided the answer to the problem of 
authority: in a socialist society constructed upon cooperative 
principles, authority, plainly, would derive not from the summit 
of institutional structures but from their base. By such means, 
the existiyig social arrangements would presumably reflect the 
influence of democratic decision-making. For, to put it simply, 
t'ne syndicalist organisation of industry and society presupposed 
a system of direct grassroots democracy. 
118. 
socialisation of the means of production. It is therefore not without 
significance that syndicalist doctrine designates the workplace as 
the principal arena of class struggle. Indeed, in syndicalist eyes, 
if the purpose of socialism is to achieve a self-governing society 
with self-managing industry, then authentic revolution involves a 
complete democratisation of all authority relationships in industry 
and society - rather than connoting simply a transfer of power between 
elites. Thus the socialist utopia prefigured in syndicalist thought 
is one in which political power - to the extent that it is institution-
ally enshrined in the State had become anachronistic and irrelevant. 
Naturally, syndicalism has not been without its detractors. Its 
unconditional hostility toward party politics and its preoccupation 
with direct action on the part of the trade unions as the means of 
abolishing capitalism, has predictably generated considerable controv-
ersy. Inevitably, also, the syndicalist position has come to be 
characterised as 'antipolitical' or 'apolitical' by even sympathetic 
critics like Campbell (1945) and Schumpeter (1970). Likewise, 
Ramsay MacDonald, (who as British Labour Party leader and later as 
Prime Minister symbolised the gradualist politics reflected in the 
concept of the 'parliamentary road to socialism'), ironically depicted 
revolutionary syndicalism as a 'revolt against socialism' (1912: 6-8). 
Significantly, moreover, syndicalism as a method of class struggle 
came under attack from no less a revolutionary than Leon Trotsky (1972). 
However, with the exception perhaps of Trotsky, few critics of 
syndicalism appear to have grasped that its political agnosticism can 
only be adequately understood in the context of its fundamental anti-
authoritarian ethos. Within the dream of total emancipation envision-
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ed by revolutionary syndicalism, there is no place for the central 
committee autocracy of a Bolshevik 'vanguard party'. On the contrary, 
the self-liberation of the working class demands primarily the direct 
method of the strike and other indigenous forms of proletarian revolt. 
In such forms of direct action all could participate. There was 
therefore no call for a socialist intelligentsia to think and plan 
for the working class (see below). From their own resources they 
possessed the necessary means to liberate themselves and to remodel 
society along more egalitarian lines. 
Characteristically, revolutionary syndicalism imparts to the attempt 
to formulate the outlines of a liberated and democratic society, a 
vision of the prominent part to be assumed by the trade unions in 
post-revolutionary social institutions. It also imparts to revolution-
ary praxis a reminder of the ultimate futility of political strategies 
for the capture of the State. In its view, the real revolutionary 
task to be undertaken is to be the dismantling of the relations of 
power instead of the conquest of power. 
Predictably, however, revolutionary syndicalism sought to deal with 
the ramifications created by the complexity and centralisation of 
Rather^ to a syndicalist way of thinking^ the relation of intellectuals 
to the working class struggle presupposed in Bolshevik theory, 
announced a highly dictatorial perspective. From their viewpoint, 
central to the Bolshevik concept of revolution is the notion of an 
ideologically inert working class which has to he prodded into 
revolutionary activity hy an intelligentsia who are the generators 
and custodians of 'socialist consciousness'. Beedless to say, the 
authoritarian tendencies disclosed in the Bolshevik postulate of 
'socialism from outside' find little nourishment in syndicalist 
practices. 
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highly industrial society - not by confronting them - but by attempt-
ing to evade them altogether with impassioned appeals for 'decentral-
isation' . Thus it dismissed the problem of the prevailing capitalist 
state by simply endowing the trade union movement with the ability to 
carry out the tasks of government without the irksome responsibility 
to constitute itself specifically as such. 
Certainly, syndicalist enthusiasm for 'direct action' is well-epitomised 
in its conception of the General Strike. For, in the General Strike, 
syndicalists perceive a force of almost unsurpassed potential. In fact, 
as syndicalist rhetoric would have it, the General Strike will contrive 
not only to abolish the existing State and the authoritarian economic 
infrastructure of capitalist society, but in vesting the control of 
industry and society in the trade unions, it lays the foundations for 
a new and egalitarian pattern of social relationships both within the 
workplace and in the wider society (see below). 
To some extent, the syndicalist failure to demonstrate any real grasp 
of the magnitude of the problems posed by the existence of the State 
is partly a reflection of its general indifference to political theory. 
Yet, it is far too facile to write off revolutionary syndicalism as 
simply the blunt and politically-illiterate edge of proletarian 
Bes-pite its pretensions to an unsentimental '-pvactioal' view of the 
phenomenon of socialist revolution^ nothing so demonstrates the latent 
utopianism of syndiaalist diagnosis as the exaggerated importance it 
attached to the General Strike and its romantic assumption that the 
State would simply disintegrate with the overthrow of capitalism. 
(See Camphell, 2945: 66-8). 
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rebellion, as its portrayal as 'anti-intellectual' by critics like 
Schumpeter (1970) suggests. For, although not noticeably exercised 
by any compelling urge to give systematic philosophical expression 
to its ideas, nevertheless, in George Sorel (1974), syndicalism found 
a theoretical exponent of formidable talent (see below 1). Sorel's 
essential revolutionary genius was to theoretically apprehend that 
in order to translate the elemental sense of class discontent of the 
proletariat into active political protest against the existing system, 
the working class needs to be possessed of what he terms a 'great 
myth'. (By 'myth', he does not mean the conventional idea of a 
fanciful construction; rather, in Sorelian terms, a myth is 
essentially a rallying cry to action). To Sorel, the working class 
had within its indigenous industrial culture just such a myth in the 
General Strike. 
For Sorel, capitalist rule could only be broken by force (see below 2). 
Indeed, as he writes: "The strike is a phenomenon of war" (1974: 274) 
This tendency to construe class struggle in militaristic terms is 
further evident in his view on the General Strike. As he argues: 
Ironically, Sorel's own bourgeois social origins would, in principle, 
have debarred him from playing a prominent or active role in syndicalist 
labour movements. Ridley, therefore, may well be right when he claims 
that Sorel was "at best an interpreter of the movement" (1970: 
Be that as it may, what is significant about the Sorelian contribution, 
is that it flatly contradicts any suggestion that syndicalism was devoid 
of theoretical content. On the contrary, tlie Sorelian perspective 
manages to create a syndicalist theory that is a synthesis of Marxism 
and anarchism. 
In Sorel's hands, the syndicalist impulse is essentially a critique 
by clout. 
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The Syndicalist general strike presents a very great 
number of analogies with the first conception of war: 
the proletariat organises itself for battle, separating 
itself distinctly from the other parts of the nation, 
and regarding itself as the great motive power of 
history, all other social considerations being subord-
inated to that of combat; it is very clearly conscious 
of the glory v/hich will be attached to its historical 
role and of the heroism of its militant attitude. 
(1974: 167) 
Basically, it is remarks like this which have led to Sorel's portrayal 
as an apostle of violence for violence sake. Yet there is in his 
glorification of violence, a highly-literal rendering of the Marxian 
concept of violence as the 'midwife' of history. In fact, far from 
being anti-Marxist or un-Marxist, as critics like MacDonald (1912) 
imply, revolutionary syndicalism, in its emphasis on the proletariat 
as the author of its own liberation - and even more significantly, in 
its declared aim to abolish wage labour - echoes Marxian tenets at 
their most fundamental. Similarly, in its intention to supplant 
the State with the decentralised authority of the trade unions, 
there is plainly a highly fundamentalist interpretation of the Marxian 
concept of the 'withering away of the State' Csee below). Certainly, 
such evidence readily lends credence to Ridley's characterisation of 
revolutionary syndicalism as 'hyper-Marxist' i.e. 'more Marxist than 
Marx' (1970: 103-4). 
Signifioantly, despite their apparent mutual antipathy, the abolition 
of the State was an idea ostensibly shared by Bolshevism, as witness 
its revolutionary slogan of 'all power to the Soviets'. Yet, it is 
in syndicalism t'nat the Marxist edict of the dictatorship of {rather 
tl^an over), the proletariat, finds its most loyal expression. 
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If the revolutionary impulses of revolutionary syndicalism were more 
empirical than theoretical, its origins were distinctively French. 
However, the influence of syndicalist ideas were by no means confined 
to France, or even to Europe (see Schumpeter, 1970: 336-7). On the 
contrary, syndicalist notions made their presence felt as far afield 
as the United States and Australia where they played a large part in 
the industrial movement to create 'one big union'. Known as the 
International Workers of the World (I.W.W.), or more affectionately, 
as the 'Wobblies', they sought through worker solidarity to achieve 
the millenarian dream of an end to class exploitation. As Paul 
Brissenden describes the objectives of the American 'Wobblies': 
The idea of the class conflict was really the bottom 
notion or 'first cause of the I.^/JV. The industrial 
union type was adopted because it would make it 
possible to wage this class war under more favourable 
conditions. 
(1957: 108) 
Significantly, however, for all the controversy it generated, the 
appeal of the Wobblies - as measured by active support of it, was 
relatively modest. For example, according to one estimate, the 
Wobblies in the U.S.A. never managed to attract more than 5 per cent 
of the organised workforce (Renshaw, 1967: 23). Likewise in 
Australia, despite the stir its existence created (see Turner, 1967), 
the evidence suggests that the influence of the Wobblies was minor 
and relatively short-lived (.Turner, 1965). 
To sum up, this chapter set out to examine some of the classical 
Marxist approaches to trade unionism. In outlining the ideas of 
Marx, Lenin, Luxemburg etc., the intention is not to suggest that 
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the observations of these writers completely exhaust the Marxist 
tradition. Rather, the purpose has been to point to the central 
significance of the contributions of these writers - both in their 
own right, and as continuing sources of intellectual inspiration 
for contemporary researchers. 
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4 . C L A S S , WORK A N D U N I O N I S M 
TRADE UNIONS AND THE ' I N D U S T R I A L R E L A T I O N S ' PARADIGM 
The normative frame-of-reference 
There is a pervasive belief - some would say an orthodoxy, among many 
of the academic experts on industrial relations, that the anti-capital-
ist formulations of the Marxist tradition are largely irrelevant to 
research and totally inimical to any real understanding of the complex 
nature of modern industrial realities. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the 
apocalyptic anticipations of Marxism tend to generate a distinct lack 
of sympathy within conventional academic discourse on industrial 
relations. Ironically, however, the aversion to Marxism, (.as shown by 
the intensive efforts to discredit it as a valid conceptual tool for 
the analysis of industrial relations), only serves to underline the 
continuing influence of Marxist ideas. (See below) 
In the main, the industrial relations literature evidences little 
indication of concern with theory - Marxist or otherwise. On the 
contrary, the discipline seems to he based upon an ethos of unapolog-
etic pragmatism. With few exceptions, most of the academic exponents 
of industrial relations see it as being primarily concerned with the 
practical problems and issues arising out of the organisation of 
industrial life. Predictably, therefore, sustained theoretical concern 
with the social potential for fundamental change is hardly a prominent 
feature of its research priorities. Yet, despite its empiricist ^  
preoccupations, it is deal' that industrial relations investigations 
are not immune from theoretical influences. Indeed, the ola.im of 
theoretical uncontamination often reflects an ignorance of, or 
reluctance to acknowledge, the theoretical assumptions inherent in 
both the treatment and selection of social data. 
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To a large extent, the anti-Marxist stance that characterises much 
of the writing on industrial relations, seems to rest on the dubious 
supposition that political value-questions lie outside its legitimate 
domain. Yet, even allowing for its unremitting hostility to 'ideology', 
what is abundantly clear from the microanalytical orientation that 
informs conventional accounts of industrial relations, is the lack of 
any serious attempt to situate analysis of trade unions within a 
theoretical framework "which grasps 'industrial relations' as an 
element in a totality of social relations of production". (Hyman, 
1975: IX). Much less is there any attempt to systematically explore 
the transcendent possibilities embedded in the existing social order. 
(See below) 
Quite the contrary, the dominant tendency to project trade unions as 
ends in themselves only serve to express an underlying conception of 
industrial relations as a phenomenon 'sui-generis'. As a consequence, 
such approaches give rise to the portrayal of capitalist society as a 
relatively-neutral back-drop to essentially 'industrial' problems and 
conflicts - instead of as a centrally-relevant variable for comprehend-
ing and analysing these antagonisms. Put simply, the study of indust-
rial relations has conventionally dwelt on the network of arrangements 
and problems arising out of workplace relations. Absent from such 
endeavours has been any attempt to trace the implications of work-
The traditional aoaderrrLc view of Marxism as a time-bound 19th century 
political ideology offering little of real value to the servous 
student of modem industrial relations, has powerfully vnpeded d%s-
passionate academic a-nalysis of the utility of Marxist approaches to 
the study of industrial relations - a shortoom%ng that many wrzters 
are belatedly trying to remedy. 
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place relations, and especially of industrial conflict, for class 
relations - other than to simplistically attribute the decline of 
class conflict to the establishment of institutionalised mechanisms 
for mediating industrial disputes. In effect, as one critic of 
conventional 'industrial relations' bluntly explains the limitations 
of this perspective: 
The focus is on how any conflict is contained and controlled, 
rather than on the processes through which disagreements and 
disputes are generated. From this perspective, the question 
whether the existing structure of ownership and control of 
industry is an inevitable source of conflict is dismissed 
as external to the study of industrial relations - which 
must be concerned solely with how employers, trade unions 
and other institutions cope with such conflicts. 
(Hyman, 1975: 11) 
Not accidentally, the 'industrial relations' view of trade unions 
inherently disputes the classical Marxist concept of them as potential 
instruments of socialist transformation. As a leading British exponent 
of the fledgling 'science' of industrial relations strenuously main-
tains : 
Workers do not join unions because they think alike or share 
the same political outlook. They do so for the sake of gaining 
immediate improvements in their lot which can only come from 
collective action. Their unity, that completeness of the 
organisation of trade unions which is the foundation of their 
strength must always be imperilled when they import political 
faction fights. 
(Flanders, 1972: 18) 
Accordingly, as he fumes: 
What I find so objectionable as well as invalid in the 
Marxist view is its implicit contempt for 'pure-and-simple' 
trade unionism. 
(Flanders, 1972: 18) 
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Typically, therefore, Flanders' reply to the Marxist approach is 
framed in a waspish, discursive style that substitutes epithets for 
rigorous analysis. For example, as he asserts with withering sarcasm: 
Trade unions, by doggedly sticking to their immediate 
ends and refusing to be captured and exploited by any 
political party have gradually transformed society. 
Only not according to dialectical laws'. That they 
may be right in preferring reform to revolution and 
unity to discord never crosses the mind of those whose 
theory tells them all the answers. 
(Flanders, 1972: 18) 
Contrary therefore to the classical Marxist view of trade unions 
as rudimentary institutional expressions of working class consciousness, 
Flanders envisages them principally as sectional organisations. As 
he flatly declares, "trade unions exist to promote sectional interests -
the section of the population they happen to organise." (Flanders, 
1972: 20). Now, it is one thing to see trade unions as occupational 
pressure groups, indeed, as instrumental bargaining agencies rather 
than as necessarily integral parts of a wider working class movement. 
In fact, as Richard Hyman reminds us, the fragmentation of the work-
force, and the sectional basis of trade union organisation conspire 
to blind workers to "consciousness of class identity" (1975: 42). 
Yet as he warns, "the notion of working-class unity is more than a 
wild fantasy. The notion of the working class .... denotes the basic 
similarity of all who lack ownership and control over the means of 
production, who are forced to sell their working capacity in the 
labour market, who are subordinated to a hierarchy of managerial 
control". (Hyman, 1975: 41). 
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The structural implications of the lack of ownership and control over 
the productive resources of society are, as Hyman shows, "many common 
grievances in terms of insecurity of employment, lack of autonomy 
in work, dissatisfaction with pay and conditions and so on" (1975: 41-2) 
From all of which it is plain to see that: 
There is thus, objectively, a common relationship of 
opposition and antagonism to capital, and to the owners 
of capital and their functionaries. (It is indeed 
precisely this relationship of opposition which gives 
the notion of a working class its coherence and meaning). 
This objective community of interest is the source of the 
unifying tendencies in trade unionism: the extension of 
organisational boundaries; recruitment of non-unionised 
workers; mutual support and solidarity; amalgamation, 
federation, and the creation of such all-embracing bodies 
as the T.U.C. It is this common situation and common 
interest which gives the notion of a labour movement 
(Hyman's emphasis) its meaning and appeal. 
(Hyman, 1975: 42) 
Put simply, then, in denying any wider political significance to 
trade unions, Flanders appears to be using the yardstick of a 'class-
for-itself , as classical Marxism terms it, while overlooking the 
(probably) antecedent situation of a 'class-in-itself'. Or, to 
put it in the parlance of French Marxists like Bettelheim (1971) and 
Peulantzas (1976), 'class position' (how a class politically behaves) 
does not automatically follow from 'class determination' (its objective 
existence). 
Characteristically, from the 'industrial relations' standpoint, any 
suggestion that the working class should mobilise its political 
strength in order to politically overturn the prevailing social 
system is invariably denounced as a thoroughly 'improper' use of 
worker organisations like trade unions. (There is, to put it mildly, 
more than a little trace of hypocrisy in some of the arguments that 
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trade unions should confine their attention to purely industrial 
matters. Clearly, many of the staunchest opponents of union involve-
ment in 'politics' appear to be only too ready to unquestioningly 
support the domesticated trade unions of the Communist world - should 
they ever take up the political cudgels against their own totalitarian 
political masters. Perhaps, even more ironically, while pre-lVorld 
VJar II Spanish, Italian and German trade unions deservedly stand 
condemned before the bar of history for failing to spear-head the 
political struggle against fascism, the detractors of contemporary 
trade unions have elevated political agnosticism to the status of 
a moral imperative for the 'industrial wing' of the working class 
movement. 
Predictably, Marxist tenets like 'worker self-management' have generally 
received little serious consideration in "academically respectable' 
approaches to industrial relations. If anything, the industrial 
relations orientation appears to give tacit encouragement to the 
simplistic platitude that just as there cannot be cops without 
robbers, so too, there cannot be workers without capitalists. (See below) 
Th^ impl-ioation that the existing hierarahical structures of control in 
capitalist industry (and ultimately the hierarchical nature of society 
itself) are simply a natuj^al and inevitable outcome of the prevailing 
work technology, allows th^ apologists of the capitalist division-of-
labour to breezily discount mrxist notions like worker self-management 
as simply a romantic dreojr, at best, and a load of impractical claptrap 
at worst. But contrary to the mystifications of the convergence 
theorists, who point to the persistence of pyramidical, authoritarian 
structures of control within the nationalised industries of capitalist 
societies (and even more tellingly, in the State-run enterprises of 
Russia and its Communist satellites), the dividing line in industry 
between 'those who command' and 'those who obey' as Lopreato and 
Hazelr-igg (1972) descriptively termed them, is not an inevitable 
consequence of some so-called technological 'logic'. Underlying the 
cormon fu-nationalist tende'ncy to equjate the social division of labour 
with the technical division of labour is the facile assumption that 
the former is basically dictated by the latter. However, as writers 
like Bravennan (1974), (k>rz (1976), Stone (1974) and Waohtel (1974) 
note, this is really to place the technological cart before the social 
relations of producticrn horse. Revealingly, as the historical record 
unequivocally shows, th.e establishment of factory discipline and 
control under capitalism classically preceded the emergence of machine-
based prodv.ctio-n. Indeed, a cursory glance at the pre-machine age 
factory system in Britain highlights the class struggle to subordinate 
'labour to capital, th.ereby i-fidicating in qv.ite unamMguous terms,^ the 
extent to which th^ development of specifically capitalist relatio'ns 
of production occu/rred prior to the development of the forces of 
production created by machinofacture. (See Marglin, 1974). 
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Not unexpectedly, as sociological studies confirm, workers' political 
attitudes occasionally tend to mirror such conditioning. This 
propensity is perhaps best illustrated in Zola's 'Germinal' where the 
author has one character assert, "the bosses are often swine, but there 
will always be bosses won't there? What's the good of racking your 
brains to try to make sense out of it?" (Cited in Nichols and Beynon, 
1977: 180) 
It is pertinent to note however, that Flanders' critique is, to say 
the least, equally uncomplimentary to both Marxist and conservative 
visions of union purpose. Notably, he vehemently rejects the conserv-
ative doctrine of 'responsible trade unionism' which he sees as an 
attempt to blackmail trade unions into acting obliquely as agents of 
labour discipline by "keep(ing) the chaps in order and the wheels of 
industry turning" (Flanders, 1972: 19). In a stinging rebuttal of 
this view, Flanders maintains that the "first and overriding respons-
ibility of all trade unions is to the welfare of their own members." 
(1972: 19) 
Curiously enough, there are parallels between this view of union 
purpose and the conservative standpoint that: 
Few trends would so thoroughly undermine the foundations of 
our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials 
of a social responsibility other than to make as much money 
for their stockholders as they possibly can. 
(Friedman, 1962: 133) 
However, such similarities in perspective on 'public responsibility', 
while striking, are purely superficial. Unlike Friedman's uncondit-
ional support of unfettered 'free enterprise', Flanders, by contrast, 
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seemingly perceives the trade union right to self-determination as 
an abstraction: it is something of which he approves - but largely 
in principle. This is underscored in his subsequent remarks. For 
example, at one point he writes that the prime responsibility of 
trade unions is "not to be firm, not to an industry, not to the 
nation" (1972: 19) but to their own members, only to contradict 
this later by proposing that trade unions should 'voluntarily' accept 
pay restraint. 
The essential inconsistency of Flanders' position is that having 
identified 'collective bargaining' as the pre-eminent purpose of trade 
unions, he now seeks to urge upon these organisations acceptance of 
an 'incomes policy' which virtually amounts to a suspension of their 
right to collectively bargain. The cant about an incomes policy 
being a mechanism of wage 'justice' and 'order' and the feeble surmise 
that trade unions cannot reject limitations on their freedom to bargain 
collectively and "remain true to their own purpose" (Flanders, 1972: 26), 
are indicative of the shallowness of an analysis, which from all appear-
ances, is oblivious to anything as inconvenient as fact and evidence. 
Certainly, the uncritical acceptance of wage pressures as the primary 
cause of 'inflation' helps to explain Flanders' complicity with the 
capitalist solution to the problem: an incomes policy. 
Equally, the inexcusable humbug of Flanders' discussion of 'what are 
trade unions for' is that having blisteringly condemned the conservative 
notion of 'responsible trade unionism', he winds up by insinuating 
virtually the same idea into his account of their functions. For 
implicit in the very notion of an incomes policy is the supposition 
that when the future of the system is at stake, the trade unions are 
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in some mysterious way 'responsible' for ensuring its survival. In 
fact, much of the debate from the 'Right' and 'Centre' of the political 
spectrum seems devoted to propagating the impression that keeping 
capitalism afloat is no less than the simple patriotic duty of the 
trade unions. 
However, by accepting that it is the workers who must make the major 
sacrifices - in the 'national interest' - so to speak, the only question 
that remains to be decided with regard to an 'incomes policy' is who 
shall administer it: the government or the trade unions themselves. 
(See belowj Naturally, Flanders is quick to make the point that: 
Chavaoteristically3 to the self-admitted supporter of an incomes policy 
like Flanders^ wlio implicitly accepts the bourgeois premiss that the 
fundamental cause of inflation is excessive pay claims^ the implement-
ation of such checks on collective bargaining is self-evident 'common-
sense' . Apart from which:, such restrictions on free wage bargaining 
are demonstrably 'reasonable and fair' because after all, "trade 
unions ... get more for their members at the expense - let us face it -
of members of other unions". (Flanders, 1972: 26). It follows from 
this therefore, that the better-paid workers should exercise moderation 
in their pay demands in order to allow the lot of their less-fortunate 
counterparts to be improved. However, in the first place, we should 
beware of falling victim to capitalist mythology and believe that the 
proportional share of the national product between capital and labour 
is fixed and immutable and t'hat redistribution of surplus-value can 
only take place within, rather than between, relative shares. Secondly, 
and more importantly, to see an incomes policy as a mechanism for 
producing distributive justice by enforcing 'restraint' on the better-
off sectors of the workforce, is simply to ignore thit the wage increases 
foregone by them rarely find their way into the paypackets of the more-
poorly remunerated. In fact, it is plausible to suggest that where the 
most pivotally-placed and strongly-organised groups of workers manage 
to win only modest pay increases, those less favourably-svtuated are 
likely to fare even worse. 
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The T.U.C. objects to a government-imposed incomes policy 
and insists that, so far as wages are concerned, a 
voluntary policy operated by itself is the right answer. 
Clearly this would be preferable. 
(1972: 27) 
Put bluntly, such statements tell us more about the author's value-
preferences than about the reasons for union acceptance of a 'voluntary' 
incomes policy in the first place. Certainly, it is quite understand-
able that faced with the prospect of either 'voluntarily' administering 
an incomes policy or having one statutorily imposed, unions should opt 
for the former course of action. But this is quite a different matter 
from saying that they favour an incomes policy without qualification -
as Flanders' comments slyly suggest. (In fact, the very way he frames 
the discussion represents a shabby and underhanded attempt to 'sell' 
pay restraint to the trade unions. Further, it makes his allegations 
of ideological bias against the conservative and Marxist stances a 
monumental hypocrisy.) 
It comes as no surprise therefore, that trade union wage militancy to 
counteract the effects of inflation on their members' earnings (which, 
in effect, only reflects the legitimate desire of working people to 
be paid a living wage) is stigmatised by Flanders as a 'free-for-all' 
and an 'industrial jungle war'. Significantly, such phraseology clearly 
identifies him with the conservative position he purports to anathematise 
and underscores the fact that when the chips are down, certain so-called 
academic 'liberals' swiftly abandon the role of detached expositor for 
that of staunch defender of the existing order. 
Plainly, the implication of inflammatory terminology like 'free-for-all' 
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and 'industrial jungle war', is that greedy, selfish, unreasonable, 
irresponsible and bullying trade unions are endangering the well-being 
of decent, ordinary folk and wrecking the country. Such beliefs only 
serve to confirm that the trade unions are everybody's favourite 
punching bag. Yet, a cynic might say that if bullying, holding to 
ransom and defiance of the law are really what is required or expected 
of trade unions, then they certainly require expert tuition, because 
so far they have revealed little real aptitude in these directions. 
There is no doubt that Flanders' thinking on trade unionism is as 
locked into the existing system and accepted modes of thought as that 
of any of the conservative ideologists he criticises. Like theirs, 
his approach is devoid of any recognition of the fact that the institu-
tional matrix within which 'industrial relations' takes place can be 
drastically altered. (See below) Characteristically, therefore, the 
dominant tendency of this approach is to suppose that apart from minor 
reforms, any threat to the existing social order must be resisted. 
Clegg's (1960) conoe-pt of 'industrial demoovacy' in which the trade 
unions are cast in the role of a perpetual countervailing force to 
managerial djornination, epitomises the tendency of 'establishment' 
academics in the field of industrial relations to progect capitalism 
as an eternal hurnan necessity. In this context, Marx's sardonic 
observation on evolution is pai'ticularly apposite: 
"Darwin did not know what a bitter satire he wrote on mankind and 
especially on his countrymen, when he showed that free competition, 
the struggle for existence, which the economists celebrate as the 
highest historical achievement, is the normal state of the animal 
kingdom. " 
(Cited in Meek, 1954: 185-6) 
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However, it will simply not suffice to assert that: 
Only those who hold the Marxist view can brush it (the 
need for an incomes policy - VJ.S) aside until - on 
some glorious but unspecified date in the future -
we enter the promised land and the day of a fully 
socialist planned economy dawns. 
(Flanders, 1972: 26) 
For to seek to establish the necessity of an 'incomes policy' simply 
by caricaturing Marxist objections to it, is to maintain as cavalier 
an attitude to 'mainstream' economics as to the more profound 
facets of the Marxist critique. Certainly, the implication that 
Marxism conceives of revolutionary social change as a sudden, miraculous 
occurrence must represent the nadir of intellectual commentary. It 
says something, incidentally, for the level of debate within academic 
'industrial relations' that its protagonists can, seemingly without 
any necessity to provide logical justification for them, present 
capitalist social arrangements as inevitable and permanent. 
Interestingly, the celebration of the status-quo in the industrial 
relations literature finds forthright expression in the work of one 
New Zealand writer. Drawing a sharp distinction between a 'social 
revolution' and an 'industrial relations dispute', the author - clearly 
at intellectual loggerheads with radical criticism of the industrial 
relations perspective, contends that: 
if one of the actors developed as its major objective the 
destruction of another actor (for example, if the government 
wanted to destroy all trade unions as did Germany in the 
1930's, or if the workers decided their major objective 
was to destroy the managerial class), then the situation 
is too large to be considered simply 'industrial relations.' 
(Geare, 1977: 281) 
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The disposition of 'industrial relations' advocates to accept at 
face-value the existing institutional structures, inevitably spurs 
the familiar reflex to annihilate such resonances of Marxism as 
ideas of radical social change from academic debate. Thus, for 
example, Geare decries "the radical's belief that capitalism should 
be overthrown ... (and that) there should be a Marxist revolution 
and the democratisation of 'society as a whole.'" (1977: 281) 
Naturally enough, from such a perspective, any fundamental questioning 
of the legitimacy of the existing social order is inherently mis-
chievous if not malevolent in motivation. Geare, for instance, in 
dismissing radical criticism of existing social arrangements alleges 
in self-justification that "there is more than a slight implication 
that conflict is desirable - as a means of raising consciousness 
and thus bringing the hoped-for revolution." (1977: 281) 
By contrast, the study of industrial relations is conceived to be 
more properly concerned with specifying the normative bases under-
lying the existing social order. This is evident from the tendency 
of its pundits to define industrial relations in terms of 'collective 
bargaining' which, as we are told, is essentially a 'rule-making 
process'. In fact, as Flanders stoutly affirms, "one of the principal 
purposes of trade unions in collective bargaining is regulation or 
control. They are interested in regulating wages as well as raising 
them; and of course, in regulating a wide range of other issues 
appertaining to their members' jobs and working lives". (1972: 21) 
This orientation is also evident in the work of other academic 
industrial relations stalwarts. For example, it finds 
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exposition in the work of Fox and Flanders (1969). Briefly, their 
analysis of industrial relations is approached by way of Durkheim 
through the concept of 'anomie' or normative breakdown, which they 
insist characterises the state of industrial relations in Britain. 
The focus of their theoretical endeavours is, of course, the Donovan 
Report and its concept of 'two systems' of industrial relations: a 
centralised system of industrial bargaining between employer repres-
entatives and their trade union counterparts and an informal system of 
shop-floor bargaining between the managements of individual firms 
and their shop stewards. 
It is the contention of the Donovan Report that the growth of shop-
floor bargaining in Britain has put immense power into the hands of 
the shop stewards and thereby weakened the authority of the official 
leaders of the trade unions over their own rank-and-file. To Donovan, 
this situation is not only undesirable: it is clearly detrimental 
to 'good' industrial relations. In his view: 
The informal system undermines the regulative 
effect of industry-wide agreements; ... (and should 
be discouraged because of - W.S) the tendency of 
extreme decentralisation and self-government to 
degenerate into indecision and anarchy; the 
propensity to breed inefficiency; and the resist-
ance to change. 
(Cited in Hyman, 1975: 156) 
Fundamentally, this is a conclusion with which Fox and Flanders 
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largely concur. (See below) To them, 'collective bargaining' 
constitutes the major norm-generating agency in industrial relations 
"because the rules it produces, expressed in collective agreements 
and in unwritten understandings, are supported by a sufficiently 
high degree of consensus among those whose interests are most affect-
ed by their application". (Fox and Flanders, 1969: 160) Hence, 
to the extent that shop-floor activity poses a challenge to centralised 
agreements between capital and labour, the 'normative basis' of 
industrial relations is assumed to be eroded. The result is a 
situation of disorder or 'anomie'. 
Despite the laudable efforts of Fox and Flanders to move beyond a 
merely empirical concern with the nature and ramifications of 
economic bargaining to an explicit theoretical consideration of 
the 'rule-making process' itself, the conceptual poverty of their 
approach has rightly been deplored. Goldthorpe (1974), for example, 
has taken these authors severely to task: basically, he charges 
them with possibly misconstruing, and certainly, with misapplying 
At the very leasts Fox and Flanders ' article contrives to endow the 
Donovan angle of vision on industrial relations with a measicre of 
sociological legitimacy. Revealingly, as certain critics of their 
paper have noted^ the writers even manage to out-Donovan Donovan 
himself in the conservative way in which their analysis of industrial 
relations is formulated. This is instanced in their rejection of 
Donovan's concept of an 'informal' system of industrial relations 
on the grounds that such a notion tacitly overstates the extent of 
normative integration within the industrial sphere. Put bluntly, 
what they are in effect saying is that Donovan's diagnosis of the 
problem is overly optimistic in that the state of industrial 
relations is more chaotic than his analysis suggests. 
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the Durkheimian concept of anomie. To put it bluntly, what Goldthorpe 
in effect suggests, is that Fox and Flanders' formulation of the 
concept of anomie is framed in a manner that is fundamentally incon-
sistent with the Durkheimian meaning. 
Admittedly, in the Durkheimian perspective, anomie signified a state 
of social disorder. However, embodied in the concept is a view of 
anomie as essentially a pathological condition of the externality of 
social constraints. In other words, it is the coercive influence of 
prevailing societal arrangements upon individual behaviours that is 
fundamental to his analysis. From this standpoint, therefore, the 
anomie condition symbolises that situation where normative bonds have 
been undermined or dissolved. 
However, apart from the inadequate rendition of Durkheim's concept 
of anomie. Fox and Flanders' conceptual approach classically reflects 
the epistemological deficiencies of the Durkheimian gaze. For example, 
as Horton (1964) has so timely reminded us, Durkheim's concept of 
anomie intrinsically addresses itself to the problem of the 'adequacy' 
of social control - rather than to the 'legitimacy' of it. More 
importantly, perhaps, what needs to be kept uppermost in mind, is that 
it is not the absence of norms but the mere fact of their existence 
that accounts for the possibility of class domination. At the same 
time, as John Rex has fittingly emphasised: 
There is room for normative elements in a Marxist type 
theory. Indeed, they are quite essential to any account 
of the development of class-solidarity. But a conflict 
of interests or ends is put at the centre of the model 
of the system as a whole. The result of this is that the 
model is directly applicable to the kind of social system 
which we find in industrial society. Such systems do not 
have to be treated in an appendix as abnormal. 
. (1965: 102) 
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Characteristically, such considerations are remote from the Fox and 
Flanders perspective. For them, the chief defect of British industrial 
relations is the want of normative consensus. The visible manifestation 
of this defect was, they affirmed, to be seen in the chaotic, dispute-
ridden state of industry. (See below) Not unexpectedly, the ideological 
character of these premisses - in particular, the implicit emphasis 
they place on the pre-eminence of order and consensus has been called 
into sociological question. As Goldthorpe, for example, was to bluntly 
suggest: "Order looks rather different, depending as it were on which 
In effect^ such an interpretation renders faraical the claim elsewhere 
of one of the authors to view Sociology as an instrument of 'demyst-
ification'. (See Vood and Elliott, 1977: 108). Likewise, if as the 
other author once claimed, an essential purpose of collective bargain-
ing is to provide workers with 'participation in Qoh regulation' in 
order to 'gain more control over their working lives' (Flanders, 1972: 
22), it is difficult to see why a centralised system of industrial 
bargaining that is remote from the workaday world of the worker can 
better serve these purposes than shopfloor bargaining with its 
potential for greater grassroots worker involvement. Plainly, what 
Fox and Flanders' article does is to uncritically accept the basic 
outlines of the Donovan Report. The ideological character of this 
report and its political sequels has been exposed by Richard Hyman 
who writes: "In brief, its (Donovan's) definition of the central 
'problem' of British industrial relations was the 'anarchy and 
disorder' - in other words, the undermining of managerial control -
at factory level. To assist managements in recovering control, two 
main lines of attach were proposed: the greater involvement of full-
time union officials (in conQunction with higher management) in 
supervising industrial relations at the point of production, and 
the closer integration of shop stewards within the official structure 
of trade unionism and the official institutions of collective bargain-
ing (1971: 34). As Hyman further makes plain, the 'voluntary' aspect 
of the Donovan proposals was soon supplanted by legal compulsion in 
the form of the Industrial Relations Act which sought to "compel union 
leaderships, on pain of severe financial penalties, to assume and apply 
vowers to discipline and control their workshop representatives." 
^ (1971: 34) 
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end of it one happens to be". (Cited in Hyman, 1975: 156). 
Generally, such criticisms have been echoed and expanded upon by both 
Eldridge (1973) and Hyman (1975). Hyman, for instance, has drawn 
attention to the conservative idiom in which Fox and Flanders basically 
frame their analysis. As he notes: 
In practice, the existing forms of material inequality and 
capitalist control constitute the taken-far-granted framework 
for conventional industrial relations analysis. Their 
perpetuation and stabilisation are presupposed in the various 
proposals for the 'reconstruction of the normative order' 
in industry. More specifically, the prescriptions for the 
reconstruction of control by managements and (in so far as 
they accept a quasi-managerial role) trade union leaders, 
necessarily assume that the natural condition of the ordinary 
employee and union member is one of subjection, subordination 
and passivity. 
(1957: 157) 
Under the banner of the 'normative regulation of industrial relations', 
Fox and Flanders invest with sociological credence the Donovan proposals 
to modernise and streamline the British system of industrial relations. 
(See below) The irony, however, is that traditionally, much of the 
As his critics report. Fox claims in his subsequent writings to hccoe 
parted company totally with the pluralist orientation toward industrial 
relations which characterised his collaborative enterprise with 
Flanders. Notably, in his more recent work, which he dramatically 
represents as a 'radical' critique of the pluralist perspective. Fox 
proposes to situate analysis of industrial relations within a structur-
al context which, in his view, more accurately reflects the realities 
of power in capitalist society. Certain of Fox's critics, however, 
remain unconvinced that his more recent efforts represent a decisive 
break with pluralism. In fact, some question "whether the debate 
between 'pluralists' and 'radicals' may not ultimately be a debate 
within the orthodoxy of industrial relations rather than a debate 
between competing theories". (Wood and Elliott, 1977: 109). 
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opposition to the kind of centralised industrial bargaining that 
Donovan advocates has come - not from the trade unions - but from 
employers. Research on managerial attitudes confirmed that many had 
a "preference for informal bargaining with shop stewards and not the 
official trade union officer". (Ingham, 1974: 83) The apparent 
paradox however, is soon resolved. Basically, it transpires that: 
Many customary practices were viewed as managerial concessions 
which employers were reluctant to see become institutionalised 
rights and, if this were to occur, it was feared future gener-
ations of shop stewards might use such rights as a basis for 
more demands. 
(Ingham, 1974: 83) 
Arguably, the conception of industrial relations in predominantly 
normative terms has special applicability to Australia where the 
antagonistic interests of capital and labour are mediated by a 
centralised system of conciliation and arbitration. What needs to 
be kept firmly in mind is that: 
Compulsion is of the very essence of the system and was 
a material element in its origins. The law compels the 
recognition of trade unions registered under the various 
statutes. ... Neither unions nor management can, at law, 
avoid the obligation of conciliation or, where that fails, 
arbitration. And when an agreement or an arbitral decision 
is embodied in an award, the terms, unlike those of the 
typical British collective agreement, become enforceable 
through processes of law. Whatever may be the voluntarist 
elements in the system, in practice, at each stage they 
have the compulsions of law behind them. 
(Sorrell, 1977: 251-2) 
The legalistic character of industrial relations 'rule-making' in 
Australia derives to some extent from the salience of arbitration. 
As we are told: 
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Arbitration dominates the scene despite the importance 
of conciliation on particular occasions. Basic to the 
arbitration function, of course, is the power to make 
rules specifying pay and working conditions. Such rules 
are set out in the awards of commission-type tribunals 
or in the 'determinations' of wages boards (which are 
not arbitral bodies in conception but operate as such 
in practice). Awards and determinations have the force 
of law; that is, they are legally enforceable against 
employers and employees subject to them. 
(Martin, 1975: 25) 
The pre-eminence of arbitration in the Australian system of industrial 
relations is also indicated by the fact that even where unions and 
employers have reached a private agreement it will frequently be 
referred to an arbitrator for ratification. (Martin, 1975: 25). 
Fundamentally, this power to confer legitimacy on even the outcome 
of private bargaining between employers and trade unions highlights 
the position of arbitration as the major 'norm-creating' agency in 
Australian industrial relations. However, the 'rules' it formulates 
with respect to the employment relationship depend for their observance 
less upon the willing consensus of the parties involved than upon 
administrative and legal coercion. 
Perhaps one of the most significant features of industrial relations in 
Australia is the scope of legal control over the activities of 
organisations like trade unions. For example, as Rawson observes, 
the degree of "regulation of unions' internal affairs ... has no 
parallel in similar capitalist countries." (1978: 57). Their 
administration, their financial management and even the election of 
their officers are, as Rawson points out, subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Industrial Court which has the competence to rule on such 
matters. (Rawson, 1978: 58-60). 
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Fundamentally, arbitration serves to institutionalise the subordinate 
status of labour in capitalist society. 
Perhaps best symbolising the ideological element is the 
attitude of tribunals towards encroachment upon what are 
quaintly knovm as 'the prerogatives of management ... One 
such encapsulating phrase used in all jurisdictions is 
'industrial matters' which are 'matters pertaining to 
the relations of employers and employees.' Those matters 
that are thought to lie properly within the exclusive 
powers of management do not, it seems, pertain to such 
relations and are not, therefore within the purview of 
the tribunals. 
(Sorrell, 1977: 253) 
Put simply, then, such propensities underline the role of arbitration 
in legitimising and reproducing the existing social order. 
Possibly one of the most remarkable developments in modern Australian 
industrial relations has been the growth of a system of collective 
bargaining alongside the formal arbitration system. The spectacular 
upsurge of direct negotiation has spurred considerable academic debate 
in Australia (see, notably, Portus, 1971; Hancock, 1962; Hince, 1967; 
Hughes and Rawson, 1960; Isaac, 1974; Kirby, 1965; Moore, 1973; 
Niland, 1976; 1978 and Woodward, 1970), Equally, it has prompted 
academic speculation that a process of 'hybridisation' between 
arbitration and collective bargaining is in train. (See especially 
Yerbury and Isaac, 1971: Niland, 1978.) 
Emphatically, by the mid-1960's, Australian industrial relations were 
also experiencing the problems of 'wage drift' (ie. payments extracted 
from employers over the Award rates set by Arbitration), and the 
erosion of managerial control - as a consequence of the spread of 
decentralised collective bargaining. Thus, it is no accident that 
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Australian academics like Foenander (1965) were no less exercised 
by the question of 'shop steward power' as were Donovan and Fox and 
Flanders in Britain just a few years later. 
The consensual ethic 
"The significance and meaning of conflict in industrial society", 
writes Alan Fox, "has received widely-differing interpretations". 
(1971: 144). Indeed, as he instances, for Marx, conflict not only 
served to enhance class solidarity - it was the basic generator of 
fundamental social change. (Fox, 1971: 144). To begin with, in 
Marxian eyes, conflict was rooted in the antagonistic material 
interests of capitalists and workers. Further, by virtue of its 
pervasiveness and its ineradicable nature in capitalist society, 
it facilitated the political mobilisation of the working class for 
their assigned revolutionary confrontation with the forces of capital; 
from which, Marxian theory decreed, they would emerge victorious. 
Characteristically, the Marxian viewpoint on the structure of society 
and the mechanisms of social change is totally at odds with those 
conventional sociological standpoints like structural-functionalism 
which envisage order and stability as 'desirable' - even 'natural' 
social states. 
The structural-functionalist rejection of the Marxist conflict model 
of society in which the themes of social conflict and social change 
are accorded analytical prominence has generally been mirrored in 
industrial relations research through such influential schools of 
thought as 'scientific management' and 'human relations' - as well 
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as their more contemporary offshoots like 'organisation theory' and 
'systems theory'. Tellingly, however, as Richard Hyman (1972) dis-
closes, whereas the currently unfashionable approaches like 'scientific 
management' and 'human relations' at least acknowledged the existence 
of class conflict - even if simply to deplore it - more 'modern-sound-
ing' perspectives like 'systems theory' refuse to analytically enter-
tain the notion of conflict - preferring to invoke such vacuous 
euphemisms as 'sub-optimal system functioning'. 
It is nevertheless noteworthy that the consensual view of society which 
treats conflict as a negative force i.e. as disruptive and fundamentally 
'abnormal' has been theoretically challenged - most notably by Lewis 
Coser in his much-discussed book, 'The functions of social conflict' 
(1956). Briefly, Coser's thesis is that the expression of conflict, 
far from conducing to the disintegration of society, may, paradoxically, 
contribute to its integration. Echoing Simmel, he adjudges conflict 
to be 'functional' for society in so far as its articulation provides 
outlet to 'dissociating elements' which would otherwise imperil the 
basic consensus that is the presumable 'normal' condition of social 
systems. From this viewpoint, it would seem that the real source of 
instability in society derives - not from the articulation of conflict 
- but, on the contrary, from its repression. Opposed to the 'common-
sense' notion of conflict as being destructive - Coser proposes that 
it may be constructive. In effect, what Coser has continued to do is 
to stand Karl Marx on his head: for he transforms conflict from a 
weapon of revolutionary change into an instrument for perpetuating 
the status-quo. 
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Critics of the functionalist perspective on conflict have observed 
that: 
Such arguments owe much to the evidence of the history 
of industrial relations: the development of trade unions 
from apparent organs of protest and revolt into respectable 
components of the social fabric of capitalism. 
(Hyman, 1971: 24) 
As the conventional wisdom would have it, the decreasing intensity 
of class hostilities in post-Marxian capitalist societies reflects 
the success of capitalism in localising class conflict as industrial 
conflict so that industrial disputes no longer involve a direct 
challenge to the stability of the whole social system. In the words 
of one of the most influential propagators of this position: 
Increasingly, the social relations of industry, including 
industrial conflict, do not dominate the whole of society 
but remain confined in their patterns and problems to the 
sphere of industry. Industry and industrial conflict are, 
in post-capitalist society, institutionally isolated i.e. 
confined v/ithin the borders of their proper realm and 
robbed of their influence on other spheres of society, 
(Dahrendorf, 1965: 268) 
Or, as 'mainstream' sociology succinctly and platitudinously asserts, 
class conflict has been 'institutionalised'. Typically, institution-
alisation is seen as centrally entailing an institutionally-reinforced 
dissociation of industrial and political conflict. 
In practical terms, the worker is exhorted to pursue his economic 
and political goals through separate institutional mechanisms for 
mediating dissent. Predictably, the fragmentation of class conflict 
into industrial conflict and political conflict profoundly undermines 
the effectiveness of working class protest. Not surprisingly, the 
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leaders of working class organisations have fallen victim to the 
"dominant ideology through which industrial action for industrial 
ends is deprecated but accepted, whereas industrial action for 
political ends is totally unacceptable". (Allen, 1975: 246). 
As this writer further notes: "According to the dominant ideology, 
political decisions must be made within the rule of law through the 
parliamentary process". (Allen, 1975: 246). Yet as he reports; 
"Governments, however, are increasingly intervening in industrial 
relations and in economic and social affairs in such a way as to 
influence the industrial objectives of unions". (Allen, 1975: 246). 
The case against workers pursuing their economic goals and political 
goals separately has been put even more strongly by Richard Hyman. 
As he vehemently maintains, "the increasing intervention of the state 
on the side of employers in industrial relations means that the 
traditional trade union segregation of 'industrial' and 'political' 
activities has become largely meaningless". (Hyman, 1972: 171). 
Set against this, it is widely-believed that the political quiescence 
of contemporary trade unions in advanced capitalist society is due 
in no small part to the 'legitimacy' they have managed to attain in 
such systems. As one notable sociological pundit alleges, "industrial 
conflict has become less violent because its existence has been accepted 
and its manifestations have been socially regulated By collective 
bargaining the frozen fronts of industrial conflict are thawed." 
(Dahrendorf, 1959: '257, 260). For another 'opinion-maker' in academic 
social science, the mere presence of tension-management mechanisms in 
a society acts to powerfully inhibit impulses for radical social change. 
In fact, he even goes so far as to conjecture that: 
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Communist movements have developed in countries 
which were most inclined to deny legitimacy to 
unions and other democratic expressions of 
working class aspirations. 
(Lipset, 1959: 113) 
Clearly, to hold that radical dissent is mainly a product of the 
absence of institutionalised dispute-settling procedures, is to beg 
the question of whether the conflicts that a social system generates 
are necessarily resolvable within its own confines. Put another way, 
if Tsarist Russia {say), had possessed institutionalised means of 
handling class protest, would that fact alone have guaranteed the 
perpetuation of the regime? There is thus no denying that the notion 
of the 'institutionalisation of class conflict' has assumed the function 
of a potent stupefier in academic social theory as well as in more 
practical orientations toward industrial relations. This is illuminated 
in the popular sociological assumption that the recognition of divergent 
class interests and their deflection into formalised modes of collective 
bargaining or State-mediated forms of arbitration (as in Australia), 
acts to stifle workers' political insurgency by providing a safety-
valve for class tensions. 
Inevitably, however, such approaches tend to overstate the extent of 
consensus and stability underlying 'institutionalisation'. Typically, 
moreover, they all but ignore the degree to which the elemental social 
abrasions which produced organised worker opposition in the first place 
continue as powerful barriers to the complete assimilation of such 
institutions into the capitalist framework. (Hyman, 1971: 25). 
(See below). 
In short, fne ca'pitalist mode of production itself provides an 
endviTing basis for worker-employer oonflict. 
151 . 
Conv-ersely, the "institutionalisation of industrial conflict does 
indeed achieve a provisional conLainment of disorder; but where 
workers' grievances and discontents are not resolved, they give 
rise eventually to new forms of conflict." (Hyman, 1975: 199). 
Given the fact that institutionalisation of industrial conflict in 
essence entails a 'dialectical' process of confrontation and com-
promise, it is easy to see why the overall impression of even highly-
formalised modes of industrial relations more nearly suggests a 
state of 'antagonistic co-operation' than of peaceful co-existence. 
Certainly this is true even for societies like Australia where the 
state maintains a fairly high profile in the regulation of industrial 
relations. To be sure, the manifest function of the Australian 
system of arbitration is to nullify the class struggle in the sense 
of denying it any wider significance than economism. Indeed, arbitra-
tion arguably serves to institutionalise the relations of domination 
and subordination inherent in wage labour by ruling fundamental 
questions of class power - the so-called 'prerogatives of management', 
as outside the legitimate arena of industrial dispute. 
Significantly, there is a piece of sociological mythology which 
maintains that the institutionalisation of industrial conflict has 
accomplished the decline of trade union strike activity. Expressed 
in the form of the 'Ross-Hartman thesis', this view posits the 
'withering away of the strike'. Fittingly, this argument has been 
comprehensively debunked by Geoffrey Ingham (1974J. Plainly, more-
over, the Australian experience provices convincing refutation of any 
idea that the provision of formal channels for settling industrial 
disputes has resulted in a reduced incidence of strikes. For, even 
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allowing for the definition problems that plague the making of cross-
country comparisons, it is still strikingly evident that Australia has 
arguably one of the highest strike-rates of any advanced capitalist 
society. Accordingly, as one Australian academic commentator concludes, 
"it is still fair to say that Australia's record would place in the 
folk-lore category the belief that compulsory arbitration effectively 
minimises strike problems." (Niland, 1978: 42). 
Such evidence completely explodes the supposition that the attenuation 
of class conflict is attributable to a decline in industrial conflict. 
In fact, as more sophisticated theorists recognise, it is the 
qualitative transformation of class conflict - specifically, its 
expression in predominantly industrial terms - rather than a quantitative 
reduction of industrial conflict per se that is central to the postulate 
of institutionalisation. For example, in the context of Australian 
industrial relations, institutionalisation involves the mutual legitim-
ation of the so-called 'two sides of industry'. In effect, the 
Australian arbitration system simultaneously highlights and neutralises 
the irrepressible conflict of interests between capital and labour by 
its orderly canalising of class resentments into economic bargaining -
thus in essence depriving such grievances of political outlet. 
Through arbitration, Australian trade unions are offered some power-
ful incentives to work within the system instead of actively seeking 
to precipitate its overthrow. Rawson, for example, has drawn attention 
to the extent to which the organisational fortunes of Australian trade 
unions are dependent upon the functional requirements of the arbitration 
system. As he writes: 
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Although many unions pre-date the arbitration system, there 
is a sense in which the majority of them have been, in the 
literal sense, the creatures of that system. This helps 
to explain the extent to which (willingly for the most part) 
they have submitted to its regulation and control. 
(Rawson, 1978: 25) 
Certainly, the arbitration system has some very effective means of 
persuasion to secure trade union compliance with its authority. 
An enticing carrot it holds out is the recognition it can confer on 
a trade union as the sole legitimate organisational representative of 
particular categories of workers. Alternatively, it wields a mighty 
big stick in the form of its power to deregister a trade union or to 
withhold recognition of it - thereby effectively consigning it to the 
industrial wilderness where it may face an acute struggle to survive. 
It is not surprising therefore that, as Rawson notes: 
The unwillingness of even radical-led unions to cut themselves 
off from arbitration suggests that the advantages of registration 
are great. They are certainly very important for unions which 
have accommodated themselves to the system and come to rely on 
its protection. Many of the smaller unions, whose members are 
too few in number and too poor in resources to maintain a 
substantial organisational structure, would simply vanish if 
larger, and in some cases more appropriate, unions had free 
access to their members. Most of the larger unions themselves 
have adjusted their level of organisation and financing to a 
system which requires a minimum of effort from them, either 
in enrolling and holding members or in the negotiation of 
conditions. 
(1978: 49-50) 
Clearly, the depoliticisation of class conflict depends ultimately for 
its effectiveness on the extent to which the industrial militancy of 
organised labour can be deflected into, what industrial relations 
writers generally describe as 'compromise bargaining'. 
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(See below) Correspondingly, however, as more insightful sociological 
observers have noted, the 'stability' which emanates from the institu-
tionalisation of industrial conflict tends to be notoriously fragile. 
Paradoxically, despite such concessions to 'reality', much of the 
conventional sociological analysis of conflict presumes that it is 
ultimately resolvable within the confines of the existing social 
system. Tellingly, this 'consensual ethic' underlies both the so-called 
'equilibrium' and 'conflict' models generated by functionalism. 
Fundamental to the functionalist approach, as Gunder Frank rightly 
points out is the surmise "that there is, and indeed must be, a long 
run tendency toward social integration in all existing social systems. 
But functionalist analysis does not, and due to its own short-run basis 
cannot, present any empirical evidence in support of the supposed fact 
of long run integration". (1969: 101) 
Characteristically, much of the debate within functionalism between 
'equilibrium' or 'consensus' models of society and 'conflict' models 
is invalidated by the common problematic within which they are framed. 
Put simply, they both tend to envisage society as a basic consensus 
wherein conflict is generated but ultimately reconciled. Certainly, 
functionalist conflict models have no conception of a system in which 
opposing interests are so starkly defined that the ultimate resolution 
Fundamentally, moveover, the implied tolevation of strikes and 
opposition political parties signifies the success of 'institution-
alisation' in deflecting class antagonisms into relatively-autonomous 
spheres of economic and political protest. 
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of social conflict involves the destruction of one of the parties. 
(See below) On the contrary, as Gunder Frank observes, "the function 
of social conflict for functionalists is only social integration. 
All other social conflicts - revolution and social disintegration -
are off-limits for functionalist theory and practice". (1969: 103) 
A very useful way of conceptualising functionalist 'conflict' models, 
is in terms of Allen's distinction between a conceptual innovation and 
a conceptual adaptation. In his view, a "conceptual innovation (is) 
an alteration in the conceptual basis itself while an adaptation makes 
it more efficient" (1975: 47). To the extent that the 'conflict' 
models thrown up by functionalism seek to divest functional theory of 
its more Utopian connotations rather than to question what Gunder Frank 
(1969) calls its 'structural fundamentals', they are clearly 'conceptual 
adaptations'. 
According to Allen (1975), two of the sociological examples, par 
excellence, of 'conceptual adaptations', are Coser's 'The functions of 
social conflict' and Dahrendorf's 'Class and class conflict in industrial 
In fact, it might well he avgued that the very notion of radical 
change within the pvevailing system is an absurdity given the 
fact that the conditions which most often require urgent change 
are exactly those upon which the system's preservation is 
predicated. Typically, the functionalist approach to conflict 
tends to treat struggles and, by implication, the vested interests 
against which they are waged in ahistorical terms, ie. as permanent 
aspects of all social systems. Since 'stability' is generally 
regarded by this approach as a universal functional prerequisite, 
the containment of conflict is inevitably accorded at least tacit 
approval. Rarely do fA.nctionalist formulations centrally examine 
the specific causes of conflict - let alone consider the necessity 
for the use of violence to shift an incumbent political administration. 
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society'. In Allen's view, "the conceptual adaptation to which Coser 
contributed was the introduction of conflict into the system frame of 
reference". (1975: 48). As he further reports, Coser's work was 
greeted with relief, if not enthusiasm, by many academic commentators, 
who saw it as a refutation of the lacerating taunt that functionalism 
lacked the ability to 'handle conflict'. (Allen, 1975: 48) 
However, it was Dahrendorf's epic analysis of 'class and class conflict' 
which really set academic sociology buzzing with excitement. Like a 
breath of fresh air after the crippling conceptual aridity of cold 
VJar-era sociology, Dahrendorf's work, predictably, stirred wide interest 
upon its publication in the late 1950's and profoundly influenced 
sociological thinking and research for more than a decade. 
To disenchanted liberals, critical of the static, consensual orientation 
of the dominant paradigms in academic sociology, Dahrendorf's work had 
an instant appeal: here at last was a rigorously analytical study which 
spoke of class rather than 'stratification'; which was not afraid to 
face up to the challenge posed by Marxist ideas, end which, equally-
importantly "treated (conflict) ... systematically as a permanent 
feature of reality rather than as a minor remedial friction". (Allen, 
1975: 49). Conversely, to the 'conservatives' within sociology, 
Dahrendorf's analysis although contradicting many of their ideas never-
theless provided a powerful defense of the existing social system: 
notably, it epitomised the emphatic theoretical laying to rest of the 
Marxist bogey which had so bedevilled academic sociology. 
As Allen (1975) contends, Dahrendorf's approach comprised a highly 
significant 'conceptual adaptation' to the body of sociological theory. 
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Its major accomplishment was to: 
Analyse conflict as a consequence of authority relations 
rather than as the result of the social relations of 
production on the one hand or disturbed equilibrium on 
the other. He assumed that there had been a divorce of 
ownership from control in industry and that the controll-
ing managerial class possessed its own values, but that 
these did not place employees and their unions.in 
implacable opposition to management Authority-derived 
conflict, therefore, was not seen as a disintegrating 
force, dividing classes and providing the stimulus for 
structural change but as an adapting one through which 
institutionalisation and democratisation contributed 
toward the achievement of equilibrium within the 
existing social relations of production. 
(Allen, 1975: 49) 
Characteristically, perhaps, presupposed in the idea of conflict 
'institutionalisation' is the assumption that the existing system 
is dynamic by virtue of its containment of the various forces that 
threaten to explode it. Naturally, the question of whether managed 
change within a system is capable of remedying its own fundamental 
inequalities is rarely in doubt in Dahrendorf's text. For example, 
he advances the claim that in the advanced Western countries: 
ownership of capital is 'widely dispersed'. To support this view, 
he mentions that 3 per cent and 8 per cent respectively of the 
populations of West Germany and the U.S.A. "own one or more shares 
of joint-stock companies". (Dahrendorf, 1959: 42). Like Nichols, 
one might be forgiven for asking "whether the figures cited are 
evidence of dispersion or concentration." (1970: 42) (See below) 
In fact, the spuriousness of Dahrendorf's 'dispersal' thesis is high-
lighted hy the increasing tendency of large corporations to buy back 
their own publicly-held stocks, ^s a consequence, while the number 
of stockowners has risen, the proportion of individually-held corporate 
stock has actually declined (see Domhoff, 1967). Further, while 8 per 
cent of the U.S. population may own stock, the proportion of stock-
owners who derive the bulk of their incomes from shareholdings is very 
nruch less. As one economist estimated, approximately 40 per cent of 
the income from property in the U.S. went to only 1 per cent of the 
population. (See Lampman, 1962) 
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For Dahrendorf, however, the spread of the joint-stock form of 
enterprise has led, in Nichols' words to "the emergence of a new 
kind of industrial order in which ownership and control are separated 
and for which the term 'capitalism' is no longer appropriate" (1970: 42) 
As Dahrendorf himself tells us: 
if we want to retain the concept of a capitalist society 
at all .. (it seems advisable) .. to insist on the union 
of private ownership and factual control of the instruments 
of production as the distinguishing feature of a capitalist 
form of society. 
(1959: 40) 
Thus, Marx's concept of capitalism as a transitory historical stage 
has been completely inverted by Dahrendorf. For to suggest that the 
industrialised Western countries are no longer capitalist is to imply, 
contrary to Marx, that such societies have completely transformed 
themselves - indeed, capitalism itself has been transcended - without 
the unpleasant necessity to fire a shot in anger. (This is not to 
deny that corporate capitalism does differ from its laissez-faire 
predecessor, but as critics like Hacker (1965) pointedly observed, the 
change has been more in the adjective than in the noun). In view of 
his fundamental amendment to the Marxian notion of capitalism, Nichols' 
interpretation that "Dahrendorf's own views are in consonance with what 
he takes to be the 'Marxist' tradition" (1970: 41), only goes to 
illustrate the inherent capacity of a 'conceptual adaptation' to mislead, 
Revealingly, moreover, Dahrendorfs redefinition of class in terms of 
'authority relationships' has important implications for his treatment 
of social conflict. As Nichols rightly points out, the simple-minded 
view "that since the managers are not property owners the conflict of 
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interest betv/een owners and workers is no longer present" (1970: 45) 
is certainly not endorsed by Dahrendorf. On the contrary, "the 
major function of class and class conflict was to establish that 
authority is the major determinant of class and also of class conflict". 
(Nichols, 1970: 'A5-6). Yet, what the conception of class in terms of 
authority does is to drastically revise Marx's idea of class and class 
conflict. Notably, instead of the projected polarisation of society 
into two huge mutually-antagonistic camps as envisioned by Marx, 
Dahrendorf sees 'class conflict' as becoming more diffused as a 
result of the basic line of cleavage created by authority within 
every institutional hierarchy. 
Critics of this view like Parkin (1971) and Giddens (1973) have drawn 
the obvious inferences from it in making the point that such a 
perspective is intrinsically at odds with the classical Marxian notion 
of a unitary ruling class - or, indeed, a unitary working class for 
that matter. But then Dahrendorf seems quite happy to concede the 
idea of 'pluralistic' class struggles within 'industrial society'. 
As he affirms: "In theory, there can be as many competing, conflict-
ing, or coexisting dominating conflict groups in a society as there 
are associations". (Dahrendorf, 1959: 198) 
Inevitably, the trivialised empiricism of U.S. sociology has made its 
characteristically-shallow contribution to the authority/class debate 
in the form of a survey conducted by Lopreato (1968) in - of all places, 
Italyl Briefly, the researcher sets out to test Dahrendorfs premiss 
of the dichotomous division of industry between those with authority and 
those without. The 'findings' are yawningly predictable: 'authority' 
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(at least in the highly-superficial way it is operationally-defined 
by Lopreato), is pluralistically distributed in industrial enterprises; 
those who are most resentful of its exercise are not the regimented, 
alienated workers on the shopfloor and in the office (in Lopreato's 
parlance, the 'obey class') but the lower rungs of the so-called 
'command class' i.e. junior management and supervisors. 
This emphasis on how the various parties within industry subjectively 
perceive their situation manifestly neglects what is central to 
Dahrendorf's analysis of authority: the objective structural factors 
which constitute the framework within which the attitudes and outlooks 
of superordinate and subordinate groups in industry are formed. By 
contrast, Crouch grasps the point perfectly when he states that the 
"exchange relationship around employment provides the basis for the 
fundamental dichotomous class model .... The inequality of the 
exchange implies at one and the same time an inequality of economic 
reward and an authority relationship; and it is the capacity of these 
dimensions to have major consequences for the lives of actual persons 
that the tendency for class relations to assume an empirical form 
consists". (1977: 7) 
On the other hand, given the 'pluralistic' connotations of his model 
of class and class conflict, Dahrendorf is hardly in a position to 
complain when more conservatively-inclined writers make use of his 
work to support their simplistic thesis that class struggle in advanced 
Western societies has been totally transformed into competition and 
conflict between various institutional pressure groups. 
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(See below) The significance of viewing class and class conflict 
in pluralistic terms has been analysed by Allen in a penetrating 
critique. As he warns us: 
Pluralism assumes permanent diversity of interests, 
objectives and power within groups, organisations and society 
and between them. Thus every conceivable tension, friction or 
conflict can be acknowledged. All situations are diffused, 
fragmented and competitive. There are rival sources of power, 
of leadership and attachment. The diversity, however, is 
reconcilable by assumption. The different interests are 
assumed to comprise coalitions or viable collaborative 
structures in which the diversity can be maintained, freedom 
of action can be provided, consistent with the preservation 
of the system or society under consideration - in which, in 
other words, balance can be achieved. Pluralism is a 
particular expression of equilibrium analysis; it represents 
permanent aberrations from equilibrium positions in which the 
possibility of achieving them is always present. 
(Allen, 1975: 50) 
Such insights however are clearly foreign to the work of researchers 
like Higley et.al. (1979), Fox (1966), and Fox and Flanders (1969). 
To assume as Dahrendorf evidently does, that the Marxist concept of 
a capitalist ruling class is invalidated unless one can clearly 
demonstrate an "axiomatic identity between the managers or capitalists 
of industry and the ministers or highest civil servants of the state" 
(1959: 141), is to ignore that what holds the various vested interests 
together is ultimately an attitude of mind rather than social ties. 
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(See below). Indeed, Fox (1966) and Fox and Flanders (1969) leave 
no doubt that they view a 'pluralistic' approach to industrial 
relations as an effective conceptual antidote to the facile 'unitary 
The purpose of Eigley et. dt's research is in itself unexoeptiondble: 
to vjtcover th^ "structure and behaviour of Australian national elites" 
(1979: 3). Typically^ 'power in society is seen by the researchers 
as being pluralistically distributed among a number of elites viz. 
'the business elite', the 'trade union elite', the 'political elite' 
etc. Unbelievably enough, Eigley et. al. even manages to identify a 
'voluntary association elite' - a concept which implies that the 
leadi'ng personnel of any institutional hieraspchy ipso facto constitute 
an 'elite'. This impression is reinforced by the authors' statement 
th^t "there must be hierarchies of power in all large and complex 
organisations". (Eigley et. al. 1979: 3) (Emphasis added) Wn,y 
should this be so? Simply because, as the writers assert, organisat-
ional "size and oom.plexity necessarily creates elites". (Eigley et. al., 
1979: 3). Clearly, to argue in this fashion is to uncritically 
accept Michels' glil> epigram: 'who says organisation says oligarchy. ' 
A.lthough offering a degree of insight, this aphorism assumes that 
functional specialisation necessarily entails social domination - a 
view which to sa,y the least, is highly-debatable. Significantly, the 
problem of class conflict is extinguished as a qv.estion in Eigley 
et. al's study: instead, what we are offered is a characterisation 
of trade unions a.s simply one of a number of competing pressure groups. 
Fredictoi)ly, the image of social conflict which emerges from Eigley 
et. al's analysis of elites, is of a diffuse power struggle among 
shifting coalitions of interest. It is further noteworthy that in 
irucluding trade union leaders in their pantheon of 'national elites', 
the researchers implicitly assume that such officials necessarily 
shuxre the preva,iling ideological consensus. For example, as they 
write: "The presumption underlying this study is that these distinctive 
featv.res of Australian society -- (political stability and democratic 
practices) — derive primarily from, the consensual unified structure 
tha,t its elites harje always formed". (Eigley et. al., 1979: 2V. 
Surely, however, the existence or not of ideological consensus is a 
question for empirical investigation rather than 'a priori' assertion. 
Fuspther what Therbom (1978) calls the 'suJbgectivist' methodological 
approach is evident from the questions these researchers ask: l-fho 
rn^.s Australia? Eow is it ru:n? - as the blurb on the cover of their 
book so helpfully infonv.s us. Criticising the subjactivist orientation 
which suffuses the pluralist/elitist debate, Therbom maintains that 
the qv.estion of "who rules: a unified elite or competing leadership 
groups?" has to be viewed in the context of far more important 
^str-uctural considerations viz. "Wnat kind of society and what basic 
relaticras of production are bei'og reproduced? By what mechanisms? etc. " 
As he concludes: "The analysis of reproduction enables us to explain 
hew the different moments of the exercise of power in society may be 
interrelated, even in the c^sence of a conscious inter-personal 
connection." (Therbor-n, 1978: 137-8) 
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ideology' which permeates 'scientific management' and 'human relations' 
perspectives on the employer/employee relationship. As noted, 
Fox has subsequently repudiated the 'pluralist' position, arguing that 
it presents a highly-misleading picture of the realities of power in 
capitalist society. Critics of his 'radicalisation of industrial 
relations theory' are, however, frankly sceptical that his new-found 
'radical' approach does more than simply "develop and modify pluralism 
in response to changing conditions". (Wood and Elliott, 1977: 109). 
In a sense, such an orientation typifies the sparse sociological 
attempts to theorise either about society in general, or about 
industrial relations in particular. Even where a genuine effort is 
made to address the fact of social conflict, the attempt is inevitably 
aborted by the consensual ethic which suffuses much of academic sociol-
ogical theory. Yet, despite such criticisms of their conceptual 
inadequacy, these theoretical initiatives are to be welcomed -
particularly in the field of industrial relations. For, all too often, 
a gross empiricism characterises discussion of the subject. Indeed, 
the study of industrial relations is noted for its reluctance to 
acknowledge any necessity for 'theory' - let alone Marxist theory. 
The typical approach is still regrettably the superficial standpoint 
spelled out by a leading academic expert on Australian industrial 
relations. Writing about the problem of 'effective conflict resolution', 
he proceeded to simplistically argue: 
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Where industrial capitalism is considered to produce 
inevitable and revolutionary class conflict, the question 
of whether compulsory arbitration or collective bargaining 
better facilitates dispute resolution between employers 
and employees becomes largely irrelevant. Marxists would 
no doubt point out that both modes require the parties' 
acceptance of a stable non-Marxist framework for effective 
operation. Those rejecting capitalism or one of its 
modifications might prefer one process of dispute resolution 
over the other for strategic reasons in in interim, but over 
the long run both arbitration and bargaining would be reject-
ed, equally, as instruments of capitalism. But to the 
extent that we are prepared to endorse a non-Marxist economic 
and social framev/ork, the significant differences between 
compulsory arbitration and collective bargaining in enhancing 
genuine dispute resolution take on an abiding relevance. 
(Niland, 1978: 35) 
Having thus presumably 'disposed' of Marx, this researcher can then 
get on with the serious academic business of minutely describing 
how the system manages to endlessly resolve its industrial frictions. 
However, to situate the academic study of industrial relations in this 
fixed and limited concept of social reality is to entrench the tunnel-
visioned focus and crude empiricism of the discipline. As we can see 
from Niland's statement, 'pragmatism' in the academic study of 
industrial relations almost inevitably seems to involve a taken-for-
granted view of the existing institutional structure and a correspond-
ing presumption of a basic consensus in society. 
Put simply, capitalism sets the terms of debate in industrial relations. 
Accordingly, the role of the researcher is delimited by this assumed 
'reality'. Additionally, ' industrial relations' thinking about 
conflict is premissed upon a 'consensual ethic' which presupposes that 
compromises between warring factions are not only possible but desirable. 
To the extent that the basic methodological assumptions of industrial 
relations accept as given, the legitimacy of the existing power structure. 
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they are the assumptions - not of a scientific endeavour but of 
apologetics and ideology. As Allen has usefully reminded us: 
An ideology is essentially a mechanism for social control. 
It works by producing a uniformity of responses about the 
primary activities in a society. In other words, in various 
ways it imposes a conformity on a society. This is necessary 
for the protection of the dominant power interests. 
Unless power is to be perpetually retained through the crude 
use of armed might the members of a society must be convinced 
of the legitimacy of the power structure. 
(1975: 230) 
For the exponents of industrial relations like Niland, who are 
'prepared to endorse a non-Marxist economic and social framework' 
(perhaps it is too innocent of the scientific enterprise to suggest 
that the basic task of the researcher is not to 'endorse' any 
particular methodological perspective but to critically analyse its 
advantages and limitations for explaining particular phenomena), no 
other options to the given institutional structure can be considered. 
But this is to say, in essence, that a capitalist framework is a 
necessary pre-requisite for the production of goods and services. 
To pose the issue in these terms is to immediately apprehend the 
discredited, ideological character of industrial relations premisses. 
Clearly, if the academic study of industrial relations is to contribute 
anything of scientific value to our understanding of it, then it will 
need to keep in mind that "science can only pose problems on the 
terrain and within the horizon of a definite theoretical structure". 
Althusser and Balibar, 1970: 25). Or, as Einstein's famous dictum 
asserts: "It is the theory which decides what we can observe". 
(Cited in Bell, 1976: 9). However, like the person who spoke prose 
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without realising it, the 'pragmatic' view of industrial relations 
similarly ignores that: "Empirical data are interpretations within 
the framework of previous theories; as a result, they themselves 
share the latter's hypothetical character." (Habermas, 1974: 199). 
Possibly, however, one of the most compelling reasons for the need 
for systematic theoretical thinking in industrial relations is that, 
as Paul Hirst observed of sociological theory: 
The lower the general level of theoretical culture 
the more difficult it becomes to continue and to 
develop advanced theoretical work. 
(1972: 216) 
The stratification explanans 
Since the Second World War; the occupational structure of Australia 
has, like that of most economically-developed countries, undergone a 
profound transformation. Notably, all these societies have experienced 
a dramatic and continuing rise in the 'non-manual' segment of their 
workforces. Significantly, 'white-collar' employment has expanded 
not only numerically but as a proportion of the labour force. The 
Australian data on occupational change are illustrative of the funda-
mental shifts in employment which have occurred in the advanced 
industrial nations. 
Between 1947 and 1971, professional, executive and clerical employ-
ment increased by 122 per cent while labour force growth as a whole 
expanded by only 66 per cent. Even more tellingly, the proportions 
of workers employed in manufacturing rose by only 44 per cent, while 
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those in primary industry actually fell by 7 per cent. (Lansbury, 1977; 
186-7). In the grandiloquent prose of this writer: 
The archetypal Australian is no longer a sunburt 
pioneer of the outback but a grey-suited, white-collar 
worker in the plate-glass offices of the fast-growing 
cities. 
(Lansbury, 1977a: 184) 
What this thicket of cliches serves to reinforce is the fact that 
the occupational composition of Australia has markedly changed. 
Inevitably, the rapid expansion of the white-collar sector in the 
developed countries has generated speculation about the implications 
of this trend for the growth and indeed the very character of trade 
unionism. 
Initially, the rise to prominence of the 'service sector' was viewed 
by some commentators as heralding the demise of the trade union movement. 
Predictably, such ideas gained credence from the steady and virtually 
universal contraction of union growth throughout the developed capitalist 
world from the mid-1950's to about the early 1970's. Typically, a 
pessimistic but, nevertheless, highly-influential interpretation suggest-
ed that trade union growth in the so-called 'post-industrial' societies 
had reached 'saturation point'. (Bell, 1974). Stated simply, the 
contraction of employment in the heavy industries in which unions have 
traditionally enjoyed their greatest strength has meant that the 
established centres of union influence are on the decline. 
Further, since the bulk of the employees in heavy manufacturing, 
mining, railroad and similar types of employment were already 
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unionised, the only scope for further unionisation was to organise 
the employees of the small, scattered firms in this sector which 
still remained outside the union orbit. However, the gains of such 
an operation are likely to be offset by its potential cost and by 
the effort it requires in terms of time and manpower. 
In effect, while unionisation was expected to make a significant 
headway in the more proletarian segments of the service sector, these 
advances would be counter-balanced by the shrinkage of membership in 
traditional areas like the docks, railways and mining as technological 
change and economic considerations made their impact felt. Finally, 
the unhappy prospects for further growth in trade unionism was indicated 
by the fact that it was precisely among the most rapidly increasing 
sections of the labour force i.e. professional, administrative and 
technical employees - particularly those employed by private industry, 
that union recruitment experienced least success. (Bell, 1974: 140) 
For British writers, the inability of the trade unions to attract 
white-collar and professional workers was seen to be a product of the 
poor image these institutions had in the eyes of such workers. To 
such enthusiasts of union reform like Eric Wigham (1961) and Michael 
Shanks (1967), trade unions had to cast off the 'period' flavour that 
still clung to them. Indeed, in the public mind, so it was argued, 
the trade union movement was epitomised by Lowe's cartoon portrayal 
of the T.U.C. as a carthorse: solid, ponderous, dull and out-of-date 
in the technological era. As Michael Shanks ridiculed, the organis-
ational structures and the political rhetoric of the trade unions were 
hangovers of a bygone age. To survive in the brave new technological 
world of the second half of the 20th century, the trade unions v^ould 
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have to adapt - and quickly, or perish. No less impressed by the 
challenge facing trade unions, Eric Wigham (1961) was to put forward 
no fewer than twenty-five recommendations - or more accurately, 
'cures' for their backwardness. (See below 1) 
What is significant about this debate is that the trade unions have 
totally confounded their critics. Not only have the reports of their 
death been greatly exaggerated, but far from becoming moribund, as 
the professional Jeremiahs predicted, the trade unions have grown 
considerably in size, influence and importance. The exception in 
this regard (if Bell's (1974) figures are to be accepted), 
is the U.S.A. where the percentage of union members in the labour 
force has declined. (See below 2) 
1 
As Rawson -points out, little of this kind of discussion took place 
in Australia:, pavtly hecause, as he suggests, "concevn about declin-
ing union density during this period was largely muffled by the 
effects of a rapidly growing workforce". (1978: 29). In other 
words J as Rawson reports, while the percentage of the unionised 
workforce fell, the raw numbers of trade unionists had actually 
risen quite significantly (1978: 29). 
2 
It would argyjably be as misleading to overemphasise the influence 
of managerial antipathy towards trade unionism in explaining the 
proportional decline of unionisation in the JJ.S.A. as it would be 
naive to corr^letely deny it of any significance. Plainly, if trade 
w%ionism in the U.S.A. has failed to moke any headway among certain 
categories of white-collar workers, some part of the blame for this 
can ^justifiably be attributed to the attitudes and policies of U.S. 
managements. To put it bluntly, the acceptance of trade unionism 
by U.S. employers has traditionally been, at best, grudging. _ For 
example. Bell himself, in his earlier and ecjually-controversial _ 
magnum opus was moved to comment on the 'uneasy partnership' which 
prevailed between management and union in the U.S: "uneasy because 
in many cases employers would still prefer to exercise sole power, 
although the more sophisticated employers know the value of such 
powerful allies as the unions in safeguarding their interests; 
uneasy too, because there is still the historic tendency of laboui> 
(continued next page) 
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Characteristically, Bell has sought to draw all kinds of question-
ably pessimistic inferences from the data. However, certain points 
need to be kept firmly in mind. Firstly, the percentage of trade 
union members in the U.S. has rarely exceeded 25 per cent - thus 
invalidating any implication that the decline of class polarisation 
is a product of the 'coming of post-industrial society'. Similarly, 
the 'decline' in trade union membership, as Bell's own figures 
confirm, has, to say the least, been slight - from 22.9 per cent 
in 1947 to 22.6 in 1970, Revealingly, moreover, the decline has 
been anything but uniform. Taking Bell's figures again, we see 
that from a high point of 25.2 per cent in 1956, trade union member-
ship declined to 23.6 per cent and 22.2 per cent in 1960 and 1964 
but rose again in 1968 to 23 per cent, finally falling back to 
22.6 per cent in 1970. Typically, Bell's explanation of the 
reasons for the fluctuations in union membership is far from 
satisfactory - a feature it shares with much of the Australian 
act-vna as a. sos-ial movems-nt to opvcss employevs as a alass". (1960: 216) 
^lo oe sui'e, t'm vast sie^.s svsnt by U.S. indiisti^j on social science 
r'essai'cr. iritc 'laji^oio' v^^o'olsr.s^ since the cs'Lehrated 'Eojjthovne 
evito^.ses this concevn. Sig-p.ificantly, I-Lovever, despite 
-r.e r.assi-Je e--ovuS to irzvvove 'hz^.crr. relations' 'between vnarxigevs 
a-ci -oi'kei-'s arid to zvain factovy szivevvisovs in 'commy.nication 
-hs vake of the studies, U.S. envloyers have 
'nov -:anaaed vo eli^ate blus-collai^ lozianis-:. Fia^ther, despite 
t>3 in-i^ivelv ^.ore sovhisvicated techniques of behxrjiovj'al 
^ZvCc-hazicr. that contejirpovav-y social science has placed^at their 
disv^sal it is doubted vhethev U. S. managene-nts will ultimately 
successfiil in per-ra-ne-ntly vepvessing white-collaj? wid 
vrof^sional iazionis::^ion in co-r-.evce, fiizcozce etc. as Bell (1974) 
so ob'jiousl'iJ believes. 
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v^/^iti^g on this problem. (See below) 
Leaving aside the plainly exceptional case of the U.S., it is note-
worthy that trade union membership in both Australia and the U.K. 
has risen considerably. Basically, much of the reason for this has 
been due to the success of the trade unions in organising groups 
of workers previously thought to be immune to unionisation viz. 
professional, technical and administrative employees and more 
particularly, women white collar workers. (Bain and Price, 1972; 
Lansbury, 1977a, 1977b; Rawson, 1978). The upsurge of union growth 
is all the more remarkable because it has taken place against a 
simultaneous decline of employment in the industries where the 
unions have traditionally enjoyed their greatest strength. 
According to the conventional academic wisdom, the permanent and 
continuing shift from manufacturing to service employment ipso facto 
For example, to argue as such writers do, that the impetus to the 
unionisation of the new categories of 'white-collar' workers came 
basically from union officials, employers and the State is to cloud 
rather than clarify discussion of white-collar unionism. To hegiyi 
with, such an argwnent completely devalues the rising industrial 
militancy of many segments of the white-collaj' rank-and-file. 
Equally-importantly, it evades examination of the structural changes 
to white-collar work, which, in drastically and permanently under-
mining the work conditions, pay and prestige of such employees 
created the ohpective preconditions for their organisation. 
Characteristically, the image presented by Rawson (1978)^ of passive 
white-collar workers in Australia being dragooned into gaining 
trade unions by 'compulsory unionism' clauses in their employment 
contracts gives methodological priority to the psychological 
predispositions of such workers without troubling to analyse the 
structural context in which such outlooks are formed and, more 
importantly, are changed. 
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spelled the decay and ultimate disappearance of the trade union 
movement. To those renowned experts in the art of instant prophecy 
like Bell (1960, 1974) and Galbraith (1967) the future of unionism 
was bleak. Basically, their argument could be summarised as follows 
trade unions were predominantly associated with secondary industry 
and with manual employment; both these areas were on the wane hence 
trade unions could be expected to experience a drastic decline in 
membership. 
As noted, this simplistic syllogism has been decisively refuted -
at least in Australia and the U.K., for reasons which have very 
little to do with their 'public image', as the likes of Wigham (1961) 
and Shanks (l967) once fondly believed. (See below) In their sing-
ular preoccupation with whether or not the trade unions could attract 
the more prestigous categories of non-manual employees, what these 
writers neglected to consider were the objective features of the non-
manual work situation which might lead such workers to join unions. 
Put bluntly, in their zeal to demonstrate that trade unions held 
little appeal for the white-collar workers, what such writers conven-
iently overlooked is the historical fact that perennially, workers 
ha\'e been - not so much attracted to trade unions as driven to them. 
I-n -particulca?. Shanks expressed considevcible disappointment that the 
wade union mover.ent iTad not maruxged to produce a 'JHnston Churohill' 
- an organisaticrn which also ^badly needs its Valter Reuther' and an 
'able arzd vell-paid staff to map out the fiiture and plan strategy' 
(1967: 97-ll4)\ 
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Likewise, to seek to explain the processes of decline and growth in 
particular segments of the Australian labour force in terms of State 
support or the lack of it, as writers like Howard (1977), Lansbury 
(1977a; 1977b) and Rawson U978) do, is to beg the question of why 
the State should voluntarily wish to foster the development of trade 
unionism. (.See below) More importantly, in confining their discussion 
of union growth to proximate causes - such as the attitudes of employ-
ers and the State, what these analyses neglect to do is to examine how, 
for example, the industrial and political attitudes and behaviour of 
various categories of 'white-collar' labour are likely to be affected 
by changes to their objective class situation. 
In tvacing the sources of support for the introduction and extension 
of 'arbitration' in Australia, Howard (1977) points to what he evident-
ly regojpds as a paradox, viz. that the creation of the system though 
stemming initially from trade union pressure, was readily accepted hy 
the State. Chara^cteristicaXly, he fails to draw the obvious implications 
of such support. Likewise, although he notes the constitutional 
sanctions for the system, the point thxit arbitration is a mechanism 
for reinforcing the capitalist system in Australia is all but lost on 
this writer. Moreover, he talks about arbitration giving unions 
"government protection from employers and from rival unions" (Howard, 
1977: 265) and cites approvingly Higgins' (the second President of 
the Arbitration Court) grandiose view of ajrbitration as a metaphor 
for equity and social justice, while blandly overlooking the 
fact that arbitration inhibits trade unions from contesting the right 
of owners of capital to appropriate surplus-value. In fact Howard's 
account of how the arbitration system came into being is most reveal-
ing. As he informs us: "In the Australian case, the society passed 
to governments the task of creating an industrial relations mechanism 
which would provide a measure of peace and which would shield the 
whole society from the distasteful effects of industrial struggles". 
(1977: 273). "such mystifications about 'society' however, leave 
unanswered fwndamental questions about the nature of power in capital-
ist systems; in effect, the problems of the ownership of the means of 
production and the appropriation of surplus-value - central to any 
real wnderstanding of the structure of eco^in£)mic power - are tacitly 
reduced to the status of inconsecfuences. 
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In fact, contrary to the euphoric predictions of the 'post-industrial 
society' thesis, the generalised upgrading of labour in response to 
the needs of a 'technological' society has simply not eventuated. 
Rather, as Braverman (1974) reports, the introduction of new work 
technologies has led to a progressive 'deskilling' of labour which 
he insightfully characterises as the 'degradation of work.' 
Tellingly, clerical, professional and technically-qualified employment 
has not escaped the effects of these changes within the labour-process. 
Thus, while such categories of workers have grown numerically more 
prominent in advanced capitalist societies, the identity of vast slabs 
of this new strata as distinctively-privileged occupations has been 
made a hollow pretence by objective changes in their work situation 
and the consequent decline in pay, prestige and job security of such 
employment. (It is also noteworthy that in the present economic 
crisis in Australia, such presumably high-status professions like 
architecture and engineering as well as those classic models of 
professions viz. law and medicine, are experiencing relatively-high 
levels of unemployment. The ultimate irony of 'post-industrialism' 
is the incipient growth of unemployment among computer specialists!) 
What all of this adds up to, is that Bell's (1974) grandiose (and 
flawed) vision of benevolent technocratic hegemony has been completely 
exploded. As was obvious from the outset to those whose vision was not 
blurred by the rose-tinted prisms of Bell's recklessly-optimistic 
futurology, the scientists and engineers instead of becoming a new 
ruling class were essentially being transformed into the 'servants of 
power' - to use Baritz's (1965) very apt expression. In effect, as 
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Giddens (1973) noted, 'post-industrialism' really meant that the 
'powerful have knowledge' rather than that the 'knowledgeable have 
power'. 
To put it another way, the assimilation of science and technology 
within the existing framework of capitalist power relations symbolises 
not the creation of a qualitatively-different social system but the 
entrenchment of the existing system of power and privilege. Thus, the 
expansion of the ranks of 'intellectual' labour heralds the extension 
of traditional oppressions rather than the birth of a new millenium. 
To understand the altered situation of white-collar and professional 
employment and the potential for enhanced class-consciousness on the 
part of these groups, it is vital to grasp the phenomenon of 
'stratification in the labor process' as V/achtel (1974) dubs it. 
Before proceeding to do so, however, it is necessary to dispose of 
some of the misleading formulations which are propagated by the 
contemporary 'Left'. 
The static orientation 
There is a vast amount of academic literature providing a wealth of 
information on various aspects of 'industrial relations' in capitalist 
society. In fact, few areas have been more thoroughly studied, 
measured, tabulated and reported on - even though significant gaps 
remain to be filled. Yet, for all the massive documentation and, in 
some cases, the undeniable technical virtuosity of conventional 
industrial relations research, it is highly-debatable whether this 
perspective offers (or, indeed, even claims to do so), an adequate 
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intellectual basis for the theoretical understanding of working class 
institutions like trade unions - let alone the factors which conduce 
to their development and subsequent possibilities. 
Characteristically, the industrial relations perspective, as earlier 
emphasised, is predicated upon the assumption that capitalism is 
basically unproblematic. Fundamental to this approach, is the 
presumption that the capitalist system has the ability to endlessly 
reproduce its productive relations. Trade unionism therefore, not 
surprisingly, is axiomatically viewed as part of a broad ideological 
consensus which assumes the inviolability of the capitalist framework 
of industrial relations and simply devotes its energies to getting 
the best terms within it. 
Significantly, the attempts to develop 'Marxist' approaches to 
'industrial relations' ironically embody many of the conceptual 
deficiencies of the latter. Illustrative of this is Richard Hyman's 
(1975) 'Marxist introduction' to industrial relations. Briefly, and 
very promisingly, the stated aim of Hyman's book is to "sketch an 
approach which grasps 'industrial relations' as an element in a totality 
of social relations of production" (1975: ix). In particular, as he 
further tells us, his approach "seeks to develop an analysis which is 
firmly rooted in the Marxist perspective, and is necessarily influenced 
by the attempts of others to apply this perspective to the field of 
industrial relations" (Hyman, 1975: 6). 
Essentially, what Hyman claims to be offering is a "political economy 
of industrial relations". (1975: 31) Central to this perspective, 
is a definition of industrial relations as the "processes of control 
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over work relations". (1975: 12) More importantly, these 'processes 
of control' take place within a distinctively capitalist context. 
This means that much of the productive system is 
privately owned, with ownership concentrated in 
a very small number of hands, that profit - the 
pursuit of economic returns to the owners — is 
the key influence on company policy (whether or 
not top management actually possesses a financial 
stake in the firm); and that control over 
production is enforced downwards by the owners' 
managerial agents and functionaries. 
(Hyman, 1975: 19) 
Typically, Hyman makes much of his 'dialectical' approach and insists 
upon according conceptual primacy to the 'social relations of product-
ion' . Yet, he neglects to demonstrate precisely how the changes 
within the capitalist labour process which are presently transforming 
the occupational structures of capitalist societies and drastically 
altering the patterns of union growth and activity are mediated by 
the social relations of production. More precisely (and bluntly), 
Hyman's approach evidences little concern with bringing Marxism up 
to date in the face of the profound structural transformations which 
have been generated by the capitalist mode of production. Indeed, 
other than occasionally acknowledging that 'clerical' and 'technical' 
workers exist, Hyman does not explore the significance of the 
structural locations of such layers in the labour process for either 
their unionisation or their industrial behaviour. 
Certainly, he gives little analytical attention to the degree to 
which the stratified nature of the labour process generates divergences 
of interest between the various segments of the labour force thereby 
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conducing to sectionalism in their organisational activities. (See 
below 1.) Consequently, while he advocates greater trade union and 
worker solidarity, he can provide no inkling as to the actual or 
potential structural bases for such alliances. Thus, although the 
value of 'industrial relations' in its bourgeois forms is interrogated 
and even condemned as irrelevant by Hyman, all that he can seemingly 
offer in the final analysis is a vague wish for the "abolition of 
'industrial relations' as it exists today through working-class 
struggle". (1975: x) (See below 2.) 
The limitations of current Marxist efforts to provide a theoretical 
approach to industrial relations are even more glaring apparent in 
1 
Clearly, the rcon-ifications of the tendency for the hieravchical 
form of the labour-process to stratify not only between but vrlthin 
oacu:pa,tions would, seem to require at least some theoretical explan-
ation. 
2 
Despite such criticisms, Hyman's work is a great advance over the 
descriptive, empiricist approaches which tend to predominate in 
Hn^stria.l relations', since it offers much-needed theoretical 
insight into the com:plex contradictions which underlie the wage-
labour relationship under capitalism. It is quite true, as Hyman 
indicates, that the 'institutionalisation of class conflict' is 
highly-precarious in that such conflict is inherent in the class 
relationship. But if the sectional nature of such conflict is 
not spelled out in more detail, the limits (and possibilities) of 
such struggle is almost impossible to assess. Admirable though 
his aims are to provide an approach to industrial relations which 
is 'exrplicitly theoretical', Hyman's basic failure to relate his 
analysis to amy empirical reality results in a fundamentally 
untenable level of generality and abstractness in his social gaze. 
}!hile it can readily be conceded that theory may assume a wide 
variety - both of forms and of levels of abstraction, the validity 
of a theory with pretensions to informing radical social action, 
basically resides in its capacity to clearly grasp the nature of 
reality and to delineate th^ conditions for its c'nange. ^tting 
it simply, if we are going to aspire to change reality, it is 
imperative that we are first able to make sense of it. 
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the work of writers like Allen (1971) and Lane (1974). Stated simply, 
Allen sets out to formulate a 'sociology of industrial relations', 
while for his part. Lane modestly proposes to investigate the 'politics 
and trade unionism of the British working class'. Allen's basis 
premiss, as he confides "is that movement is generated and perpetuated 
by the existence of contradictions at every level of social behaviour 
and in all its aspects. It is on the notion of contradiction that 
the possibility of model building for a dynamic analysis really rests." 
(1971: 8-9). Yet, as he simultaneously reveals, "there is little 
evidence of the use of such a model" (Allen, 1971: 9) in his book. 
Sadly, for Marxist theoretical advances in 'industrial relations' Allen 
is perfectly correct in this judgement. 
Accordingly, in place of any coherently worked-out theory, we are 
offered the feeble argument that "implicit in the book is the assump-
tion that movement occurs through contradictions". (Allen, 1971: 9). 
However, this statement only begs the question of what conceivable 
purpose can there be in having an assumption - implicit or otherwise -
which has no basis in the overall analytical framework. 
Interestingly, in both Allen's and Lane's books, the trade unions are 
cast in leading parts in the industrial relations drama. Allen, for 
example, is of the opinion that the "central institutions in the 
sociology of industrial relations are trade unions". (1971: 20) 
Likewise, Lane insists that: "Absolutely central to an understanding 
of the political condition of the working-class is a clear and unem-
bittered appreciation of that class's one durable monument: the trade 
unions". (1974: 28) The basic inadequacies of these 'Marxist' 
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approaches are especially-evident in their exponents' concept of 
'industrial relations'. 
Most notably, to Allen, "industrial relations arise out of the prime 
economic relationship in society which is the buying and selling of 
labour-power". (1971: 9) Ironically, by giving analytical prominence 
to labour as a commodity, Allen's methodological approach explicitly 
highlights the market or distributive aspects of social class as the 
central reality of 'industrial relations' - contrary to Marx's own 
view, which gives theoretical primacy to the antagonistic relations of 
production in explaining capital-labour interactions. (See below) As 
Marx himself was at pains to point out, the locus of worker oppression 
under capitalism is to be found - not in the sphere of market relation-
ships but in the realm of production relations. From Marx's theoretical 
perspective, the market relationship a fortiori mirrors the fundamental 
polarity in capitalist production relations i.e. between those who 
Altr^'ugh the huyinc and selli-ng of toi^ovj? vouer is a necessary pre-
requisite for the (xpvrovriation of svu>plv.s-value, such appropriation 
is 'not deterrrlned by it. To o-oknowledge this fact, is merely to 
recog-nise thja.t uage-Zahoia' may prevail in the a'bsence of capitalist 
rela^tions of production. Accordingly, Allen's cla.ims to he present-
ing a 'I'arxisz' inter-pretation of industrial relations are unAermined 
hy his -Jer-j perception of this phenome-non, which has much more in 
coTTr.on wiim 'a l-^eherian. than a Mai'xian perspective on class relations. 
The centrality of the mode of production in determining fundarp.ental 
class formations' is in fact emphasised by Marx hi^nself. As he wrote: 
"The essential difference loetrweern the various econx>m.ic fonns of society, 
bet-wee-n, for vnstanoe, a society based on slave-labour, and one based 
on wage-iaboia->, lies only in the m.ode in which this s'urplus-lahour is 
in each case extracted from, the actual producer, the labourer". (1967: 
217) At another level,' to say that m.arket relations derive out of 
production relations - the ma.rketplace essentially being the site 
wh^re svr>pVus-value is realised, is not to imply that the relationship 
betrweer, mlarket sphere anA the sphere of production is asijmmetrical. 
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produce surplus-value and those who appropriate it. 
This point has been brilliantly driven home in a revelatory passage in 
'Capital' which should also serve as a salutary reminder of the dangers 
of confusing appearance with reality. 
Accompanied by Mr. Moneybags and by the possessor 
of labour-power, u'e therefore leave for a time this 
noisy sphere, where everything takes place on the 
surface and in view of all men, and follow them both 
into the hidden abode of production, on whose threshold 
there stares us in the face "No admittance except on 
business". Here h'e shall see, not only how capital 
produces, but how capital is produced. l-^e shall at 
last force the secret of profit-making. 
(Marx, 1967: 176) 
Clearly, then, any analysis of the employer-employee relationship 
under capitalism that lays claim to be 'Marxist' must intrinsically 
transcend the 'limits of the market' and the 'sphere of circulation' 
if it is to get beyond discussion of surface appearances. By such 
criteria, Allen's 'sociology of industrial relations' is manifestly-
deficient. 
The static nature of both Allen's and Lane's conceptions of 'industrial 
relations' is \'ividly-reflected in their treatment of the trade union 
and the trade union leader. Fundamentally, such worker organisations 
and their officials are en\'isaged as being trapped within an institution-
al framework which completely voids any potential for revolutionary 
activity. Thus, to Lane, "trade union leaders (are) professional 
compromisers" (1974: 282), while Allen considers "the behaviour of 
any person who becomes an official (as) almost entirely predictable". 
(1971: 51) 
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Despite such pessimistic evaluations, working-class consciousness 
among the union rank-and-file is arguably, far from dead. Indeed, 
there are seemingly times when the class resentments of the rank-and-
file "could apparently explode the limitations of trade unionism 
pure and simple and unconsciously engage in activity of considerable 
political moment". (Lane, 1974: 177). It follows, therefore, that 
to adequately assess the impetus for radical transformation of 
prevailing 'industrial relations', analysis must 'leave for a time 
this noisy sphere (of trade union activities) where everything takes 
place on the surface' and seek answers in the highly-promising realm 
of production relations. Fittingly, the selection of the mode of 
production as an analytical focal point provides a far more adequate 
basis for investigation of the relationship of work, class and union-
ism. In one sense, study at this level of analysis is relatively-new 
in the social sciences; yet, in essence, the general approach 
represents a re-awakening of interest in conceptual problems which 
were central to the work of the 'founding fathers' of sociology. Not 
only does Durkheim's concern with the 'division of labour in society' 
underline this but not for nothing did Marx sub-title his first volume 
of 'Capital': 'A critical analysis of capitalist production'. 
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P R O D U C T I O N R E L A T I O N S A N D S O C I A L C L A S S 
Social class; The problem of definition 
In general, popular discussion of the working class inevitably tends 
to be framed in terms of the pervasive stereotype of the manual worker 
employed in manufacturing industry or in mining or construction etc. 
Unquestionably, three or four decades ago, this industrial worker 
epitomised the 'working-class'. Today, however, the situation has 
become a great deal less clear-cut. 
To begin with, the contemporary worker in the advanced capitalist 
society is nothing like the proletarians whom radical social theorists 
like Karl Marx anointed the ultimate redeemers of human civilisation. 
On the contrary, the changing composition of the labour force in such 
societies has given rise to a vast new army of professionals, tech-
nicians and white-collar workers whose attitudes and in some cases, 
lifestyles, may differ substantially from those of the traditional 
blue-collar worker. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the problem of the class determination of 
the new occupational categories of 'white collar' and service labour 
has compelled a fair degree of attention from contemporary social 
theorists. Possibly, two of the most comprehensive and widely-debated 
analyses of class formation and its social implications have come from 
Braverman (1974) and Poulantzas (1973a, 1973b, 1975). Of the two, 
Poulantzas's work is more explicitly theoretical and owes much to the 
ideas of Louis Althusser (1969, 1970). But the work of both these 
writers has been enormously influential - inspiring a great ferment 
of debate and creative theoretical thinking on the phenomenon of 
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social class from both their intellectual admirers and their detractors. 
Significantly, although both Braverman's and Poulantzas's work are 
rooted in the Marxist tradition, there are major conceptual differ-
ences between the two in their articulation of the problem of class 
formations. True, basic to both approaches is a concern with the 
structural determination of class. To put it another way, a central 
objective of both approaches is to delineate - to use Wright's (1976) 
phrase, the 'class boundaries in advanced capitalist societies'. 
Essentially, therefore, the methodological task is to highlight the 
contours of the working class and to identify (explicitly in the case 
of Poulantzas, indirectly in the case of Braverman), the probable 
supporters of this class in its struggle against 'monopoly capitalism'. 
Fundamental to Poulantzas's approach, as Wright (1976) has observed, 
is the idea that classes are structurally-determined - not only 
economically, but ideologically and politically as well. In Poulantzas's 
view, the primary determinant of a class is its relationship to the 
means of production. However, although ascribing conceptual primacy to 
the economic level, Poulantzas insists that the political and ideo-
logical aspects are also critically-relevant in determining class 
formation. By way of illustrating the point, he cites the existence 
of a 'new petite-bourgeois' class of intellectuals, state employees 
and similar occupational groupings. As he then emphasises; economically, 
these groups are wage-earners, yet politically and ideologically their 
behaviour in many respects reflects the outlook of the traditional 
petite-bourgeoisie in terms of the similar preoccupation with individual-
istic status-striving and uncritical acceptance of the status-quo. 
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Consequently, unlike certain other Marxist theorists - notably, 
Mandel (1975), whose focus is predominantly economic and who assigns 
to the 'working class', all wage-earners in the productive sphere 
(including, paradoxically such strata as engineers and some managers), 
Poulantzas, by contrast, stoutly maintains that while occupational 
categories like engineers and managers are undeniably wage-earners, 
they are not part of the working class. Rather, as he firmly declares: 
Technicians and engineers do tend to form part of capitalist 
productive labour, because they directly valorise capital in 
the production of surplus-value. If they do not as a group 
belong to the working class, this is because in their place 
within the social division-of-labour they maintain political 
and ideological relations of subordination of the working 
class to capital (the division of mental and manual labour), 
and because this aspect of their class determination is the 
dominant one. 
(Poulantzas, 1975: 242) 
As is evident from the foregoing quotation, for Poulantzas, the 
structural location or 'place' of a group - or, to use his term, 
'fraction', in the labour-process is a reflection of its function 
and, in turn, fundamentally determines its objective class situation. 
In simple terms, social class is constituted by the relations of 
domination within the mode of production. Centrally-relevant to 
the issue of class determination, however, is the distinction between 
'productive' and 'unproductive' labour. Using these two yardsticks 
i.e. whether a particular occupational category does productive or 
unproductive labour and, further, whether in the authority relations 
of the enterprise, it is part of the dominant group or of the 
subordinate group, Poulantzas's conception of class determination 
may be summarised as follows. To begin with, paid employees like 
managers and engineers, although situated in the sphere of production 
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are, nevi-rtheless, part of either the capitalist class proper, or of 
the ' pet i l;e-bourgeoisie ' . 
Likewise, foremen and technicians within this sphere, plus clerical, 
sales anri similar types of employee in the sphere of circulation 
(i.e. 'unproductive' workers) belong to the petite-bourgeoisie. Thus, 
onl>' the v/age-earners in the sphere of production are, in Poulantzas's 
view, entitled to be designated 'working class'. The equation of 
working class with 'productive labour', to be sure, reflects Poulantzas's 
con\'ictiDii that only productive labour produces 'surplus-value'. 
Since, to him, the key to class exploitation in capitalist society is 
the bourQnoisie's power to appropriate surplus-value, then since only 
product!vn labour produces surplus-value, emphatically, only this class 
can bo, at? he puts it, "directly exploited in the form of the dominant 
capitalist relation of exploitation, the creation of surplus-value" 
(1973: 2.i2). 
Howes or, as he readily concedes, this is not to say that 'unproductive' 
workers ai-e not taken advantage of economically by capitalists: indeed, 
as Poulantzas would have it, while 'productive' labour is economically 
exploitod, 'unproductive' labour is economically-oppressed - a distinction 
which hin;:es on the critical difference, as he sees it, between the 
expropriat ion of surplus-value and the expropriation of surplus-labour. 
For Poularitzas therefore, what essentially distinguishes 'circulation 
workers' from the working class is the mode of their remuneration. 
Stated si'^iply, unlike the working class who directly produce the means 
whereby they are remunerated i.e. surplus-value, circulation workers 
deri\e their incomes from the surplus-value appropriated by the 
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capitalists from the working-class. Put crudely, like the capitalist, 
they too 'live off the working class'. (What is not to be overlooked, 
however, in formulations like this, is that such workers themselves 
are generally not employers of labour or appropriators of surplus 
in any meaningful sense of the terms.) 
In summary, the Poulantzas distinction between productive and 
unproductive labour hinges upon a fine analytical division he draws 
between what can best be described as 'primary' and 'secondary' 
exploitation. (See Carchedi, 1975a, 1975b: Johnson, 1977.) 
Sympathetic critics of Poulantzas like Wright (1976) have neverthe-
less deplored the restrictive view he takes of productive labour. 
As Wright points out, Poulantzas quite dogmatically views productive 
labour purely in terms of material production. The consequence of 
this, as Wright discloses, is to place non surplus-value producing 
wage earners outside the working class - simply by virtue of their 
structural location outside the primary relation of exploitation. 
(Wright, 1976: 7). 
Predictably, the irony of so narrow a definition of the working class 
is that it inadvertently gives intellectual respectability to the 
vacuous formulations of the 'post-industrial society' theorists. 
For, fundamental to this latter perspective, is the presumption that 
the proportional decline of the 'real' working class serves to nullify 
the objective basis for social revolt. The pessimistic implications 
of Poulantzas's analysis are only too apparent - given his argument 
that classes are only effectively-constituted by class struggle. In 
other words, he is seemingly of the firm belief that in the final 
analysis, social aggregations become classes only by virtue of political 
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struggle. It thus follows from this that class is not antecedent to 
the existence of class consciousness. However, such an interpretation, 
while superficially-evocative of Marx's own views, nevertheless, 
manifestly dissolves the classical Marxian dichotomy (or, perhaps 
more accurately) continuum, between a 'class-in-itself' and a 'class-
for-itself . 
Braverman, on the other hand, is frankly sceptical of the significance 
of analytical categories like 'productive' and 'unproductive' labour 
as determinants of class boundaries. Rather, he gives theoretical 
fo cus to the relations of domination and subordination within the 
capitalist labour-process and the contradictions which arise from 
them. Thus, while he recognises the technical distinction between 
'productive' and 'unproductive' labour, Braverman insists that "the 
two masses of labour are not otherwise in striking contrast and need 
not be counterposed to each other. They form a continuous mass of 
employment which, at present and unlike the situation in Marx's day, 
has everything in common". (Braverman, 1974: 423) 
Put in a nutshell, Braverman's thesis is that capitalist control over 
the labour-process gives rise to forms of work organisation which serve 
to simultaneously unite and fragment the workers subject to such 
authority. In other words, the development of the forces of production 
within capitalist production relations entails the reinforcement of 
the dictatorship of capital. The obverse side of this coin, is the 
'proletarianisation' of ever-widening segments of the labour force, 
as even such traditionally privileged arenas of employment like 
clerical, technical and professional labour, in turn yield to the 
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blind and relentless dictates of capitalist 'rationalisation'. 
As Braverman makes plain, central to capitalist control over the 
labour-process are three essential elements: the separation of the 
conception of work from its execution, the stratification and 
hierarchical control of the labour force and the deskilling of jobs. 
Consequently, to adequately assess the potential for class unity 
among workers and their 'combat' organisations like the trade unions, 
it is vitally important to comprehend the significance and implications 
of the social processes identified by Braverman. 
Technology, the labour-process and occupational change 
Possibly one of the most riveting aspects of Braverman's analysis of 
the capitalist labour-process, is his uniquely-insightful exposition 
of the deleterious impact of technology under capitalist conditions, 
on the jobs, skills and incomes of countless thousands of wage and 
salary earners of all kinds. Braverman, to be sure, makes no bones 
about his feelings toward the way in which the capitalist labour-
process systematically atomises, deskills and cheapens work activity. 
The full sub-title of his book: 'The degradation of work in the 
twentieth-century", epitomises the depth of his passion at the 
pervasive debasement of work under the brutal imperatives of capitalist 
accumulation and reproduction. 
To begin with, what Braverman emphatically underlines throughout his 
book is that the introduction of technology under capitalist relations 
of production is designed - not to enhance the versatility, or 
creativeness or autonomy of the worker but to subject him to ever more 
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repressive methods of control in order to optimise the 'productivity' 
of his labour. By way of substantiating this proposition, Braverman 
takes us through the introduction of technology in capitalist industry 
and documents with remarkable clarity the effects of such technology. 
In particular, he addresses two fundamental issues: firstly, the much-
heralded decline in the proportion of the traditional working class 
in advanced capitalist society (specifically, the U.S.A.), and, 
secondly, the monumental contradiction between conventional sociolog-
ical formulations of 'technological' society which stress the urgency 
for improved levels of education, training and skill among the labour 
force and the indisputable empirical evidence of the continuous 
fragmentation and routinisation of work. 
Basically, the focus of his approach is the objective development of 
the working class. In the process, he spurns any attempt to be drawn 
on the question of the subjective consciousness of this class. As 
he loftily declares in the introduction to his book: "This is a 
book about the working-class about a class-in-itself, not a class-
for-itself" (Braverman, 1974: 27) (emphasis author's). But while 
methodologically, such a restriction on the scope of investigation 
is plausible, even excusable, theoretically, this limitation of 
analysis involves considerable difficulty for Braverman when he seeks 
to explain the class situation of certain of the intermediate strata, 
which he labels the 'middle layers' - a term perhaps more redolent 
of aviaristic concernsl 
Predictably, Braverman seeks to rationalise such a major shortcoming 
of his work by feebly equating the analysis of class consciousness 
with the superficial attitudinal surveys favoured by much of academic 
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social science. Thus, the much-criticised stratification surveys of 
the redoubtable Lloyd Warner are once again singled out for attack. 
Characteristically, what Braverman chooses to ignore in his futile 
demolition of such straw-men (straw persons?), is that the study of 
class consciousness does not have to assume the trivialised empiricist 
form established by Warner and his subsequent imitators. 
None of this, however, is intended to diminish the profound theoretical 
importance of Braverman's work. On the contrary, the clarity and insight 
he imparts to the analysis of class formation is difficult to gainsay. 
Fundamentally, he begins his analysis by pointing to the original unity 
of the functions of conception and execution within the work process. 
From this he goes on to outline the destruction of this unity as the 
forces of capital increasingly assert their dominance over the labour 
process, consequent upon their appropriation of the function to conceive 
and organise work. As Braverman shows, by gaining direct control over 
the labour-process, capital has been able to ensure that the trajectory 
of development in work methods - in particular, the application of 
science and technology to work processes, serves its needs and reflects 
its priorities. 
Using the work of James Bright, Braverman cogently demonstrates the 
'deskilling' consequences that mechanisation and automation have had 
for the bulk of the workforce. By 'deskilling', he means the sub-
stitution of semi-skilled and unskilled labour for skilled. Strongly 
rebutting the pervasive mythology that the introduction of new tech-
nology while destroying traditional job skills creates a demand for 
new skills e.g. in the servicing and repair of the new technology, 
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Braverman cites Bright's conclusion that an automated technology 
requires - not more education, training and skills, but less. 
The apparent paradox is resolved by recalling Bright's observation 
that the more sophisticated the new technology, the less-dependent 
it is upon an extensive infrastructure of skilled personnel to service 
it because not only does such technology inevitably embody the function 
of self-monitoring but, in many cases, it tends to be constructed on 
modular principles which negate the necessity for skilled personnel 
to replace the defective parts. (Braverman, 1974: 222-3). Certainly, 
Braverman's background as a skilled metal worker uniquely equips him 
to discuss and critically-evaluate the half-truths and absurdities 
many academic sociologists have propagated about the issue of tech-
nology and skill. Fittingly, he points to the sociological tendency 
to romanticise about the presumed dealienating effects of continuous 
process technology. Equally-important, he calls attention to the 
propensity of such work to confuse the functional requirements of 
labour under continuous process technology, e.g. maintaining charts, 
reading dials etc., with skill or technical knowledge. As he sarcastic-
ally remarks of this perspective, "few have stopped to think whether 
it is harder to learn to read a dial than to tell time". (1974: 224) 
Braverman underscores the minority control of industry and the central-
isation of skills and knowledge relevant to the operation of industry 
by pointing to the extent to which automation increasingly places 
control of the system in the hands of the engineers and correspondingly 
obliterates the need for the workers who attend the new machines to 
have much skill or education (1974: 225). Even more devastatingly, 
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he shows that for the U.S.A., in any case, the data upon which many 
presumptions of an increase in skill due to technological development, 
is to say the least, highly-questionable. 
Underlying the misconceptions, as he shows, is the fact that much of 
the assumed 'upgrading' of the U.S. labour force in terms of its skills, 
has been due to the revamping in the 1930's of occupational classific-
ations by the compilers of official statistics. Revealingly, tradition-
al classifications of labourer and craftsman have been augmented by an 
intermediate category viz. 'operatives' - a 'catch-all' division 
encompassing all those whose job involves working with machines. Such 
workers, as Braverman sarcastically notes are designated 'semi-skilled'. 
Accordingly, the act of mechanisation even though it creates only 
machine-minders axiomatically increases the skill levels of the labour-
force according to such methods of classifying it. 
The spuriousness of the concept of 'semi-skilled', as Braverman further 
reports, is evident from the period of training received by such workers 
which, as he emphasises, may vary from a few hours to perhaps a month -
with most having a few days at the maximum. As he contends, the 
employment of the term 'skill' in the official statistics even though 
adjectivally-qualified by the word 'semi' is plainly incongruent with 
the notion of skill derived from the concept of a 'craft'. To the 
degree, therefore, that academic sociology accepts official statistics 
on job classification at face-value, despite abundant empirical evidence 
to the contrary, it is little wonder that much of the research on 
'mobility' has been so optimistic and so profoundly misleading. 
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Significantly, the 'deskilling' of labour and large-scale structural 
unemployment as a result of technological change does not only affect 
the manual i.e. 'blue-collar' segments of the labour force. On the 
contrary 'white-collar', technical and professional jobs are now 
being subjected to much the same technological pressures that have 
previously preponderated in the factory. The progressive reduction 
in the skill required of office jobs has led many writers to 
characterise the process as one of 'proletarianisation'. Essentially, 
what is meant by 'proletarianisation' is that the nature of the labour-
process to which office workers are subject increasingly resembles 
that of the factory. 
The propensity of capitalist production relations to 'deskill' and 
'degrade' all jobs does not, as Braverman reports, take place all at 
once. Indeed, factory labour was the first to feel the blast of 
capitalist methods to reduce labour costs while simultaneously raising 
labour productivity. At the turn of the century, of course, when such 
techniques for intensifying work output like 'scientific management' 
first made their appearance, 'office labour' comprised a miniscule 
proportion of the labour force. With its proliferation, however, it 
too was subjected to the imperatives of 'rationalisation'. The result 
was the systematic dismantling of its privileged status. To begin with, 
the replacement of male labour with female in many office jobs inevit-
ably meant lower levels of pay. The process of deskilling and cheapen-
ing of office labour power has been further accentuated by the applic-
ation of 'time-and-motion' study techniques to re-organise office jobs 
and make them more efficient. The culmination of the process is now 
to be seen in the rapid automation of many office operations which is 
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now displacing the deskilled, cheapened, female labour (as well as 
supervisory male workers). Consequently, factory and office labour -
originally so different in character, has become increasingly more alike, 
As Braverman makes plain, there is simply no comparison between the 
contemporary clerk and his 19th century predecessor. The 19th century 
'black-coated worker' enjoyed a level of pay and prestige far superior 
to that of manual labour, worked in close proximity with his employer 
and most importantly, his job involved a career with clear opportunities 
for promotion and even marriage to the boss's daughter as the ultimate 
reward for diligence. In modern times however, the job of the clerk has 
been transformed from such exalted heights into an atomised, deskilled 
position with little autonomy and even less room for initiative. 
Most damning of all, it has plummetted from being one of the best paid 
occupations to one of the worst paid. It is hardly surprising, there-
fore, that trade unionism has made considerable inroads among office 
workers. 
The drive by capital to extract every last ounce of 'productivity' 
from its office labour is increasingly evident in the machine pacing 
to which office work has been systematically habituated. Indeed, the 
'paper conveyor belt' is no less remorseless in its demands for speedy 
responses than is its metal counterpart on the factory floor. More-
over 'factory despotism' has its parallel in office despotism: in 
fact, the pervasive supervision of labour in the office has been 
greatly extended by technological change. Notably, with computer-
isation, the overseeing function of supervisors, is increasingly being 
built into the machines. For example, many of the new machines being 
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adopted have the facility for providing management with a detailed 
record of the output of its operator (including the number of mis-
takes he/she has made). 
Characteristically, the development of microelectronics typified 
by the microprocessor or the ubiquitous silicone 'chip', contributes 
greatly to the potential for a further exacerbation in the nature of 
work conditions. Rarely are the deskilling effects of the new 
technology conceded before its adoption. Rather, as Braverman 
sardonically observes, "the public unveiling of the new devices is 
accompanied by much self-congratulation and by philanthropic phrases 
about the lightening of the toil of the worker, the ease with which 
laborious tasks are accomplished, and so forth". (1974: 205) 
The point, however, is that, as Braverman is at pains to stress, is 
that it is not the technology that is to blame for the deleterious 
effects on jobs and employment - it is the way it is used by capital 
to entrench and accentuate its control over the labour-process. 
In reality, machinery embraces a host of possibilities, 
many of which are systematically thwarted, rather than 
developed, by capital. An automatic system of machinery 
opens up the possibility of true control over a highly-
productive factory by a relatively small corps of workers, 
providing these workers attain the level of mastery over 
the machinery offered by engineering knowledge, and 
providing they then share out among themselves the 
routines of the operation, from the most technically 
advanced to the most routine. Yet this promise which 
has been repeatedly held out with every technical advance 
since the Industrial Revolution, is frustrated by the 
capitalist effort to reconstitute and even deepen the 
division of labour in all its worst aspects. 
(Braverman, 1974: 230) 
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Putting it bluntly, technology tends to be used by capitalism not to 
free workers from the drudgery of hard, unpleasant and unsafe jobs 
but to deskill labour and cheapen labour costs. Certainly, as 
Braverman has minutely documented, the displacement of labour by 
technology has been a perennial feature of industrial capitalism. 
V,'hat is unique about the development and application of micro-
electronics is the rapidity and pervasiveness of the process. Over 
the past decade, a bewildering array of new products based on micro-
electronics have emerged: radios, T.V.'s, digital wrist watches, 
pocket calculators plus a profusion of electronic games and toys. 
Much of the impetus for these developments has come from the 'space 
race' as well as from more direct military considerations. It is 
therefore hardly surprising to find that some of the more sophisticated 
electronic applications are devoted to improving the means of 
destruction in the military field; the ability to wage a 'push-button 
war' is no longer in the realms of science fiction. But it is in 
the workplace that the structural dislocations resulting the 'micro-
electronic resolution' are readily apparent. In the field of mechan-
ical engineering, the design of a whole range of products as well as 
much of their assembly is done by computer. The levels of accuracy 
in metal cutting in this field no longer depends of human skill: 
numerically-controlled machine tools now make it possible to achieve 
the high standards required with a minimum of error. In turn the 
'brains' i.e. the tapes for these ingenious devices are themselves 
now prepared by computer. 
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The impact of the new technology is not only increasingly transform-
ing the bulk of manufacturing from 'batch' production to 'continuous 
process' e.g. chemicals, steel etc., but administrative operations 
e.g. stock control, payroll processing, data collection, production 
scheduling, time keeping, performance evaluation, have progressively 
been computerised. All these technological changes have profoundly 
affected the nature of jobs and given rise to tremendous debate on 
the social implications of automation. On the one hand, the Utopians 
envisage a glorious future being opened up for man by the 'computer 
revolution'. Among the glorious vistas held out by this perspective 
are such dubious benefits as being able to work at home - maintaining 
contact with the office through visual communication devices, being 
able to completely program household activities by computer etc. 
Conversely, the pessimists speak of a 'computer holocaust' conjuring 
up a frightening caricature of a malevolent technology which is 
reminiscent of the diabolism of medieval fears. What unites both 
the hyper-optimistic and hyper-pessimistic discussions of the new 
technology are the sensational terms in which debate tends to be 
framed and the shallowness of analysis. The 'reification' and 
'fetishism' justifiably deplored by Braverman, are evident in such 
simplistic formulations as 'the computers are taking over our jobs'. 
As Braverman critically remarks: 
It has become fashionable, however, to attribute 
to machinery the powers over humanity which arise 
in fact from social relations. Society, in this 
view, is nothing but an extrapolation of science 
and technology, and the machine itself is the enemy. 
The machine, the mere product of human labor and 
ingenuity, designed and constructed by humans and 
alterable by them at will, is viewed as an independ-
ent participant in human social arrangements. 
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It is given life, enters into "relations" with 
the workers, relations fixed by its own nature, 
is endowed with the power to shape the life of 
mankind, and is sometimes even invested with 
designs upon the human race. 
(1974: 229) 
'Bourgeois ideologists' have initially assumed that computer develop-
ment and specifically, microelectronics would not adversely affect 
employment levels. As the prevailing complacency would have it, 
jobs would be created in the manufacture of microelectronic components 
themselves, these components would lead to the development of new 
products which would in turn create new jobs, jobs would be created in 
programming the new computer (the so-called expansion of 'software' 
requirements) and finally, that workers displaced by technology would 
find jobs in servicing the new machines. (See below). 
Over and above all, the panacea for the 'short-term' problems created 
by computerisation was to 'understand' and become proficient in the 
use of computers, rather than 'fearing' them. Yet, while 'software' 
applications have provided some jobs, these are nowhere in proportion 
Charactevistically, the naive -pvestmption prevails that the massive 
increases in produotivity made possible by automation can of itself 
negate what Marx called the 'laws of motion' of capitalism. Thus, by 
some mystical process, automation is seen as being capable of revers-
ing the tendencies toward recession md guaranteeing perpetual 
economic growth. (The sense of dega vu and deja ecoute are overwhelm-
ing when one recalls the extravagant claims made not so long ago^ for 
Keynesian economic technic^es.) Accordingly, individual countries 
are seen to have no option but to override Luddite fears of their 
workers and to expand automation, lest they lose out to their economic 
competitors. Rarely is the question posed as to what happens when all 
these nations automate: instead the vacuous epigram of 'automate or 
stagnate' is uncritically assumed to be the grim reality. 
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to those lost by the introduction of computers. Perhaps the greatest 
irony of all is that 'the computers' (sic) have now begun to wipe 
out jobs in the computer field itself. Thus, the splendid vision of 
a vast upgrading of education and skills as increasing numbers of 
people 'worked with computers' has proved to be an illusion. As 
Joan Greenbaum (1976) reveals, the same processes of job fragmentation, 
hierarchical control, speed-ups, the automation of the labour-process 
and structural unemployment are now part and parcel of the experience 
of what she calls, 'the division-of-labour in the computer field'. 
Again light relief is provided by Lansbury and Gilmour. Discussing 
the computerisation of the accounting operations of an enterprise, 
which results in the consolidation of this work into one section rather 
than the five that previously existed, the writers hail this develop-
ment as fostering 'job enlargement'. (1977: 159-60). 
To summarise then, the occupational structure of the advanced capital-
ist countries has been fundamentally transformed by technological 
change. The decline of labour in the goods-producing sector (consequent 
upon the introduction of new technologies) vis-a-vis the expansion of 
work in 'tertiary' industry, originally led to a welter of misleading 
pronouncements of 'occupational mobility' from the social science 
pundits. However, the notion that office employment represents upward 
mobility has been completely debunked by the 'proletarianisation' of 
many so-called 'white-collar' jobs. In the process, many of these 
workers have been forced by the relentless logic of the capitalist 
'rationalisation' of work to abandon their status pretensions and to 
join trade unions and engage in industrial action to preserve their 
jobs and living standards. 
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Production relations and the class determination of professional 
employees 
The rise of salaried professionals and the steady expansion of their 
ranks under 'monopoly capitalism' raise some very thorny analytical 
problems for social theorists. Of particular concern, is the question 
of whether such strata are to be categorised as a 'new middle class', 
as some writers argue, or whether, conversely, they constitute a 'new 
working class', as others maintain. (See below) Naturally enough, 
answers to this question differ - which perhaps is only to be expected, 
given the profound divergences of theoretical and ideological perception 
which inform discussion of this subject. Nevertheless, the critical 
implications of social class for industrial and political behaviour, 
contrive to ensure that the problem of the class determination of 
professional employees is not simply to be discredited as a mere 
pedantic quibble of traditional stratification dispute. 
Revealingly, however, the issue of the structural locations of social 
formations like salaried professionals has, apart from the odd exception. 
There is a pvonounced tendency -brith-ln conventional sociological 
literature to use the term 'profession' as almost a synonym for 
privileged occupational and social status. This mode of conceptual-
ising the professions is typified by Dunkerley, who after echoing 
the familiar platitudes about the high economic rewards and social 
prestige of the professions^ goes on to assert that "there is some-
thing to be said for regarding the professions as a social elite". 
(1975: 58) Predictably, what is ignored in such facile views of 
professions, is the internal differentiation within the professions 
due to their contradictory structural locations within the spheres 
of appropriation, realisation and reproduction, which contributes 
toward making some members of professions far more 'privileged' 
than others. 
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not been seriously addressed by either contemporary Marxism or 
academic sociology. On the contrary, as one critic perceptively 
notes, the "dominant theoretical focus has been at the level of 
'consciousness' - it is here that the crucial determining factor has 
been sought". (Johnson, 1977: 195) (See below). But, as this 
writer is quick to point out, the basic flaw in such a perspective is 
that "to focus on the forms of consciousness exhibited by agents and 
the associated question of how individuals achieve class membership 
through mobility leaves the prior question of the determination of 
class positions unanswered and, therefore, subject to arbitrary 
operationalism". (Johnson, 1977: 195). (Emphasis author's.) 
One of Karl Marx's profounder insights was the observation that the 
elemental economic relations of society occur out of the sight of the 
producers. By that he meant, most importantly, that the class structures 
The tendency for sociological research to uncritically accept the 
'prevo.iling organisation of work and to focus instead on how the 
worker sv^oectively 'reacts ' or 'adjusts' to it - so thoroughly 
condemned hy Braverman (2974), nevertheless continues to influence 
study of rnanvjal workers and 'bureaucratised professionals' alike, 
(c.f. Argyris, 1964; Blau and Scott, 1962; Blauner, 1964; Chinoy, 
1955; W M n , 1956; Gouldner, 1959; Komhauser, 1962; Thornton, 
1970) The net result of this approach, is that the objective 
socio logical question of the relevant circumstances which call for 
one type of ccu.thority rather than the other within bureaucratic ^ 
setti-ngs - i.e. ccu^thority based on 'imperative co-ordination' instead 
of on 'specialist knowledge' has been completely submerged by the 
reductionist methjodological preoccupation with how 'professionals ' 
employed in bv:reaucracies conceive of their roles. As Braverman 
pu-agently remarks about this general method£)logical orientation: 
"It is therefore not at all fortuitous that most orthodox social 
scientists adhere firmly, indeed desperately, to the dictum that 
their task is not the study of the objective conditions^ of work but 
only of the subjective phenomena to which these give rise: the degrees 
of 'satisfaction' and 'dissatisfaction' elicited by their questionnaires." 
(Braverman, 1973: 139-41) 
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fabricated by these economic relations are obscured by the multitude 
of social and ideological fissions that are created by the productive 
and reproductive apparatuses of the system. Naturally, these divisions 
become increasingly more complex as capitalist development proceeds. 
Typically, the development of 'monopoly capitalism' sees the multipli-
cation and expansion of those sectors devoted to the 'realisation of 
surplus-value'. (Included here are functional areas within the 
productive enterprise engaged in the 'accounting of value' e.g. the 
sales and accounts divisions of business firms. Also encompassed in 
the 'realisation' process are agencies which are external to the firm, 
whose main job involves the 'allocation of surplus-value' among the 
various segments of the capitalist class. Notable examples of these 
are banks, insurance companies and similar financial institutions.) 
Likewise the dramatic growth in the government sector reflects the 
progressive inability of 'private enterprise' on its own to resolve 
the contradictions and disruptions created by the rise of monopoly 
capitalism. (See below) Put simply, monopoly capitalism requires 
a more-interventionist State - not a less-interventionist one - as 
the more backward sections of capital and their ideologists assume. 
(See, for example, the various pronouncements of the inappropriately-
In effect, 'monopoly capitalism' marks the exacevlDation of the 
inhevently anarchic nature of capitalism. Putting it simply, the 
inbuilt tendencies of the system toward inflation, unemployment 
and crisis are, arguably, magnified under 'monopoly capitalism', 
posing even more of a threat to its survival. Notably, therefore, 
the inter-oentions of the State in the everyday functioning of the 
economy are dictated by the need to keep the mechanisms of capitalist 
accumulation and reproduction well-oiled, as well as to deal with any 
problem that threatens the viability of the system. 
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named and presumably now defunct, 'Workers' Party' in Australia. This 
self-appointed mouthpiece of 'small business' stridently proclaimed 
that the arena of business should be left to businesspeople and 
proposed confining the activities of the State to a handful of 
'essential functions' e.g. defence, foreign affairs etc.) 
Characteristically, the continuous improvement of the forces of 
production and the extension of capital into new fields generates new 
functions and occupations within capitalist society. Or, to put it 
another way, the dynamics of capitalist development necessitates the 
performance of a number of functions which are crucial to its reprod-
uction. Accordingly, changes in the structure of capital have impelled 
changes in the structure of the labour force giving rise to new 
categories of workers viz. clerical, service, professional and similar 
types of employee. Significantly, the growing complexity of capitalist 
forms and social arrangements does not spell any fundamental changes 
in the elemental class relations. To put it bluntly, the development 
of the forces of production which is responsible for the proliferation 
of new categories of, takes place within a pre-existing set of product-
ion relations. The result is that the way in which such labour is 
organised and used, reflects the priorities of capitalist accumulation 
and reproduction. 
The central contradiction of capitalist development resides in the 
tendency for capitalist expansion to fragment the labour-force while 
simultaneously unifying it by virtue of tis common subjection to 
capitalist production relations. Carchedi (1975a, 1975b) in his 
studies of class 'identification' envisages a fundamental line of 
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social division within the capitalist mode of production between those 
agents who perform either the 'global functions of capital' or who 
simply function as agents of the 'collective worker'. To Carchedi, 
the concept of the 'global functions of capital' signifies the dis-
persion of ownership powers over the productive process to agents who 
do not own the means of production. Correspondingly, the concept of 
the 'collective worker' refers to the fragmentation of the labour process 
into a collection of minutely-specialised and interdependent tasks -
each performed by a different worker. Interestingly enough, for Carchedi, 
the 'collective worker' encompasses not only manual labour but includes 
professional categories like engineers and technicians who are involved 
in the process of material production. 
Revealingly, the origins of the 'collective worker' and of the agents 
who perform the 'global functions of capital' are traceable to a 
common source of innovation within the capitalist mode of production 
viz. the separation of the functions of conception and execution. 
(See below) As Braverman (1974) cogently demonstrates, capital's 
monopolisation of the function of conception not only endowed it with 
direct control over the labour-process but predictably resulted in a 
highly-elaborate division-of-labour, as capitalism set about the task 
of 'rationalising' production in order to enhance its accumulation of 
The phenomenon of 'multinational' capitalism is simply the bland 
way much of academic social science chooses to depict and analyse 
what Carchedi (1975b) more accurately describes as the 'international-
isation of the global capitalist and 'the collective labourer'. 
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'surplus-value'. Thus was born the 'collective worker'. 
Significantly, however, such task specialisation is by no means a one-
way process. Within the ranks of capital the growing importance of 
the functions of control marketing etc. found diffuse expression in 
such work activities as planning, record-keeping, and similar operations 
which are central to the conception function of capital. The rise 
of 'monopoly capitalism' heralding the growing centralisation and 
concentration of capital is paradoxically accompanied by profound 
complexity and differentiation of functions within the ranks of 
capital. Thus, there emerges a highly sub-divided 'white-collar' 
and professional labour force whose jobs have been created by the 
conception function of capital. While some of these agents, strictly 
speaking, perform what Carchedi calls the 'global functions of 
capital', by far the great majority are engaged in a labour-process 
and subject ot broadly similar modes of control and regimentation 
as any manual factory worker. (See below) 
Tyipical of the failure of much of 'bourgeois sociology' to grasp the 
essential significance of capital's control over the labour-process, 
is the work of one Australian-based:, U.S. sociologist, who in a review 
of Bell's (1974) work on 'post-industrial society', saw the major 
problem posed by a large 'non-manual' labour-force as being "the 
difficulty of holdi'ng persons not engaged in measurably productive 
work to the mlnimwrn standards of sobriety, diligence, and prudence 
necessary to the effective functioning of the complex organisations 
in which most material production occurs in such societies". (Eigley, 
1975: 6). This paper is, moreover, studded by such gems as the 
following: 
"The inability to be certain of their own or their fellow -workers' 
productivity inclines non-manual workers toward various combinations 
of frivolous and defensive occupational behaviour, according to what 
they think is eccpedient at any given time. " (Eigley, 1975: 6) 
(continued next page) 
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The expansion of 'tertiary' employment which 'bourgeois sociology' 
celebrates as the 'coming of post-industrial society', naturally 
raises the vexed question of the class determination of the new 
occupational strata. The problem, as writers like Bell (1974) 
apparently imagine, can be simply disposed of, without any great 
necessity to engage in profound class analysis. Thus, for example, 
in referring to technicians and salaried professionals. Bell talks 
grandly about a 'professional and technical class' (1974: 125). 
Plainly, such uncritical and profligate use of the term 'class' only 
serves to beg the question of what is meant by it. (See below 1.) 
Fortunately, this conceptual problem and the massive complexities 
it raises, is taken rather more seriously by Marxist-inclined social 
theorists like Braverman (1974), Carchedi (1975a, 1975b) and 
Poulantzas (1973a, 1973b, 1975). Carchedi (1975a, 1975b), as we have 
and: 
"Because they oan never he cevtain that they ave aurrently applying 
themselves effectively to tasks set for them, non-manual workers 
tend to errbrace very broad definitions of aoceptahle behaviour on 
the job — much of which is more playful than productive. " (Higley, 
1975: 6-7) 
This catalogue of absurdity goes on. Completely ignored is the fact 
that increasingly, much of office laboicr has assumed the attributes 
of the factory assembly-line. Ind.eed, Braverman's (1974) masterly 
exposition of the 'degradation of work % carefully documents that 
with the expansion of the office sector^, the same principles of 
'efficiency' so successfully applied to manual work, have been intro-
duced to non-manual. In effect, Taylor's 'work-study' techniques of 
the factory floor have found their office counterpart in 'time-and-
motion' studies. 
^ Certainly, the 'latent' effect, if not the 'manifest'^ aim, of 
conceptualising occupational categories like technicians and 
professionals as 'classes' is to completely obscure the objective 
basis for unity between such class 'fractions'. 
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seen, conceptualises the class determination or, 'identification' 
as he calls it, of any particular social strata, in terms of the 
elemental distinction between the 'global functions of capital' 
and the functions of the 'collective worker'. From his standpoint, 
therefore, to neglect to differentiate between the functions of 
capital and the functions of labour not only misses the essence of class 
identification but renders virtually unanswerable the question of which 
'fractions' or segments of a particular social formation are potential 
allies of the working class and which are the likely social supports 
of the bourgeoisie. 
Needless to say, as far as the class determination of salaried 
professionals are concerned, these functional distinctions are of 
crucial importance if we are to avoid the uncritical assignment to 
the same social class, agents whose labour has objectively-different 
social implications. To begin with, 'professionals' are employed in 
a diverse range of activities within the spheres of 'appropriation', 
'realisation' and 'reproduction', that is to say, in such areas as 
production management, marketing, financial control and administration 
as well as in various agencies of the state like welfare departments, 
education, and health services. Such employees are, strictly-speaking, 
wage-earners. Yet, as virtually every observer concedes, they are not 
part of the 'real' working class. 
To writers like Poulantzas (1975), most of these bureaucratically-
situated 'professionals' are part of a class of 'new petite-bourgeoisie': 
in effect, 'unproductive' workers. In Poulantzas's view, the distinction 
between 'productive' and 'unproductive' work is of critical significance 
in determining class boundaries. (This emphasis by Poulantzas on the 
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surplus value creation attributes of work as the basic determinant 
of class leads to his exclusion of wage-earning 'unproductive' 
labour from the ranks of the working class.) (See below) 
By contrast, Braverman (1974) is totally unconvinced of the usefulness 
of the productive/unproductive distinction as criteria for different-
iating between the working class and non-working class. Indeed, as he 
shows in a closely-reasoned analysis of the new 'middle layers', such 
intermediate strata - unlike their forerunners i.e. the 'old' petite-
bourgeoisie of shopkeepers etc., are structurally-located within the 
prevailing class polarisation of capitalist society instead of being 
partly external to it. Consequently, they are affected by the forces 
of class polarisation from which they derive and into which they are 
placed. Hence the tremendous heterogeneity of the 'middle layers'. 
Basic to the differentiated character of the 'middle layers' are 
differences in 'authority'. 
Since the authority and expertise of the middle ranks 
in the capitalist corporation represent an unavoidable 
delegation of responsibility, the position of such 
functionaries may best be judged by their relation to 
the power and wealth that commands them from above, and 
In equating 'productive labour' with material •production^ Foulantzas's 
approach - far from being congruent with the theoretical standpoint of 
Marx - is intrinsically at odds with it. ^s Carchedi very usefully 
reminds us, for Marx, it was absolutely immaterial to the production 
of surplus-value, whether a capitalist - in Marx's own pungent phrase-
ology "laid out his capital in a teaching factory, instead of a 
sausage factory". (Cited in Carchedi, 1975b: 405) Nor, indeed, does 
Foulantzas's additional distinction i.e. between 'mental' and 'manual 
labour' adequately serve to differentiate between the working-class 
and other class fractions. 
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to the mass of labour beneath them which they in 
their turn help to control, command and organise. 
(Braverman, 1974: 405) 
Likewise for Wright (1976) the key to understanding the class 
situation of professionals and other segments of the 'middle layers' 
is to be found in analysis of the authority relations which serve to 
internally differentiate such class 'fractions'. Following Poulantzas, 
Wright conceptualises 'authority' from the standpoint of the production 
relations of capitalist society. Thus he draws a fundamental distinction 
between 'economic ownership', i.e. not legal title but, as Terry Johnson 
explains it, real economic control in the sense of "the power to exploit 
the direct producers by the appropriation of surplus-labour/surplus-
value" (see Johnson, 1977: 209), and 'possession' - in effect, "direct 
control over the means of production in its operation". (Johnson, 1977: 
209) 
Put another way, 'possession' confers control over the labour-process 
and, as such, constitutes the basic source of authority relations. 
Significantly, perhaps, the rise of 'monopoly capitalism' has contrived 
a growing divorce between 'possession' and 'economic ownership'. 
Tellingly, however, 'possession' itself has not remained immune to 
fission. On the contrary. Overall control over the labour-process 
devolving upon top managers has become progressively separated from 
the direct control over work activities i.e. the supervisory function. 
Undeniably, Wright's approach provides considerable insight into the 
class determination of such categories as professional employees. 
Arguably, however, further refinements of his analytical framework 
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are necessary before meaningful distinctions within such occupational 
strata can be drawn. In this context, the work of Carchedi (1975a, 
1975bj is of inestimable importance. Basically, Carchedi's concept 
of the 'global functions of capital' identifies two vital capitalist 
functions: the functions of 'surveillance' and 'control'. These 
functions, in Carchedi's view, arise out of the social division-of-
labour and are associated with the prerogatives of capital. However, 
counter-posed to these, are the functions of 'co-ordination' and 
'unity', which he envisages as arising out of the technical division-
of-labour and thus, ipso facto, are properties of the 'collective worker' 
(See below) Carchedi has also forcefully made the point that the 
distinction between the 'function of capital' and the 'function of 
labour' is central to class identification. Further, he maintains that 
there is a qualitative "difference between the expropriation of surplus 
TeH-ingly^ Carohedi's conoe-pt of the functions of capital ('surveillance 
and control') points up the repressive and politico-economically 
specific character of such functions. By contrast, the functions of 
the 'collective labourer' ('co-ordination and unity') are universal 
imperatives of work organisation. It is thus vitally important to 
recognise that, as Carchedi stresses, the "same technical division 
of labour originates the same structure of operations but not 
necessarily the same structure of positions — the latter structure 
is also determined by political and ideological factors". J 1975b: 368) 
(Emphasis added.) To put it another way, it is quite feasible to 
erect quite different production relations on the same technical 
division-of-labour. Interestingly, perhaps, with the rise of the 
'collective labourer', it might plausibly be argued that 'monopoly 
capitalism' has significantly advanced, rather than diminished, the 
objective basis for worker control. To begin with, the technical 
knowledge and control of the labour-process, of which the worker was 
divested by 'family capitalism', has under monopoly capitalism, passed 
to a collectivity of supervisory employees, who, in a narrowly-object-
ive sense, are potential allies of the working-class by virtue of the^r 
common subjection to the wage-relation and the capitalist labour-process. 
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labour of those who perform the function of labour (irrespective of 
whether such labour is 'productive' or 'unproductive' - W.S) and 
those who perform the function of capital". (1975b: 367) 
However, although such functional distinctions go some way toward 
explaining the processes of stratification within the ranks of 
salaried professionals, they clearly fail to apprehend the qualitative 
difference in actual work roles between the 'conceivers' and 'executors' 
of surveillance systems. (Johnson, 1977) In fact, a clear demarcation 
line can be drawn between professionals in the appropriation process 
who conceive (say) job enrichment programs, or time-and-motion systems 
of job redesign and those whose occupational task it is to give 
practical effect to such 'innovations'. Likewise,within the realis-
ation process, as Terry Johnson shows, a similar line of cleavage 
bisects the profession of accountancy: "for as well as those account-
ants who execute the day-to-day routines of cash and stock control there 
exist those who frame systems of financial and stock control and super-
vise their implementation. Such accountants (are) socially-distinct 
from the 'colleagues' and potentially members of an antagonistic class 
grouping". (1977: 219). (See below) 
This notion of intra-professionat class differences comes very close 
to confusing between class role and class membership. For example^ 
the class role of an agent of repression e.g. a member of the police 
force or the military, is not necessarily coincidental with his/her 
class membership. This, however, is by no means to deny Johnson's 
suggestion of polarisation and friction within professional occupations. 
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Such variations within professional ranks are also evident among 
such categories who are occupationally-situated in the reproduction 
process carrying out the social maintenance functions of capital. 
Thus, within both medicine and social work, a similar basic line of 
functional division between 'conceivers' and 'executors' can be 
traced. As a result, the lower echelons of such occupational strata 
have now become a curious blend of professional and proletarian as 
their jobs increasing assume the atomistic, controlled character of 
routine clerical work. 
Contrary to such sociological complacencies as the 'knowledge society' 
and the 'professionalisation of everyone', the proliferation of 
professional and technical employment does not ipso facto portend 
any general requirement by modern technology for an upgrading of 
education and skills. In fact, every advance in technology heralds 
an even greater concentration of knowledge, skills and control over 
the new system, in the hands of a minority at the apex of occupational 
pyramids. For the vast majority - professional or otherwise, the net 
result of technological innovation is what Braverman calls 'deskilling'. 
This process has been illustrated in respect to professional employment 
like computer programming and engineering by Greenbaum (1976) and 
Braverman (1974) respectively. For example, citing the findings of 
two researchers, Braverman notes that the "index of the ratio of median 
engineering salaries to those of the full-time manufacturing wage-
earner shows that if the 1929 ratio is taken as 100, by 1954, the ratio 
was only 66.6" (1974: 243). This steady downward drift of engineer-
ing salaries to a situation where the gap between them and the wages 
of a manual 'blue-collar' worker are considerably narrov^^ed reflects 
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fundamental changes within the labour-process of engineering - rather 
than simply being a consequence of the 'oversupply' of engineers - as 
the researchers quoted by Braverman naively assume. 
Likewise, the conventional sociological wisdom that an increasingly 
technological society basically requires a better-educated labour-
force in toto, is strangely at variance with the objective realities 
of the nexus between education and jobs. As researchers like Berg 
(1973) have shown, the link between education and jobs has grown 
progressively remote: in fact, he reports a tendency for many 
people to be overqualified for the jobs they hold - a situation he 
whimsically describes as the 'great training robbery'. 
Further, as both Braverman (1974) and Carchedi (1975b) point out, 
although the educational standards demanded by employers for many 
jobs have risen dramatically, such requirements increasingly have 
less to do with the intrinsic degree of education required to per-
form the job. Rather, the easy availability of a pool of highly-
qualified labour enables an employer to use education as a screening 
device for job applicants. 
Clearly, if a job requiring only a level of secondary education is, 
due to the existence of a surplus of graduates, filled by an individ-
ual with a bachelor's degree, then it is not that the job has been 
educationally upgraded, as the proponents of the 'knowledge society' 
thesis so speciously assume. On the contrary, it is the level of 
education which has been devalued: both in terms of the kind of job 
and the level of pay that now accrues to it. In fact, what is involved 
here is mere credentialism - the use of the education process as a 
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screen within the labour market. 
Thus, to assume that the pressures for educational upgrading necessar-
ily reflect the greater complexity of relevant jobs is quite false. 
Indeed, the educational upgrading of accountancy and teacher education 
in Australia convincingly underscore this. To begin with, much of the 
impetus for the upgrading of education in accountancy came from the 
professional association. A not unimportant consideration in this 
struggle to improve the educational standards to graduate level for 
entry into the profession was, predictably, the question of profess-
ional status and, by implication, economic rewards. 
The Vatter Report (1964) which surveyed the state of accountancy in 
Australia, was candid enough to admit the importance of such factors 
in pressing for the educational upgrading of the profession. However, 
the Martin Report (1964) which recommended such upgrading, chose to 
base its decision on rather abstract and unspecified claims of 'complex-
ity' resulting from 'changes in the nature of the work of accountants'. 
When one bears in mind that a not-insignificant part of accountancy 
is bookkeeping, i.e. routine recording of cash and/or stock flows and 
that computers have already made tremendous inroads into this area, 
the necessity for the educational system to turn out large numbers of 
graduate accountants is somewhat questionable. 
Equally, it is significant that much of the evidence to the Davidson 
Committee (1972) urging the up-grading of teacher education in 
Australia from three years to four, took it as self-evident that such 
an extension in the length of the course resulted in 'better' teachers. 
Significantly, despite the massive consensus on the desirability of 
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such upgrading of teacher education, nothing in the way of firm 
evidence was presented to the Committee to demonstrate the necessity 
of 4 years of teaching training for the intrinsic needs of schools. 
Rather, it was widely-presumed that tremendous educational benefits 
would automatically flow from such improvement in 'human capital'. 
It is hardly necessary to belabour the point that credentialism has 
done much to debase the nature of education. When employers for no 
reason related to the intrinsic requirements of the job demand 
educational qualifications in excess of it, is it any wonder that 
the bachelor's degree has increasingly become a 'worthless piece of 
paper' - both economically and educationally? Or, that where a job 
calls for a bachelor's degree - in order to ensure that the applicant 
possesses the necessary skills, it has become increasingly more 
judicious to demand post-graduate qualifications. Naturally, the 
response of employers and the media has been to blame the educational 
system for producing 'virtually illiterate' and 'innumerate' matric-
ulants and graduates. From such perspectives, it is the educational 
system which is at fault - which, indeed, is 'out of step with the 
needs of industry', which is 'failing society', which is failing to 
produce people who can 'cope with the increased demands of a modern 
technological society'. 
Conversely, a cynic may be justified in suggesting that devalued jobs 
in advanced capitalist society only get the devalued education they 
deserve. In fact, such a claim would not be too far from the truth. 
Increasingly, the process of technological innovation under capital-
ism serves to devalue the labour-power of workers. That this phenomen-
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on is now taking place in professional employment is clearly demon-
strated by Joan Greenbaum (1976) in her discussion of the 'computer 
field'. As Greenbaum shows, in little over two decades, computer 
programming has been transformed from a highly-skilled, highly-paid 
occupation that offered tremendous 'diversity', 'challenge' and 
autonomy, to a routine, uncreative and progressively deskilled 
occupation. 
Underlying the increasingly alienated and proletarian character of 
computer programming has been the separation in this activity of the 
functions of conception from those of execution i.e. the "separation 
of analytical tasks from those that required only translation into 
programming" (Greenbaum, 1976: 48). The result has been a polaris-
ation within this occupation between programmers as such and a newly-
created category - the systems analysts. 
The job of systems analyst became the highest level 
in prestige and salary, as systems analysts were 
separated from programmers. Although both job 
descriptions still required technical expertise 
and thought processes, the systems analyst was to 
develop procedures to process information and 
determine the method and solution to business 
problems, while the programmer was to translate 
these solutions into a language the machine could 
understand. 
(Greenbaum, 1976: 48) 
However, even the programming function of translating instructions 
into computer language has, as Greenbaum further discloses, been 
undermined by "the introduction of pre-planned application languages, 
where programmers need only insert a pre-arranged series of codes." 
(1976: 48) Moreover, not only have such innovations meant "the total 
removal of technical skill from some of the tasks of programming" 
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(Greenbaum, 1976: 48) but the 'job degradation' of computer programm-
ing has begun to reveal itself in the salaries they are now able to 
command. In effect, the difference in pay between a computer programm-
er and a computer operator has progressively declined: indeed, as 
Greenbaum tells us, with overtime the operators frequently earn more 
than the programmers. 
This devaluation of the labour-power of the computer programmer, to 
be sure, is repeated in the case of many other types of technical and 
professional employment. The much discussed 'proletarianisation' of 
office labour simply refers to the growing similarity of work conditions 
and narrowing income differentials between many 'white-collar' and 
'professional' workers and their 'blue-collar' counterparts. Other 
indications of the growing 'proletarianisation of the new middle class', 
as Carchedi (1975b) suggests, are, reduced autonomy at work, a decline 
in status, lessened job security, the decrease in their pay 'relative to 
the average' and their growing unionisation and industrial militancy. 
Carchedi (1975) maintains, however, that the proletarianisation of the 
'new middle-class' is not simply the product of the devaluation of 
workers' labour-power, as some writers assume. As he rightly indicates, 
such a process has been going on since the birth of industrial capital-
ism. What is now, has been the steady transformation of ever-widening 
segments of clerical, technical and professional employment from agents 
performing the 'global functions of capital' to agents whose task it 
is to discharge the functions of the 'collective labourer'. To the 
extent that, what Carchedi calls, this 'technical dequalification of 
positions', occurs, such workers are propelled downwards into an 
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increasingly-oppressive labour-process - with all the predictable 
proletarianising consequences that have been noted. 
Plainly, then, in attributing the growth of 'professional unionism' 
to factors such as the size and 'impersonal' character of the work-
place etc. (c.f. Goldstein, 1954, 1955; Kassalow, 1965, 1969), 
academic social science thus deals with the symptoms of 'technical 
dequalification' rather than its causes. The importance of the 
work of Braverman, Carchedi and Poulantzas is that by bringing such 
'class fractions' as technicians and salaried professionals within 
the focus of the analysis of production relations, it is possible 
to reveal the significance of the work situation for the kind of 
industrial organisation which they form, for the strength it commands 
and for the types of industrial and political activity in which it 
engages. 
However, this is not to suggest that worker consciousness is constitut-
ed purely within the sphere of work. On the contrary: indeed, the 
work of Goldthorpe, Lockwood et. al. (1968, 1969) completely falsifies 
any such implication. At the same time, the salience of work for 
people's industrial and political attitudes and behaviour renders 
the analyses of Braverman etc. of profound importance in attempting 
to grasp the relationship between class determination and class action. 
To begin with, as their conceptualisations suggest, the traditional 
manual worker whose economic exploitation by capital is plainly-
evident has been traditionally mobilised on the basis of opposition 
to the brute fact of economic exploitation. Conversely, however, while 
salaried professionals are also economically-oppressed, such oppression 
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may not be quite as obvious thus the organisations they form in the 
industrial sphere may differ both in terms of fundamental ideologies 
and strategies pursued. 
Certainly, the unionisation of 'white-collar' and professional workers 
has expanded considerably within recent years. More importantly, the 
industrial militancy of such unions is no longer in doubt. In fact, 
an increasing number of them have now lost, what Hyman (1975) sarcastic-
ally terms, their 'industrial virginity' by going out on strike. Yet, 
whether the formation of trade unions and the willingness to engage in 
the full range of direct industrial action signifies an upsurge of 
'working class consciousness' on the part of unionised professionals, 
or whether such activity simply represents a form of pragmatic 
'instrumental collectivism' - to use the marvellous expression of 
Goldthorpe and Lockwood (1963), requires - not speculation but empirical 
investigation. To this end comparative survey of the industrial and 
political attitudes of the leaders of 'blue-collar', 'white-collar' and 
'professional' trade unions reported on in the succeeding sections was 
undertaken. Plainly, how such officials view their organisations in 
relation to the industrial organisations of other workers and particular-
ly how they socially-define these organisations vis-a-vis the prevail-
ing social order is of crucial importance - not only for understanding 
the immediate concerns of such institutions - but for assessing the 
potential for worker unity and collective action by the movement as a 
whole. 
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5 . RESEARCH STRAGEGY 
Data Collection 
The data to be analysed in this report consist of information 
collected between July and August, 1975, from the full-time 
secretaries of trade unions in Sydney by means of a question-
naire survey. Basically, the choice, both of respondents 
and research setting, was dictated by a combination of 
methodological and practical considerations. To begin 
with, the effective operational base of Australian trade 
unions is the State. The state basis of Australian union-
ism is reflected in the institutional framework within which 
the unions operate and which legally-defines the scope of their 
activities. 
Apart from the fact that many unions in the various Australian 
states have members working under the awards of the state 
tribunals, many of the essential activities of trade unions 
e.g. a wide variety of negotiations and most-importantly, 
strikes, involve the state rather than the federal 
organisation. Likewise, as Martin reports, "it is the 
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state organisation alone which is eligible to affiliate 
to such major interunion bodies as the trades and labor 
councils and the A.L.P." (1975: 38) Furthermore, 
it would appear from what Martin says in a footnote, 
that the state branches of federal unions have consid-
erable autonomy over such matters as amalgamation with 
other unions. (1975: 36) Needless to say, there 
is considerable dispute among the various 'experts' on 
the Australian trade union movement over whether the 
power of federal union leaders is actually greater than 
that of their state counterparts. 
Accordingly, while on the surface the research focus on 
the state leadership of the unions may appear 
paradoxical in view of the 'national' flavour of many 
of the questions it poses, there is a certain logic in 
this approach. As we have seen, many of the organ-
isational and industrial initiatives a trade union in 
Australia can take are essentially a state responsibility. 
Secondly, the complex interplay between state and federal 
institutional structures within which trade unions 
operate is highly-productive of a national orientation 
on the part of their leaders in the various states. 
In choosing to conduct this survey in Sydney, the decision 
was influenced by two further factors. Firstly, by the 
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fact that the state of New South Wales contains nearly a half 
of the trade union members in Australia; in fact, Rawson and 
Wrightson (1970) and Rawson (1973) estimate it to be approx-
imately 40 percent. Secondly, on the basis of practicality,' 
the relative closeness of Sydney to Canberra made it a 
feasible setting for the study, particularly in view of the 
vast distances between capital cities in Australia. 
Indeed, the dispersion of the federal offices between capital 
cities (mainly Sydney and Melbourne) ruled out, on the grounds 
of cost and time, the study of federal union Secretaries. 
The research design was further influenced by a number of 
other external constraints. Ideally, the study of trade 
union leadership attitudes should be based largely on in-
depth, open-ended interviews. However, the substantial 
workload of the average Australian trade union Secretary 
effectively precludes such a research strategy. In fact, 
overworked union Secretaries can scarcely be expected to 
devote any great amount of their valuable time to 
completing extensive questionnaires. Relative brevity 
of the research instrument was therefore a prime 
consideration in the circumstances. Such conditions 
seemed to indicate the need for either a brief inter-
view which would obtain detailed information on an extreme-
ly narrow range of subjects or a self-administered questionnaire 
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consisting largely of 'forced-choice' items which would permit more 
extensive coverage of the issues involved. Accordingly, the mail 
questionnaire seemed the more desirable alternative both from the 
standpoint of satisfying the basic requirements of the research 
design and because it could be more effectively used within the 
limited resources available to the researcher. 
Traditionally, however, the use of the mail questionnaire, as 
numerous writers have warned, has one major drawback, a low response 
rate. (c.f. Denzin 1970a; 1970b; Galtung, 1967; Goode and Hatt, 
1932; Hyman, 1967; Kerlinger, 1973; Moser and Kalton, 1971; Stacey, 
1969) In fact, the experience of pre-testing the questionnaire on 
which the study is based revealed that Australian trade union leaders 
while highly-sympathetic to sociological research are reluctant to 
respond to anonymous requests to complete mail questionnaires. 
Indeed, it would seem that not even a researcher's imposing sociolog-
ical reputation alters this situation very much. It is noteworthy, 
for example, that in his study of trade union leaders in the United 
States, C. Wright Mills (1945; 1948) was only able to obtain a 
response rate of about 50 per cent. 
What such factors suggested therefore, was that a more personalised 
approach might improve the response rate and thus enhance the 
representativeness of the sample. To this end, the trade union 
leaders selected for study were contacted by letter (see Appendix 1). 
This briefly explained the purpose of the research and sought their 
participation in the survey. Happily, a swift response was received 
from the majority of union leaders indicating their willingness to 
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complete the questionnaire and arranging suitable times for the 
researcher to make personal contact. Essentially, the purpose of 
these visits was to distribute the questionnaires along with stamped, 
addressed envelopes for their return. Additionally, this approach 
meant that any difficulties experienced by the respondents with 
the questionnaire could be clarified by the researcher on the spot. 
The personal visits were also useful for making contact with union 
leaders who had not responded to the letter. This served both to 
minimise refusals and to discover whether the particular union 
existed as an organisational entity at state-level. In the 
distribution of the questionnaire, the prospective respondents 
were assured that the research was independent and that the inform-
ation obtained would be treated as confidential and presented basic-
ally in statistical form. It is believed that by giving these 
assurances some of the hesitancy on the part of one of two union 
leaders was overcome thereby improving the overall response rate. 
Since a key concern was to ensure confidentiality of the information 
given by the trade union leaders, it was felt that the use of names 
on the questionnaire would result in a low response rate. Accordingly, 
to prevent identification either of the leaders or their unions by 
third-parties, the respondents were given numbered questionnaires to 
complete. Indeed, given some of the information which this study 
hoped to elicit, confidentiality seemed essential to its success. The 
numbered questionnaires moreover, enabled the researcher to determine 
which leaders had not returned the questionnaire. These were sent 
reminder notices (see Appendix 3) in which was enclosed another copy 
of the questionnaire and stamped addressed envelope for its return. 
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By these means, the non-response rate was kept fairly low. 
In summary, the research approach employed in this study was, 
as a basic data-gathering device, far superior to the conventional 
mail guestionnaire. Simultaneously, it possesses one of the major 
advantages of the mail-questionnaire approach in that it avoids the 
not unimportant problems of alternative research methods such as 
the problem of interviewer effect. By and large then, given the 
limitations of money, manpower and time to which this study has 
been subject, the research methods chosen were the most effective, 
if not completely satisfactory means of obtaining the required data. 
Description of sample 
As mentioned, the data for this study comes from trade union 
Secretaries in the state of New South Wales. At the outset, a 
major problem facing researchers on trade unions in Australia 
is the absence of detailed information on their size and the 
distribution of the membership of a union between the various 
states. In fact, there is disagreement about even how many 
trade unions there actually are in Australia. 
The key source of information on trade unions is the Australian 
Bureau of Census and Statistics which publishes this data in its 
annual 'Labour Reports'. Significantly, however, the legislation 
by which the Commonwealth Statistician gathers his information from 
the union also precludes him from giving any information about the 
individual unions or from even revealing the names of those from 
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which he compiled his data. (Rawson, 1970). Fortunately, this 
situation has been remedied to some extent by the publication of two 
handbooks on 'trade unions and employees' associations'. (Rawson 
and Wrightson, 1970; Rawson, 1973). These handbooks provide a list 
of the names and overall membership of each of the trade unions. 
They also give certain other details like the affiliation of the 
union with the A.C.T.U. and the A.L.P. 
Although these handbooks are a significant improvement on the 
'Labour Reports' for the researcher on trade unions, nevertheless, 
they have a few limitations. Notably, we have no way of knowing 
exactly the size of many unions in New South VJales. (See below) 
Accordingly, using the national membership figures for each union 
given in the handbooks, 'guesstimates' of their New South VJales 
membership were made on the basis that, reflecting national trends, 
40 per cent of a union's membership could be expected to be in this 
state. 
This method of estimating union size proved wildly inaccurate in a 
few cases, as certain unions with a substantial national membership 
had only a token membership in New South Wales. Where detected early 
enough, the next largest unions derived from the 'guesstimates' were 
substituted. By such means, a list of the largest 100 unions in the 
state of New South Wales was drawn up (see Appendix 1). There are at 
This problem relates essentially to the New South Wales branches 
of federally-organised unions rather than to unions organised on 
a state-basis only. 
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least two notable omissions from this list; the Shop Assistants 
Union, which at state level declared that it had merged with the 
state branch of the Australian Workers Union. Secondly, in view 
of the inappropriateness of many of the items in the research 
instrument, it was decided to exclude the New South Wales Police 
Federation from the survey. 
Given the fact that almost half the trade unions in Australia are 
tiny in size, a sampling of 100 unions in a state like N.S.W. 
conceivably should include every active trade union. This assumption 
proved correct. In fact, of the 100 trade unions, 22 of them did not 
have a full-time Secretary in New South Wales or could not be contact-
ed, either by the Post Office or the researcher. However, since the 
research design of the study calls for completion of the questionnaire 
by full-time union Secretaries, part-time officials were excluded. 
This was done on the grounds that little valid inform-
ation could be gained from this group about aspects of professional 
union leadership such as union careers, incomes. Characteristics of 
the sample are shown in the tables which follow. 
TABLE 5.1 RESPONSE RATES 
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Response Number Percentage of Total 
Answered questionnaire 61 78?^ 
Refusals 5 O/O 
Non-return of 
questionnaire 
12 16?c' 
Total 78 100?^ 
As Table 5.1 indicates, the survey of union Secretaries had a response 
rate of 78?^ which is relatively-high for a study of this kind. 
The sample, moreover, included 9 of the lU largest non-manual unions 
i.e. those v/ith a national membership above 20,000. Disappointingly, 
however, of the 10 largest manual unions (i.e. those with a national 
membership in excess of 50,000), only 4 Union Secretaries completed 
questionnaires. Nevertheless, since union influence is not simply 
a function of size but also of strategic location, the sample, 
significantly, included virtually all of these unions which have an 
organisational presence in New South Wales. ^See belowj. 
It is thus faivly-vepvesentative of the trade unions in New South Wales. 
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The distribution of the sample by the type of union is shown in 
Table 5.2. 
TABLE 5.2 DISTRIBUTION OF THE SAMPLE 
Type of Union * Number Percentage of Total 
Blue-collar 33 54?p 
White-collar 20 33?o 
Professional 8 13?^  
Total 61 100?^ 
* As classified by the respondents. 
The under-representation of the professional group is essentially 
a reflection of the minute size of professional unions as a whole. 
In effect, this means that most unions of professionals are too 
small to support full-time union Secretaries at state-level. 
Characteristically, the unions sampled reflect the national trend 
for membership to be concentrated in a few large unions while the 
remainder of union members are scattered among a multitude of 
relatively small unions. 
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The Research Instrument 
The many demands upon the time of a full-time trade union 
official then, played a large part in the choice of the 
research instrument. Basically, what the situation required 
was an instrument which would yield the maximum amount of 
information while offering significant advantages in time 
saving, convenience and ease of administration. One 
research technique which adequately fulfils the above 
conditions is the Likert attitude scale. 
Scale Construction and Scoring 
Essentially, the procedure for constructing a Likert-type 
scale involves assembling a series of items or statements 
considered relevant to the attitude being investigated. 
The subject is then asked to respond to each in terms of 
a number of categories ranging from 'strongly agree' to 
'strongly disagree'. These categories are assigned 
scores ranging from 4 or 5 for strong agreement (depending 
upon the number of response categories) to 1 for strong 
disagreement. An individual's total score is the sum of 
these individual scores. 
Item Analysis 
Following administration of the scale, the list of state-
ments is subjected to analysis in order to select items 
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which will provide an internally-consistent scale. 
Correlating the average item score for each individual with 
each of the actual item scores provides one way of assessing 
this internal consistency. Another approach and, indeed, 
the one used in this study, involves the elimination of state-
ments with little discriminating power in the sense that they 
fail to discriminate between people with very high and very 
low scores namely, for instance, the top and bottom 25 percent 
of the respondents. The remaining items with good discrimin-
atory power are then combined to form the scale and the score 
for each invidual is derived from totalling their scores on 
each of the remaining items which make up the scale. Because 
of its basic characteristics Likert scaling is generally acknow-
ledged to produce summated rating scales. 
Among the many advantages of the Likert scale is that it permits 
a measurement of the intensity of opinion as well as being 
generally simpler to construct than the Thurstone scale and per-
haps even the Guttman scale. Furthermore, unlike the Thurstone 
scale, the Likert scale provides a more reliable and sensitive 
measure of attitudes by virtue of the fact that each Likert-type 
scale item allows expression of various degrees of agreement and 
disagreement whereas the Thurstone scale item permits a choice of 
only two responses. Certainly, Likert-type scales are not with-
out their disadvantages but for the purposes for which they were 
utilised they adequately met the needs of the present study. 
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6. THE CONCEPT DF CLASS IDENTITY 
Operational Definitions 
A basic precondition of class consciousness in capitalist 
society is that workers and certainly, the leaders of 
the organisations that they form, are possessed of a 
sentiment of solidarity, of sharing a common social 
situation and, therefore, of common bonds with others 
subjected to the wage relation. To envisage class 
consciousness in this manner clearly creates immense 
methodological difficulties. At the very least, it 
requires the identification of the particular categories 
of workers and of worker organisations with which this 
sense of a shared condition is considered to exist. 
This problem of class identity is rendered enormously 
difficult by the skill, status, sexual, ethnic and 
national divisions within the labour force. Needless 
to say, a basic line of division results from the 
changes in the occupational composition of the working 
population. Inevitably, these changes have been 
reflected in the heterogenous occupational character 
of the trade union movement. To the extent 
that organisational fragmentation constitutes 
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an obstacle to the unity of workers as a class, the attitudes of 
union leaders to greater trade union integration are obviously 
critically-relevant to the question of class identity. Indeed, 
viewed within the context of organised labour, the concept of 
class consciousness intrinsically presupposes a recognition by 
the union and its leadership of the similarity of its interests 
to those of other trade unions and a willingness to ally itself 
with them. Thus a key indicator of class identity is to be 
found in trade union leadership attitudes toward union 
amalgamation. 
Another indicator is the extent of their identification with the 
wider trade union movement represented by the affiliation of 
their unions with the A.C.T.U. Arguably, such affiliation or 
the willingness to affiliate may be more instrumentally motivated 
than expressive of class unity. Yet, insofar as the labour 
movement also has its political aspect then such affiliation 
arguably encompasses also a more distinctively ideological 
dimension. This is perhaps most salient in the case of union 
affiliation with the Australian Labor Party (A.L.P.). 
It is of course a commonplace that trade unions represent the 
fundamental basis for the organisation of workers as a class. 
Thus, these institutions have a pivotal role to play in under-
lining and achieving the essential unity of interest which exists 
between all workers. Traditionally, this notion has found 
expression in the idea of 'worker solidarity' - a concept which 
denotes the fundamental unity between working people and which is 
held to overshadow the sectional divisions of craft and skill. 
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Indeed, it is because of the existence of such sentiments - no 
matter that they are often acknowledged more in their breach than 
in their observance - that it makes any sense at all to talk of a 
trade union or labour 'movement'. 
Historically, union solidarity inevitably meant the solidarity of 
largely manual worker organisations. However, in the past decade 
or two, the advanced industrial nations - Australia among them, 
have experienced a vast expansion of non-manual employment. This 
period has also seen an unprecedented growth in the unionisation 
and industrial militancy of this segment of the labour force. 
In Australia and elsewhere, the significance of these trends is 
plain to see. To begin with, were it not for the influx of non-
manual workers, the Australian union movement would have declined 
rather than grown. Furthermore, if present trends continue, non-
manual workers and their organisations are likely to predominate 
in the industrial scene in Australia within a generation or less. 
Clearly, what impact such developments makes on the character of 
Australian unionism is likely to be crucially-influenced by the 
social images manual and non-manual workers hold of themselves and of 
each other. Needless to say, trade union leaders are in a unique 
position to influence the social perceptions of their members. 
Accordingly, the concept of class identity would appear to suggest 
a sense of collective solidarity between manual and non-manual 
workers and the industrial organisations they create to represent 
their interests. 
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However, apart from organisational divisions and manual and non-
manual differences within the trade union movement, there are two 
major potential sources of worker disunity. The first of these 
concerns the vexed question of pay differentials and the second 
relates to the notion of compulsory unionism or 'preference to 
unionists' as it is often euphemised. Clearly, therefore, any 
meaningful concept of class identity must address these two 
issues - given their potential to corrode worker unity. 
Possibly nowhere is the fragmentation of the working class more 
strikingly evident than in the division of the labour force 
along sexual lines. In common with most industrial societies, 
there has been a dramatic rise in the workforce participation 
of women in Australia since the Second World War. For instance, 
between 1947 and 1974, the proportion of women in the Australian 
workforce almost doubled; from 22.4% to just over 42?o. In effect 
women comprise more than one-third of the Australian workforce. 
In addition, during the period of economic growth in the two 
decades following the end of World War II - the so-called 'long 
boom', the female component of the workforce grew much faster than 
the male rate. (Cass, 1978; Mercer, 1975) The attitudes of 
union leaders toward women workers and their needs are thus a key 
criterion of their sense of class identity. 
Likewise, migrant labour, as writers like Collins (1975) have 
noted, has created an important line of social cleavage within 
the Australian working class. This objective division within 
the working class between what Collins (1975) perceives to be a 
•labour aristocracy' of indigenous workers and a layer of socially-
underprivileged migrant workers, poses special problems for the 
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consciousness and unity of the class. The attitudes of union 
leaders are therefore of pivotal importance in counteracting 
ethnocentrism and promoting the solidarity of all workers regard-
less of cultural differences. Indeed, the concept of class 
identity would seem to presuppose such unity. 
Although immigration has been exceptionally important for post-
war economic growth in Australia, changes within the contemporary 
Australian economy indicate a diminishing need for large-scale 
infusions of immigrant labour. To begin with, Australia's 
economic future is increasingly being seen in terms of the massive 
development of its mineral resources by international corporations. 
Being capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive, the so-called 
'resources boom' is not expected to generate any great demand for 
labour. Moreover, not only has Australian manufacturing industry 
experienced severe contraction but there is an increasing tendency 
for this sector to shift its operations to 
low-wage Asian countries. 
The production of manufactured goods overseas with low-cost Asian 
labour, which are then imported into Australia, has seen the 
virtual disappearance of the clothing, textile and footwear 
industries in Australia. These industries which, interestingly 
enough, are the largest employers of migrant labour - particularly 
female migrant labour, have been forced to follow suit and go 
'offshore' or go out ofbueiness. The demand for these forms of 
factory labour in Australia thus progressively diminishes, as 
instead of bringing labour to capital, many segments of Australian 
industry resort to taking capital to labour. 
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The implications of the political decision that Australia's 
economic future lies mainly in primary production - especially 
of mineral development and export, are serious for the Australian 
working class and its institutions like trade unions. Certainly, 
the internationalisation of capital poses acutely the questions 
of united action and active solidarity between workers and labour 
organisations of developed capitalist nations and their counter-
parts in the 'Third World'. It follows therefore that in the 
present context of the international division-of-labour, a sense 
of class identity among union leaders implies the transcendence 
of national frontiers. 
In effect, then, as the foregoing discussion suggests, the con-
cept of class identity embodies at least seven different 
components. They are: 
i) union amalgamation; 
ii) affiliation with the A.C.T.U.; 
iii) affiliation with the A.L.P.; 
iv) manual and non-manual worker solidarity; 
v) solidarity with women workers; 
vi) solidarity with migrant workers; 
vii) international worker solidarity. 
Accordingly, in operationally-defining class identity in terms 
of these seven variables, what we have formulated is a single 
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concept with seven distinct indicators of it - each, moreover, 
potentially an independent measure. 
METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
For the purposes of this study, we sought to measure class 
identity with a twenty item Likert scale. These items or state-
ments were framed either in a positive form, e.g. 'Clerical and 
professional unions should affiliate with the A.C.T.U. and the 
Trades and Labour Council', or in a negative form, e.g. 'It is 
of no concern to Australian trade union leaders if multinational 
companies which have branches in Australia, or Australian-owned 
firms, treat their workers poorly in other countries'. 
Respondents were required to make one of four possible responses 
to each statement: strongly agree; agree; disagree and strong-
ly disagree. These responses have been scored from 1 to 4 so 
that the response indicative of the most favourable attitude is 
given the highest score. The total score can thus range from 
twenty to eighty, the upper level indicating a strong sense of 
class solidarity or class identity. Very importantly, the 
'uncertain' response category which is often a feature of Likert 
scaling was omitted in this study. Briefly, the reasons for 
this is that the issues on which trade union leadership opinion 
was sought were such that the respondents might reasonably be 
expected to hold a view on them one way or the other. 
Accordingly, the union leaders surveyed were asked to indicate 
the direction and intensity of their feelings with regard to 
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union amalgamation, union affiliation with the A.C.T.U. and A.L.P., 
as well as to the idea of unity with workers across status, 
ethnic, gender and national boundaries. As explained in more 
detail in Chapter 5, the questionnaire was presented 
to two groups of trade union leaders. One group numbering thirty-
three people comprised leaders of 'blue-collar' trade unions. The 
other group consisted of twenty-eight leaders of 'white-collar' and 
'professional' trade unions. 
The classification of the unions as 'blue-collar', 'white-collar' 
and 'professional' was made by the respondents themselves in 
answer to a questionnaire item asking them to indicate which of 
the three terms would best describe the type of union they led. 
In view of the very small number of respondents in the 'professional' 
category, this group was combined with the 'white-collar' group for 
the purposes of analysis. 
In setting out to determine whether the initial group of 20 items 
could validly be added together to form a scale of class identity, 
it is first necessary to ensure that the items are internally con-
sistent. Put simply, the items or statements need to be subjected 
to a procedure which tests whether they all lie on the same 
dimension. By these means statements which in the present case 
do not lie on the dimension 'class identity' would be identified 
and eliminated from the scale. 
Item analysis is the usual means by which scale items are checked 
for dimensionality. Presently there exists a variety of 
proposed methods of item analysis. In fact, complex multi-
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dimensional analyses such as factor analysis might be considered 
to be the ultimate in item analytic procedures for the precision 
it is capable of achieving. However, while factor analysis is 
not an absolutely necessary prerequisite for selecting items to 
be included or omitted, at the very least, a comparison between 
the scale items for the top and bottom twenty-five percent of the 
respondents who completed the questionnaire is essential for 
ensuring that there is empirical as well as theoretical rationale 
for combining the information contained in the various items. 
Briefly, the procedure involved in this form of item analysis is 
as follows. First, the total score for each respondent is 
calculated by aggregating the respondent's scores on each of the 
items. From this, the twenty-five percent of respondents with 
the highest total scores and the twenty-five percent with the 
lowest total scores are selected. Having done this, every item 
used to construct the scale is examined to determine how it was 
answered by the two groups. Next, the mean score on the item 
for the upper and lower group is calculated. 
Whether the two mean scores are statistically significant may then 
be tested. The test usually employed for this purpose is the t-
test. The statistical procedures used to calculate the t-test 
are set out in Appendix 5. The calculation is made for all the 
statements or items in the scale. This allows every item to be 
given a t-value. Items selected in the final scale are thus 
selected on the basis of their t-scores. Those items with the 
highest t-scores, in effect, indicating that they discriminate well 
between upper and lower groups are retained to form the final 
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scale. (See Appendix 6 for details of the t-scores on the 
individual items.) 
CONSCIOUSNESS OF CLASS IDENTITY; TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP 
ATTITUDES TO LABOUR UNITY 
Class identity and type of union 
The thirteen items comprising the final class identity 
attitude scale are shown below and overleaf. 
'In place of the 300 or so unions which exist in 
Australia, a single large union in each industry 
would serve the workers much better.' 
'Clerical and professional unions should affiliate 
with the A.C.T.U. and the Trades and Labour Council.' 
'Small unions will need to amalgamate or federate 
with larger unions in order to survive in a society 
dominated by large-scale business and government 
concerns.' 
'Generally speaking, clerical and professional 
trade unionists have more in common with employers 
than they do with manual trade unionists.' 
'The presence of more clerical and professional 
unions in the A.C.T.U. and the T.L.C. would reduce 
the militancy of these organisations.' 
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'If women want jobs then they should accept the 
same conditions as men and not expect the union 
to get special conditions for them.' 
'Unions should provide special opportunities 
for women to enable them to achieve full-time 
official positions.' 
'Trade unions in Australia should avoid affil-
iation with political parties.' 
'When a parliamentary election is about to be 
held unions which are affiliated with a 
political party are less free to take indus-
trial action, than unions which are not so 
affiliated.' 
'Trade unions which are affiliated with a 
particular political party are generally at 
a disadvantage compared with non-affiliated 
unions when that party is out of office.' 
'It is not in the best interests of trade 
unionism for senior union officials to 
simultaneously hold senior positions in a 
political party.' 
'It is of no concern to Australian trade 
union leaders if multi-national companies 
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which have branches in Australia, or Australian-
owned firms, treat their workers poorly in other 
countries.' 
'The activities of multi-national corporations 
call for co-ordinated international trade union 
action.' 
The distribution of scores for the blue-collar and white-
collar union leaders surveyed is shown in Table 6 .1 . 
TABLE 6.1 COMPARISON OF BLUE-COLLAR AND WHITE-COLLAR UNION LEADER 
SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS IDENTITY 
Type of N 
Score 
Union 
23-29 30-36 37-43 44-50 Mean 
Blue-Collar 33 30% 39% 27% 39.45 
White-Collar 28 32% 46% 7% 37.18 
Significance of difference of Means 
t = 1.72 
p > .05 
N.B. Owing to the approximations involved in rounding 
to whole numbers, the above percentages do not 
sum to exactly 100. 
Scores on the scale can range from thirteen to fifty-two, 
the upper level indicating a strong sense of class identity. 
As might be expected, the range of scores among white-collar 
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union leaders was much broader than among blue-collar 
officials - 24 to 50 compared with 29 to 50. However, 
while in percentage terms some of the score differences 
between manual and non-manual union leaders appear to be 
substantial - given the relatively small numbers involved, 
no conclusive interpretations can be drawn from the data. 
Nevertheless, the mean scale scores for the two groups 
were calculated from the actual scores recorded and are 
shown in Table 6.1. 
It will be recalled that according to certain versions of 
the 'new working class' thesis, class identity is expected 
to be much weaker among non-manual trade unionists than 
among manual unionists. Indeed, as we have seen, the 
motivations for non-manual unionisation are said to be 
guite different than for manual forms of collectivist 
organisation. Certainly, there is a widespread academic 
and public belief that 'white-collar trade unions are 
different'. However, in regard to their level of class 
identity, measured by the attitudes of union leadership to 
the industrial and political unity of working people regard-
less of status, ethnic, gender and national differences, a 
specific test of the effects of the type of union viz. white-
collar vs blue-collar, failed to show any significant 
statistical difference in the mean scale scores of their 
respective leaders; t = 1.72, p > .05. 
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Union affiliation with the A.C.T.U. 
Apart from the blue-collar/white-collar difference, there 
are various ways in which unions and union leaders are 
divided. Within the Australian labour movement, a key 
difference between trade unions is between those which are 
formally associated with the major umbrella organisation of 
trade unions, the A.C.T.U. and those which are outside it. 
Another difference between trade unions involves those 
which are affiliated with the Australian Labor Party 
(A.L.P.) and those which are not. 
However, while unions which are affiliated with the A.L.P. 
are usually also affiliated with the A.C.T.U. or with one 
of its state branches such as the various trades and labour 
councils, there are a number of unions which are affiliated 
with the A.C.T.U. but which have avoided affiliation with 
the A.L.P. Although the A.C.T.U. has traditionally been 
a stronghold of blue-collar trade unionism, recent years 
have seen a tendency for increasing numbers of white-collar 
unions to affiliate with the A.C.T.U. - despite the fact 
that many of these unions also had, until comparatively-
recently, their own peak organisations such as the Australian 
Council of Salaried and Professional Associations (A.C.5.P.A.) 
and the Council of Commonwealth Public Service Organisations 
(C.C.P.S.G.) 
There are, of course, strong practical grounds for trade 
unions to seek affiliation with the A.C.T.U. As the major 
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federation of trade unions in Australia, the A.C.T.U. has 
inevitably been the body which governments and business 
leaders have consulted on a range of matters affecting the 
welfare of workers. Hence, there are powerful instru-
mental reasons for white-collar unions to affiliate with 
the A.C.T.U. However, affiliation with the A.L.P. implies 
quite different considerations. In brief, many writers 
would claim that this form of association by trade unions 
suggests a more specifically ideological commitment on the 
part of these organisations than does their affiliation 
with the A.C.T.U. 
Characteristically, given the tendency to perceive the 
affiliation of white-collar trade unions with the A.C.T.U. 
in instrumental terms, we would expect the leadership of 
such unions to hold much weaker attitudes toward labour 
unity than do their manual counterparts. For, if the 
assumption of white-collar union instrumentalism is true, 
the affiliation of these organisations with the A.C.T.U. 
is not impelled by considerations of class solidarity 
with manual workers. The comparisons between manual and 
non-manual unions which are affiliated with the A.C.T.U. 
are shown in Table 6.2. 
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TABLE 6.2 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON SCALE OF CLASS IDENTITY BY 
UNION AFFILIATION AND TYPE OF UNION 
Affiliation 
Blue-Collar 
0/ /O Mean 
White-Collar 
% Mean 
Significance 
of difference 
of Means 
A.C.T.U. 
Non-A.C.T.U. 
100 39.45 
0 
63 
37 
38.59 
35.4 
t = 0.526 
> .05 P 
Significance of difference of Means t = 1.44 p > .05 
(Nr33) (N=27) 
Predictably, within the sample of trade union leaders, the 
blue-collar unions are all affiliated with the A.C.T.U. 
which only serves to confirm the general tendency for such 
organisations at large to be affiliated. Among the white-
collar unions in the sample however, while nearly two-thirds 
were affiliated with the A.C.T.U., a sizeable proportion 
were not. Interestingly, however, of the unions not 
affiliated with the A.C.T.U., all but one were affiliated 
with one or other of the white-collar union federations 
viz. A.C.S.P.A., C.C.P.S.O., etc. 
However, what is of critical theoretical importance is the 
attitudes of the leaders of the various types of unions on 
the scale of class identity. As shown in Table 6.2 the 
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mean score of blue-collar and white-collar leaders of trade 
unions which were affiliated with the A.C.T.U. were virtually 
identical with manual scores exceeding non-manual by a mere 
0.86 points (39.45 for manual union leaders compared with 
38.59 for non-manual). This difference is manifestly not 
significant statistically at any level, t = 0.526. It is 
therefore clear that within the sample, non-manual union 
leaders whose unions are affiliated with the A.C.T.U. do 
not differ to any great extent in their attitudes to labour 
unity from their manual counterparts heading A.C.T.U. 
affiliated unions. 
Indeed, where measureable differences in leadership attitudes 
exist, these tend to exist between the leaders of non-manual 
unions affiliated with the A.C.T.U. and their non-manual 
counterparts which are not. As mentioned, only one of the 
white-collar unions in our sample was not affiliated with a 
union federation of some kind. In order to determine whether 
the type of federation with which a non-manual trade union is cK^ diaki 
affected leadership attitudes, the scores of leaders of 
A.C.T.U. affiliated unions were compared with the scores of 
A.C.S.P.A./C.C.P.S.O. affiliates. 
As shown in Table 6.2, the leaders of white-collar unions 
which were affiliated with the A.C.T.U. achieved a mean 
score of 38.59 on the scale compared with a mean score of 
35.4 for unions affiliated with the white-collar union 
federations. However, although the mean difference in 
their scores was 3.19, again statistical tests revealed 
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that this difference was not significant, t - 1.44, 
p > .05. Accordingly, despite differences in their 
forms of affiliation with central union federations like 
the A.C.T.U. or A.C.S.P.A., the level of 'class identity' 
among white-collar union leaders in our sample is remark-
ably similar to that of the manual union officials. 
Union affiliation with the A.L.P. 
However, the extent to which such attitudes are influenced 
by the political affiliations of the union need to be 
examined. As mentioned earlier, a basic form of political 
affiliation which trade unions in Australia tend to have is 
affiliation with the Australian Labor Party. It is a 
commonplace that the trade unions played a major part in 
the founding of the A.L.P. and continue to exercise con-
siderable influence within the party apart from being major 
financial supporters of it. 
Although party affiliation is not without benefits for trade 
unions and their officials, nevertheless, these are not as 
industrially apparent for trade unions as is affiliation with 
the A.C.T.U. Accordingly, while a substantial proportion 
of manual trade unions are affiliated with the A.L.P., very 
large numbers of non-manual trade unions - especially those 
formed within recent years, have remained outside of the 
A.L.P. To some extent, the higher proportion of manual 
unions affiliated with the A.L.P. relative to non-manual 
unions is a product of their different histories. In fact. 
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when it first became possible for trade unions to affiliate 
with the A.L.P., there were proportionally far greater 
numbers of manual trade unions in Australia than non-manual 
ones. 
Furthermore, while it may have required little effort of 
will for most manual unions to perceive their political 
interests as best being served by the A.L.P., the still 
privileged position of the bulk on non-manual employees 
some decades ago would perhaps have entailed a considerable 
degree of explicit class identification for non-manual trade 
unions to perceive their political fortunes as being tied up 
with the A.L.P. Accordingly, the real cause for comment 
is the significant proportion of white-collar trade unions 
which have been affiliated with the party almost from its 
inception. 
Clearly, if the foregoing speculations about union 
affiliation with the A.L.P. have any substance, we would 
expect to find stronger attitudes toward labour unity among 
the leaders of non-manual unions which are affiliated with 
the A.L.P. than among the leaders of manual unions which 
have such affiliations. These associations are examined 
in Table 6.3 where the attitude scores of blue-collar and 
white-collar leaders of A.L.P. and A.C.T.U. affiliated 
unions are compared with A.C.T.U. affiliated unions only. 
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TABLE 6.3 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON SCALE OF CLASS IDENTITY 
BY AFFILIATION AND TYPE OF UNION 
Affiliation 
Blue-Collar 
% Mean 
White-Collar 
% Mean 
Significance 
of difference 
of Means 
A.L.P. and 
A.C.T.U. 
91 39.53 41 42.86 t = 0.66 
p > .05 
A.C.T.U. only 
(N=33) 
38.67 59 
(N=17) 
35.6 t = 0.82 
p > .05 
Significance 
of difference 
of Means 
t = 0 .26, p > .05, t = 3 .26, p < .05 
Predictably, the overwhelming majority of blue-collar unions 
in the sample were affiliated with both the A.L.P. and the 
A.C.T.U. In fact, the proportion of the blue-collar unions 
which were affiliated in this way was more than double that 
of the white-collar trade unions. By contrast, where only 
9% of the blue-collar unions in the sample were affiliated 
only with the A.C.T.U., 59?^  of the white-collar unions were 
so affiliated. In essence, as the table clearly demon-
strates, white-collar trade unions were much more likely to 
affiliate with the A.C.T.U. than with the A.L.P. However, 
what is most noteworthy about this is that the mean scores 
of white-collar leaders whose unions were affiliated with 
both the A.L.P. and A.C.T.U. exceeded those of leaders of 
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the blue-collar A.L.P. and A.C.T.U. affiliates. In fact, 
the mean scores of the white-collar group were 42.86 compared 
with 39.53 for their blue-collar counterparts - a difference 
of 3.33 points. However, in subjecting the scores to 
statistical testing, the difference in the mean scores bet-
ween the white-collar and blue-collar union leaders failed 
to reach significance, t = 0.66, p > .05. 
Furthermore, although the mean scores of blue-collar union 
leaders whose organisations were affiliated with both the 
A.L.P. and A.C.T.U. exceeded those of A.C.T.U. affiliated 
only unions, the difference was very slight, viz. 39.53 
compared with 38.67 and, predictably, not statistically 
significant, t = 0.26, p > .05. The real difference bet-
ween the unions in the sample was between the white-collar 
unions which were affiliated with both the A.L.P. and the 
A.C.T.U. and those which were affiliated with the A.C.T.U. 
only. 
Among the former, the mean score achieved on the attitude 
s cale was 42.86 compared with a score of 35.6 for those 
whose organisations were affiliated only with the A.C.T.U. 
This difference in mean scores of 7.26 between A.L.P. and 
A.C.T.U. affiliated and A.C.T.U. only unions, proved to 
be statistically significant; t = 3.26, p < .05. This 
suggests that affiliation with the A.L.P. is associated 
with much stronger levels of class identification among 
leaders of white-collar trade unions. 
In fact, as Table 6.3 shows, non-manual unions affiliated 
only with the A.C.T.U. have much more in common with 
similarly affiliated blue-collar trade unions than they 
do with fellow white-collar unions which are affiliated 
with the A.L.P. Thus, party political affiliation of 
their organisations is clearly linked with more positive 
attitudes toward labour unity by the union leaders in 
our sample. 
Union Size 
Apart from affiliation with the A.C.T.U. and the A.L.P., 
trade unions in Australia differ in a variety of other 
respects. Most fundamentally, they differ in size. 
Size of union membership may be an important influence 
on leadership attitudes - not only in terms of the 
organisational constraints this may have on the behaviour 
of leaders within the organisation but because of its 
implications for a wide ranging number of issues. The 
influence of union size on leadership scores on the scale 
of class identity is examined in Table 6.4. 
255, 
TABLE 6.4 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON 
AND TYPE OF UNION 
CLASS IDENTITY SCALE BY SIZE 
Membership 
Blue-Collar 
^ % Mean 
White-Collar 
?o Mean 
Significance 
of difference 
of Means 
Under 5,000 45 38.93 46 36.31 t = 
P 
1.26 
.05 
5,000-15,000 36 36.17 28 36.62 t = 
P ^ 
0.076 
.05 
Over 15,000 18 42.33 25 38.0 t = 1.0 
(N=33) (N328) 
P > .05 
Dv.e to approximations involved in rounding to 
whole moribers the ahove percentages do not svun 
to exactly 100, 
Characteristically, the unions in the sample reflect the 
trend in Australia as a whole for union membership to be 
concentrated in a few large unions while the remainder of 
union members are scattered among a multitude of relatively 
small unions. For example, Rawson (1978) estimates that 
nationally more than a half of the trade unionists belong to 
only 16 unions, while just 36 trade unions account for near-
ly 80 percent of the workers who are unionised. By contrast, 
under 4 percent of the total union membership in Australia is 
distributed among 172 trade unions. 
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As Table 6.4 reveals, nearly a half of both the blue-collar 
and white-collar unions in the sample had memberships below 
5,000. However, at the other extreme, where only 18 per-
cent of the blue-collar unions exceeded 15,000 members, a 
quarter of the white-collar unions did so. Altogether, 
the unions in the sample ranged in size from as few as 500 
members on the one hand to as many as 45,000 members on the 
other, the median size being 8,000 members. However, while 
white-collar unions were bigger in size than blue-collar 
unions - ranging from 600 to 45,000 members, compared with 
500 to 38,000 members, the median size of the blue-collar 
unions was slightly higher than that of the white-collar 
unions,viz. 6,000 members, compared with 5,500 members. 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the table is that class 
identity is strongest among the leaders of the largest unions 
viz. those with memberships above 15,000 people each. 
Characteristically, moreover, except for unions with member-
ships between 5,000 and 15,000 members, class identity was 
stronger among blue-collar union leaders than among white-
collar union leaders. However, a specific test of the effect 
of union size on trade union leadership attitudes failed to 
reach significance at any level for unions of any size (see 
Table 6.4). 
The inconclusive nature of the results on union size suggests 
that this variable needs to be examined in the context of 
factors which carry greater salience for trade union leader-
ship attitudes. The concept of 'unionateness' is relevant 
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here. As mentioned earlier, unionateness refers to how 
much a worker industrial organisation resembles an ideal 
type trade union. Within the framework of Australian 
industrial relations, the indicator par excellence of 
unionateness is union affiliation with the A.C.T.U. The 
results yielded by examination of these variables are out-
lined in Table 6.5. 
TABLE 6.5 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS IDENTITY BY 
SIZE, AFFILIATION AND TYPE OF UNION 
A.C.T.U. NON-A.C.T.U. 
Size Blue-Collar White-Collar Blue-Collar White-Collar 
^ % Mean % Mean % Mean % Mean 
Under 5,000 45 38.93 33 36.67 0 0 11 38.0 
5,000-15,000 36 36.17 11 43.0 0 0 18 32.8 
Over 15,000 18 42.33 18 39.4 0 0 7 37.5 
(N:i33) {H=ll) (N=10) 
* Due to approximations involved in rounding to whole 
numbers3 the above percentages do not sum to 
exactly 100. 
Among the unions in the sample as Table 6.5 reveals, class 
identity generally increased with union size except for 
small-scale white-collar unions which were unaffiliated 
with the A.C.T.U. and medium-sized white-collar unions 
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which were affiliated. Paradoxically, moreover, medium 
sized white-collar unions affiliated with the A.C.T.U. 
displayed the strongest levels of class identity -
substantially exceeding those of other medium sized unions 
and indeed, exceeding that of any category of blue-collar 
union. However, the differences in the mean scores while 
impressive proved not to be statistically significant. 
For example, between white-collar and blue-collar, medium-
sized unions affiliated with the A.C.T.U., the test yielded 
the following result; t = 0.74, p > .05. 
Conversely, between medium sized white-collar unions 
affiliated with the A.C.T.U. and those not affiliated the 
result was t = 1.61, p > .05. Similar comparison of 
the differences in the means of the various types and 
affiliations of the unions in the sample also failed to 
yield statistically-significant results. However, a great 
deal of caution needs to be exercised in interpreting such 
conclusions. To begin with, it might plausibly be argued 
that broad classifications of trade unions of the kind 
examined in these tables leave a great deal unsaid about 
the social situations of those who happen to lead them. 
In particular, the data considered so far tell us little 
of the ways in which various factors in the individual's 
background influence his perception of the role of his 
organisation. 
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Social backgrounds of leaders and class identity 
There are four aspects of the union leader's social back-
ground we take as basic. They are age, income, length of 
time a union leader and political party member. The 
most obvious of the four background factors is age and its 
importance for the class attitudes of trade union leaders 
is examined in Table 6.6. 
TABLE 6.6 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS IDENTITY 
BY AGE OF LEADER AND TYPE OF UNION 
Age Blue-Collar White-Collar Significance 
?a Mean Mean 
51 and under 45 40.53 68 37.68 t = 1.53; p > .05 
Over 51 45 39.47 32 35.66 t = 1.74; p > .05 
(N:i30) (N328) 
The trade union leaders in our sample ranged in age from 24 
years to 65 years with a median age of 51 years. White-
collar union leaders were on average younger than their blue-
collar counterparts with a median age of 44 years and a range 
from 24 to 62 years of age compared with a median of 52 years 
and an age range from 29 to 65 years. 
As the table indicates, class identity tended to weaken with 
age. However, it remained stronger for blue-collar officials 
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than for white-collar officials. Again, the difference in 
the means for the blue-collar and white-collar leader scores 
on the scale were not significant at the five percent level. 
The next background factor to be considered was that of in-
come. The income of trade union leaders is important as an 
indicator of their life-styles and the degree of their social 
differentiation from their members which in turn as Michels' 
'iron law of oligarchy' contended generations ago carries 
some profoundly conservative implications for trade union 
leadership ideologies. The effects of income on class 
identification are shown in Table 6.7. 
TABLE 6.7 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS IDENTITY BY 
INCOME OF LEADER AND TYPE OF UNION 
Income Blue-Collar White-Collar Significance 
% Mean Mean 
Under $8,000 27 40.33 0 0 
$8-$9,999 39 41.08 14 37.75 t - 1.04; p > .05 
$10-$14,999 30 36.4 46 37.31 t = 0.33; p > .05 
$15,000 + 3 N.A. 39 36.45 
(Nz33) (N=28) 
The table points up some interesting contrasts. Notably, 
while well over half the blue-collar union officials earned 
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below $10,000 per year only 14 percent of the white-collar 
leaders did so. Even more revealingly, where under one-
third of the blue-collar leaders earned above $10,000 per 
year, close on 90 percent of their white-collar counterparts 
had earnings above this figure - with 39?o of the latter 
earning in excess of $15,000 per year compared with the 
solitary blue-collar official who did so. As far as class 
identity is concerned, there was a general tendency for it 
to decline with income. However, the conclusions are not 
readily interpretable. For, whereas class identity was 
stronger among blue-collar leaders earning between $8,000 
and $10,000 a year than among white-collar leaders, the 
exact opposite resulted among those earning between $10,000 
and $15,000. Needless to say, in neither case were the 
mean differences in the scores statistically significant. 
Central, of course, to the notion of oligarchic control of 
trade unions as formulated by Michels, is the idea that 
trade union leaders not only have superior material living 
standards to those of their members but also that they tend 
to be fairly entrenched in their positions - even though 
they may have to contest such positions at regular elections. 
To test whether 'oligarchic tendencies' influence class 
identity, we divided the sample into those who had held their 
present positions for 5 years or less and those who had done 
so for more than 5 years. The results are set out in Table 
6 . 8 . 
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TABLE 6.8 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON CLASS IDENTITY SCALE BY INCOME, 
LENGTH OF TIME A UNION LEADER AND TYPE OF UNION 
Income 
5 YEARS AND UNDER OVER 5 YEARS 
Blue-Collar White-Collar Blue-Collar White-Collar 
Mean % Mean /O Mean % Mean 
Under $8,000 6 41.5 0 
$8-$9,999 
$15,000 + 
12 41.5 14 
$10-$14,999 27 38.11 29 
(Nzl5) 
0 25 
(N=19) 
18 38.5 0 
37.75 15 40.6 0 
36.87 18 39.17 18 
35.14 
(N=18) 
N.A. 14 
(N=9) 
0 
0 
38.0 
38.75 
Within the sample, there was a tendency for class identity 
to decline with income for those who had held office for a 
period of 5 years or less, the decline being sharpest among 
those earning above $10,000 a year in the case of the blue-
collar leaders and above $15,000 a year for their white-
collar counterparts. Predictably, when income category is 
taken into account, class identity is shown to be marginally 
stronger among the blue-collar officials than among the 
white-collar officials in the sample. 
Further, while class identity tended to decline over time, 
it is worth noting that this decline was entirely confined 
to the manual union leaders earning the lowest salaries of 
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the sample. Among both manual and non-manual leaders in 
the sample earning above $10,000 a year, class identity 
actually increased with time in office. Thus, contrary 
to the claims of the 'iron law of oligarchy', class iden-
tity among the best paid union leaders in the sample who had 
held their positions for more than 5 years was stronger than 
for those earning similar amounts but who had held office 
for much shorter periods. Michels' thesis, of course, 
assumes that the greater the length of time in office and 
the better the pay of the union leader - particularly the 
blue-collar union leader, the more ideologically conservative 
she/he becomes and the weaker his/her sense of class solid-
arity . 
Such claims, however, are not borne out by the responses of 
the union leaders in the sample. It is not so clear what 
can be learnt about class identity from the fact that the 
sharpest decline in it occurred among the lowest-paid but 
longest-serving blue-collar union officials. It is, how-
ever, interesting to note that when income alone was 
considered (Table 6.7),class identity among the lowest paid 
manual union leaders was much higher than among those blue-
collar officials on the highest income level in the sample. 
In fact, as we saw from Table 6.7, there was a general 
tendency for class identity to decline with income for both 
groups. 
It is, of course, possible that other variables are at work 
in producing the results shown in Table 6.8. One variable 
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which might be expected to have an influence on the level of 
leadership earnings and the length of time in office is age. 
Of the two factors, age is more closely related to the 
length of time in office than it is to the level of earnings. 
Furthermore, as we saw in Table 6.6 there was a tendency for 
class identity to decline with age for both the manual and 
the non-manual leaders in the sample. Other background 
factors which might be expected to have an influence on the 
class identity of union leaders are their political party 
memberships and their party preferences. The party member-
ship of the sample and its effect on class identity are 
shown in Table 6.9. 
TABLE 6.9 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON CLASS IDENTITY SCALE BY PARTY 
MEMBERSHIP AND TYPE OF UNION 
Political 
Party 
Blue-Collar 
% Mean 
White-Collar 
% Mean 
Significance 
of difference 
of Means 
A.L.P. 73 39.75 64 39.78 t = 0.02; p > .05 
NON-A.L.P. n s 35.17 36 32.5 t = 0.95; p > .05 
(Nr30) (N=28) 
Significance 
of difference 
of Means 
t = 2.19, p < .05 t = 5.39, p < .05 
Non-A.L.P. blue-collar category excludes those giving Corrmmist 
Fartu o- Australia or one or other of the Socialist Parties of 
V/ » 
Australia as the party to which they belong. 
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The political party to which the vast majority of the union 
leaders in the sample belonged was the Australian Labor 
Party. Nearly three-quarters of the manual union leaders 
and almost two-thirds of the non-manual officials acknow-
ledged being members of the party. Of the blue-collar 
union leaders who did not belong to the A.L.P., nearly 10 
percent belonged to either the Communist Party of Australia 
or to one or other of the Socialist parties of Australia. 
Overall, less than a fifth of the entire manual union leader-
ship in the sample said that they were not members of a 
political party. Finally, of the white-collar union leaders 
who were not members of the A.L.P. only one admitted to being 
a member of the Liberal Party. 
The A.L.P. as Table 6 . 9 shows held the allegiance of not only 
the majority of the blue-collar union officials but also the 
majority of the white-collar leaders in the sample. It is 
noteworthy that while 91 percent of the blue-collar trade 
unions were affiliated with the A.L.P. only 73 percent of 
their leaders were themselves members of the party. By con-
trast, where only 25 percent of the white-collar unions in the 
sample had formal ties with the A.L.P. in the form of affil-
iation with it, nearly two-thirds of the white-collar union 
leaders were themselves members of the party. 
This fact raises a number of interesting questions for the 
future directions of non-manual unionism in Australia. While 
many Australian writers readily concede the possibility of 
non-manual unions increasingly affiliating with the A.C.T.U., 
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most are openly sceptical that a similar trend might occur 
with affiliation with the A.L.P. It has been observed 
that traditionally affiliation with the A.L.P. is pre-
eminently a blue-collar union phenomenon. It has further 
been noted that the party has generally failed to gain 
affiliates from among the new and growing sectors of non-
manual unionism. Furthermore, it is claimed that party 
political affiliation on the part of trade unions, in 
effect, affiliation of the union with the A.L.P., is un-
popular with the members of the new non-manual unions. 
However, if these claims are true, then the white-collar 
union leaders in our sample do not appear to share their 
members' chariness of the A.L.P. The implication, more-
over, that in the long run it is going to be the influence 
of the members of these non-manual unions rather than that 
of the leaders which proves decisive on the question of 
whether or not they affiliate with the A.L.P. remains to be 
demonstrated. 
Class identity, as one might expect, is strongly associated 
with party membership. For example, while there were no 
statistically significant differences between the scores 
of blue-collar and white-collar union leaders who were members 
of the A.L.P. on the one hand, or between their counterparts 
who were non-A.L.P. members, significant differences were 
recorded between the A.L.P. and the non-A.L.P. members of 
both the blue-collar and white-collar groups in the sample. 
For example, within the blue collar group, a statistical test 
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of the difference in class identity between A.L.P. members 
and non-A.L.P. members proved highly significant at the 5 
percent level; t = 2,19. Likewise, among the white-collar 
officials, the difference in class identity achieved even 
higher levels of significance; t = 5.39, p < .001. 
It might be expected that class identity would be stronger 
for union leaders who were members of the communist or 
socialist parties than for those who were members of the 
A.L.P. or non-party members. This proved to be the case. 
For example, the mean score of union leaders who were mem-
bers of the communist and socialist parties on the scale of 
class identity was 45,67. This compares with mean scores 
of 39,75 and 39.78 respectively, of blue-collar and white-
collar union leaders who were members of the A.L.P. These 
differences, moreover, were statistically significant. For 
example, when communist and socialist union leaders were 
compared with blue-collar labor party union leaders the 
difference in scores reached significance at the .05 level; 
t = 2.23. These statistical differences v^ere even greater 
when such union leaders were comparcdwith white-collar, labor 
party union leaders reaching significance at the .01 level; 
t = 3,05. 
From these results, it would appear that the more radical 
the political party to which a union leader belongs, t!te 
stronger is his sense of class identity. Admittedly, in 
view of the fact that all of the union leaders who belonged 
to communist and socialist parties headed blue-collar unions. 
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it might be questioned whether the type of union influenced 
the level of cl ass identity. However, as we earlier saw, 
not only was there no statistical difference in class iden-
tity between A.L.P. affiliated blue-collar and white-collar 
unions in the sample, but the scores of the white-collar 
officials actually exceeded those of the blue-collar leaders. 
Finally, as far as the question of party loyalty is concerned, 
it should be noted that the A.L.P. was the preferred party of 
all the blue-collar union leaders who were not members of it -
apart from the handful of officials who were both members of, 
and politically-committed to one or other of the communist 
or socialist parties. By comparison, half of the white-
collar union leaders who were non-party members indicated a 
preference for the A.L.P. Of the remainder, one gave his 
political allegiance to the Liberal Party and the rest were 
uncommitted. 
Blue-collar union leaders in this sample, not surprisingly, 
scored slightly higher on the scale of class identity than 
white-collar officials with a mean score of 35.17 compared 
with 34.8. However, the difference between them (0.37) 
was much too small to be statistically significant; 
t = 0.12, p > .05. Characteristically, class identity 
was weakest among the white-collar group in the sample whose 
preferred political party was either the Liberal Party or 
who expressed no party preference at all. However, when 
compared with both the blue-collar and white-collar union 
officials in the sample whose preferred political party 
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was the A.L.P., statistical tests in both instances failed 
to reach significance; t = 1.36, p > .05; t = 1.64, p < .05 
respectively. Thus, while the level of class identity among 
union officials is closely associated with political party 
membership, as shown in Table 6.9, mere preference for the 
A.L.P. does not produce statistically significant differences 
in the officials' levels of class identity. 
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7. THE CONCEPT OF CLASS OPPOSITION 
Operational Definitions and Measurement 
A class perspective on industrial relations conventionally envis-
ages the employment relationship as a form of unequal exchange in 
v/hich those who purchase labour-power and determine the uses to 
which it is put comprise a dominant class, while those who sell 
their labour power and place it at the disposal of others con-
stitute a subordinate class (Crouch, 1977:7). Typically, the 
'inequality of the exchange' finds expression in an 'inequality 
of economic reward' and a relationship of power (Crouch, 1977: 8). 
The subjective implications of class exploitation receive perhaps 
their most basic articulation in the existence and activities of 
trade unions. Accordingly, the way that the employment relation-
ship is perceived by union leaders critically determines whether 
the existing economic and social arrangements are regarded as 
natural and inevitable or whether they are subjected to strong 
and unremitting ideological challenge. Clearly, therefore, the 
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degree of legitimacy assigned to the existing distribution of re-
wards (both within industry and the wider society) by trade union 
leaders is a basic determinant of the existence or not of an 
oppositional ideology. It follows from this that the degree of 
acceptance of the existing distribution of income by union leaders 
provides a very useful measure of their level of class opposition. 
Characteristically, trade union leadership attitudes toward the 
distribution of the overall social product between profits on the 
one hand and wages and salaries on the other have assumed consid-
erable significance in the context of the growing instability of 
Australian and, indeed, world capitalism. The impact of the 
recession is evident in the pressures exerted by employers and 
the state on union leaders to accept, among other things, restraint 
on workers' incomes. Within Australia, this strategy of shifting 
the burden for inflation on to workers finds expression in the 
concept of 'wage indexation'. The attitudes of union leaders to 
the question of pay restraint are thus centrally-relevant to any 
discussion of the level of class opposition. 
However, even more fundamental to the concept of class opposition 
are the attitudes of workers and their representatives to employ-
ers. Not so long ago, it was popular to argue that trade unions 
could be classified in terms of their attitudes toward employers. 
Specifically, manual trade unions were believed to be more likely 
to hold a systematic and developed oppositional ideology. In 
essence, this is presumed to derive from a greater awareness on 
the part of such unions that the deprivations of their members 
spring from the class nature of society and require collective 
struggle to alter it. 
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By contrast, non-manual unions are widely perceived to lack the 
acute awareness of their blue-collar counterparts of the conflict 
of interests which exists between employers and all workers -
regardless of status differentiation. But whether or not a con-
flict orientation is the exclusive property of manual workers, 
what is undeniable is that such an orientation is a vital indicator 
of class opposition. 
Another important measure of class opposition among Australian 
trade union leaders is to be found in their attitudes to arbitration, 
The system of compulsory arbitration which lays down the broad 
principles whereby labour power is sold and put to work has become 
something of a sacred cow in Australian society. Indeed, whatever 
its critics might say, there is a pervasive mythology that the 
existence of the system serves as a guarantee of justice and equity 
in the settlement of industrial disputes between employers and 
employees. Yet, what is particularly noteworthy about arbitration, 
as many observers have noted, is the intrinsically-coercive nature 
of the system. For example, its widespread powers include the 
power to extend or withhold recognition of trade unions with all 
that such actions imply for trade union structure and growth. 
Above all, the legally-binding nature of arbitral decisions serves 
as a powerful reminder that despite its 'voluntaristic' appearance, 
arbitration rulings have the force of law to sustain them. 
Although it is not without its advantages to the trade union move-
ment, the arbitration system in Australia has resulted in an in-
dustrial relations environment where decision-making is highly-
centralised. Most pertinently, however, from the standpoint of 
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class opposition, is the tendency for the arbitration system to 
render the prerogatives of management sacrosanct. Typically, as 
its many critics have observed, the arbitration system acts to 
suppress or neutralise any fundamental challenges to the existing 
power relationships. 
Characteristically, implicit in the system of arbitration, is the 
idea that there are intrinsically 'two sides' to industry and that 
any resulting class conflict is resolvable within the present 
social order. Accordingly, any discussion of the level of class 
opposition among union leaders must crucially call into question 
the degree of their commitment to arbitration as the basic frame-
work for worker protest in Australia. Specifically, to meaning-
fully assess the extent of class-opposition among union leaders we 
need to determine their views concerning in whose interests the 
system of arbitration operates. 
Possibly, the most direct and recognised expression of class 
opposition from the forces of organised labour is the strike. 
Although the strike is acknowledged - even by critics of such 
action, to be a fundamental right of trade unions, nevertheless, 
the exercise of that right inevitably produces strong condemnation 
from the media and conservative politicians. Often, too, 
criticism comes from fellow unionists who are not directly in-
volved in the strike but who are nevertheless affected by it. 
Certainly, few countries have made a more determined effort to 
eliminate strikes than has Australia. Yet, despite an extensive 
network of arbitration tribunals designed to abolish the need for 
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them, strikes have stubbornly persisted. Not only have all 
attempts to outl aw strikes Tailed but even when strike action 
was subject to severe legal penalties, the Australian strike rate 
was one of the highest in the world. Generally, this trend has 
continued, leading one writer to suggest a few years ago that 
'Australian strike figures are such that no militant unionist 
need hang his head in international company'. (Martin, 1975:128) 
Central to the notion of class opposition, of course, is the view 
that conflicts of interest exist between capital and labour and that 
such conflicts are a pervasive feature of capitalist society. 
Certainly, trade unions have to present an industrial challenge 
to employers if they are ever going to achieve their demands. 
To this extent, a conflict perspective characterises any trade 
union with pretensions to legitimacy. Although strikes are the 
most visible expression of this conflict of interest between em-
ployers and workers, it is also clear that the capitalist frame-
work in which Western trade unions normally operate constrains 
the possibilities of oppositional activity. Yet, what is also 
plainly-evident is that in the final analysis the limiting con-
sequences of the 'industrial relations' environment critically 
depend on the degree to which trade unions and, especially their 
leaders, continue to accept the prevailing situation as a durable 
framework for action. 
To measure class opposition among trade union leaders, we sought 
to tap their attitudes toward the Tour dimensions oT the employ-
ment relationship which we have identified. Specifically, the 
union leaders surveyed were presented with a questionnaire 
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containing fourteen Likert-type items which sought to measure 
their attitudes to employers, to arbitration, to the distribution 
of the social product between capital and labour and, finally, to 
strikes (see Appendix 7 for a list of the preliminary scale 
items). Union leaders were asked to record their degree of agree-
ment or disagreement with these items in four response categories. 
The items were then scored from 1 to 4, and added to give each 
respondent's overall score on the scale. 
Following item analysis of the responses, eleven items were used 
in the final scale on the basis of selecting those items with the 
highest t-values (see Appendix 7). The eleven items comprising 
the class opposition scale are as follows: 
'Wage and salary earners in Australia receive a fair 
return from employers for their efforts.' 
'The share of the National Income between profits 
on the one hand, and wages and salaries on the other 
has become more fair.' 
'Most employers would be a lot happier if trade 
unions did not exist.' 
'Arbitration is preferable to collective bargain-
ing with individual employers.' 
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'Most private employers are more concerned with 
making profits than with their employees' well-
being . ' 
'In the main, the Arbitration System serves the 
interests of employers better than it serves the 
interests of trade unions.' 
'Industrial action generally ensures unions of 
more favourable decisions from the Arbitration 
of their grievances.' 
'Generally speaking, workers can improve their 
conditions without going on strike.' 
'Strikes unnecessarily antagonise employers and 
delay the improvements workers are seeking.' 
'Industrial action on the part of trade unions 
should be confined to work place issues.' 
'Wage and salary restraint is necessary if 
Australia's current economic, difficulties are 
to be overcome.' 
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ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Class opposition and type of union 
In considering the overall levels of class opposition, it 
is useful to examine the differences in scores between the 
leaders of the different types of trade union in the sample, 
The distribution of scores as well as the mean scale scores 
for the sample are shown in Table 7.1. 
TABLE 7.1 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS OPPOSITION BY 
TYPE OF UNION 
Type of 
Union 
DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES {%) 
19-23 24-28 29-33 34-38 39-43 N Mean Score 
Blue-Collar 18 30 21 15 33 31.06 
White-Collar 7 43 43 0 28 28.53 
Significance of the difference between the Means: t = 1.63 p > .05 
* Due to the approximations involved in rounding to 
whole nimhevs the percentage does not sum to 
exactly 100. 
Since there were eleven items in the scale and four response 
categories for each item giving a possible range from 4 to 
44, it is noteworthy that while the scores of the blue-collar 
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officials in the sample ranged from 20 to 43 with a median 
score of 30, the white-collar scores ranged from 22 to 37 
with a median score of 28.5. Further, while more than a 
third of the manual union leaders scored 34 or higher on 
the scale of class opposition with nearly a half of these in 
turn achieving a score of 39 or better, only a tiny fraction 
of the non-manual scores on the scale exceeded 33 points. 
In fact, nearly all the non-manual scores on the scale fell 
between 24 and 33 compared with less than half of the manual 
scores. Blue-collar union leaders, then, scored on average 
higher than their white-collar counterparts - both in terms 
of their median scores as we have seen, and in terms of their 
mean scores as shown in Table V. 1. In the latter case, the 
mean for the blue-collar group was 31.06 compared with 28.53 
for the white-collar group. 
However, while this suggests that class opposition was 
stronger among manual than among non-manual union leaders, 
a statistical test of the difference between the means 
failed to reach significance; t = 1.64, p > .05. The fact 
that there is no significant difference in class opposition 
between the different types of trade union suggests that 
similar factors are likely to be at work and indicates the 
need to examine other aspects of union organisation in or-
der to determine whether pronounced differences in class 
opposition exist between the leaderships of manual and non-
manual trade unions. The importance of this last point is 
clear when we consider the two types of trade union in terms 
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of their various forms of affiliation. 
Union affiliation with the A.C.T.U. and A.L.P. 
As we have seen, trade unions in Australia differ in a great 
number of respects. However, a key distinction between 
Australian unions is between those unions which are affil-
iated with the central inter-union body viz. the A.C.T.U., 
and those which remain outside of it. Typically, affil-
iation with the A.C.T.U. is presumed to signify identification 
with the wider trade union movement - a step some would see as 
indicative of increased 'unionateness' on the part of a trade 
union. 
In fact, in terms of the typology of 'unionateness' formulated 
by Blackburn and his colleagues at Cambridge University, 
affiliation with the central inter-union organisation like 
the T.U.C. or, in Australian terms, the A.C.T.U., represents 
the penultimate step on the continuum of unionateness. As 
conceptualised by these writers, this form of affiliation is 
a key dimension of what they term 'society unionateness' 
which they claim embodies a recognition by the union of the 
community of interest it shares with other unions and which 
is manifested in the willingness to ally itself with them. 
In addition, 'society unionateness' as these writers view it, 
entails a perception on the part of the union of the differ-
ences of interest which exist between employers and itself. 
As a consequence, we might expect affiliation with the 
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A.C.T.U. to be associated with heightened levels of both 
class identity and class opposition. Table 7.2 examines 
the effect on class opposition of union affiliation with 
the A.C.T.U. 
TABLE 7.2 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS OPPDSITION BY 
UNION AFFILIATION AND TYPE OF UNION 
Affiliation 
TYPE OF UNION 
Blue-Collar 
Mean Score 
White-Collar 
Mean Score 
Significance 
of difference 
of Means 
A.C.T.U. 
Non-A.C.T.U. 
31.06 
(N::33) 
28.6 
28.18 
(N=27) 
t = 1.23 
p > .05 
t = 1.26 
p > .05 
As the table indicates, class opposition was stronger among 
leaders of blue-collar unions which were affiliated with 
the A.C.T.U. than among white-collar union officials gener-
ally. Such differences, however, were not statistically 
significant. What is perhaps more surprising is that when 
we compare the leaders of white-collar unions which are 
affiliated with the A.C.T.U. with those which are not, we 
find that their levels of class opposition are virtually 
identical. Clearly, therefore, for the union leaders in 
our sample, affiliation with the A.C.T.U. per se is not 
associated with significant differences in class opposition, 
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All of this suggests that identification with the wider 
labour movement - symbolised for example, by affiliation 
with the A.L.P., may be an even more sensitive indicator 
of class opposition than affiliation with the A.C.T.U. 
or the fact of being a manual or non-manual trade union. 
As earlier indicated, affiliation with the A.C.T.U. does 
not necessarily carry the same explicit ideological im-
plications for political action in support of group 
interests as does affiliation with the A.L.P. 
It is relevant in this context to note that affiliation 
with the A.L.P. represents the ultimate stage in the 
continuum of 'unionateness' and constitutes one of the 
most important dimensions of 'society unionateness'. As 
we saw earlier, there are important differences between 
trade unions which are affiliated with the A.L.P. and 
those whose affiliation is with the A.C.T.U. only. 
The extent to which such differences are reflected in 
the attitudes of the leaders of these unions is shown 
in Table 7.3. 
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TABLE 7.3 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS OPPOSITION 
BY UNION AFFILIATION AND TYPE OF UNION 
Affiliation 
Blue-Collar 
Mean Score 
White-Collar 
Mean Score 
Significance 
of difference 
of Means 
A.L.P. and 
A.C.T.U. 
A.C.T.U. only 
31.63 
25.33 
(Nr33) 
30.28 
27.7 
(N=17) 
t - 0.53; p > .05 
t - 0.39; p > .05 
Significance 
of difference 
of Means 
t = 1,66; p > .05. t = 1.35; p > .05 
Not surprisingly, within the sample, class opposition was 
much stronger among the leaders of trade unions which were 
affiliated with the A.L.P. than among those whose unions 
were affiliated only with the A.C.T.U. Typically, moreover, 
class opposition was strongest among the leaders of blue-
collar unions which were affiliated with the A.L.P. 
Paradoxically, however, among the unions affiliated only 
with the A.C.T.U., class opposition was slightly stronger 
among the leaders of the white-collar unions rather than 
the blue-collar unions. In general, the type of af^'iliation 
of the unions was more important for the strength of class 
opposition among their leaders than was the fact of being a 
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blue-collar or white-collar trade union. For example, the 
differences in class opposition between leaders of blue-
collar and white-collar unions affiliated with the A.L.P. 
were very slight as, indeed, were the differences between 
leaders of such unions which were affiliated with the A.C.T.U. 
Needless to say, such differences were not statistically 
significant. 
Likewise, while the differences within both blue and white 
collar unions affiliated with the A.L.P. and those affil-
iated with the A.C.T.U. alone were substantially higher than 
the manual/non-manual differences when affiliation was con-
trolled, nevertheless, the inter-union differences also 
proved not to be statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. In fact, even statistical comparison of the differ-
ence in class opposition between leaders of blue-collar 
A.L.P. affiliated unions and their white-collar counterparts 
heading unions affiliated with the A.C.T.U. only failed to 
reach significance: t = 1.82; p > .05. 
Union size 
One of the most elementary and visible differences between 
trade unions, as earlier noted, are differences in size. In 
seeking to explore the implications of union size for the 
strength of an oppositional ideology among union leaders, 
it must be borne in mind that the size of union membership 
may have important ramifications for the overall strength of 
the union as well as for the degree of control the leadership 
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is able to exercise over the rank-and-file. Table 7.4 shows 
the effects of union size on class opposition among union 
leaders. 
TABLE 7.4 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS OPPOSITION BY 
SIZE AND TYPE OF UNION 
Size 
Blue-Collar 
Mean Score 
White-Collar 
Mean Score 
Significance 
of the difference 
of Means 
Under 5,000 
5,000-14,999 
15,000 + 
30.8 
32.33 
29.17 
(Nr33) 
29.0 
28.14 
28.12 
(Nr28) 
t = 0.89; p > .05 
t = 1.68: p > .05 
t = 0.65; p > .05 
As we can see from the table, except for leaders of medium-
sized blue-collar unions, there was a tendency for class 
opposition to decline with size of union membership. Predict-
ably, class opposition was stronger among the manual rather 
than the non-manual union leaders. Again, the greatest 
difference was between the leaders of medium-sized blue-collar 
and white-collar trade unions. However, it is also relevant 
to note, that when union size is controlled for, the differ-
ences between the leaders of blue-collar and white-collar 
unions failed to reach significance at the 5 percent level. 
This suggests that broadly-similar factors are likely to be 
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at work in producing this result. 
There is some evidence for this belief when we take into 
account the affiliation of unions with bodies such as the 
A.C.T.U. As we might expect, the existence of formal 
links with the A.C.T.U. is associated with clear differences 
in class opposition (see Table 7.5). 
TABLE 7.5 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS OPPOSITION BY 
SIZE, AFFILIATION AND TYPE OF UNION 
Blue-Collar White-Collar 
Size A.C.T.U. Non-A.C.T.U. A.C.T.U. Non-A.C.T.U. 
Mean Score Mean Score Mean Score Mean Score 
Under 5,000 30.8 0 29.11 28.75 
5,000-14,999 32.33 0 29.33 27.4 
15,000 + 29.17 0 28.7 26.0 
(N=33) (N=0) (Nzl7) (N:rlO) 
For example, for the trade unions in the sample, class 
opposition was weakest among the leaders of white-collar 
unions which were not affiliated with the A.C.T.U. Since 
all the blue-collar unions in the sample were affiliated 
with the A.C.T.U. comparisons cannot be made within the 
blue-collar group in order to explore the general influence 
of affiliation on class opposition when union size is 
controlled. 
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Again, as the table indicates except for the leaders of 
medium-sized unions affiliated with the A.C.T.U., there was 
a definite tendency for class opposition to weaken with 
union size. This finding is highly-interesting in view of 
the common accusation made by the media and conservative 
politicians about leaders of large, powerful unions 'holding 
the country to ransom'. 
While the greatest differences in class opposition were be-
tween the leaders of blue-collar unions which were affiliated 
with the A.C.T.U. and the leaders of the white-collar unions 
which were not, even the biggest difference between the two 
groups viz. those heading medium-sized unions was, when sub-
jected to statistical testing found to be not significant; 
t = 1.42; p > .05. 
Needless to say, the differences between the leaders of 
manual and non-manual unions which were affiliated with 
the A.C.T.U. were almost non-existent in the cases of the 
small and large unions in the sample. However, even among 
the medium-sized A.C.T.U. affiliates, the difference in 
class opposition between their leaders was not statistically 
significant; t = 1.0; p > .05. Perhaps the most inter-
esting feature of the table is that the differences in class 
opposition within the white-collar group between those 
affiliated with the A.C.T.U. and those not, were much the 
same as between the white-collar group and blue-collar group 
which were affiliated with the A.C.T.U. Bearing in mind 
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that all of the white-collar group in the sarrple which were 
not affiliated with the A.C.T.U. were however affiliated 
with one or other of the major white-collar union federations 
like A.C.S.P.A., perhaps the result is not so surprising 
after all. 
Social backgrounds of union leaders and class 
opposition 
Since class opposition is likely to be influenced far more 
directly by the life experiences and political outlooks of 
the union leaders themselves than by the type and institution-
al links of the organisations they lead, we set out in this 
section to explore the influences of a number of social back-
ground factors on the class ideologies of the officials in 
the sample. Table 7.6 shows the effects of age on class 
opposition. 
TABLE 7.6 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE DF CLASS OPPOSITION BY AGE 
Age 
Blue-Collar 
Mean Score 
White-Collar 
Mean Score 
Significance 
of difference 
of Means 
51 and under 
Over 51 
32.2 
31.07 
(N=30) 
29.1 
27.33 
(N=28) 
t = 1 .73; p > .05 
t = 0 .36 ; p > .05 
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Contrary to the prevailing business and media stereotypes 
of older trade union leaders having rigid, inflexible, 
class antagonistic outlooks, what is noteworthy about the 
union leaders in the sample is that there is a noticeable 
drop in class opposition as age increases. Among this 
group, class opposition is strongest among blue-collar 
union officials aged up to fifty-one years and weakest 
among white-collar leaders aged above fifty-one years. 
Within both age categories, i.e. those aged 51 and less 
and those aged above 51, class opposition was markedly 
stronger among the blue-collar leaders than among the 
white-collar leaders. The differences, however, as shown 
in Table 7.6 were not statistically significant at the five 
percent level. 
Since the formulation by Michels' of his 'iron law of 
oligarchy', a prolonged period in office by a union leader 
has been presumed to result in a lessening of class antagon-
istic ideology. As Michels' saw it, extended incumbency 
in union office eroded commitment to fundamental social 
change; as union leaders developed the aptitudes necessary 
for bargaining successfully with employers over the distri-
bution of rewards to labour, their orientations shifted, 
according to Michels', from seeking to transform the exist-
ing social order to working within it. Whether the length 
of time they have held their present positions is associated 
with growing 'conservatism' as suggested by Michels' thesis 
is explored in Table 7.7. 
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TABLE 7.7 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS OPPOSITION 
BY LENGTH OF TIME A UNION LEADER 
Time in 
present 
position 
Blue-Collar 
Mean Score 
White-Collar 
Mean Score 
Significance 
of difference 
by Means 
5 years and 
under 
Over 5 and 
under 10 
Over 10 
31.4 
29.89 
31.67 
(N=33) 
28.47 
28.86 
28.0 
t =1.45; p > .05 
t =0.54; p > .05 
t =0.75; p > .05 
In fact, what we find is that the length of time they have 
been in office made little difference to the strength of 
class opposition of the union leaders in our sample. 
Further, although class opposition was stronger among manual 
union leaders than among non-manual union leaders, the differ-
ences were not statistically significant. In sum, then, not 
only are the attitudes of opposition remarkably similar but 
for the union leaders in our sample, anti-employer sentiment 
has not diminished the longer that they have remained in 
office. 
However, it is not merely the length of time that union lead-
ers have held their positions that is thought to lessen their 
class antipathies toward employers. Rather, the presumed 
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'conservatism' of union officials is also believed to be 
strongly associated with the type of income that they enjoy 
which, in turn, permits a life-style similar more to employ-
ers and their representatives than to their own rank-and-
file. The question of whether size of income produces a 
lowering of class opposition among trade union leaders is 
examined in Table 7.8. 
TABLE 7.S LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS OPPOSITION 
BY INCOME 
Blue-Collar White-Collar 
Mean Score Mean Score 
Under $8,000 31.89 0 
$8-$9,999 31.0 29.25 
$10-$14,999 30.3 28.92 
$15,000 + 30.0 27.82 
(N=33) (N=28) 
Again, as Table 7.8 shows, there was a tendency for class 
opposition to decline slightly with increased income among 
the union leaders in our sample. This trend applied 
equally to leaders of manual and non-manual trade unions. 
Further, although at each income level, class opposition was 
stronger among blue-collar officials than white-collar 
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officials, such differences were too marginal to be statis-
tically significant. For example, even in the case of 
union leaders earning above $15,000 p.a. where the difference 
in class opposition was greatest, statistical tests of this 
difference failed to reach significance: t = 0.47; p > .05. 
Likewise, although a composite measure of 'oligarchy' such 
as income and length of time a union leader might be expect-
ed to have an effect on class opposition, as we saw in the 
case of class identity no clear trends emerge from such a 
table and consequently, we shall not reproduce it here but 
go on to examine the effects of political party membership 
on attitudes of class opposition among the union leaders in 
the sample. 
TABLE 7.9 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS OPPOSITION BY 
POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP 
Party 
Blue-Collar 
Mean Score 
White-Collar 
Mean Score 
Significance 
of difference 
of Means 
A.L.P. 
Non-A.L.P. 
Communist/ 
Socialist 
30.4 
30.0 
39.4 
(N=33) 
29.28 
27.55 
0 
(N=27) 
t = 0.46; p > .05 
t = 1.39; V > .05 
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As the table indicates, class opposition was stronger among 
union officials who were members of the A.L.P. than among 
those who were not. Predictably, the strongest levels of 
class opposition were to be found among the leaders who were 
members of one or other of the Communist or Socialist Parties 
of Australia. These officials, it must be pointed out, were 
all leaders of blue-collar trade unions. Characteristically, 
the only statistically significant differences in class 
opposition were to be found among the leaders of unions who 
were members of the communist and socialist parties and those 
who were not. For example, the difference in class opposition 
between these officials and the blue-collar A.L.P. group reached 
statistical significance when tested; t = 2.64, p < .05. 
The difference was much greater when communist-socialist union 
officials were compared with the A.L.P. non-manual union officials; 
t = 4.63, p < .001. 
As might be expected, such differences between the communist-led 
unions and both the A.L.P. and non-A.L.P. led unions in the sample 
remained high when party preference was taken into account (Table 
7 .10). 
293, 
TABLE 7.10 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS OPPOSITION BY 
POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE 
Party preference Blue-Collar White-Collar 
Mean Score Mean Score 
A.L.P. 30.2 28.96 
Non-A.L.P. 0 26.6 
Communist/Socialist 39.7 0 
(N=33) (N=27) 
As Table 7.10 shows, all the manual union officials in the 
sample gave the A.L.P. or one or other of the communist 
parties as their preferred party. By contrast, while the 
A.L.P. was the preferred party of the overwhelming major-
ity of white-collar union officials, the rest were politic-
ally-uncommitted - apart from the lone Liberal Party 
white-collar union official who has been excluded from the 
table. Party preference as can be seen from the table 
makes little difference to the strength of class opposition 
among the union leaders in the sample over that recorded 
for party membership (see Table 7.9). Again, the major 
differences in class opposition were between the communist 
and socialist-led unions and the rest. For example, the 
difference between such unions and the blue-collar, A.L.P. 
supporting unions in the sample was statistically significant; 
t = 2.66, p < .05. It was even more so, when communist-led 
294, 
and white-collar A.L.P. supporting unions were concerned; 
t = 4.99, p < .001. 
Such results, however, should occasion no great surprise. 
Given the nature of their party ideologies, it is natural 
to expect class opposition to be strongest among communist 
trade union officials. Rather, what is interesting is 
that there is no statistically-significant difference in 
class opposition between the A.L.P. supporting blue-collar 
unions in the sample and the presumably politically-neutral 
white-collar unions; t = 1.3, p > .05. 
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8. THE CONCEPT OF CLASS ALTERNATIVE 
Operational Definitions and Method of Analysis 
The themes of industrial democracy, worker participation and worker 
control have received much discussion and varying amounts of sup-
port and criticism within and outside the trade union movement in 
recent years. There is little doubt that in this discussion, 
many of the critical issues relating to trade union and workers' 
struggles have involved in one way or another the question of demo-
cratic control over the workplace. 
Characteristically, the concept of 'industrial democracy' is one 
which evokes widespread support in many quarters. For many employ-
ers, the involvement (albeit, limited) of employees in the process 
of decision-making in the workplace is viewed as a positive means 
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of integrating them more closely into the enterprise by enhancing 
their identification with managerial goals. Likewise, many 
social reformers see in industrial democracy the means whereby 
both managerial authoritarianism and worker alienation may be 
curbed. Even elements of the 'New Left' have generally regarded 
industrial democracy with favour - envisaging it as a key instru-
ment for achieving the goal of the workers' control of industry. 
The centrality of job control issues to the concept of class alter-
native is clearly indicated by the degree to which much of industrial 
conflict involves not simply wage demands but problems arising from 
changes in work methods, the introduction of new technology as well 
as the intensification of the pace of work and structural unemploy-
ment. Accordingly, any meaningful notion of class alternative must 
take into account the extent to which ideas of workers having a say 
in questions of working conditions and investment decisions of in-
dustry are salient concerns for the individuals in question. 
It has been a perennial criticism of Australian radicals that 
Australian trade union officials have succumbed to the pressures 
for co-optation and have changed into technocrats interested only 
in gaining a greater share for labour in the existing system. 
Certainly, under the leadership of Bob Hawke, the main trade union 
central organisation, the A.C.T.U. embarked upon a wide range of 
commercial enterprises stretching from a retail store to holiday 
travel and petrol discounting. These manifestations of union 
capitalism were seen by many as another avenue for trade unionists 
to compete with (hopefully, successfully) some of the agencies of 
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private enterprise. Accordingly, in setting out to investigate 
the extent of radical alternative orientations among trade union 
leaders, their attitudes to the business ventures launched by the 
trade union movement are clearly important. 
A much more direct indicator of alternative ideologies, however, 
is the perception of union leaders of the 'proper' role of the 
unions. Here the key issue is whether the major energies of the 
unions should be devoted to obtaining better wages and conditions 
for their members even if this means leaving entirely the running 
of the workplace to management. Clearly, too, any alternative 
conception of work relations needs to address the nature of the 
participation of employees in the running of the workplace. To 
begin with, is such participation to be confined purely to staff 
matters such as employee safety, health and welfare or should such 
workers also have a say in policy formulation for the enterprise 
by sitting on its Board of Directors. 
Most importantly, the notion of a radical shift in the way 
industry is run would seem to call into guestion the extent to 
which enterprises should be reguired to disclose details of their 
commercial operations to their employees. Finally, of course, 
central to the idea of job control is the degree to which employees 
are able to constrain managerial attempts to unilaterally alter the 
way work is organised and performed. 
Clearly, however, worker radicalism entails more than support for 
changes in the authority relations within the workplace. 
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Fundamental to the concept of class alternative, in fact, is the 
conception of an alternative economic and, indeed, social order. 
Accordingly, any coherent conception of an alternative system 
intrinsically involves a fundamental restructuring - not simply 
of the authority relations of the existing social order but also 
its property relations. 
Characteristically, it is a conventional wisdom that class conflict 
has been 'institutionalised'. In effect, so the argument goes, 
even the most radical of trade unions despite their militancy and 
anti-employer rhetoric cannot avoid integration into the capital-
ist system. There is no denying that the capitalist context in 
which trade union demands are framed profoundly affects both the 
nature of their goals and the manner in which they are pursued. 
Indeed, trade union structure itself basically reflects the con-
tours of the capitalist division of labour. 
Certainly, the sectional and essentially reactive character of 
the trade unions should occasion little surprise. Yet, while 
trade union action may be curtailed by the institutional context 
in which such organisations typically function it does not auto-
matically follow from this that organised labour accepts the 
existing framework as a permanent state of reality. Accordingly, 
to explore the existence of alternative concepts among union 
leaders, it is necessary to examine the degree to which the 
property relations of Australian society are radically called in-
to question by them. 
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The sense of 'class alternative' among trade union leaders was 
rreasured by means of a Likert scale. What we did was to present 
the officials with a number of statements relating to control 
over the workplace and to private property. On this initial 
list of twelve items, the respondents were asked to indicate 
their degree of agreement on a four point scale. 
Following item analysis of the responses, nine items were selected 
to form the final scale of class alternative on the basis of the 
level of their t-scores (see Appendix 8). The nine items which 
went to make up the composite measure of 'class alternative' are 
as follows: 
'The economic prosperity of Australia depends upon 
a more vigorous expansion of private enterprise.' 
'Large scale private foreign investment is in the 
best interests of Australia's economic development.' 
'Private ownership of Australia's natural resources 
should be nationalised.' 
'Private business companies should be allowed to 
grow as large as they can.' 
'Replacing the private ownership of the means of 
production by public ownership is of little rele-
vance to the Australia that exists today.' 
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'Trade unions should devote their energies to 
getting better wages and working conditions for 
their members and leave the running of the work-
place to management.' 
'Private and nationalised industries should be 
legally required to furnish their workers with 
full details of their operations, subject to 
reasonable security safeguards.' 
'Managerial proposals concerning any alterations 
in the staffing, speed, or content of work 
should be implemented, while workers objections 
to them are being put through the grievance 
procedures. ' 
'Pending union agreement, no proposed management 
change which affects employees should be intro-
duced. ' 
Since there were nine items in the final class alternative 
scale and four response categories for each item, the scores 
on the scale have a possible range from 9 to 36, indicating 
low and high orientations toward the idea of class alternative, 
301 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Class alternative and type of union 
To obtain a picture of the general sense of class alter-
native, it is necessary to begin by examing the differences 
in scores between the leaders of the different types of 
trade unions. Table 8.1 reports on the score distributions 
and mean scale scores for the blue-collar and white-collar 
union leaders in the sample. 
TABLE 8.1 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS ALTERNATIVE 
BY TYPE OF UNION 
Type of 
Union 
DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES (%) 
16-22 23-29 30-36 Mean Score 
Blue-Collar 12 52 36 33 2 8 . 6 
White-Collar 54 39 28 27.9 
Significance of difference of Means t = 0.58; p > .05 
As we can see from the table, more than half the scores of 
both the manual and non-manual union leaders fell into the 
23-29 range. Apart from the similarity in their modal 
scores, the table shows that more than a third of both 
groups achieved a score of 30 or better on the scale. 
302. 
In fact, on the scale with a possible score range from 9 to 
36, the non-manual scores ranged from the midpoint on the 
scale to the maximum possible score, i.e. from 18 to 36. 
Likewise, the manual scores ranged from just above the mid-
point scale score to the maximum possible score, i.e. from 
20 to 36. 
Further, while the mean scale score achieved by the blue-
collar officials was slightly higher than that recorded for 
the white-collar group, the difference was too small to be 
statistically-significant; t = 0.58; p > .05. Contrary 
therefore to the assumption certain variants of the 'new 
working class' thesis, a sense of class alternative has not 
been shown to be stronger among the non-manual than among 
the manual union officials in our sample. To these new 
working class theorists, it was, of course, the technically-
trained workers in the most advanced and automated sectors 
of the economy among whom the vision of an alternative 
society is more likely to develop and flourish. 
Basically, the logic of this argument is that since such 
workers occupy strategic locations within the labour process 
where issues of control and alienation are most readily 
apparent, their protests are much less likely to be defused 
within the conventional economistic bargaining framework. 
In fact, as mentioned, it is among these groups rather than 
the traditional manual workers that the concern with alter-
native systems of industrial and societal control is 
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expected to be most evident. The character of employment 
in the technologically-advanced and automated areas of indus-
try suggests that the trade unions formed by engineers, 
technicians, computer experts and other 'white-collar' special-
ists will generally tend to be small. The effects of union 
size on the leaders' sense of class alternative are examined 
in Table 8.2. 
Union size 
T A B L E 8 . 2 L E A D E R S H I P SCORES ON THE S C A L E OF C L A S S A L T E R N A T I V E BY 
S I Z E AhD T Y P E OF UNION 
Blue-Collar White-Collar Difference in 
Size I. r- Means Mean Score Mean Score 
Under 5,000 28.93 28.0 0.93 
5,000-14,999 28.25 28.0 0.25 
15,000 + 28.33 27.57 0.76 
(N=33) (Nz28) 
As shown by the table, neither the size nor the type of 
union made much difference to the sense of class alternative 
among the union leaders in the sample. Indeed, if anything, 
alternative orientations tended to be slightly stronger among 
the blue-collar officials than among their white-collar 
counterparts. More importantly, the differences within 
blue-collar and white-collar unions of different sizes are 
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almost the same as the differences between them. It is, of 
course, possible that other characteristics of trade unions 
apart from membership size could influence the development 
of an ideology among union leaders which emphasises a strong 
orientation to issues of control rather than to the quanti-
tative economic issues typical of much of 'industrial 
relations' . 
As mentioned earlier, one of the most important institution-
al ties to be found among trade unions in Australia is affil-
iation with the A.C.T.U. How this affects leadership ideo-
logies is shown in Table 8,3. 
Union affiliation with the A.C.T.U. and A.L .P. 
TABLE 8.3 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS ALTERNATIVE BY 
UNION AFFILIATION 
Affiliation 
Blue-Collar White^Collar Difference in 
li r M r Means 
Mean Score Mean Score 
A .C .T .U . 28.61 28,94 0.33 
Non-A.C.T.U. 0 27.1 
(Nz33) (N=27) 
It is interesting to note that among the leaders of trade 
unions affiliated with the A .C .T .U . , the white-collar 
officials outscore their blue-collar counterparts on the 
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attitude scale by the narrowest of margins. Likewise, of 
the white-collar organisations not affiliated with the 
A.C.T.U., all but one were affiliated with one or other of 
the main white-collar trade union federations like A.C.S.P.A. 
This possibly explains why the scale scores of this group of 
union officials although lower than either the manual or non-
manual groups affiliated with the A.C.T.U. were not 
statistically-different. For example, comparing the scores 
of the white-collar, non-A.C.T.U. group with the blue-collar 
A.C.T.U. group in the sample yielded the following result; 
t = 0.93, p > .05. Although the difference in white-collar 
scores between those affiliated with the A.C.T.U. and those 
not affiliated was slightly higher, the difference was also 
not statistically-significant; t = 1.14, p > .05. 
Accordingly, as we have seen so far, neither union size or 
union affiliation with the A.C.T.U. is associated with 
marked differences in alternative ideologies among the leaders 
of the trade unions in our sample. It might be expected, 
however, that a sense of class alternative encompassing both 
the idea of democratic control of industry and public owner-
ship will be much stronger among trade unions which are 
politically-partisan than among those who are not. The for-
mal expression of this political partisanship among 
Australian trade unions is trade union affiliation with the 
A.L.P. Since such affiliation suggests the seeking of 
changes which extend beyond the conventional wages and work-
ing conditions struggles, it is plausible to expect that 
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a f f i l i a t i o n w i t h the A . L . P . i s assoc ia ted w i th d i f f e r ences 
i n i d e o l o g i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n s among the union l eade r s . 
TABLE 8 . A LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS ALTERNATIVE 
BY UNION AFF I L IAT ION 
A f f i l i a t i o n 
B l u e -Co l l a r 
Mean Score 
Wh i te -Co l l a r 
Mean Score 
D i f f e rence i n 
Means 
A .L .P . and 
A.C.T.U. 
A.C.T.U. only 
28.63 
28.33 
(N=33) 
29.57 
28.5 
(N=17) 
-0.94 
-0.17 
The r e s u l t s are shown i n Table 8.4. What i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
noteworthy i s that the e f f e c t o f A . L .P . a f f i l i a t i o n on the 
sense o f c l a s s a l t e r na t i v e exh i b i t ed by the union o f f i c i a l s 
i n our sample i s f o r p r a c t i c a l and s t a t i s t i c a l purposes, 
qu i t e i n s i g n i f i c a n t . L ikewise , wh i le the d i f f e r ences be-
tween manual and non-manual union leaders were to , say the 
l e a s t , extremely sma l l , i t i s neverthe less i n t e r e s t i n g to 
note that the non-manual o f f i c i a l s manage to outscore t h e i r 
manual counterpar t s . 
S o c i a l backgrounds o f union leaders and c l a ss 
a l t e r n a t i v e 
To a l a rge ex tent , however, o r i e n t a t i o n s toward r a d i c a l 
s o c i a l change are l i k e l y to be i n f l uenced more d i r e c t l y by 
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attributes of the union leader in question - rather than by 
the nature of the organisation she/he leads. Character-
istically, given the implications of income for people's 
political outlooks, it is relevant to question whether the 
incomes of union officials are linked to differences in their 
levels of commitment to alternative social arrangements in 
industry and in the wider society (Table 8.5). 
TABLE 8.5 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS ALTERNATIVE 
BY INCOME 
Blue-Collar 
Mean Score 
White-Collar 
Mean Score 
Under $8,000 30 0 
$8-$9,999 28.1 28.5 
$10-$14,999 27.5 28.0 
$15,000 + 34.0 27.54 
(Nr33) (Nr28) 
As shown by Table 8.5, increasing income is associated with 
a slight decline in the strength of alternative ideologies 
among the union leaders in our sample. The apparent contra-
diction of this trend viz. the case of blue-collar union 
officials earning in excess of $15,000 per annum, comprises 
only one person and is thus hardly representative of the 
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category as a whole. Again, where direct comparisons are 
possible, it is notable that the white-collar union leaders 
have a slight edge over their blue-collar counterparts in 
terms of the strength of their orientations toward funda-
mental social change. Needless to say, the differences 
are far too tiny to be statistically significant. 
Since, trade union officials in their everyday activities 
are implicated in bargaining processes which legitimise the 
existence of capitalism, it is reasonable to question what 
effect the length of time a person has been a union leader 
has on his/her vision of an alternative social order. The 
results are outlined in Table 8.6. 
TABLE 8.6 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS ALTERNATIVE BY 
LENGTH OF TIME A UNION LEADER 
Blue-Collar 
Mean Score 
White-Collar 
Mean Score 
Difference in 
Means 
5 years and 
under 
28.8 
Over 5 and under 29.33 
10 years 
Over 10 years 27.55 
(N=33) 
27.53 
29.0 
27.5 
(Nr28) 
1.27 
0.33 
0.05 
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As indicated by the table, the sense of class alternative 
was strongest among the union leaders in the sample who 
had been in leadership positions in their unions for bet-
ween five and ten years. 
Overall, there was a tendency for conceptions of alternative 
social arrangements to decline with the length of time a 
union leader had been in office - though it must be stressed 
that the differences between officials who held office for 
less than five years and those who did so for more than ten 
years were marginal. More importantly, perhaps, there was 
virtually no difference in attitude between the manual and 
non-manual union officials who had been in leadership 
positions in their organisations for longer than five years. 
Further, although the sense of class alternative was strong-
er among the blue-collar officials who had been in office no 
more than five years was stronger than for similar white-
collar union leaders, the difference was not statistically 
significant; t = 0.76, p > .05. 
Characteristically, since income and length of time in 
office are partly related to age, it was decided to examine 
the effects of age upon the attitudes toward fundamental 
social change of the union leaders in the sample (see Table 
8 .7). 
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TABLE 8•7 LEADERSHIP SCORES DN THE SCALE OF CLASS ALTERNATIVE 
BY AGE 
Blue-Collar White-Collar Difference in 
Mean Score Mean Score 
51 years and 29.27 28.37 0.9 
under 
Over 51 years 29.1 26.89 2.21 
(N=33) (Nr28) 
As shown by the table, there was a general tendency for 
orientations toward alternative social arrangements in 
industry and society to decline with age - more so, in the 
case of the non-manual union officials than among the manual 
where there was virtually no difference in attitude between 
union leaders aged 51 or younger and those over 51 years of 
age. Likewise, the only substantial difference in outlook 
was between blue-collar and white-collar union leaders over 
51 years old, though here again this was tested and found 
to be not significant statistically; t = 1.19, p > .05. 
Naturally, the political allegiances of union leaders might 
be expected to have considerable impact on their ideological 
orientations. The extent to which political party member-
ship influences attitudes to fundamental social change is 
examined in Table 8.8. 
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TABLE 8.8 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS ALTERNATIVE 
BY POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP 
Party 
Blue-Collar 
Mean Score 
White-Collar 
Mean Score 
Difference in 
Means 
A.L.P. 
Non-A.L.P. 
Communist/ 
Socialist 
28.58 
27.33 
31.33 
(Nr33) 
28.94 
26.89 
0 
(N=27) 
-0.36 
0.44 
As indicated by the table, the scores for the blue-collar 
and white-collar union officials on the scale of class 
alternative were virtually identical. Predictably, unions 
in the sample whose leaders were members of the A.L.P. 
slightly outscored those whose leaders were not. 
Not surprisingly, communist-led trade unions in the sample 
had the strongest views on the need for an alternative 
social order. However, statistical tests of the differ-
ences between both communist and A.L.P. union officials and 
communist and non-A.L.P. union officials failed to reach 
significance. For example, between the communist-led and 
the A.L.P.-led blue-collar trade unions the result was as 
follows; t = 0.98, p > .05. Likewise, between the 
communist-led and the A.L.P.-led white-collar unions: 
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t = 0.98, p > .05. Rather, more surprisingly, there were 
no statistically-significant differences between the 
communist union officials in the sample and the non-A.L.P. 
union leaders, e.g. comparing the communist with the non-
A.L.P., white-collar union leaders yielded the following 
result; t = 1.06, p > .05. When compared with the non-
A.L.P. blue-collar union leaders, the result although 
marginally better was still not statistically significant; 
t = 1.17, p > .05. 
Much the same picture emerges when the party preferences of 
the union officials in the sample are taken into account 
(see Table 8.9). 
TABLE 8 . 9 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS ALTERNATIVE BY 
PARTY PREFERENCE 
Party 
Blue-Collar White-Collar 
Mean Score Mean Score 
A.L.P. 28.33 28.61 
Non-A.L.P. 0 26.25 
Communist/ 31.33 0 
Socialist 
(Nr33) (N=27) 
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As we can see, there is virtually no difference between the 
scale scores obtained for party membership and party affil-
iation. To begin with, and as already mentioned, all the 
blue-collar union officials in the sample except those 
supporting the communist or socialist parties gave the 
A.L.P. as their preferred party. Of the non-manual union 
officials, the majority gave the A.L.P. as their party of 
preference. Accordingly, the category 'non-A.L.P.' comprises 
essentially those union officials who did not indicate a 
party preference. Whether this group is genuinely politic-
ally uncommitted or not is impossible to say. What is note-
worthy about their responses to the various components of 
the attitude scale is that their scores are lower than for 
comparable A.L.P. supporting groups. Before going on to 
assess the results of our survey for theoretical claims 
about the nature of trade union leadership ideologies, it 
is necessary to consider one further line of theoretical 
argument viz. the presumed hold of the dominant ideas on 
the thinking of union officials. 
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TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP ATTITUDES; 
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR HEGEMONY 
REVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT 
Over the past decade or two, a minor theoretical industry within 
sociology has arisen to grapple with the question of the capacity 
of V/estern trade union movements to sustain a radical challenge to 
prevailing property and authority relations in the industries and 
societies of their respective countries. Although there is no 
denying the general tone of pessimism emanating from many of 
these analyses, an interesting feature of the whole debate is the 
unfavourable comparisons which might reasonably be drawn between 
the political dynamism of the French and Italian trade union move-
ments and the general political quiescence which characterises 
organised labour in much of the rest of the Western world. 
Certainly, it is within this context that many writers have 
attempted to account for the reformist and economistic tendencies 
within Western trade unions in terms of Gramsci's concept of 
'hegemony'. 
Basically, hegemony refers to the penetration of certain values and 
beliefs into the consciousness and behaviour of the vast majority 
of the population. As Gramsci argued, in the advanced Western 
nations, ruling class power rests predominantly on the consent of 
the mass of the people to its rule. In effect, therefore hegemony 
suggests the idea of class domination in society by means other 
than force. 
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Fundamentally, the ideological hegemony of the dominant class is 
reflected in the way in which the prevailing ideology regarding 
the nature of capitalist social arrangements becomes ingrained in 
the consciousness of workers and their industrial and political 
representatives. These dominant values legitimise the private 
ownership of the means of production, the organisation and 
operation of managerial authority, and the presumable 'mutual' 
interests of owners, managers and workers in the perpetuation of 
the system. Further, they serve to sustain an unproblematic 
conception of 'national interest', 'reasonable demands' and of the 
kinds of actions, e.g. strikes, which threaten these absolutes. 
Understandably, any discussion of hegemony essentially calls into 
question the extent to which the dominant value system manages to 
pierce the consciousness of subordinate groups in society. To 
those who envision the stability of Western societies in terms of 
the concept of 'hegemony', there is little doubt that the ruling 
ideas are deeply-entrenched into the thinking of these groups. 
Yet, while hegemony connotes the systematic though not necessarily, 
overt, engineering of mass consent to the established order, it 
does not imply wholesale acceptance of such ideas by workers or 
the leaders of their organisations. 
Certainly, as many hegemonic theorists would readily acknowledge 
the influence of the 'ruling culture' although pervasive is not 
absolute. Notwithstanding this, the basic implication of the very 
idea of hegemony is that the essential aspects of the ruling 
culture receive widespread endorsement throughout society. 
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METHODOLOGICAL P R O B L E M S 
Central to any attempt to empirically investigate hegemonic in-
fluences within the trade union movement is the problem of deter-
mining exactly how much union support for the dominant ideas is 
necessary in order to accept or reject the claims that are 
advanced. Since there are very few guidelines on what constitutes 
an appropriate level of support for the ruling ideas, clearly any 
chosen level is bound to be arbitrary and subject to dispute. 
Yet, insofar as our concern is with empirically assessing the 
effects of the dominant ideas on the outlooks of the leadership of 
organised labour, the problem of measurement is critical to the 
investigation. 
Since even the most ardent protagonists of the hegemony thesis do 
not go so far as to claim complete support for the ruling ideas, 
it is clearly inappropriate to either expect or require 100 per-
cent trade union leader endorsement of the dominant value system. 
Simultaneously, however, it is equally plain that the notion of 
hegemony connotes not simple majority support but substantial, in-
deed, overwhelming support. 
Accordingly, it might plausibly be argued that support for the 
hypothesis that trade union leadership thinking essentially reflects 
the influence of the dominant ideology requires at least about 75 
percent acceptance of key elements of the dominant value system in 
relation to the particular issue in question. Undeniably, such a 
level of acceptance would constitute 'substantial' support, thereby 
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lending credibility to the notion of a 'ruling' culture. 
To substantiate the claims that trade union leadership ideologies 
reflect the influence of the dominant value system we would there-
fore expect to uncover somewhere in the vicinity of 75 percent 
trade union leadership support for such values in relation to 
selected aspects of the capital-labour relationship. That is to 
say, support of this order of magnitude for the dominant ideas 
should exist in relation to: 
i) the purposes of trade unions and trade union activities 
like strikes; 
ii) the institutional framework in which industrial and 
political relations in Australia are set and; 
iii) the property relations which prevail in Australian 
society and the authority relations in industry to 
which they give rise. 
SOME DOMINANT THEMES IN THE RULING CULTURE 
Hegemony, as we have seen, essentially refers to a ruling class's 
domination through ideology; in effect, through the shaping of 
popular consent. However, since the 'ruling class' is not a 
homogenous group but essentially an alliance of powerful and some-
times conflicting interests, the securing of hegemony involves a 
constant search for an enduring basis for legitimate authority. 
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Despite their divergent interests, what makes possible the 'rule' 
of the ruling class is the high degree of consensus which exists 
among the competing groups on certain key ideas about the nature 
and operation of society. 
To the extent that the 'ruling ideas of society are the ideas of 
the ruling class', it is clear that such ideas are defined within 
the hegemonic cultures and form the horizon of thought about the 
world for the vast majority of the population. Possibly, the 
cornerstone of hegemonic control in societies like Australia is 
the success of the ruling bloc in gaining large-scale acceptance 
for the notion that the present economic arrangements constitute 
the best of all possible worlds. 
Typically, the taken-for-granted nature of such beliefs operates 
to inhibit the possibility of change and to 'naturalise' the 
social order by obscuring the historical struggles which produced 
the present disposition of social forces. The fact that the 
private ownership of the means of production is popularly accepted 
as the 'natural' framework for the production of goods and services 
in society rarely reguires explicit justifications to be made for 
private enterprise and the market economy. This does not however 
mean that such justifications do not exist and are not made. They 
do and are made in the context of debate about 'enterprise', 
'industriousness' , 'efficiency', 'success' and 'economic and social 
development of society'. 
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Thus large private profits are generally represented as a just re-
ward for enterprise, industriousness and efficiency in grasping 
economic opportunities and making the most of them. However, 
another twist often given to this argument is that large profits 
benefit not only those who own private property but contributes to 
the economic well-being of society as a whole. Nevertheless, al-
though much is made in the ruling ideas about the 'partnership' 
between employers and employees, ownership is still seen to confer 
exclusive rights over the uses to which property is put. 
Effectively, what this means is that within the industrial sphere 
those who own the enterprise have the undisputed right to determine 
how it should be run, what should be produced, as well as such 
basic issues as investment decisions, the recruitment of labour and 
the uses to which it is put and, of course, when it is no longer 
required. The right conferred by ownership to dictate how property 
is used is further legitimated by legal sanction. 
Consequently, while elements of the dominant ideas might seek to 
portray the capital-labour relationship in terms which emphasise 
'co-operation' and 'joint interests', it is also noteworthy that 
such perspectives are careful to avoid any suggestion that respons-
ibility for the way industry operates should be a matter of joint 
involvement. On the contrary, on this issue the message of the 
ruling culture is abundantly clear: within industry, legitimate 
control and legitimate authority accrue to those who own it by 
virtue of the fact of their ownership. Accordingly, the attitudes 
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of union leaders to the system of property and authority relations 
are critical to empirical investigation of hegemonic influences 
within the forces of organised labour. 
To begin with, however, the dominant ideas on the role and functions 
of trade unions are particularly crucial in any examination of the 
attitudes of union leaders. Characteristically, the question of 
trade union rights tends to generate sharp contradictions within 
the ruling culture. For example, while it is readily conceded 
that trade unions in a 'democratic' society have the right to free-
ly exist and to strike, it is simultaneously often maintained that 
unions are a source of social unrest in society, that they often 
act 'irresponsibly', that their economic demands 'hold the country 
to ransom' and that their activities like strikes 'inconvenience 
the community' and 'harm the national interest'. 
This tendency to portray trade unions as a problem takes many forms. 
In fact, if many sections of the mass media are to be believed, 
trade unions are entirely to blame for most of the ills which 
presently beset the economy and undermine the well-being of the 
society. In this view of the unions, they are seen to threaten 
the viability of industries and imperil economic growth by their 
'greedy' demands; to compel workers to go out on strike against 
their will; to get involved in issues which are of no concern to 
them e.g. the nuclear energy debate and the question of the mining 
and export of uranium. 
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Consequently, while the principle of free trade unions is constantly 
celebrated in the ruling ideology as one of the hallmarks of a free, 
open and democratic society, at the same time this ideology goes on 
to emphasise what a problem such unions really are and the enormous 
social costs they entail for society. Thus a key element of the 
dominant value system concerns the question of nature and purpose 
of trade unions in society. Needless to say, the attitudes of 
trade union leadersto this problem will help to vitally establish 
the validity or otherwise of claims about the 'hegemony' of the 
ruling ideas. 
The final area within the ruling culture where the ideational frame-
work is most systematically developed concerns the separation of the 
economic and political spheres and the development of distinctive 
institutional frameworks for the management of industrial and 
political struggles. Thus, the system of industrial arbitration is 
generally perceived as the appropriate arena for workers to pursue 
their demands for economic justice while parliament should be the 
place through which they make their political dissatisfactions felt. 
Fundamentally, the ruling ideas generally present the system of 
arbitration as being neutral, as concerned only with settling indus-
trial disputes, as a place where even-handed adjudication of conflict 
occurs. There is thus a very clear implication in the dominant 
ideas that the system of arbitration not only does not deliberately 
advantage either of the parties before it at the expense of the other 
but, more importantly, that fundamental conflicts of interest between 
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capital and labour are ultimately resolvable within its institution-
al framework. Certainly, the existence of such a system was (is) 
thought to make the need for strikes completely unnecessary; for, 
essentially, it was supposed to establish a basis for industrial 
order and economic justice. Certainly, the idea of a union going 
out on strike as a means of obtaining a speedy resolution of its 
dispute within the arbitration system is almost universally condemn-
ed by disseminators of the ruling ideas like the mass media. 
Even more importantly, the use of the strike for any other than 
narrow, bread-and-butter industrial purposes is generally repres-
ented within the ruling culture as posing a threat to political 
authority and encouraging 'anarchy'. In fact, the dominant ideas 
about political activity are fairly explicit. Notably such ideas 
emphasise parliament as the essential site for political struggle 
and the political party as the means through which the struggle is 
waged. At the same time, however, the 'political partisanship' 
of Australian trade unions in supporting the A.L.P. financially 
and otherwise through formal links between them and the party is 
seen to be essentially undemocratic because it forces union members 
who may not be supporters of the party to become reluctantly so by 
automatic deductions of a percentage of their union dues for pay-
ment to the party. Thus how far trade union leadership thinking 
is influenced by such ideas constitutes another key dimension of 
investigation of the penetration of the dominant value system. 
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LEADERSHIP ATTITUDES TO LABOLP UNITY 
Attitudes to union integration 
A pervasive theme within the ruling culture concerning trade 
unions in Australia is that there are simply too many of 
them. To its critics, the Australian trade union movement 
is widely regarded as an institutional 'Topsy' which 'just 
growed' into a riotous profusion of organisations many of 
which cover only tiny members of workers. 
Typically, the multiplicity of trade unions and the way in 
which they are organised are generally viewed as creating 
enormous complexity and confusion. To begin with, there are 
very few unions which are 'vertically' organised, i.e. 
organised on single industry lines. Rather, they are organ-
ised on a 'horizontal' basis, i.e. on craft and occupational 
lines which invariably overlap industrial boundaries. 
Inevitably, those who expound ruling ideas tend to view this 
pattern of organisation as a hindrance to 'orderly' industrial 
relations. Not surprisingly, reform of Australia's allegedly 
'antiquated' union structure is generally conceived in terms 
of the creation of single industry unions. But while enthus-
iasm for industrial unionism comes mainly from employers and 
media commentators, it is noteworthy that industrial unionism 
was one of the founding aims of the A.C.T.U. on its formation 
in 1927. 
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Predictably, those who advocate industrial unionism generally 
tend to see it as leading to a sharp decline in union demarc-
ation disputes. But while union leaders may concede that 
there are 'too many trade unions', it may be questioned whether 
they necessarily visualise closer union organisation in terms 
of industry-based unions and the absorption of small trade 
unions into larger ones. We put these issues to the union 
leaders in our sample. Their replies are given in Table 9.1. 
T A B L E 9 . 1 L E A D E R S H I P O P I N I O N S O N U N I O N I N T E G R A T I O N 
Percentage agreeing that: 
Small unions need to amalgamate or 
federate with larger unions in order 
to survive in a society dominated by 
large-scale business and government 
concerns. 
Manual 
82 
(Nr27) (N.S.) 
X^ z .505 
p> .05 
Non-Manual 
89 
(N=25) 
In place of the 300 or so unions which 
exist in Australia, a single large 
union in each industry would serve the 
workers much better. 
64 
(N=21) (N.S.) 
X^ r .118 
p> .05 
68 
(N=19) 
N.S. means not statistically 
significant i.e. p> .05 
It can be seen that there was virtually unanimous support 
among both the manual and non-manual union officials for the 
idea of absorption of small trade unions into larger ones. 
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By contrast, both groups in the sample were much less favour-
ably disposed toward the idea of industrial unionism. While 
the attitudes of non-manual union leaders to both items were 
slightly more favourable than those of their manual counter-
parts, such differences, as indicated in the table were not 
statistically-significant. 
However, although the support for industrial unionism and 
union amalgamation is substantial, it cannot simply be construed 
as evidence of the ruling ideas on trade union leadership think-
ing. To begin with, such attitudes also suggest that despite 
the factional rivalries and jealousies that undoubtedly exist 
within the union movement, the leaders of these organisations 
do not necessarily perceive the present fragmented state of 
Australian unionism to be in its best interests. Most important-
ly, the massive endorsement for the principle of union amalgam-
ation and the smaller but still sizeable support for the notion 
of industry-based unions is encouraging in view of the vested 
interests these officials presumably have in the existing union 
set-up. 
Attitudes to manual and non-manual worker and 
union solidarity 
The distinction between manual and non-manual labour is con-
stantly emphasised by the ruling ideas. The notion that manual 
and non-manual workers are 'different' is advanced from various 
perspectives. Manual workers, we are told are exposed to 
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harsh, dirty, and tiring working conditions; they are vulner-
able to risks of injury, disease and death at work in a way 
that is quite alien to the work experiences of manual workers. 
Further, it is argued that the unemployment rate of manual 
workers is higher; they work under more oppresive systems of 
supervision and control; their career patterns are more 
limited. Above all, as the ruling ideas maintain, even the 
most 'degraded' non-manual job is carried out in an office 
setting so that the physical conditions of work are better 
than those which manual workers commonly experience. 
Consequently, from the standpoint of the ruling ideas the 
differences between manual and non-manual workers have always 
been and continue to be very wide. Although it is conceded 
that the introduction of office machinery and the pressure 
toward an increasing division of labour has largely robbed 
non-manual jobs of some of the advantages which they formerly 
enjoyed, nevertheless, a central element in dominant values 
continues to assign higher prestige to such jobs and to 
encourage a view of such workers as 'middle class'. In 
effect, what such formulations are designed to do is to keep 
alive the traditional hostility between manual and non-manual 
workers thus obscuring from them both their collective inter-
ests against their mutual exploiter - the employer. The 
extent to which such hegemonic themes find expression in 
trade union leadership attitudes is examined in Table 9.2, 
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TABLE 9.2 LEADERSHIP OPINIONS ON MANUAL AND NON-MANUAL WORKER 
SOLIDARITY 
Percentage agreeing that; 
Generally speaking, clerical and 
professional trade unionists have 
more in common with employers than 
they do with manual trade unionists, 
Manual 
(N=16) (N.S.) 
Non-Manual 
43 
(N:.12) 
Clerical and professional unions 
should affiliate with the A.C.T.U. 
and Trades and Labor Council. 
91 89 
(N=30) (N.S.) (Ni:25) 
The presence of more clerical and 
professional unions in the A.C.T.U, 
and the T.L.C. would reduce the 
militancy of these organisations. 
30 36 
(NrlO) (N.S.) (N=10) 
N.S. means not statistically 
significant i.e. p> .05 
It can be seen that while nearly half the union leaders 
questioned believed that clerical and professional workers 
have more in common with employers than they do with fellow 
workers from manual backgrounds, this level of agreement falls 
a long way short of that 75 percent which would be required to 
accept as evidence of hegemonic influence. 
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Further, it is noteworthy that despite the social distance 
which was perceived to exist between manual and non-manual 
worke rs there was overwhelming support for the idea that 
clerical and professional trade unions should affiliate 
with the A.C.T.U. on the part of both manual and non-manual 
union leaders. It is also interesting to note that hege-
monic influences fail to make any great headway either on 
the issue of the likely effects on the militancy of the 
A.C.T.U. and its affiliates by expanded clerical and profes-
sional union membership. For by a margin of two to one the 
union officials in the sample completely dismiss any notion 
that increased non-manual union membership of the A.C.T.U. 
and T.L.C. is likely to be detrimental to their militancy. 
The importance of these attitudes on the part of union leaders 
needs to be seen against the background of occupational and 
organisational change in Australia within the past decade or 
two. This period, as mentioned earlier, has seen a vast 
expansion of non-manual employment. In fact, employment in 
non-manual occupations now comprises the most dynamic sector 
of the labour market. By contrast, the same period has seen 
a proportional decline in the number of manual jobs. 
Organisationally, we have also begun to witness an unprecedent-
ed growth in the unionisation and industrial militancy of the 
white-collar segment of the labour force - despite predictions 
of the 'post industrial society' thesis to the contrary. 
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Needless to say, the significance of these trends is plainly 
evident. As pointed out earlier, the growing unionisation 
of white-collar employees has served to halt the decline in 
the size of the Australian trade union movement. 
Since in the forseeable future, non-manual workers and their 
unions are likely to dominate the industrial scene, a critical 
element in determining what impact such development makes on 
the character of the union movement is likely to be the 
perceptions that manual and non-manual workers hold of them-
selves and of each other. In this regard, union leaders are 
perhaps uniquely placed to influence the social perceptions of 
their members. 
Certainly, the objective basis for unity between manual and 
non-manual workers is already present in the proletarianised 
condition of large strata of non-manual employees. But this 
potential for unity is clearly undermined if the unionisation 
and militancy of the non-manual segment of the labour force 
is simply regarded by themselves and others principally as 
a rearguard struggle to preserve or restore their cultural 
distinctiveness from manual employees. 
In endeavouring to ascertain the degree to which white-collar 
union affiliation with predominantly manual inter-union bodies 
like the A.C.T.U. is viewed as desirable, we touch on a 
highly-salient element in the ruling ideas. For in a con-
text in which non-manual trade unions had their own white-
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collar inter-union federations like A.C.S.P.A. etc., the 
relevance of A.C.T.U. identification for worker unity is 
plain to see. 
Attitudes to women workers 
An increasingly potent source of worker disunity stems from 
the gender divisions within the working class and the ways 
in which the political implications of such divisions find 
expression in the ruling ideology. The deep sexual division 
of labour within the Australian labour force is highlighted 
by the tendency for women to be found in low-paid jobs. 
Estimates suggest that as high as 64 percent of women workers 
are in the narrow band of occupations designated 'clerical, 
sales and services'. In fact, it has been claimed that 
Australia has possibly the highest level of sexual segre-
gation by occupation among the dozen or so most industrially-
advanced member countries of the O.E.C.D. 
To critically-analyse female wage labour under capitalism is 
to confront the central contradiction surrounding the 
position of women in the capitalist mode of production. This 
contradiction is rooted in the structural conditions operat-
ing to maintain women's role in the sphere of domestic labour 
while simultaneously facilitating their entry into various 
forms of wage labour. As a result, women have been exploit-
ed as wage workers at lower rates of pay than men, drawn into 
the workforce during periods of economic expansion or war, 
and pushed back into the home during slumps. 
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Underlying this pattern of exploitation is a tendency to view 
female wage labour as essentially a secondary activity -
women's 'proper place' being seen as being in the home. 
Such ideas found institutional expression in Australia in 
the famous 'Harvester judgement' of the federal arbitration 
commission in 1907. Basically, what this judgement served 
to do was to give legal respectability to the idea that women 
were simply transients in the labour force, filling in time 
prior to undertaking their domestic responsibilities. 
Accordingly, the Harvester judgement established differential 
pay rates for males and females. It designated the adult 
male as the family breadwinner and he was therefore paid a 
'family wage'. By contrast, women were paid at a rate appro-
priate to a single woman without dependants. The essence of 
this decision was to lay the foundations for the exploitation 
of women in Australian society by embodying within the prin-
ciples of wage fixation blatantly patriarchal attitudes to-
ward family life and the role of women. 
The logic of this situation has been for successive generations 
of union leaders to define their role as involving principally 
the protection of the industrial interests of 'breadwinners' 
i.e. male workers. But to the degree to which union leaders 
still do not recognise that women have a primary right to work, 
the prospects for true worker solidarity are hopelessly under-
mined. The attitudes of union leaders toward women workers 
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and their needs are therefore a key factor in determining 
whether the rising rates of female unemployment in Australia 
generates large-scale union opposition. The extent to which 
sexist notions penetrate the thinking of trade union leaders 
is examined in Table 9.3. 
TABLE 9.3 LEADERSHIP ATTITUDES TO WOMEN WORKERS 
Percentage agreeing that; Manual Non-Manual 
If many women regard their employ-
ment as only a temporary state, it 
is a waste of union time and 
resources to try and organise them. 
(N=3) 
(N.5.) 3 . 6 
(N=l) 
Unions should provide special 
opportunities for women to enable 
them to achieve full-time official 
positions. 
45 75 
(Sig.^ 
( N = 1 5 ) ( N z 2 1 ) 
X^ = 5 . 4 7 p > . 0 5 
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As we can see from the table, the idea that it is a waste of 
union time and resources to try and organise women who regard 
their employment as only something short-lived is almost un-
animously rejected by the union leaders in our sample. 
However, the issue of whether unions should provide special 
opportunities for women to enable them to achieve full-time 
official positions elicited a marked difference of opinion 
between the manual and non-manual union officials. For 
example, where three-quarters of the non-manual union leaders 
agreed with the statement, more than half the manual officials 
expressed disagreement with it. 
Needless to say, the difference of opinion between the manual 
and non-manual union officials on this issue was statistically-
significant. In effect, what this means is that the leaders 
of non-manual unions are far more favourably inclined to mak-
ing changes in union organisation which would facilitate the 
access of women to full-time official positions in the union 
movement. 
However, whether such responses by union leaders can be read 
as rejection of the dominant ideology can only be determined 
in terms of some of the socially-constructed definitions of 
the role of women in Australian society. Central to the 
image of the role of woman constructed and disseminated by 
the dominant culture is that her primary task in life is the 
emotional (and physical) care and support of the family 
unit. 
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Typically, while this does not rule out her taking a job out-
side the home, the idea of a 'career' in this arena is seen 
as subsidiary to her central and composite role of wife, 
mother and homemaker. From this standpoint, work, in the 
sense of paid employment, is not viewed as providing the 
central definition of identity for her. Rather, her identity 
is constituted principally by and within the domestic sphere 
which is regarded as her 'true' domain. Allied with this 
view of the female role is an ideology of 'femininity' and 
'motherhood' which has traditionally served to severely cur-
tail the life-chances of women in Australian society. This 
is reflected in the overwhelming concentration of women in 
the Australian workforce in a narrow range of occupations 
characterised by inferior status, low pay and poor career 
prospects. 
Needless to say, the ruling ideas about the 'place' of women 
in society are not without their contradictions. To begin 
with, despite the importance attributed to domestic labour 
within the dominant ideology - as witness the celebration of 
homemaking and the nurturing of children as the 'fundamental 
basis of our way of life', housework is not regarded as 'real 
work' because it is not seen to be 'productive' in the sense 
of contributing to Gross Domestic Product - that much used 
but highly misleading index of a country's state of economic 
and social well-being. 
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Yet, for all its contradictions, the dominant culture creates 
a definite set of expectations concerning the appropriate 
roles of female and male in society. Notably, for the male 
this involves being cast in the role of 'breadwinner' while 
the main responsibility of the female is one of support to 
this core role. By presenting the sexual division-of-labour 
as 'natural' and 'inevitable', these dominant ways of seeing 
serve to condition attitudes and expectations held by both 
women and men about women's relation to paid employment and/ 
or domestic labour. Specifically, it creates a situation 
where because the participation of females in the labour 
force is generally perceived more as a privilege than a 
right, women tended to be shunted mainly to jobs which offer 
comparatively fewer opportunities for challenge or advance-
ment . 
Additionally, the dominant view of women serves to condone 
their treatment as what Marx once described as a 'reserve 
army of labour'. Typically, this reserve army of female 
labour is encouraged into the workforce in times of war or 
when a shortage of male labour confronts employers with 
escalating rates of pay. Since, however, women are not per-
ceived within the dominant culture to be in the workplace as 
a right, their participation can and is often used to set 
men and women workers or potential workers against each 
other thereby fundamentally eroding their unity as workers. 
A particularly cynical example of this exercise was the cam-
paign which surfaces sporadically and which seeks to lay the 
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blame for the high levels of youth unemployment in Australia 
on so-called 'greedy and selfish' women who are claimed not 
to need paid employment. 
Effectively, what such campaigns which are vigorously promoted 
in the mass media seek to do, is to deflect criticism and 
social protest against unemployment by workers and their 
organisations like trade unions, away from government and 
large companies which created it and on to women. It is in 
this general context of the scapegoating of women that the 
responses of the union leaders to the items in Table 9.3 
assume significance. 
The items concerned touch on key elements of the views within 
the dominant culture on female participation in the sphere of 
paid employment and careers. As noted, the union leaders in 
the sanple emphatically reject the suggestion that unions 
should be unconcerned with extending their protection to 
women workers who may not perceive holding a job as a perman-
ent state of affairs. While from one perspective the 
responses of the union leaders represent a decisive rejection 
of the implications of hegemonic views of women, from another 
standpoint, the situation is not as clear-cut as it might 
appear. For example, it might be argued that there are very 
good instrumental reasons for union leaders to view favour-
ably the idea of a high degree of union 'density', i.e. the 
proportion of the potential membership that is actually 
unionised. 
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Conversely, the other item in the questionnaire would seem 
to require that union officials transcend the narrow view 
of the role of women propagated by the dominant ideology. 
While three-quarters of the non-manual union officials were 
ready to endorse the principle that 'unions should provide 
special opportunities for women to enable them to achieve 
full-time official positions', more than half the manual 
union leaders rejected this notion. Although this propor-
tion disagreeing with the statement does not approach the 
level selected as 'evidence' of hegemonic influence in this 
study, it is nevertheless, a majority opinion and should be 
noted. 
Attitudes to union affiliation with political 
parties 
One of the more controversial aspects of trade union behaviour 
in Australia is their political partisanship. By 'political 
partisanship' is meant the continuous and visible support by 
trade unions for a political party. In the Australian con-
text, the political party in question is the Australian Labor 
Party and union partisanship is normally expressed in the for-
mal alignment of unions to the party. 
Characteristically, the links between the trade unions and 
the A.L.P. are loudly deplored by agencies of the dominant 
culture like the mass media. To begin with, union 
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affiliation with the party tends to be presented as being 
fundamentally 'antidemocratic' as witness the shabby attempts 
by conservative politicians during parliamentary elections to 
convince voters that election of a labour government spells 
rule by trade union leaders. 
Typically, ruling class ideas that it is somehow 'improper' 
for union officials to have any significant degree of in-
fluence within the various councils of the A.L.P. like the 
constituency, state and federal branches, have seen attempts 
by the parliamentary leadership of the party to 'broaden its 
appeal' by seeking to reduce union representation on the 
decision-making bodies of the party as a whole. Ruling 
class ideas about 'democracy' and 'individual liberty' however 
reach their most strident expression in the castigations of 
the trade unions for their financial support of the A.L.P, 
through contributions made from the union subscriptions of 
their members. 
Such ideas occasionally inspire calls in various conservative 
circles for parliaments to pass legislation which would per-
mit individual trade unionists to opt out of making a finan-
cial contribution to the A.L.P. through the union affiliation 
fees to the party which are usually paid out of the general 
funds of the union. Somehow to the protagonists of this 
campaign against the suppression of 'individual liberty' with-
in the trade unions, the financial support of the A.L.P., is 
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to use a once-popular catchword, infinitely more 'reprehen-
sible' than the substantially greater support of the conserv-
ative parties by big business. It is hardly necessary to 
stress the ideological character of notions of 'personal 
liberty' which in this context amounts simply to 'an attempt 
by the possessing classes to expropriate the proletariat 
politically by reducing its party to nothing'. (Trotsky, 
1973:122). 
Trotsky's claim is not rendered invalid in Australia by the 
fact that, as Rawson (1978) points out, the courts have 
acknowledged the right for trade union funds to be used to 
support the A.L.P. For,as Rawson indicates a similar move 
by certain unions to financially support the Communist Party 
out of union funds was ruled 'tyrannical' and 'oppressive' 
by the Conciliation and Arbitration Court in 1946. (1978:61) 
Effectively, therefore, despite official sanction, a powerful 
theme in the ruling ideology asserts in various subtle and 
not-so-subtle ways that union affiliation with the A.L.P. is 
'not in the interests of democracy' and is thereby 'undesir-
able' . 
Predictably, the force of such ideas is reflected in the 
reluctance found among non-manual unions in many studies to 
affiliate with the A.L.P. For example, research by Rawson 
(1978) confirms that many rank-and-file trade unionists dis-
approve of the affiliation of their unions with the A.L.P., 
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with opposition being stronger among the white-collar than 
the blue-collar union members. In view of such findings 
we set out to examine the extent to which union leaders -
as opposed to the rank-and-file, support the link between the 
union movement and the A.L.P. 
Apart from the question of union affiliation with political 
parties as such, we wanted to know whether union leaders 
perceived any major disadvantages for the unions (as suggest-
ed in the dominant ideology) as a consequence of their party 
affiliation. The results are set out in Table 9.4. 
TABLE 9.4 LEADERSHIP OPINIONS ON UNION AFFILIATION WITH THE A.L.P. 
Percentage agreeing that: Manual Non-Manual 
Trade unions in Australia should 
avoid affiliation with political 
parties. 
9 46 
(N=3) (N=13) 
X^ = 10.916 
p< .001 
V/hen a parliamentary election is 
about to be held, unions which 
are affiliated with a political 
party are less free to take indus-
trial action than unions which are 
not so affiliated. 
30 
(N=10) 
X = 5.687 
p< .05 
61 
(N=17) 
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TABLE 9.4 (CONTINUED) 
Percentage agreeing that: Manual Non-Manual 
Trade unions which are affiliated 
with a particular political party 
are generally at a disadvantage 
compared with non-affiliated 
unions when that party is out of 
office. 
18 
(N=6) 
X^ = 6.958 
p< .01 
50 
(N=14) 
It is not in the best interests 
of trade unionism for senior 
union officials to simultaneous-
ly hold senior positions in a 
political party. 
51 
(Nrl7) 
(N.S.) 
57 
•(N3l6) 
As highlighted by the Table, there were statistically-
significant differences between manual and non-manual union 
officials over the guestion of union political affiliations. 
Notably, while only 9 percent of manual union leaders accept-
ed the view that unions 'should avoid affiliation with 
political parties', nearly half of their non-manual counter-
parts held this belief. 
Likewise, non-manual union leaders were about twice more like-
ly to accept the claim that the calling of a parliamentary 
election tended to constrain to a greater degree the taking 
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of industrial action by unions affiliated with a political 
party than among unaffiliated unions. Additionally, white-
collar union leaders were much more prepared to accept that 
'unions which are affiliated with a political party are 
generally at a disadvantage compared with non-affiliated 
unions when that party is out of office'. Finally, manual 
and non-manual union leaders were equally against the idea 
of union officials holding senior positions in a political 
party, with over half of each group being opposed to it. 
Although not reaching the 75 percent level of agreement with 
the dominant ideas set in this study as indicative of hege-
monic influence, it is nevertheless clear to see that the 
dominant ideology has made major inroads especially into the 
thinking of the white-collar group in our sample. The 
implications of these attitudes for the future of the A.L.P. 
are not encouraging. For, given the fact that the trade 
unions still provide the backbone of support - financial 
and otherwise, for the A.L.P., the failure to attract support 
from non-manual trade unions (in terms of affiliation with 
the party), threatens the future viability of the party. 
This is especially so in view of the long-term tendency for 
decline among its traditional sources of support - the 
manual workers and their unions. 
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Attitudes to international trade union unity 
and action 
During the past decade or so, there has been a pronounced 
tendency for a number of business concerns in the developed 
Western nations to 'relocate' in the countries of the 'Third 
World'. As even a cursory glance at the financial pages of 
the newspapers reveals, investment in 'Third World' has be-
come immensely profitable for a whole range of Australian-
based enterprises. 
Although the emergence of an international division of labour 
is not new, nevertheless, the contemporary situation repre-
sents a qualitative change in the internationalisation of 
capital. To begin with, where traditionally raw materials 
production represented the principal form of foreign invest-
ment in 'Third World' countries, the present investment trends 
differ from previous patterns not only in terms of scale but 
more fundamentally in the switch from primary production to 
manufacturing. 
The multinational mode of production in effect enables capital 
to become international in its operations while retaining a 
'base' in developed countries like the U.S.A., Great Britain, 
Germany, Japan or even Australia, depending on the national 
origins of the corporation. But these gigantic corporations 
are notable not simply because of their size and in many 
cases, monopolistic power, but more for the fact that the 
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multinational character of their operations allows them to 
largely evade the control of any single national government. 
One of the functions of myths, of course, is to provide 
support and reinforcement for a dominant ideology. Possibly 
one of the most pervasive and enduring myths concerning the 
large scale transfer of manufacturing industry from Australia 
to Asian countries is that Australian wages and salaries are 
excessively-high. Yet, as the figures on wage movements in 
Australia continually confirm, nearly three-guarters of the 
Australian labour force earns below the average weekly wage. 
Nevertheless, the conservative economists and other ideologists 
for the economically powerful continue to propagate the view 
that Australians are 'pricing themselves out of jobs'. The 
real situation underlying the shift of industrial production 
from Australia to countries such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, South 
Korea, Indonesia, the Phillipines, etc. is conveniently ob-
scured; namely, that the prosperity of these multinational 
companies is being increasingly based on the super-exploitation 
of the workers in these so-called 'developing' countries. 
Certainly, there is no mystery about the massive transfer of 
labour-intensive Australian manufacturing industry to Asia. 
For many of these countries do have wage rates massively below 
those prevailing in Australia and which are further kept 
artificially low by authoritarian governments anxious to 
attract multinational capital. Many, in fact, provide a wide 
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range of investment incentives designed to encourage multi-
national companies to establish their operations in these 
countries. Coupled with low wages, weak or non-existent 
trade unions, such countries provide an irresistable lure 
for the 'vagrant' corporation. 
Needless to say, the option of relocating their operations 
in the 'Third World' where the labour costs are much lower 
and the labour force far more tractable has provided manage-
ment with a major weapon with which to extract industrial 
concessions from the trade unions in the developed Western 
nations. In effect, the 'overseas alternative' presents 
management with extra leverage in the industrial balance of 
power. For it allows them to impose to a much greater 
degree their terms on the unions by blackmail or threat. 
Or, where such strategies fail, to simply pack up and set 
up business where the industrial climate is more to its lik-
ing. Either way, some groups of workers in the developed 
nations lose out: for them the alternatives posed are either 
inferior wages and conditions or the dole queue. 
For some writers, the new multinational mode of production 
has facilitated the prospect of international worker unity. 
This principle has traditionally been a cherished socialist 
objective and is enshrined in the classical Marxian rallying 
cry: 'Workers of the world, unite'. However, the massive 
loss of jobs in Australian manufacturing industry due to 
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firms moving their operations to Asia and then exporting 
their goods to Australia offers the potential for eroding rather 
than strengthening international worker solidarity. For 
a central theme in the dominant ideology which is dissemin-
ated by the mass media is that the problem facing these 
Australian workers is one of 'unfair' competition from 'cheap 
Asian imports' and 'cheap Asian labour'. It is therefore 
important to examine the extent to which such potentially 
hegemonic notions exercise a hold on the thinking of Austral-
ian trade union leaders. Accordingly, the issues of the 
activities of multinational corporations and what union 
responses were necessary were put to them. Their answers 
are shown in Table 9.5. 
TABLE 9.5 LEADERSHIP OPINIONS ON THE ACTIVITIES OF MULTI-
NATIONAL COMPANIES 
Percentage agreeing that: Manual Non-Manual 
It is of no concern to Australian 6 3 
trade union leaders if multi- (N=2) (N=l) 
national firms which have branches 
in Australia, or Australian-owned 
firms treat their workers poorly 
in other countries. 
The activities of multinational 94 100 
corporations call for co-ordinated (N-31) (N=28) 
international trade union action. 
3 4 7 . 
As shown in the Table, there was virtually unanimous rejection 
by union leaders in the sample of the idea that it 'is of no 
concern to Australian union leaders if multinational firms 
which have branches in Australia, or Australian-owned firms 
treat their workers poorly in other countries'. These res-
ponses are important if for no other reason than that a basic 
theme of the ruling ideology is that the right of a business 
company to produce where, what and how it pleases is simply 
'none of a trade union's business'. 
Clearly, the union leaders who responded to our questionnaire 
did not share this view of their role. Likewise in agree-
ing almost totally with the notion that the 'activities of 
multinational corporations call for co-ordinated international 
trade union action', the officials concerned plainly reject 
the assumption articulated by the ruling ideology that union 
concerns should be confined mainly to the industrial inter-
ests of their own members. Such beliefs have often formed 
the basis for attempts to outlaw union actions such as 'second-
ary boycotts' where a union whose members are not directly 
involved in a dispute nevertheless takes industrial action 
in support of a fellow union. 
To the extent that such views inevitably meet with resistance 
from union leaders, they only serve to underline that people 
do not unquestioningly accept the dominant ideology. Rather, 
what it clearly suggests, is that people themselves construct 
their own view of the world out of what they perceive in their 
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own practical experiences. It is this factor which helps 
to explain why people may basically consent to the existing 
social order yet simultaneously hold particular oppositional 
views. 
L E A D E R S H I P A T T I T U D E S TO THE EMPLOYMENT R E L A T I O N S H I P 
Attitudes to labour's share of the economic cake 
In this section we examine the perceptions that trade union 
leaders have of the employment relationship. It is a socio-
logical commonplace that acceptance of the dominant ideology 
by subordinate groups and their leaders contributes greatly 
to the perpetuation of the existing social order. For it 
shapes how such groups see the world and critically conditions 
what they believe to be natural and inevitable. 
Above all, it profoundly influences their perceptions of 
how society operates and how it can be transformed. As 
writers like Hyman (1975) have observed, ideological factors 
play an enormously important part in industrial relations. 
For example, he notes the extent to which the industrial 
behaviour of workers is governed by their internalisation of 
concepts like 'fairness'. Notably, he makes the point that 
although it may generally operate in a 'conservative' fashion, 
the concept of fairness has 'potentially radical implications'. 
Specifically, it provides a basis for mobilising worker dis-
sent against conditions and arrangements which are perceived 
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to violate the principle of 'fairness'. 
Needless to say, the degree of legitimacy accorded by union 
leaders to the existing distribution of the economic cake 
between labour and capital provides an important insight 
into the degree of penetration of the dominant ideology in-
to their consciousness. Vie began by seeking their opinions 
on the fairness or otherwise of labour's share of the distri-
bution of income. Their answers are set out in Table 9 . 6 . 
T A B L E 9.6 LEADERSHIP OPINIONS ON THE D I S T R I B U T I O N OF INCOME 
Percentage agreeing that: Manual Non-Manual 
V/age and salary-earners in Australia 24 39 
receive a fair return from employers 
X = 1.601 p>.05 
for their efforts. 
The share of the National Income 58 75 
(N=19) (N=21) 
X^ = 2.038 p>.05 
between profits on the one hand 
and wages and salaries on the other 
has become more fair. 
As is obvious from their answers, the union leaders did not 
believe that distributional equity existed between workers 
and employers. On the contrary, over three-quarters of the 
blue-collar and almost two-thirds of the white-collar union 
officials in the sample did not consider that 'wage and 
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salary earners in Australia receive a fair return from 
employers for their efforts'. Understandably, manual union 
officials were more dissatisfied with the workers' share of 
the 'effort bargain' and were thus inclined to doubt its 
fairness. 
Somewhat, paradoxically, however, more than half the manual 
union leaders and three-quarters of the non-manual officials 
were later ready to accept the idea that 'the share of the 
national income between profits on the one hand and wages 
and salaries on the other has become more fair'. Since in 
essence the national income is divided roughly between what 
is paid in wages and salaries and what accrues to employers 
by way of profits, the contradictory nature of their replies 
cannot be easily explained. 
Suffice it to say, however, that if the union officials 
appear to be 'confused' on this point, such confusion is 
greatly helped by the lack of accurate figures on what the 
true situation is regarding the economic shares going to 
labour and capital respectively. For instance, the 
official statistics tend to include the salaries of direc-
tors and top managers with workers' wages in determining 
the wages and salaries bill. Interestingly, however, 
incomes from property is not specified. 
351 . 
More to the point, perhaps, is the fact that in the ideo-
logical climate in which trade unions typically operate, 
the wage relationship constitutes not only the central 
mode of their oppression but also the main preoccupation 
of their struggle. However, the trade union wages struggle 
seldom succeeds in altering the workers' share of the nat-
ional income. Despite what union leaders may say, the 
pay increases that they gain for their members are gained 
mainly at the expense of other workers. 
To the extent that trade unions have become part of the sys-
tem, they have been compelled to become reformist in order 
to survive. Clearly, in a society which prizes material 
possessions and which defines personal worth in similar 
terms, it cannot occasion any great surprise if institutions 
which are part of it like trade unions come to embrace some 
of these values. But there are also sound, strategic 
reasons which only indirectly have to do with the influence 
of the dominant ideology why such emphasis is placed by 
unions on 'economistic' wage issues. In effect, they are 
readily grasped, measureable and theoretically at any rate^ 
erode profits thereby shifting the economic imbalance in 
the worker's favour. In practice, however, and especially 
when levels of inflation are high, wage demands far from 
adversely affecting profits simply lead to a collapse of 
investment and deepening recession. 
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Accordingly, the attitudinal responses by union leaders 
to the question of pay restraint are of critical importance 
for the ideological struggle against the dominant value 
system which seeks to present the existing social order 
as fundamentally unalterable - indeed, as the only social 
order possible. The views of the union leaders in the 
sample to the issue of pay restraint are summarised in 
Table 9.7. 
TABLE 9.7 LEADERSHIP OPINIONS ON PAY RESTRAINT 
Percentage agreeing that: Manual Non-Manual 
V^age and salary restraint is 
necessary if Australia's current 
economic difficulties are to be 
overcome. 
61 
(N=20) 
68 
(N=19) 
X = .345 p> .05 
As the Table indicates, a remarkably-high proportion of the 
union leaders surveyed, allowed themselves to be persuaded 
by the argument that pay restraint is a necessary pre-
requisite for surmounting the present economic recession in 
Australia. Needless to say, the level of agreement on this 
item is only marginally-below that set for acceptance of 
hegemonic influence and points strongly to it. Such 
attitudes, in fact, serve to highlight the force of the 
dominant ideas in shaping the way subordinate groups concept-
ualise their social situation and articulate their aspirations, 
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To the degree that these union leaders widely accept an 
obligation to curb the pay demands of their members, they 
effectively come to share the dominant groups' priorities 
concerning the survival and stability of Australian capital-
ism. Certainly, what the attitudes of the respondents help 
to indicate is the extent to which the hegemonic understand-
ings within society make it possible to present the narrow 
interests of a privileged and powerful minority as being 
for the good of everyone. The pervasiveness of this domin-
ance is reflected in the seeming readiness of people to ad-
just to situations and alter their goals in serving the needs 
of the socially advantaged at the expense of their own and 
those of their fellows. Plainly, working people with the 
blessings of their union leaders, are being made to pay for 
a recession not of their making while a process of condition-
ing is already in train to try and convince them that full 
employment is a thing of the past. 
Attitudes to employers 
For many writers, a key distinction between manual and non-
manual workers lies in their attitudes to employers. Notably, 
manual workers are viewed as having few illusions about their 
subordinate and exploited status in the employment relation-
ship. The subordinate and exploited condition of manual 
labour tends to be reflected in the uncongenial nature of 
their jobs, the long hours, the poor pay, the unsafe or un-
healthy working conditions, the insecurity of earnings and 
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employment. Coupled with these disabilities are the myriad 
social constraints under which such work is performed, such 
as the requirement to 'clock in' and the close supervision 
of the work activities of the manual employee. 
By contrast, non-manual employees are commonly-viewed as 
having comparatively pleasant working conditions in jobs 
which are reasonably well-paid and which offer employment 
security, pensions, sickness pay and a wide range of allied 
benefits. As mentioned earlier, a basic strand in the 
dominant ideology concerning the present economic system 
postulates the expectation that the relationship between 
employers and employees should mainly be cordial rather than 
conflictual. In this view of the employer-employee relation-
ship a basic community of interests exists between the two 
groups. 
At the level of the individual enterprise such interests are 
thought to involve improving its level of profits which is 
seen to be beneficial to both parties. Yet, while one facet 
of the dominant value system stresses the need for 'co-operation' 
and 'greater understanding' between employers and employees, 
another strand of the ruling ideas simultaneously attacks 
unions as 'self-interested', 'greedy wreckers' which create 
enormous problems for society. We therefore set out to exam-
ine the opinions of union leaders toward employers in order 
to determine the extent to which ruling class notions of the 
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'partnership of capital and labour' permeates their con-
sciousness. Their replies are shown in Table 9.8. 
TABLE 9.8 LEADERSHIP OPINIONS OF EMPLOYERS 
Percentage agreeing that; Manual Non-Manual 
Most employers would be a lot 70 71 
happier if trade unions did (N=23) (N=20) 
not exist. 
Most private employers are more 88 82 
concerned with making profits (N=29) (N=23) 
than with their employees' well-
being. 
As the Table indicates, judged by the criterion that a 75 
percent level of support for the ruling ideas about the 
'proper' relationship between employers and employees is 
necessary to sustain the claims of 'hegemonic theory', these 
responses denote emphatic rejection of them. In fact, what 
the attitudes of the union leaders in the sample clearly 
suggest is that a conflict orientation is by no means the 
exclusive property of manual workers. On the contrary, as 
Mann has noted, what the idea of non-manual employees having 
a 'harmonistic' relationship with employers typically ignores 
is that: "Unions are ... conflict organisations, incon-
gruent with any extreme view of industrial harmony." 
(1973:22) 
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Attitudes to arbitration 
Characteristically, the system of compulsory arbitration 
which regulates the conduct of industrial relations in 
Australia exercises a profound influence on the structure, 
actions and objectives of trade unions. Traditionally, 
as we have seen, conflict has inevitably arisen over the 
distribution of material rewards between employer and 
employee. In such circumstances, it is hardly surprising 
that the vast majority of industrial disputes generally 
also involve - whatever their other reasons, questions of 
pay and working conditions. As mentioned, there are 
powerful forces impelling workers and their leaders to 
voice their dissatisfactions and claims in material terms 
rather than seeking to challenge the basic economic exploit-
ation and alienation that is the lot of 'rationalised' em-
ployment in the large factory or office. Such pressures 
find strong backing in the institutional procedures govern-
ing industrial relations. Under Australia's system of 
compulsory arbitration, for example, as certain critics 
have observed, while pay claims are readily negotiable, 
managerial prerogatives are regarded as sacrosanct and out-
side the authority of the arbitral agencies. (Sorrell, 
1972) The distinctiveness of the system of industrial 
relations in Australia is however epitomised by "the 
primary use of arbitration for the resolution of disputes 
about 'interests'." (Sorrell, 1972: 252) 
357. 
Disillusionment with the system of arbitration is not new. 
Generations of union officials and activists have made 
statements and carvied motions charging arbitration 
and arbitrators with being too legalistic^ too-costly^ 
time-wasting:, short-sighted^ unfair and anti-union. 
Such charges have often been accompanied by the 
suggestion that the unions would he better-off with-
out arbitration tribunals: if they were left, that 
is3 to deal with employers face-to-face. Less 
frequently J but often enough^ there have been express 
threats to abandon arbitration if a better deal is not 
forthcoming. 
(Martin, 1975: 100) 
The significance of arbitration as various of its critics 
have pointed out lies in its ability to provide Australian 
industry with a stable and predictable national wage struc-
ture. Needless to say, it provides the most effective 
means of holding down the wages of Australian workers 
during periods of economic difficulty. Perhaps its most 
important function, however, has been to incorporate the 
trade unions and to deflect their potentially explosive pro-
tests into a legalistic mould whereby class peace is bought 
with economistic concessions. 
It is noteworthy in this regard that arbitrators have 
traditionally sought to distinguish 'industrial' from 
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'managerial' affairs. Typically, only the former are view-
ed as falling within the legitimate realm of the trade 
unions and, coincidentally, the arbitration machinery. In 
this manner, the system has served to enforce and guarantee 
the prerogatives of management to hire, fire and make use 
of employees' labour power as it sees fit. The net effect 
of the system of arbitration is a tendency by unions to see 
the economic struggle in terms of the arbitration system 
to the exclusion of the employer for whom this system acts. 
Despite the rhetoric about the 'neutrality' of arbitration, 
it is clear that the divine right of private property con-
stitutes the fundamental value assumption upon which its 
decisions are ultimately premissed. This is most clearly-
evident during periods of economic crisis when it generally 
acts to maintain or restore profits at the expense of wages. 
Underlying this approach to economic problems is the fact 
that the dominant position of the private sector in society 
means that it is essentially a business solution to the 
crisis that is imposed. In effect, the ideological hege-
mony of the dominant elite is assured to the extent to which 
it manages to gain popular support for its definitions of 
social reality. It is thus in this context that we 
endeavoured to ascertain the opinions of union leaders to 
arbitration. 
TABLE 9.9 LEADERSHIP OPINIONS OF ARBITRATION 
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Percentage agreeing that: Manual Non-Manual 
In the main, the Arbitration 
System serves the interests of 
employers better than it serves 
the interests of trade unions. 
55 50 
(N=18) (N.S . ) (N=14) 
Industrial action generally en-
sures unions of more favourable 
decisions from the Arbitration 
of their grievances. 
70 
(N=23) (N.S. ) 
71 
(N=20) 
There would be more friction 
between employers and unions 
if the Arbitration system did 
not exist. 
55 
(NzlB) 
82 
(N::23) 
X = 5.231 p> .05 
As shown by the Table, what is remarkably-evident about the 
views of the union leaders in the sample is the similarity 
in outlook between the manual and non-manual officials on 
certain items. For example, more than half the respondents 
were not taken in by the claims of impartiality made for 
arbitration, believing as they did that 'in the main, the 
arbitration system serves the interests of employers better 
than it serves the interests of trade unions'. But by the 
same token half the union leaders were persuaded by its 
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claims to legitimacy as a 'neutral' referee which are propa-
gated by the media and other agencies of the dominant 
culture. Yet, although this represents a high level of 
support for the ruling ideas, it hardly constitutes 'proof 
of the validity of 'hegemonic theory' as operationally 
defined in this study. 
It is perhaps somewhat ironical that more than 70 percent 
of both manual and non-manual union officials believed in-
dustrial action necessary to 'ensure more favourable 
decisions from arbitration of their grievances'. For the 
explicit reason for the creation of the system was to 
lessen the possibility of industrial conflict. 
Characteristically, the only statistically-significant differ-
ence in attitudes between manual and non-manual union leaders 
arose over their opinions on the amount of conflict which 
would have arisen between employers and unions had not the 
arbitration system existed. While 55 percent of manual 
officials felt that the presence of arbitration had helped 
to lessen conflict between unions and employers, a stagger-
ing 82 percent of non-manual union leaders agreed with this 
view. Yet, while non-manual union leaders were more likely 
to see the existence of arbitration as leading to a more 
peaceable relationship between employers and trade unions, 
it does not follow that they are any more or less 'pro-
arbitration' in their overall attitudes than their manual 
colleagues. 
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Certainly, while their views represent a general attach-
ment to the Arbitration system, they are neither entirely 
oblivious to its real 'class' character. 
Attitudes to strikes 
Trade unions, it has been widely-remarked, have a poor 
media image. Never is this fact more glaringly apparent 
than when they engage in strike activity. Although few 
media commentators seriously contest the right of trade 
unions to strike, the exercise of that right nevertheless 
tends to be generally deplored. Even where it is conceded 
that strikes are occasionally justified, it is still seen 
as 'regrettable' that they should occur at all. This 
negative attitude to strikes is evident in the media cover-
age of them. Rarely is such reporting confined to a fact-
ual account of the conditions which give rise to them. 
Rather, the outbreak of a strike tends to be treated as a 
cause for moral indignation. Thus strike action is often 
depicted as 'holding the country to ransom', 'senseless 
disruption', 'the cynical abuse of union muscle' and similar 
polemical formulations. Since media characterisations of 
strikes inevitably affect how they are publicly-perceived, 
it is little wonder that there is widespread antipathy 
towards them. 
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To test the extent to which these and similar 'ruling class 
notions penetrate the consciousness of organised labour, we 
posed a number of questions to trade union leaders. Their 
responses are shown in Table 9.10. 
T A B L E 9 . 1 0 L E A D E R S H I P O P I N I O N S ON S T R I K E S 
Percentage agreeing that; Manual Non-Manual 
Generally speaking workers can 
improve their conditions with-
out going on strike. 
58 89 
X^ = 7.558 p< .01 
(N=19) (N325) 
Strikes unnecessarily antagonise 
employers and delay the improve-
ments workers are seeking. 
30 
(NzlO) (N.5.) 
29 
(N=8) 
Unions which are not prepared to 
go on strike are unlikely to 
have their demands taken serious-
ly by errployers. 
67 
(N=22) (N.S.) 
68 
(Nrl9) 
Strike decisions should be made by 
a secret ballot of union members. 
39 43 
(Nrl3) (N.S.) (Nrl2) 
Industrial action on the part of 
trade unions should be confined 
39 46 
(N=13) (N.S.) (Nrl3) 
to workplace issues 
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As the Table shows, the only statistically-significant differ-
ence to emerge in the attitudes of manual and non-manual union 
leaders arose in relation to the strike as a mechanism for 
improving workers' conditions. Specifically, 58 percent of 
manual union officials but 89 percent of non—manual leaders 
agreed with the statement that 'generally speaking, workers 
can improve their conditions without going on strike'. 
Interestingly, while the response of the non-manual union 
officials on this item seems to conclusively support the 
thesis of 'hegemonic' influence, it is noteworthy that equal 
proportions of non-manual and manual union officials thought 
that 'unions which are not prepared to go out on strike are 
unlikely to have their demands taken seriously by employers'. 
On balance, the fairly heavy support given to this statement 
by the union leaders seems to point in the direction of the 
dominant value system. By contrast, the general view that 
'strikes unnecessarily antagonise enployers and delay the 
improvements workers are seeking' managed to attract less 
than half the level of support necessary for the assumptions 
of hegemonic influence to be made. Only a minority - even 
though quite a large one, of the union officials in the 
sample were prepared to sanction the idea which is given 
wide currency in the media that 'strike decisions should be 
made by a secret ballot of union members'. 
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However, it is difficult to know quite how the responses to 
this item ought to be evaluated. Certainly, it is likely 
that some union leaders interpreted the question to mean 
having a secret ballot by union members to determine whether 
to strike. Conversely, it is equally-plausible that, as 
stated, the item may be interpreted by some officials to 
mean holding a secret ballot of members to determine whether 
to end a strike. Typically, it is relevant to note in this 
context that one of the contradictions of the image present-
ed of union leaders by the dominant culture is that union 
leaders are expected to act 'democratically', carrying out 
the wishes of their members. Simultaneously, however, they 
are also expected to control those members 'responsibly', 
in the 'national interest'. 
Finally, and most revealingly, leaders of non-manual unions 
are no more likely than the leaders of the manual unions to 
favour restricting industrial action to workplace issues. 
But while the view that union action should be confined to 
industrial matters is shared by only a minority of manual 
and non-manual unions, nevertheless, it is again a size-
able minority. V/hat this serves to suggest, is that the 
attitudes of the union leaders in our sample to strikes can 
only be adequately-understood in terms of the dominant 
meanings through which much of the public discussion of 
strikes is framed. 
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It is a commonplace that public attitudes to strikes are, 
as Hyman has pointed out, "at best ambivalent and in most 
cases unreservedly hostile." (1972: 140) In Hyman's 
view, such attitudes reflect the influence of the dominant 
social values which "tend to define open industrial con-
flict as illegitimate." (1972: 140) Further, as he 
argues, these 'dominant social values' find expression not 
only in the media hostility to strikes but even in the 
tendencies for academic sociologists to perceive industrial 
conflict as being "by definition a social problem." 
(1972: 140) 
Hyman goes on to argue that such understandings of strikes 
serve to shape the attitudes of people to them and influenc-
ing the way even workers come to view them. As a consequence 
these dominant ideas exercise a powerful influence on the 
ways in which strikes are presented and understood. As 
Hyman maintains, the dominant view of strikes rests on three 
basic premisses. "First, that industrial conflict is out-
dated, unnecessary and irrational. Second, that strikes re-
sult directly in severe economic disruption. Third, that 
they are evidence of excessive union power." (1972: 140) 
The extent to which such definitions of reality have come to 
be accepted by even trade union leaders themselves is 
clearly-evident from the responses to some of the items in 
Table 9.10. For example, as we saw, almost 90 percent of 
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the non-manual union leaders in our sample considered that 
'workers could improve their conditions without going on 
strike' - a view, as we saw, was shared by 58 percent of 
the manual union leaders. 
However, while the extremely high degree of support for this 
idea by the white-collar union leaders suggests a strong 
commitment to the dominant social values by this group, this 
cannot be as we saw, automatically assumed. Admittedly, 
there has been a traditional tendency for certain white-
collar groups and their industrial organisations to view 
strikes as wrong and unnecessary whatever the problems and 
frustrations. Likewise, the alleged weakness of the 
collectivist traditions of the manual working class among 
the white-collar group and the influence of such notions 
as 'respectability' on its thinking, may, in fact, be indic-
ative of an identification with the dominant ideas. 
Conversely, however, the overwhelming belief by the white-
collar union leaders (and the substantial proportion of 
manual officials), that, in general, 'workers can improve 
their conditions without going on strike', may simply re-
flect the fact that such unions have been able to wield 
considerable influence over the processes determining the 
pay and the conditions of their members without needing to 
engage in anything so 'distasteful' as a strike. Certain-
ly, the union leaders in our sample do not rule out the 
367. 
importance of the strike as a strategic weapon with which to 
win concession to their demands from enployers. As we saw, 
over two-thirds of all the union leaders readily acknowledged 
that unions which 'are not prepared to go on strike are un-
likely to have their demands taken seriously by employers'. 
Likewise, the dominant belief that strikes only serve to 
'antagonise employers' and hinder the improvements workers 
are seeking is rejected by over 70 percent of the union 
officials. However, as we've also seen, other aspects of 
the dominant value system make their influence felt even 
within the ranks of union leadership. For example, as 
shown, a sizeable minority of union officials - approaching 
nearly 50 percent in the case of the white-collar group 
accepted the idea of secret ballots of union members as a 
way of deciding strikes. Although, as pointed out, it is 
not easily determined whether the 'strike decisions' they 
have in mind to be decided by secret ballot refer to the 
starting or ending of strikes or both. 
As v;e have seen, underlying the antipathy to strikes found 
in the dominant value-system is the idea that not only are 
strikes enormously disruptive but also enormously costly. 
However, it is interesting to note that "Australian employ-
ers tend to agonise more over production loss through 
industrial disputes" (Niland, 1978: 4) than that which 
occurs through industrial injury and illness which some 
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commentators estimate may be up to three times as high. 
Nevertheless, the idea of 'secret ballots' is seen in the domin-
ant value system as essential for lessening the incidence of the 
strikes which are thought to mainly occur through workers 
being forced to do so by excessively-militant union leaders. 
For these reasons, the responses of the union leaders to 
the item on the introduction of the secret ballot for mak-
ing strike decisions within the union are most revealing. 
Even more so, is the level of support among these union 
leaders for the view that 'industrial action on the part of 
trade unions should be confined to the workplace'. A major 
theme in the ruling ideas, as we have seen, asserts not only 
that unions are 'excessively powerful' but, more importantly, 
that they are only too ready to involve themselves in matters 
which are not of direct concern to their members. This 
notion that trade unions are only too willing to exceed their 
'mandate' is given widespread currency by the mass media. 
For these reasons, the views of the union leaders on the 
limits of industrial action are most enlightening. For, 
while their responses fall short of the level whereby we 
can argue that the ruling ideas exercise a 'hegemonic' hold 
on their thinking, simultaneously such thinking, as we have 
seen, is not entirely immune from the influence of these 
ideas. 
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LEADERSHIP A T T I T U D E S TQ PRIVATE PROPERTY AND MANAGERIAL 
AUTHORITY 
Attitudes to private property 
It has long been popular to argue that class conflict has 
been institutionalised; that, in effect, despite their 
militancy and anti-enployer rhetoric, even the most 
'radical' of trade unions cannot avoid the integration 
of the interests of their members within capitalism. There 
is no denying that the capitalist context in which trade 
union demands are framed profoundly affects both the nature 
of their goals and the manner in which they are pursued. 
What this means in effect, as Hyman (1975) observed, is 
that essentially the productive resources of society are 
privately owned by a tiny minority of people, that profit 
constitutes the basic goal of economic activity and that 
the workplace is hierarchically-organised, with power con-
centrated in the hands of management. 
Furthermore, Hyman asserts that even /^here the state in 
such countries 'owns' a sizeable stake of the economic re-
sources of society, the operations of its enterprises differ 
little from private sector concerns. On the contrary, 
their internal organisational forms and organisational 
values, says Hyman, are closely modelled on those of the 
private sector. 
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Accordingly, trade union structure tends to reflect rather 
than challenge the contours of the prevailing division of 
labour i n Western society in organising workers not as a 
class but as sectional groups of 'wage earners'. In other 
words, as 'sellers of labour power' and, in effect, creations 
of a capitalist system of private property. The sectional 
and essentially reactive character of trade unionism has led 
critics of the union movement to view trade union action as 
being founded on acceptance of the prevailing property and 
authority relations in society. Thus, for many, the 
division of activity within the labour movement into the 
political sphere (which essentially was to be the respons-
ibility of the labour party) and the economic sphere (which 
was to be taken care of by the trade unions), simply reflects 
the extent to which many workers and their leaders themselves 
have come to accept the present divisions within society as 
'given' . 
Since how people act is partly determined by the nature of 
the understandings that they develop, it is clear that trade 
union leaders no less than other members of society necess-
arily operate with their respective stocks of commonsense 
knowledge which they cannot help but use to make sense of 
the reality they encounter. Indeed, it is a necessary 
banality to observe that to the extent that the existing 
economic, political, social and industrial arrangements in 
society have come to be accepted by the vast mass of people 
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as 'natural', 'inevitable' and perhaps even 'immutable', 
then we can legitimately talk about the 'hegemony' of the 
ruling ideas. 
As we saw earlier, the central element on which the ideo-
logical dominance of the powerful and privileged in 
Australian society is founded is the idea that the per-
petuation of the present economic order is self-evidently 
necessary, worthwhile and beneficial for the whole society. 
Although it provides the basis for the political outlook 
of these elites in Australian society, it is only on rare 
occasions that systematic articulation of private enter-
prise values is glimpsed - and this is usually when some 
part of the system is perceived to be under threat, as 
with the attempted nationalisation of the banks, the 
introduction of Medicare etc. Rather, since private 
enterprise and the market economy constitute facts of every-
day life in Australia, such ideas do not have to be explicit-
ly and constantly spelt out. 
It is this feature of hegemony which helps to explain why 
trade unionists seemingly acguiesce to the present social 
order - or, at least, do not openly and radically confront 
it politically. However, the fact that radical and sus-
tained political challenges to the system do not arise from 
organised labour does not mean that people like workers and 
trade union leaders are 'brainwashed' into accepting the 
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system by the mass media or such social institutions as the 
school, church etc. On the contrary, the basis of consent 
rests on the fact that the system of social and economic 
arrangements which workers and people generally, confront 
in their daily lives come to be viewed by them as 'common-
sense ' . 
Typically, there is a tendency for people to accept the 
system of private enterprise and the market economy without 
giving it much thought. In effect, this amounts to tacit 
acceptance of an essentially capitalist value-assumption. 
But, in the main, such people do not do this because they 
have been deliberately misled by the media or other 'hidden 
persuaders' against their will. Rather, they do so because 
in the material and social world they inhabit and in which 
they daily interact, the system whereby goods and services 
are produced, exchanged and consumed is natural and only 
'commonsense'. For them, it is enormously difficult to 
conceive of any other way of doing these things. Such 
understandings of their social world go to construct 
'commonsense' for them and find expression in sentiments 
which lend support to the present economic, social and 
political order. In this context, the economistic and 
reformist nature of traditional trade union demands and 
goals should not occasion any great surprise. 
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It is, however, one thing to acknowledge that trade union 
action is generally curtailed by the institutional and 
cultural contexts in which such organisations normally 
function. But it does not automatically follow from this 
that the leaders of trade unions accept the existing system 
as a permanent fact of life. Indeed, whether they do so or 
not is essentially an empirical question. In setting out 
to examine the degree to which the property relations of 
Australian society are fundamentally called into question 
by trade union leaders, we are provided with a useful opport-
unity to observe the level to which their thinking reflects 
the influences of the dominant ideas. Their answers are 
shown in Table 9.ll. 
T A B L E 9 . 1 1 L E A D E R S H I P O P I N I O N S ON P R I V A T E PROPERTY 
3 7 4 . 
Percentage a g r e e i n g t h a t : Manual Non-Manual 
The economic p r o s p e r i t y o f A u s -
t r a l i a depends upon a more 
v i g o r o u s e x p a n s i o n o f p r i v a t e 
e n t e r p r i s e . 
61 
(N=20) (N . S . ) 
64 
(Ni:18) 
L a r g e - s c a l e p r i v a t e f o r e i g n 
i n ve s tment i s i n the b e s t i n t e r -
e s t s o f A u s t r a l i a ' s economic 
development. 
9 
(NZ:3) ( N . S . ) 
14 
(N=4) 
P r i v a t e ownersh ip o f A u s t r a l i a ' s 
n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s s h o u l d be 
n a t i o n a l i s e d . 
88 
(N=29) (N . S . ) 
79 
(N=22) 
P r i v a t e b u s i n e s s companies s h o u l d 
be a l lowed to grow as l a r g e as 
they can. 
45 
(N=15) ( S i g . ) 
14 
(N=4) 
X r 6 . 859 p< . 01 
R e p l a c i n g the p r i v a t e ownersh ip 
o f the means o f p r o d u c t i o n by 
p u b l i c owner sh ip i s o f l i t t l e 
r e l e v a n c e to the A u s t r a l i a 
t h a t e x i s t s t oday . 
27 36 
(N=9) ( N . S . ) (NzlO) 
N . S . = Not s t a t i s t i c a l l y 
s i gn i f i c a n t . 
S i g . = S t a t i s t i c a l l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t . 
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A basic theme of the dominant ideas is that Australia is 
a free enterprise society whose economic growth and social 
well-being is critically dependent upon the efforts of 
private business. The necessity of governments to keep 
the interests of business uppermost in mind in their 
decision-making is emphasised to such an extent that it 
has come to be accepted almost an article of faith by many 
people. The dominant culture, financed and controlled by 
the wealthy, powerful and educated creates the meaning-
system within which the principle of private enterprise is 
constituted as the basis of 'our way of life'. 
The oppressive dominance of the market economy is reproduc-
ed and perpetuated in the financial press and by 'expert' 
mainstream economists. Its assumptions, moreover, trans-
cend political party lines, in many instances coming to 
shape government policies in ways which are seen by the 
political incumbents as only 'commonsense' or 'economic 
realism'. Characteristically, fundamental criticism of 
this exploitative ideology is generally derided by its 
intellectual defenders as being either 'misinformed', 
'utopian', 'socialist' or all three. 
Accordingly, the dominant ideology constrains us to think 
of our material and social welfare as being linked 
umbilically to the fortunes of private enterprise. This 
mode of economic organisation results in the production 
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of commodities and services that are produced, distributed 
and consumed within an overall framework of 'hegemony'. 
In association with this particular organisation of society, 
economic activity, in fact, the process whereby economic 
resources are utilised to satisfy social needs is seen to 
largely imply private initiatives - as witness the cries 
of 'unfair competition', 'socialism' etc. when governments 
seek to establish their own operations in the more profit-
able sectors of the economy. For all these reasons and 
more then, it is perhaps only to be expected that a high 
proportion of union leaders would support the view that the 
'economic prosperity of Australia depends upon a more 
vigorous expansion of private enterprise'. 
Certainly, not only is the 'divine right' of private property 
generally assumed and enshrined in the dominant value system 
but the underlying principles of private enterprise are in-
evitably presented as the predominant means of achieving 
national economic growth and prosperity. Consequently, 
the essence of the hegemonic argument is that under such 
circumstances, there is likely to be a high measure of 
acceptance among people of the ideas of private enterprise 
and the activities which sustain it. From this viewpoint, 
the replies of the union leaders in our sample indicate a 
leaning toward the hegemonic position, showing as they do 
almost two-thirds support for a fundamental component of 
the dominant ideas. 
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Conversely, few of the trade union leaders favoured the idea 
of extensive foreign investment in Australia. In fact a 
mere 9 percent of manual and 14 percent of non-manual union 
officials supported the view that 'large—scale foreign invest-
ment is in the best interests of Australia's economic develop-
ment'. Again to understand such responses they need to be 
seen against the backdrop of debate concerning the questions 
of foreign ownership and control in Australia. 
To begin with, foreign investment has traditionally played a 
substantial part in Australia's economic development. Since 
the Second World War the penetration of the Australian economy 
by American and, more recently, Japanese capital, has increas-
ed significantly. Such is the extent of foreign ownership 
and control in Australia that it is said to account for an 
estimated quarter of manufacturing industry, about a half of 
the financial and insurance sector and well over half of the 
mineral resources. 
In the main this pattern of extensive foreign ownership and 
control has been ascribed to the reputed difficulties 
economic enterprises in Australia are said to experience in 
attempting to raise investment capital locally. Whatever 
the reasons, the idea of foreign investment as 'necessary' 
and 'beneficial' has become an important theme in the domin-
ant ideology, finding expression after World War II in the 
Australian government's celebrated 'open door' policy on 
foreign investment. 
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However, despite such government policies, there have al-
ways been deep and fundamental divisions within the domin-
ant value-system over the question of large-scale foreign 
investment in Australia. Notably, while the principle of 
foreign investment is not necessarily dispute, the scale 
of it has provoked widespread criticism within the dominant 
ideology which is also suffused with a strong streak of 
economic nationalism. 
This theme of economic nationalism pervades the three major 
political parties in Australia to varying degrees as witness 
the unsuccessful attempts of the Country Party under Sir 
John McEwen, the Liberal Party under John Gorton and the 
A.L.P.'s minister in the Whitlam government, Rex Connor, 
to 'buy back the farm'. In fact, it is noteworthy that 
certain policy initiatives taken by one government have 
been continued by its opponents - perhaps with modifications, 
when they achieve office. The Foreign Investment Review 
Board which is a federal body which was set up to scrutinise 
proposals for foreign investment in Australia. Essentially, 
the guidelines on foreign investment seek to encourage for-
eign economic ventures in Australia to seek significant 
private economic participation in their operations by 
Australians. 
The concern therefore articulated in the dominant ideology 
about the risk of Australia becoming an economic satellite 
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of the U.S.A. or Japan_,with economic decisions about 
Australia being taken in these countries,thus fundamentally 
contests the idea that foreign investment is in Australia's 
'national interest'. These contradictions within the 
ruling culture are particularly evident in discussion of 
the question of ownership of Australia's natural resources. 
This is accentuated by the growing questioning of the tech-
nological utilisation of raw materials such as 'uranium'. 
As a consequence, although the union leaders surveyed over-
whelmingly agreed that the 'private ownership of Australia's 
natural resources should be nationalised', the ambiguities 
within the ruling ideas themselves makes it difficult to 
accept their responses as either supportive or not support-
ive of such ideas. 
A clear picture however emerges when we consider the general 
question of the public ownership of industry. As we can 
see both manual and non-manual union officials emphatically 
rejected the notion that 'replacing the private ownership 
of the means of production is of little relevance to the 
Australia that exists today'. Since a key theme in the 
dominant ideology is that private property is sacrosanct, 
such replies suggest strong rejection of the ruling ideas. 
Finally, we considered the question of the size of business 
companies. Interestingly enough, the only statistically-
significant difference to emerge in the attitudes of manual 
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and non-manual union officials was over whether 'private 
business companies should be allowed to grow as large as 
they can'. As shown in Table 9.11, nearly half the 
manual union leaders were prepared to agree with this, 
compared with a mere 14 percent of non-manual officials. 
It may be that this difference reflects fundamental differ-
ences in the way managerial authority is experienced by 
manual and non-manual workers. Traditionally, non-manual 
workers have enjoyed much greater control over their own 
work than have manual workers. Thus, it is plausible to 
assume that such control would be seriously eroded were 
the size of the enterprise to be significantly increased. 
As far as the implications of their replies for 'hegemony' 
are concerned, it is noteworthy that while in theory the 
dominant value system would support the principle of priv-
ate business being allowed to expand, a contradictory 
theme within the ruling ideas is sharply critical of 
'monopolies'. Accordingly, once again the replies of 
union leaders are not easy to interpret on this issue. 
In summary, the ambiguities within the ruling ideas on 
private property are to a large extent reflected in the 
attitudes of the union leaders. To begin with, given 
their view that Australia's economic prosperity depends 
upon a more vigorous expansion of private enterprise, it 
would seem that a large proportion of union leaders are 
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prepared to accept the legitimacy of capitalist property 
relations. Conversely, however, these officials are 
plainly-unconvinced by the argument that the national-
isation of industry is 'old hat'. Altogether, then, the 
replies of the union leaders, far from representing support 
for dominant ideas, seem to epitomise, what has been 
called 'pragmatic acceptance' of existing realities. 
Leadership attitudes to managerial authority 
The notion that there is a distinctive 'national interest', 
that the interests of those who control society are identical 
to those of 'the nation as a whole' is one which has its 
echoes at the level of industry. The assumption that the 
interests of employers and employees are basically the same 
has been described as a 'unitary ideology'. Character-
istically, such an ideology conceives of the relationship 
between employers and employees as being ideally harmonious. 
In this view of the employer-employee relationship, the two 
parties are seen to have common objectives in making indus-
try efficient and profitable because they are both said to 
benefit from this. 
In effect, the 'unitary ideology' tends to represent employ-
er and employee as being part of a team. But they are said 
to be on the same side - not different sides. To the 
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extent, that the view of industry as one of 'unitary' 
harmony gains widespread credence, it serves to provide 
legitimacy for a system of minority control of industry, 
and so performs essential hegemonic functions. Widely 
held among conservative politicians and media controllers, 
the view that industry is a haven of co-operation is 
also embraced by many industrial managers. 
Yet, as mentioned earlier, while this aspect of the domin-
ant belief system highlights the community of interest 
between employers and employees an equally potent element 
in the ruling ideas emphasises that the ownership of property 
confers automatic rights on the individual in deciding the 
uses to which it is put. In effect, then, while the pre-
vailing view of industry may be presented in harmonistic 
terms in which both employers and employees are exhorted 
to 'work together as a team', it explicitly rules out any 
assumption that the responsibility for the running of 
industry should be shared. On the contrary, the control 
of industry is firmly vested in the hands of management 
by virtue of the fact that they exercise the delegated 
'rights of property'. 
Accordingly, the very internal organisation of the work-
place as well as the disciplines they propagate serve as 
efficient, though generally hidden, mechanisms of ideo-
logical control. This control essentially has as its 
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object the profitable exploitation of the 'factors of 
production' as well as the equally-important hegemonic 
task of progressively incorporating people's behaviour 
and belief patterns into a value-system that continues 
to make the private appropriation of profits possible. 
Needless to say, the ways in which contemporary work is 
organised might accurately be said to reflect a pattern 
of 'hegemonic domination'. Certainly, the division-of-
labour in modern industry, exemplified by the minute sub-
division of work from which virtually all meaning has 
been drained, has come to be portrayed as a natural if 
not inevitable consequence of increasingly automated 
technologies. However, as numerous critics of the pre-
vailing 'mode of production' have pointed out, the 
specific forms of the division-of-labour and the intro-
duction of automated technologies have been intended 
to a large extent to give management greater control over 
the labour process. 
Not surprisingly, the past few years have seen the explosion 
of a variety of new managerial techniques and 'organisation' 
theories to counter the growing resistance of workers to 
the patterns of hierarchical domination. An inportant func-
tion of these 'ruling ideas' is to reconcile the workforce 
to organisational patterns whose primary purpose is control. 
By refusing to see the structure of industrial authority 
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itself as 'problematic', ideas like 'job enrichment', 
'worker participation' etc. conceal hegemonic functions 
since they operate to divert worker attention from alter-
native possibilities of what the organisation of industry 
could be like. It is in this context that we set out to 
examine trade union leadership attitudes to the general 
problem of the managerial control of industry by question-
ing the extent to which ideas of workers' control over 
working conditions and investment decisions are salient 
concerns for them. Their answers are shown in Table 9.12. 
TABLE 9.12 LEADERSHIP OPINIONS ON THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 
Percentage agreeing that; Manual Non-Manual 
Trade unions should devote their 
energies to getting better wages 
and working conditions for their 
members and leave the running of 
the workplace to management. 
9 4 
(N=3) (N.S.) (N=l) 
Private and nationalised industries 
should be legally-required to 
furnish their workers with full 
details of their operations 
subject to reasonable security 
safeguards. 
91 93 
(N=30) (N.S.) (Nr26) 
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TABLE 9.12 (CONTINUED) 
Percentage agreeing that; Manual Non-Manual 
Managerial proposals concerning 
any alterations in the staffing, 
speed or content of work should be 
implemented, while workers object-
ions to them are being put through 
the grievance procedures. 
12 7 
(Nr4) (N.5.) (N=2) 
Pending union agreement, no proposed 
management change which affects 
employees should be introduced. 
97 100 
(N=32) (N.S.) (N=28) 
N.S. = Not statistically 
signi ficant. 
A prominent theme in the ruling culture is that wages and 
working conditions basically constitute the only legitimate 
demands that trade unions should entertain and articulate. 
However, well over 90 percent of the union leaders in our 
sample rejected the notion that 'trade unions should devote 
their energies to getting better wages and working conditions 
for their members and leave the running of the workplace to 
management'. Such responses clearly indicate an emphatic 
rejection of the ruling ideas concerning the authority of 
management. 
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It is a fundamental tenet of the ruling ideas regarding 
how industry is run that the details of their financial 
operations are sacrosanct. This ideological position is 
generally defended by recourse to formulations about the 
need to preserve secrecy so as not to betray the conpetit-
ive position of the enterprise to market rivals. According-
ly, where workers have been appointed to the Board of 
Directors, as in West Germany, they tend to be bound to 
rules of secrecy concerning the financial operations of 
the enterprise to which they become privy. 
However, as can be seen from Table 9.12 the union leaders 
in the sample overwhelmingly endorse the view that 'private 
and nationalised industries should be legally-required to 
furnish their workers with full details of their operations 
subject to reasonable security safeguards'. Clearly, too, 
such answers reveal little support for dominant values. 
Another proposition which is deeply-embedded in the dominant 
values about the present economic and industrial arrange-
ments is that control of property confers virtually absol-
ute rights in determining how it is used. Prominent in 
the view of managerial prerogatives is the belief that 
management has a unilateral right to initiate change. Al-
though this right may be contested by workers, arbitral 
systems tend to require that workers return to work while 
their grievances are heard. 
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From Table 9.12, we can see that 88 percent of the manual 
and 93 percent of the non-manual employees totally rejected 
the notion that 'managerial proposals concerning any alter-
ations in the staffing, speed or content of work should be 
implemented while workers objections to them are being put 
through grievance procedures'. Likewise, virtually all 
the union leaders in the sample supported the idea that 
'pending union agreement, no proposed management change 
which affects employees should be introduced'. Although 
such replies suggest the absolute rejection of the ruling 
ideas, another theme in these ideas suggests that while a 
state of democracy in the workplace is manifestly undesir-
able, yet workers ought to be consulted beforehand about 
matters which directly affect them. In summary, the 
evidence indicates little difference between manual and 
non-manual union leaders in attitudes to the 'rights' of 
property. Certainly, it is evident from their responses 
that neither manual or non-manual union leaders unequivoc-
ally accept the dominant ideology on workplace control -
despite the claims of their radical critics that they do 
through not openly contesting this control. 
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10- C O N C L U S I O N S 
The main objectives of the overall study have been to examine the 
implications of the global economic recession, conceived within the 
wider framework of fundamental changes within the capitalist labour-
process, for the nature of trade unionism and industrial relations. 
A further aim was to explore the inpact of these changes on the class 
consciousness of organised labour, through empirical investigation of 
the attitudes of trade union leaders. 
In the foregoing chapters, we have attempted to derive a number of 
operational measures with which to test certain theoretical propositions 
concerning the nature of trade union consciousness. Such a procedure 
is, of course, hardly novel; indeed, it is basic to the scientific 
method. 
To begin with, the survey of union leaders sets out to test the argument 
that blue-collar and white-collar unionism are associated with qualitat-
ively-different forms of worker consciousness. It has become part of 
the academic sociological consensus to view white-collar unionism as a 
'different', perhaps even inferior form of trade unionism. This ideo-
logical perspective has quite an interesting pedigree. Back in the 
heyday of 'end-of-ideology' analyses within sociology, white-collar 
employment was widely-believed to confer 'middle class' status and to 
result in disinterest in the collectivist traditions of the trade union 
movement. The subsequent upsurge in white-collar trade unionism and 
industrial militancy largely undermined the tenability of this facile 
hypothesis. 
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Nevertheless, this assumption about the white-collar condition has 
been maintained, albeit in somewhat different form. Basically, the 
argument now is that although non-manual workers might unionise, the 
character of the organisations they form is quite distinct. One 
strand of this argument suggests that the impulses to form unions 
among white-collar workers or for white-collar unions to seek affil-
iation with predominantly manual inter-union organisations are 
predicated on largely instrumental considerations of self-interest. 
This is seen to contrast with the 'principled' solidarity which is 
presumed to typify manual trade unionism. 
However, as our findings reveal, there was no statistical difference 
in attitudes toward labour unity between the leaders of manual and 
non-manual A.C.T.U.-affiliated trade unions in our sample. As indic-
ated, if the assumption that white-collar trade unions perceive 
affiliation with the A.C.T.U. in instrumental terms is correct, we 
would expect the leadership of such unions to hold much weaker 
attitudes toward labour unity than do their manual counterparts. For, 
if the assumption of 'instrumentalism' is true, then the affiliation 
of such organisations with the A.C.T.U. is not impelled by sentiments 
of solidarity with manual workers. Our findings, however, as mention-
ed, call into question the credibility of this simple proposition. 
At the basis of this particular postulate of the 'differentness' of 
white-collar unionism lies a highly-idealised image of 'traditional' 
manual working class solidarity. What this vision of the manual 
union experience however refuses to admit is that a strong element of 
390. 
self-interest has traditionally characterised trade union action. Put 
simply, trade union formation among blue-collar, as among white-collar 
workers has usually been predicated on the need to secure or defend 
the industrial interests of its own members. Consequently, not only 
has sectionalism been a central feature of trade unionism, but wider 
ties of worker solidarity were never spontaneous. 
Nevertheless, the presumption that manual and non-manual unionism re-
flect forms of v;orker consciousness which are quite distinctive is 
perpetuated in the theoretical formulations of the 'new working class' 
proponents. Essentially, as certain variants of this view imply, 
non-manual unionism is predominantly impelled by strong resentment 
toward the growing 'degradation' of white-collar jobs resulting from 
their re-design and the increasing introduction of automated technology 
into the workplace. The undermining of the white-collar worker's 
traditional level of autonomy at work, the destruction of career pros-
pects and the subjection to closer forms of supervision, it is claimed, 
conspire to make the issue of control in the workplace a particularly 
salient consideration for white-collar trade unions. At the same time 
the tendency to perceive themselves as 'middle class', i.e. as an inter-
mediate group between management and manual workers is believed to 
inhibit their development of strong feelings of class identity with 
manual workers. Likewise, an effective sense of class opposition is 
said to be hindered since their major concern in unionising is not to 
abandon their cultural distinctiveness and separateness from manual 
workers but to highlight them. 
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Accordingly, the survey of union leaders set out to test the proposition 
that manual and non-manual unions differ in regard to class identity, 
class opposition and class alternative. However, what our findings 
indicate is that factors like political party affiliation and size of 
union as well as the age, income, length of time in office and political 
party affiliations of the union leaders were far more important sources 
of variations in attitudes to class identity, class opposition and class 
alternative than was the blue-collar white-collar difference per se. 
In fact, the major statistical differences between trade union leader-
ship attitudes to class identity arose within rather than between blue-
collar and white-collar union leaders - sharply separating attitudinally 
those who were members of the A.L.P. from those who were not. A similar 
situation was found in relation to attitudes to both class opposition 
and class alternative. It is hardly necessary to add that the strong-
est attitudes on the three composite measures of class consciousness 
were found among the trade union leaders who were members of one or 
other of the communist parties. 
Altogether, the failure of significant differences in attitudes to 
emerge between the leaders of manual and non-manual trade unions would 
appear to reflect the growing structural similarities in the blue-collar 
and white-collar work experience. 
The final problem which the survey attempts to address relates to the 
question of the extent to which the thinking of trade union leaders is 
penetrated by the 'ruling ideas' of society. It has become something 
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of an i n t e l l e c t u a l f a s h i o n among the p r o g r e s s i v e l y - a g e i n g r ank s o f the 
A u s t r a l i a n 'New L e f t ' to a l l e g e t ha t the dominant va lue s y s tem has been 
remarkab ly s u c c e s s f u l i n p e n e t r a t i n g the t h i n k i n g o f o r g a n i s e d l a b o u r 
t hu s e f f e c t i v e l y undermin ing any s e r i o u s p o s s i b i l i t y o f a r a d i c a l 
worker c h a l l e n g e to the p r e s e n t s o c i a l o r de r . 
A l t h o u g h s u ch c l a ims are p e r p e t u a l l y t r o t t e d out i n the ' t h e o r e t i c a l ' 
l i t e r a t u r e , l i t t l e attempt has been made to e m p i r i c a l l y i n v e s t i g a t e 
t h e i r v a l i d i t y . What t h i s s t udy endeavours to do i s to develop 
o p e r a t i o n a l c r i t e r i a fo r a s s e s s i n g the v a l i d i t y or o the rw i se o f c l a ims 
t ha t the p o l i t i c a l qu ie s cence o f o r g a n i s e d l abour i n A u s t r a l i a r e f l e c t s 
w idesp read acceptance o f the dominant i d e a s by t rade un ion l e a d e r s . 
Our s u r vey o f A u s t r a l i a n t rade un ion l e a d e r s h i p a t t i t u d e s 
y i e l d e d r e s u l t s i n the main t h a t , a c co rd i n g to our c r i t e r i a f o r 
e v a l u a t i o n , d i d not s u p p o r t the theory o f 'hegemony ' for any o f the 
th ree major a rea s i n v e s t i g a t e d v i z . the pu rpose s o f the t rade un i on s 
and t rade un ion a c t i v i t e s l i k e s t r i k e s , the i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework i n 
which i n d u s t r i a l and p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s i n A u s t r a l i a are s e t and^the 
p r o p e r t y r e l a t i o n s i n s o c i e t y coup led w i th the a u t h o r i t y r e l a t i o n s i n 
i n d u s t r y to which they g i v e r i s e . 
Yet , even i f i t were conceded t h a t , as t h e i r c r i t i c s s u g g e s t , t rade 
u n i o n l e a d e r s do, to a degree, accept e lements o f the dominant i d e a s , 
i t needs to be kept i n mind t ha t the ho l d o f i d e a s i s n e i t h e r t o t a l 
nor n e c e s s a r i l y permanent. Ra the r , t h i s i d e o l o g i c a l dominat ion 
depends a g r e a t dea l on o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s and i s open to cha l l enge 
by the advocates o f d i f f e r e n t i d e a s . 
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Most importantly, the fact that, as our findings show, trade union 
leadership thinking is characterised by elements of inconsistency, 
should caution against the making of too sweeping generalisations 
about their capacities for political combat. Indeed, the very 
contradictory nature of their consciousness amply underlines the 
possibilities of change - given a suitable set of circumstances. 
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A P P E N D I X 1 
L I S T O F U N I O N S * 
A. B . C . (AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING COMMISSION) STAFF ASSOCIATION 
2. ACTORS AND ANNOUNCERS EQUITY ASSOCIATION 
3. ADMINISTRATIVE AND CLERICAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 
4. AIRLINE HOSTESSES ASSOCIATION 
5. AMALGAMATED METAL WORKERS UNION 
6. AMALGAMATED POSTAL WORKERS UNION 
7. AMALGAMATED SOCIETY OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS 
8. A.M.P. (AUSTRALIAN MUTUAL PROVIDENT) SOCIETY STAFF ASSOCIATION 
9. ASSOCIATION OF ARCHITECTS, ENGINEERS, SURVEYORS AND DRAUGHTSMEN 
10. ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS 
11. ASSOCIATION OF RAILWAY PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS 
12. AUSTRALIAN ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS 
13. AUSTRALASIAN MEAT INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES UNION 
14. AUSTRALASIAN SOCIETY OF ENGINEERS 
15. AUSTRALASIAN TRANSPORT OFFICERS FEDERATION 
16. AUSTRALIAN BANK OFFICIALS ASSOCIATION 
17. AUSTRALIAN BOOT TRADE EMPLOYEES FEDERATION 
18. AUSTRALIAN BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION WORKERS FEDERATION 
19. AUSTRALIAN COAL AND SHALE EMPLOYEES FEDERATION 
20. AUSTRALIAN FEDERATED UNION OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEMEN 
Some of tJisse unions have since changed theiv names. 
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21. AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION OF AIR PILOTS 
22. AUSTRALIAN FOREMEN STEVEDORES ASSOCIATION 
23. AUSTRALIAN GLASS WORKERS UNION 
24. AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF MARINE AND POWER ENGINEERS 
25. AUSTRALIAN INSURANCE STAFFS FEDERATION 
26. AUSTRALIAN JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION 
27. AUSTRALIAN LICENSED AIRCRAFT ENGINEERS ASSOCIATION 
28. AUSTRAL I AJ^J RAILWAYS UNION 
29. AUSTRALIAN SHIPPING OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 
30. AUSTRALIAN TEXTILE WORKERS UNION 
31. AUSTRALIAN THEATRICAL AND AMUSEMENT Er^lPLOYEES ASSOCIATION 
32. AUSTRALIAN TU'IEER WORKERS UNION 
33. AUSTRALIAN TRAMWAYS AND MOTOR OMNIBUS Ef-PLOYEES ASSOCIATION 
34. AUSTRALIAN WORKERS UNION 
35. BAKING TRADE ENPLOYEES UNION OF NEW SOUTH WALES 
36. BREAD INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES AND SALESMENS ASSOCIATION OF 
NEW SOUTH WALES 
37. BUILDING WORKERS INDUSTRIAL UNION 
38. CLOTHING AND ALLIED TRADES UNION 
39. COLONIAL SUGAR REFINING CO. LTD. PROFESSIONAL AND CLERICAL 
OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 
40. COMMONWEALTH BANK OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 
41. COMMONWEALTH FOREMENS ASSOCIATION OF AUSTRALIA (COMMONWEALTH PLBLIC SERVICE) 
42. COMMONWEALTH PUBLIC SERVICE ASSOCIATION 
(FOURTH DIVISION OFFICERS) 
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43. COMMONWEALTH PUBLIC SERVICE ARTISANS ASSOCIATION 
44. COMMONWEALTH TELEPHONE AND PHONOGRAM OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 
45. ELECTRICITY SUPPLY PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 
46. ELECTRICAL TRADES UNION 
47. FEDERATED BRICK, TILE AND POTTERY INDUSTRIAL UNION 
48. FEDERATED CLERKS UNION 
49. FEDERATED CONFECTIONERS ASSOCIATION 
50. FEDERATED ENGINE DRIVERS AND FIREMEN'S ASSOCIATION 
51. FEDERATED FURNISHING TRADE SOCIETY 
52. FEDERATED GAS EMPLOYEES INDUSTRIAL UNION 
53. FEDERATED IRONWORKERS ASSOCIATION 
54. FEDERATED LIQUOR AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES EMPLOYEES UNION 
55. FEDERATED MARINE STEVJARDS AND PANTRYMENS ASSOCIATION 
56. FEDERATED MILLERS AND MILL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION 
57. FEDERATED MISCELLANEOUS WORKERS UNION 
58. FEDERATED MOULDERS (METALS) UNION 
59. FEDERATED MUNICIPAL AND SHIRE COUNCIL EMPLOYEES 
60. FEDERATED PASTRYCOOKS EMPLOYEES, BISCUIT MAKERS EMPLOYEES, 
AND FLOUR AND SUGAR GOODS WORKERS UNION 
61. FEDERATED RUBBER AND ALLIED WORKERS L^JION 
62. FEDERATED SHIP PAINTERS AND DOCKERS UNION 
63. FEDERATED STOREMEN AND PACKERS UNION 
64. FEDERATED TOBACCO AND CIGARETTE WOR<ERS UNION 
65. FEDERATION OF AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITY STAFF ASSOCIATIONS 
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66. FIRElvEN AND DECKHANDS UNION OF NEW SOUTH WALES 
67. FLIGHT STEWARDS ASSOCIATION 
68. FOOD PRESERVERS UNION 
69. GASS INDUSTRY SALARIED OFFICERS FEDERATION 
70. HEALTH AND RESEARCH EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION 
71. HOSPITAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF NEW SOUTH WALES 
72. LOCAL GOVERNMENT CLERKS ASSOCIATION OF NEW SOUTH WALES 
73. MARINE COOKS, BAKERS AND BUTCHERS ASSOCIATION 
74. MERCHANT SERVICE GUILD OF AUSTRALIA 
75. MUNICIPAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 
76. NATIONAL UNION OF RAILWAYMEN 
77. NEW SOUTH WALES COMMERCIAL TRAVELLERS GUILD 
78. NEW SOUTH WALES NURSES ASSOCIATION 
79. NEW SOUTH WALES PUBLIC SERVICE PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 
80. NEW SOUTH WALES TEACHERS FEDERATION 
81. OPERATIVE PAINTERS AND DECORATORS UNION 
82. OPERATIVE STONEMASONS SOCIETY OF NEW SOUTH WALES 
83. PLATE, SHEET AND ORNAMENTAL GLASS WORKERS UNION OF NEW SOUTH WALES 
84. PLUMBERS AND GASFITTERS EMPLOYEES UNION 
85. POSTAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNICIANS ASSOCIATION 
86. PRINTING AND KINDRED INDUSTRIES UNION 
87. PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATION (COMMONWEALTH PUBLIC SERVICE) 
88. PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF NEW SOUTH WALES 
398. 
89. PROFESSIONAL RADIO ENPLOYEES INSTITUTE 
90. PLOLIC SERVICE ASSOCIATION OF NEW SOUTH WALES 
91. RACECOURSE TOTALISATOR ENPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OF NEW SOUTH WALES 
92. RURAL BANK OF NBV SOUTH WALES OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 
93. SEA^ENS UNION OF AUSTRALIA 
94. SECRETARIES AMD MANAGERS ASSOCIATION 
95. TELECOMMUK'ICATIONS TECHNICAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 
96. TRANSPORT WORKERS 1^1 ON 
97. UNION OF POSTAL CLERKS AND TELEGRAPHISTS 
98. VEHICLE BUILDERS ENPLOYEES FEDERATION 
99. WATER AND SEWERAGE ENPLOYEES L^JION 
100. WATERSIDE WORKERS FEDERATION 
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A P P E N D I X 
Dear 
I am a Ph.D. student at the Australian National 
University and am doing a thesis on Australian union officials 
which is being jointly supervised by Dr. D.V,'. Rawson (Political 
Science) and Professor 3. Zubrzycki (Sociology; of the A.N.U. 
In connection with this research, I am writing to 
seek your co-operation and participation in a survey I hope to 
undertake shortly to study the social backgrounds, ktitudes, 
and goals of union secretaries. 
Your organisation is one of a number which have been 
selected for this survey which is designed to yield basic 
information on how union officials view the purpose, goals, and 
scope of trade unionism, as well as to examine their conceptions 
of economic and political institutions and the nature of 
industrial relations in Australia. 
The information that I require will be treated with 
absolute confidentiality and no individual's answers will be 
revealed in the thesis. Rather, such answers will be expressed 
in the form of statistical tables. 
Briefly, the study will require your completion of a 
questionnaire which will take about fifteen minutes to do. How-
ex er, I would like a few minutes of your time to explain the 
questionnaire, and to answer an\ queries >'0U may have about it, 
or about the study in general. 
I am hoping to be in Sydney between mid-July and early 
August and if you can participate in this study, please indicate, 
if possible, what date and time would be most convenient for you. 
Thanking \'ou in anticipation. 
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APPEND I X 
Dear 
A few weeks ago while in Sydney I left a questionnaire 
for you to complete. The questionnaire seeks your views on various 
issues and forms the basis of a thesis I am writing on the 
industrial, economic, social and political attitudes of union 
officials. 
As explained, the concern of the study is with the 
collective attitudes of union officials. Accordingly the opinions 
of a particular union official while important in their own right, 
are not the central focus of the study. Rather the purpose of the 
study is to statistically determine the extent to which unions and 
union officials sharing common social characteristics e.g. affiliation 
to ACTU/ACSPA etc. also share similar attitudes in relation to 
industrial and political matters etc. 
In view of statistical nature of the study it is important 
to obtain a fairly large response to the questionnaire. I would 
therefore very much appreciate your completion and return of the 
questionnaire to me as soon as possible. I am enclosing with this 
letter another copy of the questionnaire (in case the original has 
been mislaid) as well as a stamped addressed envelope for its return. 
I fully realise that you may have been too occupied to pay much 
attention to the questionnaire. 
However, if time permits and you are willing to fill out 
and return the questionnaire I would be most grateful. On the other 
hand if you are opposed to completing the questionnaire, or if you 
have already returned the original questionnaire, please disregard 
this reminder. 
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A P P E N D I X 
•PINION SURVEY OF AUSTRALIAN TRADE UNION OFFICIALS 
INSTRUCTIONS 
The statements contained in the first part of this 
questionnaire are related to various aspects of industrial, 
economic, and political and social issues in Australia. Please 
indicate your opinion in each statement by putting a circle 
around the response which you feel best expresses your view. 
The four responses are: 
SA - strongly agree 
A - agree but with some reservations 
D - disagree but with some reservations 
SD - strongly disagree 
Please indicate a response to every statement. There 
are no right or wrong answers. The purpose of this survey is 
not to test your knowledge but to give you an opportunity to 
express your opinion. 
There is no need to spend much time on any one question, 
Your responses should be made as quickly as possible The whole 
questionnaire should take only a few minutes to complete. 
Finally, to preserve confidentiality, please do not put 
your name on any of the sheets. 
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1. In place of the 300 or so unions which sa a d sd 
exist in Australia, a single large 
union in each industry would serve the 
workers much better. 
2. It would be in the best interests of sa a d sd 
the trade union movement if the ACTU 
were the sole central body represent-
ing the interests of all unions. 
3. Clerical and professional unions should sa a d sd 
affiliate with the ACTU and the Trades 
& Labor Council. 
4. Small unions will need to amalgamate or sa a d sd 
federate with larger unions in order to 
survive in a society dominated by large-
scale business and government concerns. 
5. Generally speaking, clerical and sa a d sd 
professional trade unionists have more 
in common with employers than they do 
with manual trade unionists. 
6. The presence of more clerical and sa a d sd 
professional unions in the ACTU and the 
TLC would reduce the militancy of these 
organisations. 
7. Trade unions should seek to reduce the sa a d sd 
gap between highly paid and poorly paid 
workers by seeking National V^ age increases 
which pay the same amount to all employees 
regardless of skill, or occupational and 
educational differences. 
8. If many women regard their employment as sa a d sd 
only a temporary state, it is a waste of 
union time and resources to try and 
organize them. 
9. If women want jobs then they should accept sa a d sd 
the same conditions as men and not expect 
the union to get special conditions for 
them. 
10. Unions should provide special sa a d sd 
opportunities for women to enable them 
to achieve full-time official positions. 
11. Workers who are not prepared to join a 
union should be barred from enjoying the 
benefits won by the union for its member-
ship. 
sa a d sd 
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12. Non English-speaking union members sa a d sd 
should have strike issues put to them 
in their own language by trade union 
officials. 
13. Unions with significant migrant worker sa a d sd 
memberships would be better served by 
having migrant union officials. 
14. Migrant unionists should be given the sa a d sd 
same treatment as other union members 
in the union and not expect it to make 
special provision for them. 
15. Wage and salary earners in Australia sa a d sd 
receive a fair return from employers 
for their efforts. 
16. The share of the National Income between sa a d sd 
profits on the one hand, and wages and 
salaries on the other has become more 
fair. 
17. Most employers would be a lot happier sa a d sd 
if trade unions did not exist. 
18. Arbitration is preferable to collective sa a d sd 
bargaining with individual employers. 
19. Most private employers are more concerned sa a d sd 
with making profits than with their 
employees' well-being. 
20. In the main, the Arbitration System sa a d sd 
serves the interests of employers better 
than it serves the interests of trade 
unions. 
21. Industrial action generally ensures sa a d sd 
unions of more favourable decisions 
from the Arbitration of their grievances. 
22. There would be more friction between sa a d sd 
employers and unions if the Arbitration 
system did not exist. 
23. Generally speaking, workers can improve sa a d sd 
their conditions without going on strike. 
24. Strikes unnecessarily antagonise sa a d sd 
employers and delay the improvements 
workers are seeking. 
25. Unions which are not prepared to go on sa a d sd 
strike are unlikely to have their demands 
taken seriously be employers. 
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sa a d sd 
sa a d sd 
26. Strike decisions should be made by a 
secret ballot of union members. 
27. Trade unions in Australia should avoid 
affiliation with political parties. 
28. When a parliamentary election is about sa a d sd 
to be held unions which are affiliated 
with a political party are less free to 
take industrial action than unions which 
are not so affiliated. 
29. Trade unions which are affiliated with a sa a d sd 
particular political party are generally 
at a disadvantage compared with non-
affiliated unions when that party is out 
of office. 
30. It is not in the best interests of trade sa a d sd 
unionism for senior union officials to 
simultaneously hold senior positions in 
a political party. 
31. Industrial action on the part of trade sa a d sd 
unions should be confined to work place 
issues. 
32. The economic prosperity of Australia sa a d sd 
depends upon a more vigorous expansion 
of private enterprise. 
33. Large scale private foreign investment sa a d sd 
is in the best interests of Australia's 
economic development. 
34. It is of no concern to Australian trade sa a d sd 
union leaders if multi-national companies 
which have branches in Australia, or 
Australian-owned firms, treat their 
workers poorly in other countries. 
35. Private ownership of Australia's natural sa a d sd 
resources should be nationalised. 
36. Private business companies should be sa a d sd 
allowed to grow as large as they can. 
37. Wage and salary restraint is necessary sa a d sd 
if Australia's current economic 
difficulties are to be overcome. 
38. The activities of multi-national sa a d sd 
corporations call for co-ordinated 
international trade union action. 
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sa a d sd 39. Union organisations should spend more time on issues of real importance to 
workers such as a bigger say for them in 
the workplace, and less time on 
commercial activities like Bourke's 
store, holiday travel etc. 
40. Replacing the private ownership of the sa a d sd 
means of production by public ownership 
is of little relevance to the Australia 
that exists today. 
sa a d sd 41. Trade unions should devote their energies to getting better wages and 
working conditions for their members 
and leave the running of the workplace 
to management. 
42. Worker participation in the workplace sa a d sd 
should only be concerned with staff 
matters such as employee safety, 
health, and welfare. 
43. Worker representatives elected by workers sa a d sd 
and directly responsible to them should 
sit on the Board of Directors of all 
large-scale enterprises, whether private 
or public. 
44. Private and nationalised industries sa a d sd 
should be legally required to furnish 
their workers with full details of 
their operations, subject to reasonable 
security safeguards. 
45. Managerial proposals concerning any sa a d sd 
alterations in the staffing, speed, or 
content of work should be implemented 
while workers objections to them are 
being put through the grievance 
procedures. 
46. Pending union agreement, no proposed sa a d sd 
management change which affects 
employees should be introduced. 
And now, just a few pieces of information about your union in 
New South Wales, and about yourself. 
47. How many members are there in your union? 
48. What proportion (approximately) of your 
members are non-British migrants? 
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49. What proportion (approximately) of your 
members are female? 
50. How many full-time organisers does your 
union employ? 
51. How many of these are female? 
52. How many of your full-time union 
organisers are non-British migrants? 
53. Is your union affiliated with any of the 1 Yes 2 No 
following organisations? 
(Please circle the appropriate number) 
If yes, please circle, with which of the 
following organisations has your union 
affiliations? 
The Australian Council of Salaried and — 1 
Professional Associations (ACSPA) 
The Australian Council of Trade Unions — 2 
(ACTU) 
The Australian Public Service Federation — 3 
(APSF) 
The Council of Commonwealth Public — 4 
Service Organisations (CCPSO) 
The Council of Professional Association — 5 
(CPA) 
The New South Wales Trades and Labor — 6 
Council (NSW T & LC) 
The Australian Labor Party (ALP) — 7 
Other (Please specify) — 8 
54. Which of the following terms would best describe the type 
of union you lead. (Please circle the appropriate number) 
1. Blue-Collar 2. White-Collar 3. Professional 
55. How long have you held your present position in your union? 
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56. Is it full-time or part-time? 
1. Full-time 2. Part-time 
57. Were you elected or appointed to this position? 
1. Elected 2. Appointed 
58. As State Secretary of your union, into which of the 
following categories does your yearly income fall? 
(Please circle the appropriate number) 
Under $5,000 per year 1 
Over $5,000 but under $6,000 2 
Over $6,000 but under $7,000 3 
Over $7,000 but under $8,000 4 
Over $8,000 but under $9,000 5 
Over $9,000 but under $10,000 6 
Over $10,000 but under $11,000 7 
Over $11,000 but under $12,000 8 
Over $12,000 but under $13,000 9 
Over $13,000 but under $14,000 10 
Over $14,000 but under $15,000 11 
Over $15,000 per year 12 
59. Prior to taking up your position as State Secretary of 
your union have you ever held any other position, full-time 
or part-time, in this or any other union, either in 
Australia or overseas? 
1. Yes 2. No 
if yes, please give details of all positions held, (including 
unpaid positions like office representative or shop steward), 
whether the position was in Australia or overseas, and your 
age when you first took up these positions. 
NAME OF POSITION and Country where held AGE at first 
taking position 
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60. Are you a member of any political party? 
1. Yes 2. No 
61. (If yes) to what political party or parties do 
you belong? 
62. Do you have any preference for a particular political 
party? (Circle as appropriate) 
1. Yes 2. No 
63. (If yes) which political party is that? 
Now, just a few questions about your background, 
(Circle where appropriate) 
64. In what year were you born? 
65. Are you male or female? 
1. Male 2. Female 
66. In which country were you born? 
1. Australia 
3. Eire 
5. Eastern Europe 
2. Great Britain 
4. Western Europe 
6. Other 
67. (If born outside Australia) how old were you when you first 
came to Australia? 
Under 6 years old 
Between 7 - 1 2 
Between 13 - 18 
Between 19 - 25 
Over 25 years old 
- 1 
- 2 
- 3 
- 4 
- 5 
409, 
68. At what level did you complete your formal education? 
Attended Primary school _ l 
Attended Secondary school - 2 
Passed Intermediate _ 3 
Passed Leaving _ 4 
Matriculated _ 5 
Some university or other tertiary - 6 
i 
Completed Bachelor's degree/or diploma - 7 
Completed postgraduate degree - 8 
Other (please specify) - 9 
69. Were your parents born in Australia? 
Father 1. Yes 2. No 
Mother 1. Yes 2. No 
70. (If born outside Australia) how old were they (approximately) 
when they first came to Australia? 
Father Mother 
71. At what level did your parents complete their formal education? 
Father 
Mother 
72. Have either of your parents, or any member of your family 
ever been a trade union official? 
1. Yes 2. No 
if yes, please give details. 
Thank you very much for seeing this through to the end. Any comments 
you may wish to volunteer which can possibly assist this survey 
will be most welcome. Space for your comments is provided on the 
next page. 
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A P P E N D I X 5 
The calculation of significance For the Likert method 
Given two groups, an upper group and a lower group, the means 
for the two groups can be calculated using the formula: 
X z EfX 
n 
Let X^ represent the mean of the upper group and; 
X^ stand for the mean of the lower group. 
The statistical difference between the two means may now be 
calculated using the following formula for t: 
b) t-test for calculating the difference between two means 
X - X 1 2 
^ - / { + V^^/n (n-1) } 
2 2 
where V^ and V^ represent the sum of the square of the 
deviation from the mean in the two groups and; 
n = number in the group. 
In effect, t = Difference in means 
Standard error of the difference in means 
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A P P E N D I X 6 
t-scores of items in the scale of class identity 
J J ^ Scoring t-scores 
1. In place of the 300 or so unions which exist 
in Australia, a single large union in each 
industry would serve the workers much (+) 3.7 * 
better. 
2. It would be in the best interests of the 
trade union movement if the A.C.T.U. were 
the sole central body representing the 
interests of all unions. (+) 1.82 
3. Clerical and professional unions should 
affiliate with the A.C.T.U. and the Trades 
and Labor Council. (+) 2.52 * 
A. Small unions will need to amalgamate or 
federate with larger unions in order to 
survive in a society dominated by large-
scale business and government concerns. (+) 2.89 * 
5. Generally speaking, clerical and professional 
trade unionists have more in common with 
employers than they do with manual trade 
unionists. " 
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A P P E N D I X 6 
(Cont'd) 
ITEM Scoring t-scores 
6. The presence of more clerical and pro-
fessional unions in the A.C.T.U. and 
the T.L.C. would reduce the militancy 
of these organisations. (_) 2.42 * 
7. Trade unions should seek to reduce the 
gap between highly paid and poorly 
paid workers by seeking National Wage 
increases which pay the same amount to 
all employees regardless of skill, or 
occupational and educational differ-
ences. (+) .342 
8. If many women regard their employment as 
only a temporary state, it is a waste of 
union time and resources to try and 
organise them. (-) 1.83 
9. If women want jobs then they should accept 
the same conditions as men and not expect 
the union to get special conditions for 
them. 
10. Unions should provide special opportunities 
for women to enable them to achieve full-time 
official positions. 
(-) 3.53 * 
(+) 2.42 * 
4 1 3 . 
APPENDIX 6 
(Cont•d) 
ITEM Scoring t-scores 
11. Worke rs who are not prepared to join a 
union should be barred from enjoying the 
benefits won by the union for its member-
ship. (+) 1 . 0 3 
12. Non English-speaking union members should 
have strike issues put to them in their 
own language by trade union officials. (+) .65 
13. Unions with significant migrant worker 
memberships would be better served by 
having migrant union officials. (+) 1.93 
14. Migrant unionists should be given the same 
treatment as other union members in the 
union and not expect it to make special 
provision for them. (-) .77 
27. Trade unions in Australia should avoid 
affiliation with political parties. (-) 4.37 * 
A P P E N D I X 6 
( C o n t ' d ) 
4 1 4 . 
ITEM Scoring t-scores 
28. V/hen a parliamentary election is about to 
be held unions which are affiliated with 
a political party are less free to take 
industrial action than unions which are 
not so affiliated. 4.71 * 
29. Trade unions which are affiliated with a 
particular political party are generally 
at a disadvantage compared with non-
affiliated unions when that party is out 
of office. 4.61 * 
30. It is not in the best interests of trade 
unionism for senior union officials to 
simultaneously hold senior positions in 
a political party. 3.94 * 
34. It is of no concern to Australian trade 
union leaders if multi-national companies 
which have branches in Australia, or 
Australian-owned firms, treat their workers 
poorly in other countries. 3.47 * 
A P P E N D I X 6 
(Cont'd) 
415 . 
ITEM Scoring t-scores 
38. The activities of multi-national 
corporations call for co-ordinated 
international trade union action. 2.55 * 
(+) indicates that positive responses are scored highest. 
(-) indicates that negative responses are scored highest. 
* indicates the items included in the scale of class identity. 
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A P P E N D I X 7 
t-scores of items in the scale of class opposition 
item Scoring t-scores 
15. Wage and salary earners in Australia 
receive a fair return from employers 
for their efforts. (-) 6.12 
16. The share of the National Income bet-
ween profits on the one hand, and wages 
and salaries on the other has become 
more fair. (-) 3.125 
17. Most employers would be a lot happier 
if trade unions did not exist. (+) 3.22 
18. Arbitration is preferable to collect-
ive bargaining with individual employers. (-) 7.28 
19. Most private employers are more concerned 
with making profits than with their 
employees' well-being. (+) 6.3 
20. In the main, the Arbitration System serves 
the interests of employers better than it 
serves the interests of trade unions. (+) 5.96 
417 . 
APPENDIX 7 
(Cont'd) 
Scoring t-scores 
21. Industrial action generally ensures unions 
of more favourable decisions from the 
Arbitration of their grievances. (+) 2.81 
22. There would be more friction between 
employers and unions if the Arbitration 
system did not exist. (+) -2.5 * 
23. Generally speaking, workers can improve 
their conditions without going on strike. (-) 4.0 
24. Strikes unnecessarily antagonise employ-
ers and delay the improvements workers 
are seeking. (-) 4.61 
25. Unions which are not prepared to go on 
strike are unlikely to have their demands 
taken seriously by employers. (+) 1.76 * 
26. Strike decisions should be made by a 
secret ballot of union members. (+) -1.98 * 
A P P E N D I X 7 
( C o n t ' d ) 
4 1 8 . 
ITEM Scoring t-scores 
31. Industrial action on the part of trade 
unions should be confined to work 
place issues. 9.47 
37. VJage and salary restraint is necessary 
if Australia's current economic 
difficulties are to be overcome. 4.44 
-indiaates that -pos'itive responses are scored highest. 
(-) ind-icates thxit negative responses are scored highest. 
indicates the iterr.s exclvAed^ from the scale of class opposition. 
A P P E N D I X 8 
t-scores of items in the scale of class alternative 
419 . 
ITEM Scoring t-scores 
32. The economic prosperity of Australia 
depends upon a more vigorous expansion 
of private enterprise. 8.74 
33. Large scale private foreign investment 
is in the best interests of Australia's 
economic development. 4.04 
35. Private ownership of Australia's natural 
resources should be nationalised. ( + ) 5.88 
36. Private business companies should be 
allowed to grow as large as they can. 6.67 
39. Union organisations should spend more 
time on issues of real importance to 
workers such as a bigger say for them 
in the workplace, and less time on 
commercial activities like Bourke's 
store, holiday travel etc. .5 
4 2 0 . 
A P P E N D I X 8 
(Cont'd) 
U E H Scoring t-scores 
40. Replacing the private ownership of the 
means of production by public owner-
ship is of little relevance to the 
Australia that exists today. (-) 6.65 
41. Trade unions should devote their 
energies to getting better wages and 
working conditions for their members 
and leave the running of the workplace 
to management. (-) 8.0 
42. Worker participation in the workplace 
should only be concerned with staff 
matters such as employee safety, health, 
and welfare. (-) 1.78 * 
43. Worker representatives elected by 
workers and directly responsible to 
them should sit on the Board of 
Directors of all large-scale enterprises, 
whether private or public. (+) 1.31 * 
421 . 
A P P E N D I X 8 
( C o n t ' d ) 
ITEM Scoring t-scores 
44. Private and nationalised industries 
should be legally required to furnish 
their workers with full details of 
their operations, subject to reason-
able security safeguards. (+) 5.28 
45. Managerial proposals concerning any 
alterations in the staffing, speed, 
or content of work should be imple-
mented, while workers objections to 
them are being put through the 
grievance procedures. (—) 7,0 
46. Pending union agreement, no proposed 
management change which affects 
employees should be introduced. (+) 6.69 
(+) indicates fhat positivs responses are scored highest. 
C-) indicates thjit negative resvonses are scored highest. 
* indricates the items excluded from the scale of class alter}v:itive. 
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